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ABSTRACT 
The government maintains a rolling programme of financial and political support 
for companies exporting military equipment abroad at levels incomparable with 
any other industry except agriculture. The most identifiable figures show that the 
annual net cost to the taxpayer stands at between C228 million and a possible 
C990 million. Those querying this support are directed to consider how it enables 
British involvement in the international arms market from which wider benefits are 
said to accrue. These are benefits that have been increasingly challenged yet to 
date, no contemporary and comprehensive critique of New Labour's case has 
been produced. This thesis addresses this gap by critically examining New 
Labour's rationales. It finds that when the economic, strategic and political 
rationales put forward for maintaining these levels of support are subject to 
scrutiny, either the government has failed to prove its case or, more frequently, 
the case is simply unsustainable. This begs the question why does New Labour 
continue to support arms exports? One way of answering this is to look at the 
relationship between UK-based arms-producing companies and New Labour. 
This thesis finds that a picture starts to emerge both of an overly close arms 
industry - New Labour relationship and of an overly high political profile for the 
arms industry in the environment where the government operates. The thesis 
suggests that the government continues to support arms exports because New 
Labour and military industries are deeply interconnected. Their interests are so 
tied up with each other and the volume and pace of employees passing through 
the inclustry/policy- making revolving door so notable that to a significant extent, 
they are the same body. Simply by acting rationally, New Labour will be inclined 
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INTRODUCTION: THESIS OUTLINE AND OVERVIEW 
OF EXPORT SUPPORT 
RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to look at why the New Labour government is 
continuing to offer political and military support for arms exports. By support I 
refer to a rolling programme of both financial and political support provided to 
arms exporting companies at levels incomparable with any other industry except 
agriculture. The range offered includes export credit guarantee provision, 
favourable procurement choices and marketing support including the use of 
ministers, Ministry of Defence (MoD) personnel and the royal family to promote 
military sales abroad. Since 1995, four studies have begun to estimate the 
overall net costs to government of engaging in this kind of activity. Estimates vary 
mainly because of different approaches to research and development spending 
but they all show that exports benefit from considerable subsidies - between 
E228 million up to a possible E990 million per annum. ' 
Those querying the costs of this support to the taxpayer are directed to consider 
how it enables UK involvement in the international arms market from which wider 
economic, strategic and political benefits are said to accrue. Most typically 
reference is made to the maintenance of UK jobs, savings to the MoD 
procurement budget and benefits to the "defence industrial base". These are all 
arguments vital to the government in the face of public disquiet over the ethics of 
UK involvement in the international arms trade. Yet these, and others, are exactly 
the claims that have increasingly been contested, albeit largely in two separate 
literatures, one focusing on the government's economic justifications and the 
other focusing on the government's political and strategic justifications. 
' Ben Jackson, Gunrunners Gold. How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales (London: World 
Development Movement, 1995)ý Stephen Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms 
exports', Journal of Economic Studies, 26: 1 (1999), pp. 15-37ý Paul Ingram and Ian Davis, The 
Subsidy Trap: British Govemment Financial Support for Arms Exports and the Defence Industry 
(Oxford Research Group and Saferworld, July 2001), Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Arms 
Trade Subsidies Factsheet, May 2004 
<httpi//www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/economics/subsidies-factsheet-0504. php> Last 
accessed 13'ý'July 2004. 
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Exceptions to this pattern, those authors who have identified the broad 
consensus between these two bodies of literature include Neil Cooper who 
explored a range of the most widely held assumptions in 1995 and Mark 
Phythian who briefly looked at some of the rationales offered in 2000.2 To date, 
no contemporary and comprehensive critique of New Labour's case has been 
produced. This is despite the ongoing need to re-examine established rationales 
in response to changes both in the international market and in the rhetoric 
offered by government. It is despite the need to address the concerns of 
opponents trying to undermine a number of recent initiatives which would form 
the basis of a multilateral conventional arms control regime who claim that 
compliance would bring considerable costs. 
In response, the first part of this thesis presents the findings of an attempt to 
analyse every economic, strategic and political rationale that the New Labour 
government has offered in support of military exports since 1997. This systematic 
policy analysis brings together research already undertaken relevant to each 
claim along with my own findings drawn from primary and secondary sources 
including archival work, extensive correspondence with government departments 
and interviews. My argument is that when each government justification for 
maintaining this support for military exports is subjected to scrutiny, either the 
government has failed to prove its case or the case is simply unsustainable. 
Support for arms exports continues to look like a dead giveaway. 
This begs the question why does New Labour continue to support arms exports? 
Explanations based on the government's "addiction" to exporting arms or 
delusion over their benefits to the UK have been anecdotal, underdeveloped or 
have failed to really engage with what so far is not known. That is, they have 
failed to address the political power of arms-producing companies and how this 
3 
power relates to the interests of the New Labour government. This thesis puts 
2 Neil Cooper, British Arms Exports: A Vicious Circle of Disadvantage? ý (Plymouth International 
Papers, March 1995), pp. 15-36; Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 
ýManchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), pp. 29-40. 
See for example 'Addicted to Arms: A Will Self Investigation', Correspondent, BBC television, 
April 2002; Samuel Brittan, 'Why Arms Sales are Bad for Britain', The NewStatesman, 31s, January 
2000; Adair Turner, Just Capital: The Liberal Economy(London: Pan MacMillan, 2001), p 43, pp. 
360-361 ; Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p 10, pp. 321-324. One 
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forward the argument that the continuation of supportive arms export policy must 
be understood ýn kh'is context. As such, the second part at this thesis presents the 
findings of an attempt to map out, in-depth, how arms-producing companies are 
linked to the Labour Party, to Labour government departments and what their 
use of Labour linked think tanks, lobbying groups and Labour initiated 
privatisation schemes actually means. My argument is that those involved in the 
New Labour government have assumed that the case for maintaining arms 
export support is still sound because the government is in a self-serving, mutually 
reinforcing relationship with a politically powerful industry which provides a strong 
disincentive to challenge the existing ways of thinking. This support is nothing 
new. Labour's approach to arms exports is, despite the rhetoric, a case of policy 
continuity between the previous Conservative government and the current 
Labour administration. Regardless of the unique aspects of the connections 
between arms-producing companies and New Labour set out in detail in this 
report, they are part of a broader pattern that results from a structural connection 
between industry and government. Unless this relationship is addressed, it is 
unlikely that a really significant breakthrough in reducing arms export subsidies 
could be achieved. 
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into six sections. The first 
section presents an overview of the financial and political support offered to arms 
exporters and, where the information is available, the ways in which the 
government favours UK-based arms-producing companies relative to the civil 
sector. The second section shows the extent to which the existing literature has 
failed to address the inconsistencies in the UK government's rationales for 
maintaining this export support. The third section shows why it is more important 
to closely monitor the support offered to this industry above all others by setting 
out the unique characteristics of the government- industry relationship. The focus 
of section four is the deficiency in the existing literature to both fully respond to 
exception is a briefing paper by Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, The Political 
Influence of Arms Companies, CAAT, April 2003 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/other/political-influence-0403. pdt> Last accessed 
26'h June 2004. 
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why this support continues and to really tackle how the interests of the arms 
industry and the state under New Labour interplay. A fifth section reconsiders the 
idea of a military-industrial complex (MIC) in light of a radically changed political, 
strategic and industrial environment since the end of the Cold War. Although it is 
not the aim of this thesis to ask whether a form of MIC exists in the UK - this 
would require a entire thesis in its own right - this section does outline how the 
thesis will draw on an updated version of MIC type ideas as necessary to explain 
New Labour's support for arms exports. The sixth and final section of this chapter 
defines exactly what is meant by some of the key concepts used in the thesis 
before looking at the difficulties in using the available data on arms exports, 
including that published by the UK government. 
The rest of the thesis is divided into two major parts. The first part of the thesis, 
chapters one to three, critically examines every rationale that the New Labour 
government has put forward in defence of this disproportional support. It shows 
how these claims do not, in the vast majority of cases hold up to scrutiny and, in 
the remainder, are unproven. ' 
Chapter one, "Critique of the Economic Case", considers the financial rationales 
offered by the government. The chapter begins by critically examining what had 
been, up until recently, the government's most central economic rationale in 
favour of continued support - that exports sustain a significant number of jobs. 
The chapter assesses the government's case against the most recently 
published employment figures, against the impact of past job losses and against 
the potential for future job losses given the prospects for military industry in the 
UK. Chapter one moves on to consider whether exports are able to make the 
kind of savings to the procurement budget claimed via longer production runs 
given the nature of the contemporary international arms market and given the 
way that the production process works. The chapter finishes by considering what 
contribution exports actually make to the balance of trade, what contribution they 
4 For a shortened version of this section see Emma Mayhew, A Dead Giveaway: A Critical Analysis 
of New Labour's Rationales for Supporting Military Exports, paper presented to the BISA annual 
conference, 16-18 December 2002, London 
91h <http: //www. naspir. org/members/emma_mayhew/emma_mayhew. htm> Last accessed January 
2004. 
17 
are likely to make in the future and whether exports bring any other wider 
economic benefits. 
Chapter two, "Critique of the Strategic Case", largely focuses on unpacking and 
analysing the claim that arms exports have facilitated the continuance of a 
strategically important and internationally competitive UK military industry. The 
state of the UK "defence industrial base" and its relationship to arms exports is 
considered in some detail before the chapter suggests what factors other than 
equipment cost and efficiency are helping the UK to retain such a significant 
share of the world market. It draws on four case studies - India, Qatar, South 
Africa and the Czech Republic - to outline features of the UK's behaviour in the 
international arms industry. The chapter moves on to look at the relationship 
between exports and the supply of world-class equipment to UK forces before 
finishing with an appraisal of the claim that UK military exports contribute to the 
security of those defined by the government as their allies. Particular attention is 
paid to the political and economic conditions of those receiving arms exports 
under New Labour. 
Chapter three, "Critique of the Political Case", continues to focus on the nature of 
UK arms export customers. The chapter critically evaluates the claim that exports 
can mean increased influence over recipient states. Particular attention is paid to 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The chapter finishes by looking at a final rationale 
offered by the government - that arms exports can become a means to prevent 
conflict. It looks at the nature of UK export recipients, the response of 
government when their arms recipients are at greater risk of engaging in conflict 
and at the government's approach to end-use assurance failures. 
The second part of the thesis, chapters four to six, concentrates on the 
relationship between UK-based arms-producing companies and the New Labour 
government. It presents the findings of an attempt to map out, in-depth, how 
arms-producing companies are linked to the Labour Party, to Labour government 
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departments and the significance of their involvement with Labour linked think 
5 tanks, lobbying groups, and Labour initiated privatisation schemes. 
Chapter four outlines how arms-producing companies are linked to the Labour 
Party, primarily to consider whether there might exist a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the two. The chapter begins by looking at how many Labour 
MPs register interests with arms-producing companies, what those interests are 
and at whether those Members have the potential to be significant to arms export 
policy. This is compared to the situation in the Lords. The chapter outlines those 
Labour Peers who have a background as arms-producing company executives or 
who currently benefit from employment within the industry. The chapter then 
turns to the Labour Party itself, outlining both more overt and more covert funding 
of the party by arms-producing companies. The chapter concludes with a general 
discussion of the importance of corporate funding for the party in the last two 
decades, specifically, what the broader implications of this situation are in terms 
of policy. 
Chapter five looks at the ways in which current and former employees of arms- 
producing companies are working within the MoD and the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI), the two departments of most importance to the provision of 
export support and wider military policy. The chapter is primarily concerned with 
whether arms-producing companies enjoy influence disproportionate to both the 
non-corporate constituency or to other industries and whether these links are so 
extensive that it is more appropriate to consider industry as being highly 
integrated within government. It does this by setting out, in detail, the extent and 
importance of the revolving door between industry and the MoD before moving 
on to consider the more recent explosion of advisory groups affiliated to both the 
MoD and the DTI. 
For a shortened version of this section see Emma Mayhew, Brothers in Arms., The Close 
Relationship between New Labour and Arms-Producing Companies, paper presented to the BISA 
annual conference, 15-17 December 2003, Birmingham 
th <http: //www. naspir-org/members/emma-mayhew/emma_mayhew. htm> Last accessed 13 
December 2003. 
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Following on from the explosion of advisory bodies under New Labour, chapter 
six continues to look at the impact of new elements in government industry 
relations. It considers the use of Labour linked think tanks of Labour linked 
lobbying groups representing arms-producing companies, the impact of arms 
company involvement in the running of influential international lobbying groups, 
and New Labour's desire for corporations, instead of the state, to fund vital 
services. This is undertaken primarily to consider whether these new elements 
continue to raise two of the concerns already identified - that there exists a 
mutually beneficial relationship between industry and government and that 
industry enjoys disproportionate influence which feeds into the political power of 
the industry to maintain arms export support. It is the form and degree of this 
support to which this chapter will now turn. 
THE FINANCIAL SUPPORT ENJOYED BY UK-BASED ARMS-EXPORTING 
COMPANIES 
Arms exporters have benefited from a continuous programme of financial support 
even though it is unlikely that governments, and taxpayers, have had a sound 
idea what the net annual costs of supporting an average E4 billion worth of arms 
exports might actually amount to. Since 1995, four studies have begun to 
estimate this overall net cost to government. The first, conducted in 1995 by Ben 
Jackson of the World Development Movement (WDM) estimated an annual net 
cost to government of F-384 million p. a. ' Stephen Martin's 1999 article "The 
Subsidy Savings from Reducing UK Arms Exports" estimated the subsidy to 
stand at E228 million p. a. 7 Two years later Paul Ingram and Ian Davis published 
"The Subsidy Trap". This report, unlike previous studies, includes an estimate for 
research and development (R&D) costs which, if included in their bottom line 
8 figure, brings the estimated costs up to E990 million p. a. Most recently, in 2004, 
Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) published the latest in a series of 
factsheets that have set out to estimate levels of subsidy. The group has 
estimated that the costs of supporting arms exports now stands at E888 million 
6 Jackson, Gunrunners Gold , How the 
Public's Money Finances Arms Sales. 
7 Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports'. 
Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap. 
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p. a.? The information provided in these reports has been supplemented by 
information from a 2001 study by two independent and two MoD economists 
entitled "The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports" which 
includes an incomplete estimate of the financial support offered by government. 'O 
The levels of subsidy estimated by all five are shown in appendix one. None can 
accurately quantify the levels of subsidy on offer because in many cases 
commercial confidentiality restricts the information available in the public domain. 
Most warn that their figures are likely to represent considerable underestimates 
but four of the studies have still found that these substantial subsidies represent 
an overall net cost to government. 
The remainder of this section will use what information is available to briefly 
outline how these costs come about and how they compare to the civil sector 
where known, starting with the costs of taxpayer backed insurance. 
ECDG loans and guarantees 
The Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) subsidises the interest rate 
paid by buyers of UK exports and insures exporters against payment default. For 
the arms sector, the work of the ECGD effectively means that corporate risks are 
transferred to the taxpayer so that arms can be sold to states in all economic 
situations without the arms-producing company worrying about whether they will 
be paid or not. This provision was particularly useful for UK-based arms- 
producing companies after the first Gulf War. Reportedly E3.37 billion worth of 
credits were issued to Iraq in the 1980s" but the UK government had to pay 
12 
almost a billion pounds to cover contracts on which Saddarn had reneged . 
This kind of provision occurs by using what appears to be a disproportionally 
large share of the ECGD's budget. Since 2000, arms deliveries have typically 
9 CAAT, Arms Trade Subsidies Factsheet, May 2004. 
10 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports. 
" Gerald James, In the Public Interest (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) p. 67; David 
Leiph and Rob Evans, 'How El bn was lost when Thatcher propped up Saddam', The Guardian, 
28' February 2003. 
21 
made up 1.6% of all visible UK exports but have accounted for 43% of the 
department's guarantees. 13 In 2002, the government begun to dramatically 
increase the funds set aside for export credits although it is unclear what 
proportion will be used to support the military sector. 14 
The estimated cost of ECGD subsidy for exports is based on Insurance loses net 
of recoveries from buyers and suppliers credit (cover can be offered up to 75- 
80% of the value of the deal), the costs of Fixed Rate Export Finance i. e. interest 
rate subsidies and administrative costs. Varying methodologies account for 
varying cost estimations. 
The costs of promotional activity 
The government's promotional efforts on behalf of arms exporters are equally 
disproportionate when it comes to the Defence Export Services Organisation 
(DESO), the MoD department dedicated to promoting arms exports. '5 DESO use 
embassy defence attach6s and reportedly M16 as well as arms dealers to inform 
UK-based arms-producing companies of potential export opportunities and it 
does this with its disproportionately large budget. 16 In 1995, in comparison to 
their share of total UK exports DESO was receiving ten times the budget of the 
17 department promoting civil exports. Given the value of military export deliveries 
in 2001 and updated budget figures, DESO now receives eleven times more. 18 
12 Robin Cook, The Point of Departure (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003) p. 117; David Leigh and 
Rob Evans, 'How El bn was lost when Thatcher propped up Saddam', The Guardian, 28'h February 
2003. 
" Based on figures from the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA), UK Defence Statistics 
2003, table 1.12 <htip: //www. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/ukds/2003/chap1 frame. html> Last accessed 
26 1h June; The Office of National Statistics, Exports and Imports of Good and Services 1946-2003 
<http: //www. statistics. gov. uk> Last accessed 26th June 2004; Export Credits Guarantee 
Department, Annual Review and Resource Accounts 2002103, p8 
<http: //www. ecgd. gov. uk/ecgdannualreviewandresourceaccounts2003. pdf> Last accessed 1s' July 
2004. 
14 Lucy Ward, 'Funds increase fourfold for'dubious' export subsidies', The Guardian, 2 nd January 
2002. 
15 DESO, 'Who are we? '<http: //www. deso. mod. uk> Last accessed 1 9th September 2003. 16 James, In the Public Interest, p. 55. 
17 Jackson, Gunrunners Gold 
-- 
How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, p 12. 
18 The most recent figures (1999/00) show that the net operating cost of DESO was El 3.6m, 
Chalmers et al The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 56. UK Trade 
and Investment Annual Resources accounts show that f 72 million was spent on trade promotion 
and development, UK Trade and Investment's Resource Accounts 
th 
2002-2003 
<http: //www. uktradeinvest. gov. uk/corporate. html> last accessed 6 August 2004. 
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The DESO budget varies slightly year to year and it is these variations which 
account for the different estimates of net cost estimates shown in appendix one. 
DESO's work is made easier, at the taxpayer's expense, by the use of defence 
attach6s. From 1997-2000, an average of 72 embassies were hosting on 
average 116 defence attach6s, who, it was last estimated in 1989 spend 40% of 
their time on export promotion. " Most studies use this percentage but applied to 
estimations of attach6 costs from differing years. 
Arms exporters have also benefited from the military assistance provided by the 
MoD as a form of "after-sales service" to recipients as an extra incentive to buy 
British. This service often takes the form of subsidised training to buyer states. 
Examples include Indonesia, a country that received technical assistance and 
training at the time of the 1993 deal to supply 24 Hawk jets although UK training 
for Indonesian pilots has continued throughout the 1 990S. 20 The Joint Services 
Command and Staff College at HMS Dryad has also played host to Indonesian 
officers. 21 Part of the 9-1 billion BAE Systems Hawk deal agreed in 2003 
22 
reportedly involved a proposal to train Indian Air Force pilots in Wiltshire . 
More 
controversially the MoD trained Iraqi forces up to March 199023 just after it 
provided funding for Major General Yosfiah to attend a defence college in 1989, 
19 years after he commanded the unit that tortured and killed five journalists in 
East Timorese Bilib6.24 Different studies base their estimates on different 
government budgets. 
Further promotional activity available to DESO includes the use of Ministers to 
lobby potential overseas buyers, the use of UK forces to demonstrate UK 
equipment for sale and the use of government funds to sponsor arms companies 
'9 House of Commons, Hansard, 27 th July 2000, Written Answers, column 746; National Audit 
Office, Ministry of Defence: Support for Defence Exports, 1 oth April 1989, HC 303 as quoted by 
Ingram and Davies, The Subsidy Trap, p 26. 
20 Jackson, Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, p. 11; House of 
Commons, Hansard, 9th July 1998, Written Answers, column 596 as quoted by Nicholas Gilby 
Arms exports to Indonesia, (London: CAAT, 1999) 
<htT: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/indonesia-1099. php> Last accessed 
22 n September 2003. 
21 House of Commons, Hansard, 22 nd February 1999, Written Answers, column 35. 
22 No author, 'India Offered Training in the UK', Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 th March 2002. 
23 James, In the Public Interest, p. 66. 
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to visit or exhibit at overseas arms exhibitions. An example of the latter is the 
support provided to arms-producer PW Defence, owned by the Chemring Group. 
In 2000 the company was given at least F-3,1 00 to attend an exhibition in South 
Africa. In 2001 PW received at least F4,600 to attend exhibitions in the UAE and 
France. In 2002 PW received F-3,500 to attend an arms exhibition in Malaysia. '5 
This is the company that was famously accused in a BBC documentary of 
making and exporting anti-personnel landmines up until 2002, using its South 
African sister company to avoid UK licensing rules although PW denied the 
clai MS. 26 Other examples include DTI sponsorship of Astra and 12 other arms- 
producing companies to visit an Iraqi arms fair in Baghdad in April/May 1989.21 
Other visits paid for by the taxpayer include those made by a succession of UK 
Ministers, including the Prime Minister, to India between 2000 and 2003. Their 
visits where in part used to lobby on behalf of a proposed El billion BAE Systems 
28 Hawk deal. Blair also reportedly lobbied South African President Mbeki in 1997 
in support of a BAE Systems bid to supply South Africa with Hawks, reportedly 
the South Korean President in December 2001 on the sale of Eurofighters and 
the Czech Prime Minister during a 2002 EU summit to buy the Grippen fighter. In 
2004, the government published details of 29 "promotional activities" carried out 
by Ministers from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the MoD 
during 2002 and 2003 held to promote specific exports. This figure exclude 
regular Ministerial meetings in which military exports are promoted as part of a 
general discussion on UK exports and those where details have been withheld 
due to commercial confidentiality. '9 
It less clear with what frequency and at what costs UK forces are involved in 
demonstrating equipment to potential purchasers. When asked about the latter 
the MoD stated that "the information could be provided only at disproportionate 
24 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 169. 
2' House of Commons, Hansard, 13 1h June 2002, Written Answers, column 1387. 
26 Oxfam GB Press Release, 'Arms laws fail again in PW Defence controversy', May 2002 
<http: //www. oxfam. org. uk/press/releases/armslawl 00502. htm> Last accessed 25"' September 
2003. 
27 James, In the public interest, p. xviii. 
2" Lambert, Rattenbury and Prichard, The Political Influence of Arms Companies. 
29 House of Commons, Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report, Strategic Export Controls - 
Annual report for 2002, Licensing, Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 1 8th May 2004, HC 390 
<http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm/cmdfence. htm> Last accessed 24 
th June 2004. 
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CoSt.,, 30 All the estimates shown above also exclude all the costs of promotional 
activity for arms sales carried out by diplomats or the support of the civil service 
due to insufficient data and as such are only based on the average costs of 
exhibition sponsorship since 1986.31 
Distortion of public funding 
In addition to subsidised loans and promotional activity, arms-exporting 
companies also benefit from the diversion of public money. The UK government's 
tendency to buy more arms from UK-based companies, in part encouraged by 
the possibility of future exports, even in cases when the military would prefer 
buying from non UK-based producers, distorts the MoD procurement budget. A 
proportion of the additional costs to the MoD procurement budget from the higher 
prices and/or reduced capability incurred because of the narrower choice of 
supplier is seen as a direct export subsidy. Jackson and Martin both estimate this 
cost although their use of different methodologies results in a variation in their 
calculations. In addition to this is the speculative loss of non-military employment 
opportunities arising from resources being diverted into the military sector. No 
study is able to offer an estimate for this kind of cost but one, written in part by 
two MoD economists, concluded that halving military exports over a two-year 
period would lead to the loss of almost 49,000 jobs but 67,400 jobs would be 
created in non-military sectors over the following five years. " 
More speculative distortions arise from the potential use of aid to sweeten arms 
deals, a practice allegedly used throughout the 1980s and 1990s but seen in a 
modified form more recently. In 2002 it was revealed that the "Global Conflict 
Convention Pool", a fund normally used to encourage the development of civil 
society in post-conflict regions, was used to pay for two Russian made Mi-1 7 
helicopters and other equipment to be exported to Nepal. Nepal's "aid" under this 
fund will now increase 1000% to E6.7m. 33 Although it is difficult to show the use 
30 House of Commons, Hansard, 17 th July 2001, Written Answers, column 144. 31 Jackson, Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, P. 15. 
32 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, p v, paragraphs 24- 
33 & 39. 
33 David Hencke, 'Blair sneaked aid to Nepal military', The Guardian, 5 th August 2002. 
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of aid in this way as standard practice. the Nepalese example is consistent with 
the use of aid provision and arms export negotiations in the 1980s and 1 990s to 
which Robin Cook responded in 1994 
It is very difficult to ignore the pattern that is beginning to emerge. 
In a number of countries, big rises in aid to them have been 
34 followed by big arms orders by them , 
The principal cases involved Indonesia, Jordan, Oman, Thailand and most 
famously the E234 million grant for the Pergau hydro-electric dam. ý"' The main 
beneficiary of the money was the Malaysian government who owned Tenaga 
National Berhad company. The company was quickly put up for sale after its 
injection of UK cash netting the Malaysian government and its shareholders F-700 
million. 36 It is the average ongoing annual cost of this project to the ECGD that is 
used by the WDM and Martin as a broad guide to estimate the costs of the 
continuing use of overseas aid as subsidy. " 
Other subsidies 
In addition to the use of taxpayer funded and secured loans, government funded 
promotional activity and distorted public spending, a whole array of other 
activities carried out by arms-exporters represent a cost to the treasury. 
In another feature largely unique to the arms industry, money from public funds is 
spent researching and developing (R & D) new military equipment. For most 
sectors, the R&D costs of a product are met by the supplier and factored into 
the price that the buyer eventually pays but the situation is different in the military 
sector. In this industry, R&D work is contracted out to arms companies to 
undertake on the government's behalf even though it is the arms companies that 
ultimately benefit from the sale of new prod UCtS. 3" As an example, in the EU, 
34 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 170. 
35 See for example Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, pp. 177-178, Jackson, 
Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arins Sales, p. 9. 
36 James, In th e Public Interes t, p. 116. 
37 Jackson, Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arins Sales, p. 15; Martin, 'The 
subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports , p. 32-33. 38 Pippa Gallop, 'The invisible handout of the market', Corporate Watch Newsletter, Issue 11, 
December-January 2002-2003 
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industry contributes an average of 55% of aerospace R&D costs. But in 2001, 
the government announced even more help for exporters - an R&D tax credit for 
large businesses at a rate of 25% which reportedly "delighted industry, including 
39 UK aerospace". While most studies acknowledge that R&D represents a 
substantial subsidy, calculating the costs of R&D spent on exports but which 
government has not subsequently recouped is difficult and as such, almost all 
studies leave this figure out of their final calculations. 
Adding to the costs of R&D funding have been tax losses resulting from 
exporters claiming tax exemption on bribes which, until the February 2002 Anti- 
Terrorism Act, were legal if the bribery was conducted entirely outside the UK. 40 
Until then the best example of bribery in practice had been the UK-Saudi Al 
Yamamah deals. The deals, signed in 1985 and 1988, were estimated to be worth 
up to E40 billion. They involved the export of Hawks, Tornado, ammunition and 
spares paid for by a daily transfer of 400,000 barrels of Saudi oil. 41 Mark 
Thatcher allegedly secured as much as El 2 million from the deals while the 
company he owned was rewarded with around E240 million. 42 Other examples 
include the 1999 South African arms deal. Patricia Hewitt admitted in June 2003 
that "commissions" were paid by BAE Systems to secure the E1.5 billion 
contract, 43 commissions that could reportedly have reached El 60 million. 44 In the 
same month the US government reportedly accused BAE Systems and the UK 
government of "corrupt practice" in a Czech arms deal. Czech police reportedly 
45 confirmed that bribery attempts were made in support of the BAE Systems bid. 
Most recently, in May 2004, The Guardian reported that MoD police had seized 
<http: //www. corporatewatch. org. uk/newsletter/issuel 1/isuel 1_part5. htm> Last accessed 18 1h 
September 2003. 
" SBAC, 'R &D Tax Credits: Government Delivers a Welcome Boost to High -Tech Sectors', Aerospace in Parliament, Issue 5, Spring 2002, pp. 3-4 
<http: //www. sbac. co. uk/files/newsdocs/220/AerospaceinParliamentSpring02. pdf> Last accessed 
22 n July 2004. 
40 Catherine Courtney, Corruption in the Official Arms Trade (London: Transparency International 
UK, April 2002) p3 <http: //www. transparency. org/working_papers/arms trade/courtney_Juk/ti- 
uk - 
coat-prp. pdf> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
41 Tim Webb, The Armour-Plated Ostrich: The Hidden Costs of Britain's Addiction to the Arms 
Bazaar (Kent: Comerford and Miller, 1998) p. 99. 
42 The Sunday Times, 9'h October 1994; James, In the Public Interest, pp, 104-106. 4' House of Commons, Hansard, 91h June 2003, Written Answers, column 625. 44 Rob Evans and David Leigh, 'BAE 'paid millions' to win Hawk jets contract', The Guardian, 30" 
June 2003. 
45 Rob Evans and Ian Traynor, 'US accuses British over arms deal bribery bid', The Guardian, 12'h 
June 2003. 
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386 boxes during their investigation of the allegation that payments totaling more 
than E60 million had been made to the Saudis including F-17 million to the Saudi 
politician in charge of UK arms purchases. Allegedly these activities continued 
past 14"' February 2002, the date at which it became illegal for UK citizens to 
bribe foreign public officials . 
46BAE Systems deny any wrongdoing in all these 
cases but where bribes have been paid, they would have helped the arms 
industry to account for an estimated 50% of all corrupt international transactions 
every year. " Ingram and Davis assume that bribes made up 5% of the total 
value of arms export contracts. They estimate that 30% tax on that value has 
been lost to the taxpayer because companies were claiming this tax exemption 
48 on bribes. In the UK, the levels of secrecy endemic in the arms industry and the 
competition to secure infrequent but high value contracts create a unique 
49 
environment in which bribery can thrive . 
Another thriving feature is "offsets". Generally prohibited in civil industry, offsets 
in arms deals commit the seller government or manufacturer to invest in the 
buyer state via counter-trade, bartering or the transfer of production, including 
technology and jobs. For example when BAE Systems sold 66 Hawks to India in 
a deal agreed in the summer of 2003, it allowed 42 to be built by the state-owned 
aerospace company Hindustan Aeronautics. Offsets can reduce the contribution 
of arms sales to the balance of trade and can help to establish indigenous 
military industries in buyer states that may develop into commercial rivals to UK- 
based companies in the future. These costs are so uncertain that no study is able 
to offer a specific figure. 
The situation is similar for the costs of UK military intervention. Some studies cite 
the costs of peacekeeping activity following the outbreak of local or regional 
46 David Leigh and Rob Evans, 'Arms Firm's E60m Slush Fund', The Guardlan, 4"' May 2004. 
47 Gerald James, In the Public Interest, (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) pp. 104-106" 
Rob Evans and David Leigh, 'BAE 'paid millions' to win Hawk jets contract', The Guardian, 30"' 
June 2003; Rob Evans and Ian Traynor, 'US accuses British over arms deal bribery bid', The 
Guardian, 12 th June 2003; US Department of Commerce, Trade Promotion Co-ordinating 
Committee'The National Export Strategy', March 2000, as quoted by Catherine Courtney, 
Corruption in the Official Arms Trade, p 3. 
48 Ingram and Davies, The Subsidy Trap, p. 27-29. 
49 Catherine Courtney, Corruption in the Official Arms Trade, pp. 4 5ý 
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conflict due, in part, to readily available, subsidised UK weapons but none will 
offer an exact figure. 
In contrast, specific estimates for a variety of other costs outlined by the reports 
have been provided as shown in appendix one. These include an ECGD interest 
rate subsidy mainly related to Jordanian arms sales, 50 the potential exchequer 
savings should the MoD procure from a single European procurement agency, 51 
the use of the civil trade promotion budget and the recent establishment of the 
Missile Defence Centre to help exporters win contracts from the US. 52 For 
Chalmers et al., three million of the 12 million estimate of additional costs 
represents that part of the Defence Assistance Fund used to promote exports 
based on the average spent from 1997/98-1 999/00.53 0-12m of this figure 
represents other unspecified costs incurred by the MoD, FCO and the DTI. 54 
Savings from exporting 
Most studies offset these costs against a series of savings including those 
derived from the Commercial Exploitation Levy. This levy is charged against all 
commercial exports that have benefited from government R&D subsidy in an 
attempt to recoup some of the government's costs. Estimates vary between E38 
and F-50 million p. a. mainly because they are based on government estimates for 
different years. But even if this levy does provide as much as E50 million p. a., 
this still represents a contribution of only about 2.3% of total government R&D 
costs which stood at an average net cost of E2,199 from 1995/1996 to 
1999/2000.5' There are further claims that savings are made to the MoD 
procurement budget from the contribution of exports to company overhead rates. 
These may also offset the costs of export support. Martin bases his figure on 
those published in the 1995 Statement on the Defence Estimates. " Whether 
5' Jackson, Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, p 15. " Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, p 8. 
52 CAAT, Arms Trade Subsidies Factsheet 
53 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, pp. 22-23. 54 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, p. 27. 55 Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports', p. 18; DASA, UK Defence Statistics 
2003, table 1.7 <http: //wvvw. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2003/chapI frame. html> Last 
accessed 25 th September 2003. 
'6 Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports', p. 22. 
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OF BRISIUL 
these saving are made is unclear, an issue explored further in chapter one. 
Finally savings made via sales of surplus MoD equipment by the MoUs Disposal 
Services Agency may also offset the costs of export support. The report by 
Chalmers et. al. is the only study to offer an estimate, one based on an average 
of DESO's published figures from 1998 to 2000. " * Overall, only the report by 
Chalmers et al. finds that the savings made to government outweigh the costs of 
providing government support although this calculation, like two other studies, 
excludes substantial R&D costs. 
To date, the government's response to the charge that it spends a 
disproportionate amount of time and money on financial and political support for 
arms exporters has been disappointing. Instead of publishing its own 
comprehensive estimates, 58 clarifying areas of uncertainty or engaging in 
meaningful debate over these levels of support, the government's response has 
been largely to ignore or misrepresent the research that has been carried out and 
continue to avoid publishing its own estimates. " Much less of a problem for the 
government is admitting that it offers arms-producing companies political support 
to sell arms abroad, a phenomenon to which this chapter will now turn. 
THE POLITICAL SUPPORT ENJOYED BY UK-BASED ARMS-EXPORTING 
COMPANIES 
There have been tensions between the MoD and arms-producing companies 
over procurement, specifically over the transfer of financial risk to industry, over 
the ASTUTE nuclear powered submarine, Nimrod plane and the F-2.9 billion 
aircraft carrier project. 'O But these tensions with the MoD are more than over- 
shadowed by the political support offered by the government as a whole. In his 
2003 autobiography Robin Cook observes "I never once knew number 10 come 
57 Chalmers et al. , 
The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, p. 24. 
58 The report by Chalmers et al. published in December 2001, was a response to the Defence 
Select Committee's request for the MoD to publish information on the levels of subsidy offered by 
the UK government. House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Second Report. The 
Appointment of the New Head of Defence Export Services. 31 " March 1999, HC 147. The report 
was published as a University of York research report. 
'9 Compare Lord Bach's description of the report, House of Lords, Hansard, 8 Jan 2002, column 
515 and House of Lords, Hansard, 7 Feb 2002, Written Answers, coluryin 109 with Chalmers et al. 
The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports. 
60 BAE Systems, Annual Report 2002, p. 8. 
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up with any decision that would be incommoding to British Aerospace", I came 
to learn that the Chairman of British Aerospace appeared to have the key to the 
garden door to Number 10,,. 61 When Cook's analysis was quoted at the 2004 
AGM, then BAE Systems (formerly British Aerospace) Chair Dick Evans did not 
hesitate to confirm that "we have access into number 10 on key issues ... one 
thing about this government is their accessibility". 62 But accommodating policy 
choices and instant access to number 10 are just two examples of the kinds of 
political support on offer. This section argues that despite the revised rhetoric, 
the 1997 change of governing party actually brought few changes to the 
government's approach to arms exporters. From the very start arms exporters 
have been reassured that on the whole it will be business as usual in terms of the 
levels of political support that they can expect and that is why Labour's apparent 
commitment to a tougher arms control agenda has, despite appearances, been 
weak. 
Under the Conservative government, the political support offered to arms 
companies had largely been concealed. The NAO report into the Al Yamamah 
deal was branded classified. The Foreign Affairs Committee report into the 
Pergau Dam deal failed to interview vital witnesses. The DTI report into Astra's 
dealings with Iraq ruled out considering the government's role in the affair. 63 The 
Scott Inquiry found "overwhelming evidence" that the UK had adopted a more 
flexible approach to selling arms to Iraq during the 1980s. It found that 
Waldergrave and Lord Howe had lied to their constituents on the issue, that 
Thatcher gave a misleading reply to Parliament and that the MoD had authorised 
military exports to Jordan to be passed on to Iraq. " Even so, the inquiry had 
such a narrow remit that Tim Laxton, an auditor assisting to the Scott Inquiry, 
believed that it avoided "hundreds" being threatened with criminal investigation 
including "the top echelon of the British government. "" 
" Robin Cook, The Point of Departure, p. 73. 
62 Dick Evans, BAE AGM, Queen Elizabeth 11 Conference Centre, London, 5th May 2004. 
63 James, In the Public Interest, p. 53. 
64 Tim Webb, The Armour Plated Ostrich, pp. 124-125. 65 John Pilger, 'Foreword' in Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World (London: 
Vintage, 2003), p. x. 
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When that top echelon appeared to be about to change, Blair was quick to 
position New Labour in the space that the Conservative government had 
occupied. He, and his front bench team, went out of its way to reassure UK- 
based arms-exporting companies not only that Labour now understood the 
importance of military spending but that the levels of financial and political 
support which the industry had come to enjoy under the Conservative 
government would continue. In February 1997 Blair told BAE Systerns' internal 
newsletter that his government would be 
committed to creating the conditions in which the defence 
industries can thrive and prosper. Winning export orders is vital to 
the long-term success of Britain's defence industry. A Labour 
government will work with the industry to win export orders. " 
At the same time Labour's 1997 election manifesto was published. It reaffirmed 
11 we support a strong UK defence industry. which is a strategic part of our 
industrial base as well as our defence effort. " This statement was echoed by 
Robin Cook when he introduced new export criteria in July 1997. Cook reassured 
industry that "the Government are committed to the maintenance of a strong 
defence industry which is a strategic part of our industrial base as well as our 
defence effort. "6' To underline the point, this speech was immediately followed by 
the announcement of a major arms deal with Indonesia. " Almost a year later, the 
Defence Secretary George Robertson published the Strategic Defence Review 
and reiterated "The defence industry is in very safe hands" before he again 
underlined the "importance of the British defence industry, which I spend much of 
my time helping when visiting foreign lands. , 6" At all the important moments in 
1997,1998 and 1999 the Labour government was stressing the continuation of 
political support for the industry. 
Labour claim that they have a made a number of radical changes to export policy 
since 1997, changes which at first appear to represent difficult counterexamples 
66 Quoted in Curtis, Web of Deceit, p. 182 and by Catherine Brown, Nick Gilby arid Sinion Kearns. 
'Arms to Africa', CAAT News, December 2001 -January 2002 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/magazine, 'l 201 /atrica. php> Last accessed 24"' September 
2003. 
67 House of Commons, Hansard, 281h J Uly 1997, Written Answers, column 26. 
68 John Lovering, 'Labour and the Defence Industry: Allies in 'Globalisation", Capital arid Class, 65 
(1998) pp. 9-20. 
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where vested arms industry interests have lost out. The industry has seen a ban 
on the export of equipment designed to torture, the introduction of new export 
licensing criteria, agreement on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Sales and the 
ratification of the Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel landmines. But in reality, 
initiatives that may have, at first, been taken as evidence of the introduction of an 
"ethical" dimension to arms export policy have actually turned out to be evidence 
of something quite different. The Labour government appears to have 
consistently adopted a carefully planned approach aimed at minimising any real 
change for the industry. The real effect of each initiative is outlined below 
beginning with the ban on the export of equipment designed to torture. 
Within months of their election the government extended the ban on the export of 
equipment designed to torture to include electric-shock batons, stun guns and 
"similar instruments of inhuman or degrading treatment" . 
70 This came after a 
series of scandals under the Conservative administration. These included a 
Channel Four Documentary showing Royal Ordnance (now part of BAE 
Systems) sales manager offering electro-shock batons for sale and claiming that 
the company has sold 8,000 to Saudi Arabia. Unauthorised possession, 
manufacture or sale of such batons was already an offence under Section 5 (1 b) 
of the Firearms Act 1968 so according to John Pilger, New Labour's extended 
., 71 restrictions "merely enshrined in law a de facto ban that was already in force . 
For the industry there was little as stake financially anyway. The export of torture 
equipment was very limited and as such, according to the then Head of DESO, 
Tony Edwards, "has been given up pretty willing lyi,. 72 In contrast, New Labour 
were far from willing to prosecute BAE Systems in response to the Channel Four 
73 Documentary on public interest grounds despite the compelling evidence . 
Labour's initiative on the export of torture equipment, although welcomed on 
humanitarian grounds, had almost not detrimental effect on industry at all. 
69 House of Commons, Hansard, 8th July 1998, column 1091. 
70 Department of Trade and Industry, Licensing Policy 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/export. control/policy/statement. htm> Last accessed 21 s'July 2004. 71 John Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage, 1999) p 146. 
72 Minutes of Evidence, question 44, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Second 
Report: The Appointment of the New Head of Defence Export Services, 31't March 1999, 
paragraph 9. 
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The real impact to industry of the 1997 strategic export criteria has been equally 
marginal. On paper the criteria against which export licence decisions are now 
made do represent some of "the strictest in the world" as the MoD claims. 4 Yet 
these criteria are less restrictive than those advocated by Labour in the 1 980s- 
and more importantly, in practice their implementation diverges sharply from the 
standards of human rights protection and conflict avoidance that many hoped 
that they were designed to embody. 
Labour's 1983 manifesto committed the party both to the general reduction of 
arms sales and to denying weapons for specific regimes. It said 
Labour will limit Britain's arms sales abroad and ban the supply of 
arms to repressive regimes such as South Africa, El Salvador. 
Chile, Argentina and Turkey. We will not supply arms to countries 
where the chances of international aggression or internal 
repression would be increased. 7r' 
By the time Labour wrote its 1997 election manifesto, the party was not naming 
specific states to which sales would not be allowed, but it was still promising that 
"Labour will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for 
internal repression or international aggression. "", ý' Repression and aggression 
were concerns that appeared again in the new arms export criteria announced by 
Robin Cook in July 1997 but now they sat alongside a series of other factors that 
the government would also take into account when deciding on export licence 
submissions. In these, the government did promise to "take into account respect 
for human rights", consider whether there is a "clearly identifiable risk" of arms 
being used for aggressive purposes or where they "might be used" for internal 
73 Neil Cooper, Memorandum submitted by Dr Neil Cooper, Departnietit of Politics, University of 
Plymouth, Appendix 7, House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Third Report. Annual 
Reports for 1997 and 1998 on Strategic Export Controls, 11 " February 2000, HC 225. 
74 MoD, 'Key Facts', <http: //www. mod uk, /aboutusýfactfiles, deso. litiTl> Last accessed 29"' 
September 2003. 
" See Neil Cooper, Memorandum submitted by Dr Nei/ Cooper, Department of Politics, University 
of Plymouth, Appendix 7, House of Commons Select Committee orl Defence, Third Report. Annual 
Reports for 1997 and 1998 on Strategic Export Controls, 2000. 
76 The Labour Party, The New Hope for Britain, Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1983 
<http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk/area/uk/man, llab83, htm> Last accessed 25"' September 2003. Authors 
italics. 
77 The Labour Party. New Labour because Britain deserves better. Labour Party General Election 
Manifesto 1997 <http: //www. psr. keele. ac. uk)larea, 'uk, ý'tnati; lab97. lltm> Last accessed 25"' 
September 2003. Authors italics. 
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repression. But the criteria also stressed that "full weight should be given to the 
UK's national interests when considering applications for licences. " As such, 
consideration must be given to "the potential effect on the UK's relations with the 
recipient country", "the potential effect on the UK's economic, financial and 
commercial interests" and "the protection of the UK's essential strategic industrial 
,, 78 base. To square potentially conflicting commitments Cook explained that the 
criteria "constitute broad guidance" which "will not be applied mechanistically". '9 
The inclusion of these caveats have meant that the criteria which committed the 
government to at least consider human rights, external aggression and internal 
repression that remained in the 1997 announcement and in the revised 2000 
Consolidated Export Criteria have not been fully applied and have not been 
applied consistently. These caveats gave the criteria sufficient elasticity to allow 
the government to adopt, in practice, a much more permissive approach to arms 
exports than those who had called for tighter controls ever imagined. 
On human rights, criterion two of the 2000 Consolidated Export Code stipulates 
that the government will "not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that 
the proposed export might be used for internal repression. ""o Yet Amnesty 
International has serious concerns that widespread and sustained government 
sponsored human rights abuses are occurring in most of the 15 leading recipient 
states of UK arms sales from 1997 to 1999.8 ' There has been particular concern 
over the export of small arms to Bahrain, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka. 82 
On regional peace, stability and security, criterion three states that "the 
government will not issue licences for exports which would provoke or prolong 
armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final 
destination. " Criterion four specifies that "the Government will not issue an export 
licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed 
export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial 
7ý1 House of Commons, Hansard, 28 h jUly 1997, Written Answers, column 28. 
79 House of Commons, Hansard, 28 
:h 
jUly 1997, Written Answers, column 27. 
"' House of Lords, Hansard, 31 s' October 2000, Written Answers, column 84. 
81 Amnesty 
IIh 
nternational, Annual Report 2003 <http: //web. amnesty. org/report2oo3/index-eng> Last 
accessed 7 August 2003. 
62 For example see David Mepham and Paul Eavis, The Missing Link in Labour's Foreign Policy 
(London: IPPR and Saferworld, 2002) p. 18. 
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claim .,. 
83 Yet from the 21 states experiencing high intensity conflict in 2001-2002, 
standard export licences valued at more than FO. 5 million have been issued for 
export to 12 of these states since 1999. the first year that the government 
published the values of standard export licences approved for each country. For 
further details see appendix two. "' Fears have been expressed over the export 
of Hawks, armoured cars and water cannons to Indonesia, the export of Hawk 
parts to Zimbabwe, the export of field guns to Morocco, the export of F1 6 parts to 
Israel and the export of arms to India and Pakistan. 'ý' 
Under criterion eight the government will consider "whether the proposed export 
would seriously undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable 
development of the recipient country. ""' Yet between 1997 and 1999, the last 
years of available statistics from the US State Department's publication World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 86% of total UK arms 
exports, worth US $13.5 billion, were delivered to developing states. 'ý In 
Particular, concerns have been raised over the export of an air traffic control 
system to Tanzania. '8 
In these instances, the denial of human rights, regional instability and serious 
economic underdevelopment have not in themselves been seen by New Labour 
as reasons to deny arms exports. They have been eclipsed by those criteria 
stressing the importance of exports to the UK's "national interests". In July 2002, 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw made this scope even wider by adding another 
criteria to the list. Without recourse to Parliament, Straw announced that the 
government would allow the export of "head-up displays" to the US to be used in 
F1 6 jets, some of which were being sent to Israel in 2003. To allow this he 
explained that apart from the existing criteria, the government would now also 
take account of "the importance of the UK's defence and security relationship 
"' House of Lords, Hansard, 31 " October 2000, Written Answers, colunin 85. 
84 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Reports 1999 2000 <wwvv. fco. gov. tjk> Last access 17"' AugLISt 
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115 For example see David Mepham and Paul Eavis. The Missing Link in Labour's Foreign Policy, 
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<http: //www. state. gov/documents/orgariizat ion/ 1 9478. xls> Last accessed 23"' April 2004. 
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with the incorporating country". His argument was that any interruption to F1 6 
parts to America would have "serious implications for the UK's defence relations 
with the United States . "89 Their serious implications for the Palestinian people 
were brought into focus just 14 days later on 22 nd July when Israeli Forces used 
an F1 6 to attack a Palestinian apartment block in Gaza killing 15 people and 9 
children. 90 
Alongside the introduction of the new criteria, Labour cites the EU Code of 
Conduct on Arms Exports as a major achievement towards more effective arms 
controls. 9' It does this even though the code contains a series of weaknesses 
that limit its effectiveness and it does this in the face of suggestions that Labour 
was actively engineering those weaknesses to suit UK-based industry. Adopted 
by the Council of Ministers in 1998 after the UK and France tabled the idea, the 
code put forward eight criteria to be considered by member states before a 
licence is issued, it provided for a consultation mechanism between states and 
an annual report to review its operation. Yet overall the code contains significant 
weaknesses. It is not legally binding. The annual reports all states are obliged to 
produce reporting exports do not have to be published. The annual review on the 
implementation of the Code can remain confidential. It contains no regulations on 
brokering or on licenced production and it does not provide for prior 
parliamentary scrutiny of sensitive exports. But what it does provide for is the 
harmonisation of the export regulations within which European based arms 
companies operate. The motivation behind the code appears to have arisen less 
from a desire to limit irresponsible exports and more as a necessary response to 
the increasingly pan-European nature of the arms trade. The growing number of 
collaborative projects underway within Europe need arms companies based 
around Europe to be working to the same export criteria and from industry's point 
of view, preferably criteria working at the level of the lowest common 
88 For example House of Commons, Hansard, 8 th November 2001, column 393. 
'9 House of Commons, Hansard, 8 (h July 2002, Written Answers, , columns 653-654. 90 House of Commons, Hansard, 23 rd July 2002, columns 840-841. 
th 9' FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2000, p. 1 <www. fco. gov. uk> Last access 17 August 
2003. 
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denominator. 92 This conclusion is given added weight by reports suggesting that 
the UK were working to undermine some of the regulatory aspects of the code. 
Reportedly, Nordic countries had wanted to draw up a list of states who should 
be permanently excluded from buying European made arms because of their 
human rights records but the code adopted the more vague and flexible 
language used in the 1997 UK criteria. " Of particular importance is the first 
sentence used by the UK and France when they drew up their proposals for the 
code - "EU member states are committed to the maintenance of a strong defence 
industry which is a strategic part of their industrial base as well as their defence 
effort. "9' Revealingly the Defence Manufacturers Association, the trade body of 
the arms industry, reportedly said that it believed the code "would not make a 
substantial difference to existing government policy. """ The EU code raises 
important questions about whether the initiative was pursued as a useful 
propaganda tool for Labour and as a useful harmonising tool for collaborative 
exporters, watered down, where possible, by the government so as to protect 
exporters from any damaging regulatory requirements. 
Elsewhere Labour also cites its early ratification of the Ottawa Convention on 
anti-personnel landmines as a further major contribution towards effective global 
arms control. International leaders signed the treaty in December 1997 banning 
the manufacture, use, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. But 
its inherent flaws combined with a specific UK interpretation of the Treaty have 
left UK-based arms-producing companies largely operating as usual. The central 
flaw in the Treaty is that it defines anti-personnel iandmines by design and not by 
their effect. This allows any mine not narrowly defined as "anti-personnel" but 
which still has anti-personnel capabilities to be exempt, a loophole which UK- 
based companies and the MoD have been happy to exploit. The MoD, for 
example, believes anti-tanks mines to be exempt. In response, at least nine other 
92 Neil Cooper, 'The Pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy' if) Richard Little 
and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policyý A New Moral Crusade? 
ýManchester: Manchester University Press. 2000), pp. 147 167. 
3 Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit, p. 186. 
94 International action network on small arms, 'Declaration by EU Member States of) all EU Code of 
Conduct for Arms Exports: A joint proposal by the governments of the UK arid France' 
<http: //www. iansa. org/oldsite/documents/ýresearch, ýres archive/nqo19. httn> Last accessed 21 
October 2003. 
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signatories who had declared anti-vehicle mines with anti-handling devices to be 
illegal under the treaty tried to establish an expert group to examine the issue in 
2000. Only the UK delegation publicly opposed the move. 96 This interpretation of 
the Treaty allowed BAE Systems to continue to make Mk 7 anti-tank blast mines 
which are fitted with sensitive anti-tampering devices until they were phased out 
97 in 2000/01. It allows BAE Systems to continue to collaborate with other 
European firms to make the Ajax-APILAS off-route anti-tank mine and to make 
the MLRS, multiple launch rocket system which scatters the AT-2 anti-tank 
mine . 
98 This interpretation also allows the MoD to replace all the old anti- 
personnel mines that it destroyed under the Ottawa Treaty with a stockpile of 
new generation anti-tank devices and other mines. The MoD reportedly holds 
100,000 German AT-2 anti-tank mines that can be set off by an individual 
walking over it. 99 Alongside these sit undisclosed quantities of MK 7/4 mines, MK 
7/7, BAE Systems/Royal Ordnance made Barmine pressure operated mines and 
at least 63,300 US made Shielder scatterable mines, launched from Alvis made 
vehicles. The Shielder mines can detonate if disturbed. 100 Also excluded from the 
Treaty were cluster bombs although they did become the subject of a 2003 UN 
protocol requiring that those who deployed such munitions clear any unexploded 
bomblets, bomblets that effectively become landmines. 
Further to the restrictive interpretation of the Ottawa Treaty, the UK government 
has also appeared less than enthusiastic to address other issues associated with 
mines. UK forces have made extensive use of cluster bombs over the past 
decade. The RAF used BL755 cluster bombs in Bosnia. More than half of the 
bombs dropped by the RAF in Kosovo were cluster bombs, of which 31 % missed 
96 Landmine Action and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, 'Alternative anti-personnel mines: 
The next generations', p. 27. 
< http: //www. land mi neaction. org/assets/clown loads/Alternative%20A PMs%20repo rt. pdf > Last 
accessed 4 th May 2004. 
97 Paul Donovan, 'Making a Killing', The Guardian, 7 th February 2001. 
98 Landmine Action and the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, 'Alternative anti-personnel mines: 
The next generations', p. 28. 
th 99 Paul Donovan, 'Whatever happened to Diana's landmines legacyT, The Observer, 25 August 
2002. 
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their target, that is, 25,000 bomblets. During the 2003 war on Iraq, the Royal 
Artillery fired more than 2,000 cluster bombs around Basra, each containing 49 
bomblets and at least a further 66 BL755 from RAF planes. " UK troops are still 
involved in NATO operations to lay mines as long as they do not touch the mines 
themselves while the US, who have not signed the Treaty, have been stockpiling 
anti-personnel landmines on the controversial island of Diego Garcia, still 
officially "British" territory. 103 To add to this. the government has failed to act 
against companies trying to sell banned anti-personnel landmines at government 
sponsored arms fairs. Neither of those exposed in the media - Romtehnica and 
Pakistan Ordnance Factories - have so far been prosecuted. 
This kind of government inaction. inaction beneficial to UK-based arms-producing 
companies, has been repeated elsewhere. In 1997, Robin Cook told the House 
that it would not be "realistic or practical to revoke licences that were valid and in 
force at the time of our election", 104 a decision that the Foreign Office claims was 
made after legal advice was sought. "' This meant that the government did not 
cancel Indonesian orders for Scorpion tanks, armoured cars, water cannon and 
Hawk jets agreed by the Conservative government yet Tony Purton, former 
Director of Contracts at the MoD (1988-1993) has called this apparent legal 
advice "nonsense". Purton argues 
Britain's arms contracts are, with few exceptions, made between 
commercial companies and the receiving government. They 
cannot bind any British government as the government retains the 
sovereign power to deny or withdraw the necessary export 
licences. 'O') 
In fact the legal advice cited by Cook has never been published, was widely 
discredited and appears to be undermined by the government's own 1997 
Strategic Export Controls Report published less than a year later. The report 
"" Landmine Action, 'Cluster submunitions the facts' 
<http: //www. landmineaction. org/Clusterý/ý20subrTi unit ion s/. 20 I/. 20the`%20facts. asp> Last 
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outlines how licences can be revoked, for instance, in response to the imposition 
of trade sanction or an arms embargo. ' 07 A second example of government 
inaction of benefit to the industry came four years later. In 2001 the Serious 
Fraud Office were investigating allegations that BAE Systems were operating a 
E20 million slush fund allegedly used to bribe Saudi officials in order to win arms 
deals. Reportedly the Office attempted to pursue BAE Systems by referring the 
papers to the MoD but the case was not then passed to MoD police even though 
the director of the Serious Fraud Squad allegedly contacted the head of the MoD 
Fraud Squad and the MoD Permanent Secretary calling for action. The case was 
reportedly never referred to the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, or investigated 
further. The MoD argue that "There was no suggestion of misuse of public 
money, so it did not fall within the MoD police remit to investigate. " 108 In 
September 2003, the Serious Fraud Office itself was reportedly considering 
embarking on a full-scale criminal investigation of BAE Systems. 
In contrast to this inactivity the government has managed to be more proactive in 
offering intelligence services to the industry. UK spies are reportedly still 
operating on behalf of private corporations according to former M16 officer 
Richard Tomlinson who claims that M16 provided BAE Systems with details of a 
bid made by their French competitor, Dassault for a E500 million jet deal with 
Indonesia in 1993. BAE Systems won the bid and provided Indonesia with 
Hawks. Similar details were allegedly provided to BAE Systems helping them win 
another Hawk order, this time with Malaysia. 109 In 2001 M15 reportedly brought 
major corporate leaders together, including BAE Systems, for a seminar which 
included a talk on how M15 can provide intelligence information to help 
corporations win contracts abroad "if only it were asked". "O 
The initial message from the Labour party to arms exporters was and remains 
overriclingly one of reassurance that they can expect continuing political support 
from government. The government's operationalisation of the 1997 criteria, its 
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attitude to the EU Code of Conduct. its approach to The Ottawa I reaty and mine 
issues in general underlines these reassurances. There is no evidence that New 
Labour has made any significant contribution to controlling the international arms 
industry. These initiatives are symbolic gestures that have left the arms industry 
operating as usual. This kind of political support, combined with the levels of 
financial support shown above makes the arms industry the recipient of an 
unprecedented degree of help from government. help which remains largely 
unquestioned in the mainstream media and yet to receive the attention it 
deserves in much of the arms control literature. 
THE FAILURE OF THE EXISTING LITE RAT URF TO I AKI ON 1111 (', OV[ MMENT'S 
CASE 
This thesis represents a departure from the existing literature. Almost all of the 
work that had been written up until early 2002 on New Labour and arms exports 
had taken on the government's presentation of arms exports as a dilemma, a 
delicate balance between promoting the UK national interest on the one hand 
and taking into account ethical issues on the other. ''' The job of the critic was to 
highlight the cases where UK arms were used to commit human rights abuses or 
where export licences were issued for clearly unsuitable equipment which would 
work to reduce sustainable development. 
One of the few exceptions to this trend was Mark Phythian's 2000 book "The 
Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964". Phythian concentrates overwhelmingly 
on detailing UK arms exports to various countries, pulling out various 
characteristics of the arms trade as it moves along. But it also touches, very 
briefly, on how the promotion of arms exports does not deliver the economic, 
strategic and political benefits claimed by the Labour government and its 
predecessors. Yet Phythian's assessment is neither systematic nor 
comprehensive. Phythian's three-page outline and review of some of the 
economic arguments put forward by the government and his six-page summary 
and critique of the government's political and strategic rationale does not allow 
42 
him to draw on the range of work which has been responding to each claim. 
Despite its limitations, Phythian has actually provided one of the most wide- 
ranging analyses of government justifications in the existing literature because 
only a handful of other authors have questioned even a few of the range of 
government justifications on offer. The most notable amongst these is Neil 
Cooper whose 1995 paper and 1997 book "The Business of Death" devotes a 
chapter to showing how arms sales actually undermine UK military and political 
security and how their economic benefits are questionable. ' 12 Others who have 
questioned some of the government's justifications include Tim Webb, David 
Mepham and Paul Eavis, Malcolm Chalmers, Samuel Brittan, Giddeon Burrows 
and most recently Adair Turner. ' 13 But to date, no contemporary and 
comprehensive critique of New Labour's case has been produced. This is despite 
the ongoing need to re-examine established rationales given the unique position 
of the arms industry in relation to the British state. 
WHY THE ARMS INDUSTRY'S RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE MUST BE 
MONITORED MORE CLOSELY THAN ALL OTHER INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 
For most of the 20" Century UK-based arms-producing companies were 
heralded as national champions. They were largely state-owned and state- 
controlled through huge state-run procurement organisations that defined 
equipment requirement, development and production in an effort to guarantee 
the supply needed to meet domestic needs and bind client states to the UK. 
Whether publicly or privately owned, all arms-producing companies effectively 
served the needs of national forces and all were central to the strategic and 
political ambitions of the UK government. 
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Political and economic changes in the 1 980s and 1 990s radically redefined the 
environment in which arms-producing companies acted. Although the arrival of 
Margaret Thatcher in Downing Street marked a more aggressive approach to the 
sale of UK-manufactured arms abroad, the fall-out of her economic ideology was 
the privatisation of arms-producing companies. In 1979 and 1980, four out of the 
seven arms-producing companies which the MoD were paying more than f 100 
million p. a. were state owned including British Aerospace, military engine 
manufacturer Rolls Royce and armaments supplier Royal Ordnance, ' ," When 
these, and a number of other major aerospace and shipbuilding firms, were sold 
off during the 1980s, they were left more exposed to both market forces and the 
changed procurement environment. Cost plus contracts, in which the MoD 
covers company production plus a predetermined fixed amount, were reduced, 
research costs were increasingly being transferred to the cornpanies involved 
and the costs of arms production were escalating, especially frorn the pressure to 
deliver hugely expensive high technology military solutions. Later, the end of 
Cold War tensions saw the global demand for arms plunge. Between 1987 and 
1997 world military expenditure in fell by more than one third. ''" 
Arms-producing companies have since responded by fostering cross border 
arms development/production projects and by following a programme of merger 
with, or acquisition of, other companies. This industrial restructuring has led to 
control of the industry slowly transferring to super contractors, some of which 
command wealth that rivals that of many nation-states. In Europe a handful of 
major companies have emerged and prime amongst these is UK-based arms 
giant BAE Systems. This company, and others, have developed interests that 
transcend national borders and at the same time have completely redefined 
themselves as multinationals. 
The result is a paradox. On the one hand UK-based arms-producing companies 
have ostensibly become detached from the state, redefining themselves as 
1 14 J. Paul Dunne, 'The Changing Military Industrial Complex in the UK', Defence Economics, 4 
1993), pp. 91 -111. 15 US Department of State, World Military Expenciltures arid Arms Transfers, 1998, table I 
<http: //www. state. gov/www/global/arms/bureau vc, 'wmeat98vc. htrnI> Last accessed 26"' June 
2004. 
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independent commercial entities that have transcended their national origins. On 
the other hand they have remained intimately connected to the state in which 
they began. The industry still receives almost unmatched levels of financial and 
political support from the UK government to secure large arms deals and still 
plays the nationalist card when its interests are threatened, often touting itself as 
the last great UK national "metal-bashing" industry. 
More important than this, and a key point in this thesis, is that the relationship 
between military industry and the government as it stands today is, in 
comparison to other industries, absolutely unique. UK-based military industry is 
completely dependent on the UK government both as its only domestic customer 
and as the only body that can issue the export licences required to sell to non- 
domestic customers. As such, government is able to shape the market via its 
procurement strategy, a strategy that is typically characterised by lucrative but 
relatively scarce contracts. No other industry is so dependent on the government 
to define the parameters in which an entire industry's commercial activities are 
set. No other industry has such a huge incentive to become as involved as it can 
be in the formation and implementation of government policy. 
This incentive is made even greater by the New Labour government publicly 
wedding itself to the idea that arms exports generate financial, strategic and 
political benefits even though the assumptions on which this idea is based are 
either unproven or, in the majority of instances, unsustainable. Sticking to these 
rationales leaves the industry in a strong position, especially relative to a civil 
sector that cannot mobilise these kinds of arguments in support of its activities. 
The government becomes far more susceptible to pressure to adopt policies 
favourable to the arms-producing companies even when this does not align with 
the public interest. The question then becomes why the New Labour government 
would continue to place itself in this position. 
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THE FAILURE OF THE EXISTING LITF HAI UH[ T () MOVI 10 YONI) II il 
ADDICTION/DELUSION EXPLANATION 
Within the existing literature there has been little atterript to fully engage with this 
kind of question, with why governments have consistently supported arms 
exports. The most developed response to date has come from Phythian. He 
finishes his book with a few sentences presenting a two tier explanation for this 
support - he mentions corporate influence but focuses more on the idea of an 
"unbreakable addiction" that governments have to use exports to promote a 
visible world role for the UK. Phythian argues that there was a point, certainly by 
the 1980s, when both the economic and political profitability of arms sales 
became questionable. But they were not and still are not publicly questioned and 
this is because of the way that arms-producing companies, with help frorn the 
DTI and the MoD's DESO, have been able to influence, often dominate, 
government to retain active support for a declining industry. Governments listen 
because they continue to be mistaken into thinking that the UK still has an 
important global role. They think that the UK deserves a place on the UN 
Security Council, on the G7, influence in NATO, in the EU. They think that the 
retention of a supposedly independent military capability, supported by the profits 
made by arms company exports. allows the UK this role. Governments have not 
realised that this and all their other economic, strategic and political justifications 
are unsustainable because they are "cleluded". "" This delusion explains the 
continuities between UK governments on arms sales policy despite the restrictive 
policies advocated by Labour in opposition just before being elected in 1964, 
1974 and 1997. 
Phythian's underdeveloped themes of government addiction and delusion keep 
reemerging in other work. They were central to a 2002 BBC documentary 
presented by Will Self in which the entire explanation for the government's 
continued support for arms exports was centered on "addict Britain's arms sales 
fix". The programme was even punctuated with an interview between Will Self 
and Dr Robert Lefever, Director of Promis Recovery Centre Kent which treats 
those suffering from a variety of addictions on the basis that countries can also 
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be addicts. ' 17 The Financial Times economist Samuel Brittan and former CBI 
Director General Adair Turner have both blamed two economic myths or fallacies 
mistakenly accepted by governments - that the arms industry is an irreplaceable 
sector and that exports are overridingly important. "" Phythian's stress on the 
influence of arms companies on key departments who will play on government 
delusion over the UK's world role is similar to that of Tim Webb, author of "The 
Armour-Plated Ostrich". Webb also points to the "costly illusion" of the UK's 
"special" role in the world which maintains "Britain's addiction to the arms 
business. " He develops the world power delusion idea to a greater extent with a 
number of chapters devoted to tracing the development, challenges to and 
effects of this delusion since 1945.119 
The pattern in the existing literature is to account for the continuation of New 
Labour's support for arms exports in terms of fallacies, mistakes, addiction or 
delusion, a theoretical approach developed to varying degrees within the 
literature. Little has been written which works outside this account, which 
assumes that the government is not deluded into supporting exports but rather 
this is a deliberate policy choice carried out to further the shared interests of 
government and a politically powerful industry. One exception to this is John 
Pilger's 1999 documentary, "Flying the Flag: Arming the World". He implies that 
one explanation lies in huge commissions paid to influential figures . 
120 This was 
certainly the case in the late 1960s when Donald Stokes, the man responsible for 
establishing DESO explained "A great many sales were made not because 
anyone wanted the arms but because of commission en route. 02 ' Gideon 
Burrows mentions the "strong lobbying influence" of the arms industry. 122 Andrew 
Rawnsley and Kampfner both touch on the influence of former BAE Systems 
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Director Lord Hollick in Blair's "inner circle". '' ' Even in these exceptions the 
coverage given to the relationship between the political arid military corporate 
elite is either brief or largely unsystematic and anecdotal 
Given this, what is needed in the literature looking at New Labour and arms 
exports is not just a thorough policy analysis of the government's justifications for 
maintaining support. What is also needed is a closer look at what other internal 
dynamics are at work within the UK inciting support for the export of arms. What 
is needed is a contemporary and comprehensive examination of the ways in 
which UK-based arms-producing companies are linked to those in power with a 
view to a better understanding of the cumulative effect of this relationship on the 
maintenance of supportive export policy. New Labour's continued support for 
arms exports needs to be understood in the context of state-corporate relations. 
HOW THE NOTION OF A MILITARY- INDUSTRIAL. GOMPLA X INI` ORMS THIS THESIS 
The aim of this study is not to use the case of New Labour's support for arms 
exports to test whether the UK has a form of MIC. This would necessitate a 
thesis in its own right. But this thesis does approach the study of the interplay 
between the interests of New Labour and UK-based arms-producing companies 
using MIC type ideas. The second part of this study draws on part of the common 
ground between MIC theories - that military industry seeks linkages with political 
elites, linkages which will impact on how the interests of both interplay - to help 
explain the continuation of New Labour' support for arms exports. This part of the 
introduction looks at the origins of the MIC concept, summarises some of the 
major theoretical approaches towards the idea, asks whether it is historically and 
geographically specific to the US in the 1960s and 1970s and addresses how the 
notion will underpin the second half of the thesis. 
Elite theories concerned with the study of state-corporate relations became 
increasingly connected to the concept of MIC in popular American discourse of 
the 1 960s and 1970s. MIC theories stand in contrast to the idea that arms export 
12 3 Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People. The inside story of Now Labour (Londow Penguin, 
2001) p, 170; John Kampiner, Robin Cook (Londotv Phoenix. 1998) p, 145 
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support is maintained by rational policy-makers who have chosen the best 
available policies for the good of the nation. Instead, MIC theories begin with the 
premise that neither arms-producing companies, the military bureaucracy nor the 
state are passive entities. All have interests and these interests are proactively 
pursued. 
In his last speech as President, Eisenhower famously warned the American 
public to be vigilant against the growing influence of a coalition of vested state 
and military interests that formed what he called a "military-industrial complex". 
He saw the combined interests of the military, favoured military companies and 
appropriators in Congress working together to overemphasise the emergence of 
new threats in order to continually justify the funds to build new military 
equipment often at the expense of the country as a whole. 124 The theoretical 
underpinnings of Eisenhower's complex are derived from the political sociology of 
C. Wright Mills. In Mill's seminal 1956 study, The Power Elite, he argued that the 
interests of what were seemingly separate highly powerful institutions - the 
military, government and corporations - actually overlap. The President and key 
Cabinet members, Chief Executives of the largest military corporations and the 
highest-ranking military officers all share similar interests and as such form 
"overlapping cliques", working together as a single "power elite" dominating 
1950s America. Although there may be public disagreements, these are 
outweighed by points of agreement especially in the world view - concentrated 
wealth, the primacy of profits and the role of government in creating a business 
friendly environment, interests pursued in an environment very different to those 
in which other industries lobby government. 125 
The concept of a MIC has since grown to become one of the most familiar ideas 
in modern political discourse. It has done this despite there being very little 
agreement over what is meant by the term, whether it is a force for repression, 
how powerful it is and to what extent it is a monolithic body. Charles Wolf for 
example stresses the pluralistic, conflictual nature of the MIC where as Sidney 
124 Dwight Eisenhower, 'Farewell radio and television address to the American people by President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower', 17 th January, 1961 <http: //www. eisenhower. utexas. edu/tarewell. htm> Last 
accessed 15 th October 2003. 
125 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
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Lens appears to ascribe more monolithic characteristics. ''' There is little 
agreement over which groups are involved in the complex or whether it is 
comprised of a tiny elite or a broader segment of society as argued by Sidney 
Lens who saw seven sectors of society making up the complex including the 
12 , academic community. ' There is also confusion over whether the threat 
perception on which it is based is deliberately manufactured or a form of false 
consciousness and even whether the complex is a fact or simply and ideological 
construct. 128 There is dispute over whether the MIC is more powerful than other 
complexes or whether their power is comparable as Charles Wolf argues when 
he finds that the MIC is as influential as the transportation complex, the 
education complex and others. "' To add to all of this, it is also unclear whether 
the MIC concept is geographically and historically specific to the US in the 1960s 
and 1970s, in particular, whether the idea of the MIC could be applied both non- 
capitalist states and to states without large military industries as many advocate. 
For example, Vernon Aspaturian has identified and explored a Cold War Soviet 
MIC comprised of an influential network of vested interests in high military 
expenditure amongst industrial, military and political elites.! "ý In more recent 
times, Masako Ikegami-Andersson has compared the Arnerican MIC to those 
which exist in Japan and Sweden"' and Ken Conca has studied the causes and 
effects of the rise and fall of Brazil's MIC. ' " Taken as a whole, the MIC literature 
is, to date, vague, confused and operates within a framework of thinking that is 
open to considerable dispute. 
Despite all this, the approach is still of great interest here. This is because there 
was at least been agreement amongst leading Cold War proponents that high 
levels of military spending gave rise to powerful interest groups - the military, 
126 Charles Wolf, 'Military- Industrial Simplicilies. Complexities and Realilies', in Sam Sarkesian (ed. ) 
The Military- Industrial Complexý A Reassessment (London Sage, 1972) plp 2-5 52, p, 25, p 31 
21 Sidney Lens, The Military Industrial Complex (Philadelphia, Pilqrini Press, 1970) 
28 Sam Sarkesian (ed. ) The Military- Industrial Complex A Reassessment (London. Saqe, 1972) p 
vi i, Fine, p 29. 
129 Charles Wolf, 'Military- Industrial Simplicities, Complexities and Realities' 
130 Vernon Aspaturian, 'The Soviet Military Indtistrial Complex Does it Exist? in Steven Rosen 
(ed. ), Testing the Theory of the Military Industrial Complex (Lexington, MA 
Lexington Books, 1973) pp. 103 133. 
131 Masako Ikegami-Andersson, The Military Industrial Complex. The Cases of Sweden and, lapan 
ýAldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992) 
32 Ken Conca, Manufacturing Insecurity. The riseand fillf of Bra., 11's triditary industrial complex 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 
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arms-producing corporations, government officials involved in military spending 
and legislators whose constituencies benefit from military procurement. All 
occupied powerful political positions from which they attempted to promote their 
own vested interest in the continuance of military expenditure and international 
conflict in a largely coordinated fashion. 133 As such the MIC literature has 
something important to say about the ways in which the interests of arms- 
producing companies and the state interplay. Exactly how they interplay has 
been perceived by different authors in very different ways but, following Charles 
Moskos' dichotomy, can be broadly divided into three major approaches 
according to which determinant of power receives the greater emphasis - (1) the 
political power of the military establishment; (2) the organisational power of the 
state bureaucracy; or (3) the economic power of the private corporation. 134 
In the defence bureaucracy model, often identified with the work of Robert 
Heilbroner and John Swomley, the focus is on the power wielded by the military 
establishment. 135 This establishment represents an independent political force 
imposing its own will over the civil establishment and industrial suppliers at the 
expense of liberal democracy. 
In the state bureaucracy model, the focus is on how a particular section of the 
state perpetuates the complex. This model sees non-elected bureaucrats driven 
by the internal bureaucratic dynamics of the environment in which they work as 
the main determinants of the MIC. This model is often associated with Seymour 
Melman and his 1970 book "Pentagon Capitalism" in which he argues that the 
state's relationship with military companies has been transformed. Because the 
state is now a hugely powerful decision-making unit, its purpose is no longer to 
regulate the industry. Instead government itself represents a form of business in 
what he describes as "state capitalism". The end result is greater domestic power 
for the government and in particular the Pentagon for whom the operation of 
133 Moskos, 'The Military- Industrial Complex-. Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptual 
Contradictions' in Sam Sarkesian (ed. ) The Military- Industrial Complex: A Reassessment (London: 
Sage, 1972) pp. 9-16. 
134 Charles C. Moskos, 'The Military- Industrial Complex: Theoretical Antecedents and Conceptual 
Contradictions' p 9. 
135 Robert Heilbroner, 'Military America', New York Review of Books, 15: 2 (1970), pp. 5-8; John 
Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) 
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, -permanent war economy" has meant more activity under their command - more 
decision-making power and an ever-larger budget. '"' 
In the private corporate model the focus is instead on how corporate elites 
control both the state and the military, High military spendinq will continue 
regardless of whether an actual external threat is perceived because the MIC is a 
money-making device for arms-producing companies who wield the real power 
within the complex. One version of this kind of thinking is put forward by G. 
William Domhoff and Ferdinand Lundberg who see the military establishment, 
the state and the middle managers of arms-producing companies as subservient 
to some form of higher economic elite which includes top-level executives or 
super-rich ruling families. "' Another version is put forward by Michael Reich, 
Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. 13'ý' The latter's highly contested 
underconsumptionist approach finds military spending to be an important 
economic mechanism functional for the purpose of maintaining domestic 
prosperity because, in contrast to spending in other sectors, it allows the 
absorption of surplus without raising wages. Reich agrees with the necessity for 
state spending but finds that military expenditure that could not be replaced by 
social spending, whatever the external strategic environment, because this kind 
of spending feeds into both the profits and the interests of military companies that 
represent powerful sections of the economy. 
Although relevant to the question of how state and arms-producer interests 
interplay addressed in the second half of this thesis, all of these ways of thinking 
about industry-state relations were conceived not only in America, but in America 
during the 1960s and early 1970s. To be relevant to this thesis, the entire MIC 
concept must be revisited in light of the changed economic, industrial and 
strategic environment in which the New Labour government acts 
136 Seymour Melman, Pentagon Capitalism (New York McGraw Hill, 1970). Seymour Melman''In 
the grip of a permanent war economy', Bear Left. 9ý3 (2003) <litlpý /www. bear 
left. com/original/2003/0309permanent. himI> Last accessed 24- itine 2004. 
137 G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America9 (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1967)ý Ferdinand 
Lundberg, The Rich and the Super-Rich (New York: Bantam. 1968). 
138 Michael Reich, 'Military Spending and the U. S. Economy' in Steven Rosen (ed ), Testing the 
Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books, 1973) pp. B5-102ý Paul Baran arid Paul Sweezy, Monopoly Capital. (Londoný 
Monthly Review Press, 1966). 
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Reassessing the military-industrial complex in the era of New Labour 
Previously, this introduction has outlined how, for most of the 20'h Century, UK 
arms-producing companies were state owned, largely state controlled and largely 
restricted to operating only within national boundaries. The sector represented a 
national strategic asset that successfully utilised the Cold War ideology of 
international conflict to guarantee its position ahead of other complexes. Today 
we have an era of globalised markets, that is, the significance of national 
boundaries have reduced to facilitate the free movement of capital, goods and 
services. The autonomy of these governments to act as economic actors has 
been reduced and new global political structures like the World Trade 
Association operate agreements that encroach upon the sovereignty of states. 139 
Within these markets, stateless, profit driven, hugely wealthy arms-producing 
companies operate increasingly beyond the control of their old national 
governments. Within this newly defined political environment, the Cold War 
ideology of conflict has been replaced by the threat of international terrorism, a 
new military orthodoxy that Labour were quick were embrace in their 1998 
Strategic Defence Review. "' 
This radically changed environment has dramatically altered the power balance 
between the state and arms-producing companies, a symptom of the wider 
power imbalance between the state and corporations in general. The idea that 
New Labour has either been willingly "captured" by the business community in a 
form of "corporate rule" has underpinned a small number of publication or 
projects. "Former Labour Party insider" David Osler published "Labour Party 
PLC" in 2002, a book that offered a comprehensive guide to the corporate 
takeover of the Labour movement. Osler offers a detailed account of party 
donations, the work of political lobbying groups and industry secondment into 
government. 141 In parallel, Red Star Research, a web based project set up by 
"' Wyn Grant, Globalisation, Big Business and the Blair Government, August 2000 
<http: //www2. warwick. ac. uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/200O/wp5800. pdf/> Last 
accessed 2 nd August 2004. 
140 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, paragraphs 9 and 29 
<http: //www. mod. uk/issues/sdr/wp_contents. htm> Last accessed 16 th jU ly 2004. 141 David Osler, Labour Party PLC: New Labour as a Party of Business (Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing, 2002). 
53 
political activists, journalists and researchers, has bcqLjn to expose the network 
of connections that those from the corporate world enjoy within the Labour Party 
project. It investigates "friends of Tony" - the Labour donors. task force members 
and special advisors - their backgrounds, salaries and influential friencls. 
"*' But 
very little is known about the role of military corporations in all of this even though 
they are now much more independent and more powerful than Could have been 
anticipated by the MIC literature of the 1 960s and early 1970s. 
This thesis approaches the question of how the interests of UK-based arms- 
producing companies and New Labour interplay in light of this redefined 
relationship. The focus remains on part of the common ground between MIC 
theories - that groups attempted to promote their own vested interest in the 
continuance of military expenditure - but the considers indUstry-government 
relations in the light of the increased power of the corporation to help understand 
the continuation of New Labour's support for arms exports. 
One problem that arises from an attempt to address this question is defining just 
what is meant here and in the rest of the thesis by two of the most central 
concepts used - "arms-producing companies" and "arms exports" - along with the 
difficulties in using existing data. 
DEFINING CONCEPTS AND THE DIFFICULTIES IN USING THE EXISTING DATA 
Almost no company devotes themselves exclusively to the manufacture of 
military products and because of this, it has long been a point of debate which 
companies should be defined as arms companies and which should not. The DTI 
report that more than 3,500 military companies operate in the UK. "' Many of 
these will be suppliers of food, clothing, vehicles and fuel to the military. 
Companies supplying non-lethal goods may well be included in a broad 
classification of what is known as the "defence industrial base" and their 
identification is a constant problem for those trying to accurately estimate the 
14' Red Star Research <http: //www. red star- research. org. i ik > Last accessed 19"' September 2003. 
143 Ian Goudie, The Employment Consequences of a Ban of i Arryis Exports. (London. CAAT, 
September 2002) <http: //www. caat. org. ukl in format ion, pUblicalions economics, jobs 0902 php> Last 
accessed 24 th July 2003 
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number of jobs dependent on arms exports. The purpose of this thesis is to 
consider UK-based arms-producing companies, that is, those companies that, at 
an industrial or technological level, contribute to the supply of lethal weapons 
systems. This is in line with the definition used by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) who publish a wide range of statistics on arms 
transfers, a significant source of comparative and trend data used in this study. 144 
The thesis necessarily excludes almost all of those companies acting as 
suppliers of components to prime contractors, for reasons of space and data 
availability. The main focus is on the "major defence producers". A major defence 
producer is still a problematic concept particularly given the increasingly 
globalised nature of military industry. A prime contractor like BAE Systems will 
often subcontract work out to overseas factories leaving the company itself to 
simply put the deal together. The firms focused on here are the largest in terms 
of military sales based in the UK. Examples are given in appendix four. Their 
size, backgrounds and activities are outlined in much greater detail in appendix 
five along with some of the major arms-producing companies based outside the 
UK mentioned during the course of the thesis. 
Any problems arising from defining the term "arms-producing company" are more 
than overshadowed by the problems that exist in defining the term "arms export". 
This is because there is a fundamental problem with the available data on 
military exports. There is no standard categorisation of what constitutes a military 
export. There are no problems identifying equipment that will primarily be used 
for military purposes being sold to overseas forces. But there are questions of 
definition surrounding military products such as whether dual use products like 
vehicles should be included. There are also questions of definition surrounding 
customer issues such as whether non-military products like food and clothing, 
purchased by overseas forces, should be included. The three major sources of 
statistics on military exports, SIPRI, WMEAT and the Defence Analytical Services 
Agency (DASA), deal with these questions in different ways so that the statistics 
they publish are largely incomparable. 
"' SIPRI, 'Sources and Methods for SIPRI Research on Military Expenditure, Arms Transfers and 
Arms Production' <http: //editors. sipri. se/pubs/Factsheet/sipdat. html#ref7> Last accessed 25th 
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SIPRI figures show the "trend indicator value" of transferred "major conventional 
weapons" by which the authors mean weapons that have a military purpose 
supplied to the armed forces or intelligence aqencies of the state. " Although 
SIPRI includes products like aircraft. ships, missiles. armoured vehicles. artillery, 
and radar, the authors exclude small arms and small arms ammunition, trucks, 
small artillery, support equipment and components, any services provided to 
recipient states and any other product without clear military purpose. Because of 
these exclusions, the thesis mainly draws on SIPRI's databases for trend and 
comparative analysis only. 
In contrast WMEAT defines military equipment as "weapons of war, parts thereof, 
ammunition, support equipment. and other commodities clespied for military 
use" including non-armoured vehicles. uniforms, all ammunition, ordnance, dual 
use equipment when its main use is military and military services including 
training. 146 WMEAT figures only exclude food, petrol and medical supplies, a 
more inclusive definition than that used by SIPRI. WMEAT figures are particularly 
valuable in that they show the position of the UK in comparison with other major 
suppliers. As such, WMEAT figures are almost exclusively used here to look at 
which states are recipients of UK equipment, how much has been sold and how 
this varies over time, information that is rarely given elsewhere. 
The thesis makes even greater use of the annual defence statistics published by 
the Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) but notes that there are also 
serious statistical problems with these data sets. DASA define and calculate the 
value of military export deliveries by referring to a set of Customs and Excise 
codes. But because Customs and Excise record only codes that relate to purely 
military equipment, services and dual use exports are excluded. Instead DASA 
supplements its delivery figures by incorporating aerospace order estimates 
made by SBAC, the trade association for UK-based aerospace companies. In 
contrast to DASA, SBAC figures both include dual use goods and services and 
September 2003. 
145 SIPRI, 'Sources and Methods of the Arms Transfers Project' 
<http: //projects. sipri. se/armstrade/atmethods. htrTil> Last accessed 25"' September 2003. 146 US Department of State, World Mllitary Expenditures and Arryis Transfers, 1999 2000. 
'Statistical Notes' <http: //www. state. gov, 'docuriier)ts orqant/ation 18744 pdt, Inst accessed 25"' 
September 2003. 
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SBAC judges equipment as military according to the buyer rather than according 
to the product itself. The resulting hybrid figures underestimate the value of 
export deliveries to such a degree that in their study, Chalmers et al. recalculated 
them . 
14' DASA's figures on export orders are compiled by DESO who gather 
information from companies on a voluntary basis. As the report by Chalmers et al 
has found, being customer based they include all services including some that 
are not for primarily military use such as computer equipment for civilian staff. 
The values of DESO figures are eroded further because order values are subject 
to depreciation, stalling or cancellation. DASA's figures are used so extensively in 
this thesis despite the problems associated with them because they are the most 
detailed, most regularly updated and because they are the figures that the UK 
government itself uses to justify continued support for exports. 
Although DASA's data sets are more detailed than others, the kind of definitional 
problems outlined above are compounded by a lack of information, much of it 
withheld because of the secrecy surrounding military industry and governments' 
involvement in it. For example, figures on UK military imports do not indicate 
what proportion will be used in equipment to be exported, an important factor in 
any attempt to estimate the value of exports to the balance of payments. It is not 
known what income is generated by the Commercial Exploitation Levy because 
the Office for National Statistics simply do not ask what proportion of government 
receipts are generated by the levy. The value of the bribes paid during the Al 
Yamamah deal between the UK and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s are unknown 
beyond a select few because the 1996 National Audit Office report detailing them 
has not been made public, or even revealed to the majority of the Public 
Accounts Committee. To complicate the situation further, it is difficult to separate 
out government support for arms exports from government support for the 
military industry as a whole. 
In additional to DASA's figures, the FCO publish an annual report on Strategic 
Export Decisions which has provided information on licences issued for the 
exportation of controlled goods to all recipient states. Controlled goods include 
both military equipment like tanks and guns as well as non-lethal equipment 
147 See Chalmers et al, The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Expotfs, pp. 6-9. 
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designed for the military and police like anti riot shields and cle-mining 
equipment. But this information is limited. No information at all is provided on 
government to government transfers. Because the Import, Export and Customs 
Powers (Defence) Act 1939 does not bind the Crown, no licence is required for 
government to government transfers. This includes all exports under the huge 
Saudi Al Yamamah deal and all those made under a government to government 
deal with Kuwait that includes the supply of missiles and launchers. "' 
The total value of Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) to each recipient 
state has been shown in the annual reports since 1999. In the 1997 and 1998 
reports only the number of licences issued was reported and readers had no way 
of knowing the size of those orders. Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) 
allow specified arms to a specified recipient up to an agreed limit. The total value 
of Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) has never been provided and OIEL 
holders have never been asked to give details of the value of exports. These kind 
of licences are issued to an exporter to allow unlimited export of specified 
equipment to a specific recipient including small arms, ammunition, armoured 
vehicles, heavy artillery, battle tanks and combat aircraft. The number of open 
licences approved has been included in the reports since 1999 but like the 
situation with standard licences in the 1997 and 1998 reports, there is no way of 
knowing how much equipment is being exported under these licences. As an 
example, there was a huge naval licence issued to 42 different states in 2002 
that authorises the export of equipment including parts for submarines, 
torpedoes, heavy guns, surface to air missiles, heavy machine guns and combat 
aircraft. The licence has been issued for export to states including Angola, 
Colombia, India, Ivory Coast and landlocked Paraguay, a country that has a 
reputation for selling on imported arms. 149 The Paraguay example highlights a 
second problem with the reporting of SIELs and OIELs which is that no 
information is given on end-use assurances - that is on undertakings limiting how 
exported equipment will be used. For example, the reports will not show whether 
148 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 1999 <www. fco. gov. uk> Last accessed 17 th August 
2003. 
149 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence, 21't 
April 2004, HC 390-ii; FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2002 <www. tco. gov. uk> Last 
accessed 17 th August2003. 
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military equipment exported under licence from the UK is intended for the armed 
forces of the recipient state or for another state that happens to have a military 
base inside the recipient state. They do not show what end-use conditions are 
tied to the licence or which state are the ultimate end-users of the equipment. 
Classifying licence decisions according to destination rather than end-user can 
attract unfair criticism particularly where the government has allowed licences to 
recipients under embargo or engaged in conflict. For example the 2001 annual 
report shows that during the year the government approved licences allowing the 
export of body armour to Burundi even though a LIN arms embargo existed. The 
government later explained that this equipment was for the use of UN personnel 
for personal protection. 150 The 2000 annual reports show that the government 
approved a whole range of licences covering small arms and light weapons to 
Morocco. The Defence Manufacturers Association have since explained that at 
least some of those licences were for the supply of props to be used in the film 
"Black Hawk Down". "' The government is reluctant to add what is clearly 
relevant end-user information for reasons "of commercial confidentiality" but 
without it the reader is left with a more negative understanding of export controls 
than might be fair. In contrast, the failure to show the ultimate end user of 
equipment, and this is particularly relevant to exported components, may leave 
the reader with a more positive impression than is fair as exported components 
may end up in states to which the UK government would not normally export. As 
such, although the government claims that their reports mean that the UK has 
the most transparent export licensing system in the world, the information 
included is only partial. As a result these reports are almost exclusively used 
here to demonstrate the continuation of sales to developing states or those at 
risk from conflict on a case by case basis. They cannot be compared to 
WMEAT's more comprehensive statistics. 
1K House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 200 1, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 20th May 2003, HC 474, 
appendix V. 
II House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - 
Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 40. 
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The difficulty in obtaining relevant and accurate statistical information has always 
been a problem in this kind of research. The remainder of this thesis should be 
considered with reference to these caveats. 
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PART ONE 
Why New Labour Supports Arms Exports: The 
Official Reasons 
INTRODUCTION 
The government has put forward a number of reasons why support for arms 
exports should continue. It claims that this support enables UK involvement in the 
international arms market from which wider economic, strategic and political 
benefits are said to accrue. The government talks about the maintenance of jobs, 
savings to the procurement budget, benefits to the balance of trade, the 
maintenance of an strong, strategically important indigenous arms production 
capability, the ability to contribute to the security of UK allies, increased recipient 
state co-operation and the contribution of exports to conflict avoidance. The 
government has consistently avoided offering further explanation or clarification 
of the justifications it has used and has avoided engaging in debate where those 
claims have been open to question. 
The aim of the first half of the thesis is to offer a comprehensive critical 
examination of each of these rationales that have been put forward by the New 
Labour government for continuing to support arms exports beginning with the 
economic case. 
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CHAPTER ONE: CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC 
CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the economic reasons offered 
by the New Labour Government for continuing to support military exports. The 
government claims that support for military exports provides employment, brings 
budgetary savings, benefits the balance of trade and delivers other wider 
economic benefits. ' Each will be examined in turn. 
ARMS EXPORTS DO NOT CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO LEVELS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
Reference to defence-related employment and its importance to the economy 
have been one of, if not the central way in which continued government support 
of arms exports has been justified to the media and to the public. The following 
exchange in May 1994 between The Minister for Trade, Richard Needham and 
John Heppell, Labour MP for Nottingham East is typical: 
Mr. Heppell : Does the Minister agree that, with 200,000 people 
reported dead in East Timor and with John Pilger reporting that 
Hawk jets are being used for aggression against East Timor, 
there is now a case for stopping any licencing of arms sales to 
Indonesia? 
Mr. Needham :I have never seen a report from any reputable 
organisation which suggested a figure of 200,000. The maximum 
number that I saw in the United Nations report from the 1970s 
was some 80,000.1 am not going to argue with the hon. 
Gentleman about the horrendous numbers of people killed in the 
1970s, but if he believes that the problems of East Timor - which 
are, in any event, entirely different now from what they were 20 
years ago - will be solved by an arms embargo, he is entirely 
' See, for example, DESO, Why export defence goods and services? 
<http: //www. deso. mod. uk/policy. htm> Last accessed 30th June 2003; MoD, Defence Industrial 
Policy, Paper number 5, October 2002 <http: //www. dti. gov. uk/pdfs/dip. pdt> Last accessed 30'h 
June 2003. 
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mistaken. Furthermore, I note that as there are no aerospace 
companies or aerospace employees in his constituency 
Mr. Heppell : There are. 
Mr. Needham : If there are, it is even worse. I note that he is 
only too happy to salve his conscience by putting at risk the jobs 
of people in the aerospace industry. 2 
The argument has consistently been that any reduction in government support 
will lead to a loss of jobs with consequential loss of revenue to local economies 
and the exchequer. Despite this emphasis, reportedly even amongst Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) officials it has been acknowledged that on a macro-economic 
,, 3 level the employment argument is "a red herring . This is why. 
Figures published annually by the MoUs DASA and detailed in appendix six 
show estimates of the number of jobs dependent on arms exports both directly 
within the companies manufacturing the export and also indirectly through the 
supply chain. Taking the most recent figures from this table, those for 2001 - 
2002, the MoD estimates that 65,000 jobs were sustained by arms exports. 
30,000 were sustained by contractors selling directly to the MoD. 30,000 were 
sustained indirectly by sub-contractors who often have more than one customer 
making them less dependent on exports. 65,000 highly skilled and versatile 
employees represent 0.22% of total UK employment4 or 1.6% of all 
manufacturing employment. 5 65,000 is a figure dwarfed by the numbers of jobs 
supported by other manufacturing industries during 2001-2002. The rubber and 
plastic products industry supported 224,000 jobs, the chemicals and man-made 
fibres industry supported 234,000 jobs and the non-metallic mineral products and 
6 
metals industry supported 653,000 jobs. Very little attention is paid to these and 
2 House of Commons, Hansard, 11 th May 1994, column 307. 
3 E-mail, Roy Isbister, Saterworld, to the author, 1 9th February 2002. Similarly, a summary report 
written by Paul Ingram of the Oxford Research Group reports that government economists have 
agreed that the jobs argument is "weak". See Tackling the Subsidy Trap: Strategies for Reducing 
Subsidies to Arms Exports: Brief Report, December 2001, Unpublished, p. 2. 4 The Office of National Statistics Labour Force Helpline report that in June 2001 there were 29,516 
000 jobs in the UK. 
5 The Office of National Statistics report that from 2001-2002, on average, 4 million people were 
employed in manufacturing industries in the UK. The Office of National Statistics, Workforce Jobs 
by Industry 1959-2003 <http: //www. statistics. gov. uk> Last accessed 27th April 2004. 
6 The Office of National Statistics, Monthly Digest of Statistics July 2001, table 3.3, 'Employee 
Jobs: All Industries', p. 39 
<http: //www. statistics. gov. uk/downloads/theme-compendia/MD_July_2001. pdf> Last accessed 24 th 
July 2003. 
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other manufacturing industries in comparison to the attention given to the 
comparatively minor number of jobs sustained by arms exports. 
7 DASA does not record the regional distribution of jobs. But if export related jobs 
followed the pattern of jobs dependent on total MoD equipment expenditure 
which DASA did publish up until 2000, most would be based in the overheating 
economies of London and the southeast (38%) and the southwest (17%). In July 
2001 the number of people claiming unemployment- related benefits was 1.6% of 
available workforce jobs in the southeast and 2.5% in the southwest. Outside of 
eastern England, these are the lowest unem ploym ent- related benefit rates in the 
UK. 8 Moreover although a sudden end to military exports may particularly affect 
some localities like Yeovil and Brough, research suggests that the impact on 
traditionally manufacturing areas as a whole would be small. A 2002 study 
estimated that three months after any ban on military exports the number of 
those claiming unemployment related benefits in the northwest would only rise 
from 3.5% to 3.7% and in the West Midlands from 3.5% to 3.6%. 9 One reason for 
this is because it is doubtful whether a reduction in arms exports would actually 
lead to the loss of a proportional amount of jobs. As the MoD's DASA points out 
a "reduction in identified exports does not mean that these jobs disappear: the 
people who supply the effort might be diverted onto other tasks by their 
employer. "'O This would go some way to explain how the number of recorded 
export linked jobs fell by 63% from a peak in 1996/7 (175,000) to 2001/02 
(65,000) without economists reporting any discernable costs to the national 
economy. " 
' DASA does not record the regional distribution of military export related jobs. Until Defence 
Statistics 2001, DASA did show regional variations in jobs directly dependent on MoD equipment 
expenditure. The table has not been included from 2002 onwards because DASA felt that the 
figures were a partial and unreliable measure of the numbers of jobs dependent on MoD 
expenditure. For those regional distribution figures given in 2001 it is open to debate whether they 
can be used to estimate the distribution of jobs dependent on exports. 8 Based on the latest regional distribution figures for jobs dependent on equipment expenditure 
1998-1999. DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2001, table 1.12; The Office of National Statistics, Labour 
Market Trends, July 2001, Table C24 <http: //www. statistics. gov. uk> Last accessed 30th June 2003. 9 Ian Goudie, The Employment Consequences of a Ban on Arms Exports, (London: CAAT, 
September 2002) p. 16 <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/economics/Jýobs- 
0902. php> Last accessed 24 1h July 2003. 
10 E-mail, DASA, to the author, 2n October 2002. 
11 DASA, UKDefence Statistics 2001, table 1.11; UK Defence Statistics 2002, table 1.11; UK 
Defence Statistics 2003, table 1.9. 
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This last point highlights an important trend. It is doubtful whether the current 
levels of arms export related employment could be sustained even if government 
support is maintained at current levels given that the military export sector is 
widely accepted to have been declining for some time, even by the MoD. 12 In 
1995 Neil Cooper found that between 1990 and 1995 the arms market shrunk by 
13 42% . 
Reassessing this using indicators updated to 1999, the last year for which 
all are available, suggests that the major trend Cooper highlighted is continuing 
although there has been some recovery in the arms market, only now having 
shrunk by 23% if 1999 is compared to 1990. Of particular note is DASA's 
estimate of a 50% decline in the number of military export related jobs in the 
UK. 14 These and other changes are shown in appendix seven. 
Given this trend, it is worth noting that most economists working in the field agree 
that should the land, government subsidies and the skilled labour power be 
released and become available for less capital intensive, non-military companies, 
and research has particularly looked at technically comparable environmental 
industries, a net increase in employment opportunities would result. 15 A 1990 
study estimated that a 50% defence expenditure reduction from the 1992 level, if 
reinvested, could lead to the creation of 600,000 more jobs in 2000.16 This is 
echoed in the work of the economists Malcolm Chalmers, Neil Davies, Keith 
12 For example, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment 
of the New Head of Defence Export Services, 31 gt March 1999, HC 147, 'Memorandum submitted 
to the Defence Committee from the Ministry of Defence on the Defence Export Services 
Organisation'. 
13 Neil Cooper, The Cost of UK Defence Exports, paper presented to the Annual Conference on 
Economists and Security, date and location unknown, pp. 2-3. 
14 DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2002, table 1.11; DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2001, table 1.11. 
15 For the potential of environmental technologies see, for example, Miriam Pemberton, Arms and 
Environmental Technologies', October 1998 <http: //www. f pit. o rg/brief s/vo I 3/v3n 31 arms. him I> Last 
accessed 17 th August 2003; Miriam Pemberton and Michael Renner, A Tale of Two Markets: Trade 
in Arms and Environmental Technologies, National Commission for Economic Conversion and 
Disarmament and Institute for Policy Studies, May 1998 
<http: //www. webcom. com/ncecd/taleoftwomarkets. htmI#pr> Last accessed 17 th August 2003. For 
the wider effects of military support see Paul Ingram and Ian Davis, The Subsidy Trap: British 
Government Financial Support forArms Exports and the Defence Industry (Oxford Research Group 
and Saferworld, July 2001) pp. 37-38; Anthony Sampson, The Arms Bazaar (Kent: Coronet Books, 
1991); Malcolm Chalmers, Paying for Defence: Military Spending and British Decline (London: 
Pluto Press, 1985); Ron Smith, 'Military Expenditures and Investment in OECD Countries 1954-73', 
journal of Comparative Economics, 4: 1 (1980), pp. 1-30; Samuel Britian, 'Exports and Arms Brief', 
October 2000 <http: //www. samuelbrittan. co. uk> Last accessed 17 th August 2003; Ben Jackson, 
Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales (London: World Development 
Movement, 1995), pp. 10,14. 
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Hartley and Chris Wilkinson who estimate that halving military exports over a 
two-year period would lead to the loss of almost 49,000 jobs with associated 
costs via multiplier effects. But 67,400 (albeit potentially lower waged) jobs would 
be created in non-military sectors over the following five years bringing 
associated multiplier benefits. 17 
A small body of literature in the US has begun to make more detailed 
comparisons between the government support for and future outlook of the 
defence and environmental industries. One report has argued that the 
international market for environmental technologies, estimated at being worth 
$400 billion, is double the size of the international market for military hardware, 
estimated at being worth $200 billion and that while analysts predict rapid growth 
for the former, they predict decline for the later. 18 The envirotech market 
employed 4.3 million people in the US in 1998 compared to 2.8 million in 1985 
whereas the arms industry employed 2.3 million people in 1998 compared to 3.7 
in 1987. Despite these predictions and trends, the US government spends twelve 
times more on the arms industry than the envirotech industries even though half 
of all US arms export revenues come from taxpayer funded subsidies while only 
one dollar in 25 from envirotech revenues come from taxpayer subsidies. It is this 
uncertainty in the future of military industries which has led to calls in the UK for 
the kinds of support offered to large arms manufacturers, tax credits for example, 
to be diverted towards small business, especially the labour intensive 
environmental industries. Despite the profitability and employment success of 
small business to the UK economy, representing 46% of non-government 
employment and producing 42% of economic output, the sector suffers from 
difficult trading conditions. High bank rates and lack of government support in 
terms of subsidies and under-investment has lead to instability in the small 
enterprise sector. '9 It is likely that even a small diversion of resources would 
16 Terry Barker, Paul Dunne and Ron Smith, 'Measuring the Peace Dividend in the UK', 
Department of Applied Economics Working Paper No. 9019,1990, University of Cambridge, 
England. 
17 Malcolm Chalmers, Neil Davies, Keith Hartley and Chris Wilkinson, The Economic Costs and 
Benefits of UK Defence Exports (York: University of York Centre for Defence Economics, 2001) 
v, paragraphs 24-33 & 39. 
Pemberton, Arms and Environmental Technologies. 
'9 Ingram and Davies, The Subsidy Trap, p. 37. 
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create more sustainable and secure employment than that offered in military 
industry. 
In response to the kinds of arguments outlined above, the Minister for Defence 
Procurement Lord Bach, recently turned to the argument that the initial 
adjustment costs suffered by former military export employees in the scenario set 
out by Chalmers et al. above would be prohibitively high . 
2' He argued that 
although Chalmers et al. estimated that a halving of exports would create more 
jobs in the long-term, they also estimated that the adjustment costs could be as 
high as E2 billion to E2.5 billion . 
21 Of this E463 million - F795 million would 
represent costs to former defence employees, prompting Bach to argue "most 
people would consider costs of this scale as substantial; certainly many workers 
22 in the defence industry and their families would be hit hard". The expense 
would arise from a loss of income as a result of unemployment, because most 
will typically reenter the labour force on a lower wage or because of loss of future 
income should former employees permanently withdraw from the labour market 
due, for example, to age. 
It is interesting to note that concerns over the "prohibitively high" costs of 
adjustment on employees have not been so forthcoming when other industries 
have been faced with large job losses. Between 1985 and 1993,33,000 jobs 
were lost in the electricity industry, 70,000 jobs were lost in metal 
manufacturing23 and 180,000 jobs were lost in the coal industry. Unlike workers 
in military industries, those from the coal industry did not enjoy highly 
transferable ski IIS. 24 
20 Lord Bach, 'MoD Has No Difficulty With York Report', Financial Times, 13 th March 2002. 
21 Almost half of the E2.5 billion adjustment estimate cited by Lord Bach, El, 120 is a cost 
associated with the 'terms of trade effect'. This arises from the increased cost of imports and 
reduced cost of exports it currency were devalued because of the loss of military exports. The 
'terms of trade' effect is speculative and unpredictable and has been highlighted as such by the 
authors. Chalmers et al. The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 7e. 22 Bach, 'MoD Has No Difficulty With York Report'. 
23 Chalmers et al. The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 31. 24 Samuel Brittan, 'The free market case against arms promotion', The New Statesman, 1 81h 
September 2003; Unnamed, 'An arms sales ban would cost nothing', The New Statesman, 141h 
June 2004. 
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The adjustment costs to former employees estimated by Chalmers et al. and 
drawn on by Bach, are based on the findings of a study by Nick Hooper, Barbara 
Butler, Keith Hartley, Derek Braddon and Paul Dowdall on the effects of 10,000 
defence worker redundancies from 1989-1994 in the South WeSt. 25 This is one of 
a number of studies on the experiences of defence employees post redundancy 
as shown in appendix eight. The summaries show that there have been changes 
in the conclusions drawn by the most recent reports as compared to those written 
in the early to mid 1990s. 
A review of the limited number of studies conducted in this field suggests that 
although in the early to mid 1990s, adjustment costs to military workers were 
significant, both stronger economic performance in the late 1990s along with the 
introduction of a multi-agency approach to redundancies has minimised the 
impact of redundancy on former workers. 
That arms exports maintain a significant number of UK jobs is one of the most 
important justifications offered by consecutive governments and has come under 
the fiercest attack by critics of the government's policies. But a consideration of 
the number and location of military export related jobs together with their future 
prospects, the opportunity costs associated with their maintenance and the 
potential to minimise adjustment costs shows that when properly put into context 
the jobs argument becomes unsustainable. It is this potential which has led 
proponents to turn to other economic justifications in favour of sustaining 
26 
exports. The most popular alternative is to refer to the savings to be made to 
the procurement budget. 
IT IS UNCLEAR HOW MILITARY EXPORTS REDUCE MOD PROCUREMENT COSTS 
BY THE AMOUNT CLAIMED 
In 1999 the MoD claimed that every year it saves an estimated F-350 million of 
the procurement budget from spreading overhead costs over the longer 
25 Chalmers et al. The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 34. 
26 interview, Gerald Howarth with author, April 2002. 
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production runs generated by exports. 27 Longer runs also supposedly allow both 
research and development costs and production costs to be spread over more 
units of production (economies of scale) while also allowing the MoD to benefit 
from greater efficiency experienced after initial production (learning economies). 
But it remains unclear how any of these translate into the kind of savings that the 
MoD claims it enjoys. 
Manufacturers typically use their largely non-competitive environment (an 
estimated 85% of MoD procurement expenditure goes to UK-based firmS)2" and 
the willingness of the MoD to contribute early in the development process to 
research and development expenses to cover their fixed costs. So by the time 
the company comes to sell in the fiercely competitive international market, made 
up of other subsidised companies, products can, if necessary, be sold at near 
29 
marginal costs of manufacture and marketing. With exports contributing little to 
the fixed costs, the MoD's procurement price will not be reduced. 30 
Although buying in quantity should reduce unit production costs, and therefore 
MoD procurement costs, this is dependent on knowing the length of production 
prior to investment .3' Typically export orders are placed well after the domestic 
production run is established, often many years later. The economist Stephen 
Martin argues that "it is unclear how the order by, say, Finland for seven Hawk 
aircraft in 1990 will have reduced the unit production cost of 176 Hawks delivered 
to the RAF between 1976 and 1982. , 32 The impact of exporting is to prolong the 
existence of the production line via piece-meal orders, a lengthening which 
benefits the company but does not increase the rate of production at the time of 
domestic procurement and so does nothing to reduce the price paid by the MoD. 
A French National Assembly Committee found exactly this in half of the 21 
27 MoD, MoD Performance Report, paragraph 602 as quoted in House of Commons Defence 
Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment of the New Head of Defence Export Services, 
31st March 1999, paragraph 9. 
28 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, p. 51. 
29 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, p. 35. 
30 David Mepham and Paul Eavis, The Missing Link in Labour's Foreign Policy (London: IPPR and 
Saferworld, 2002) p. 29. 
31 Stephen Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports', Journal of Economic 
Studies, 26: 1 (1999), pp. 15-37, pp. 17-22. 
32 Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports', p. 20. 
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French export programmes they considered. 33 There may be benefits to MoD 
procurement costs should follow on orders, mid-life updates or spares be 
required but any potential savings made by the manufacturer from additional 
units of production will not automatically be passed to the MoD. Many companies 
produce a mixture of military and civil products and may well divert any savings 
to the latter. 
Longer production runs should also reduce MoD procurement costs via "learning 
economies" where production time per unit decreases with experience. But this 
kind of contribution is likely to be limited. Labour efficiencies are not indefinite. 
Learning curves tend to "flatten out" after 100 units in the UK. In addition, 
exported items typically differ from those originally produced for the domestic 
customer. 34 
It is possible that the MoD are saving up to E350 million p. a. by spreading 
overheads over a greater number of units according to Martin. But that does not 
mean that should exports reduce, the MoD would be paying F-350 million more 
p. a. because overheads would not remain fixed. In the long-term, overheads 
would become flexible in response to reduced industry output. At best, exports 
are contributing F-1 68 million p. a. to overhead costs, a cost that the MoD would 
35 otherwise have to pay. Using a different methodology, Chalmers et al. estimate 
that exports contributed an average of F-325 million p. a. to fixed overheads from 
1995/96 - 1999/00. This is a figure similar to the government's E350 million p. a. 
claim but Chalmers et al. estimate that 80% of these costs would initially be met 
by the companies themselves who would progressively transfer the costs to the 
MoD over subsequent years. As firms reorganize, after only five years just 50% 
of these costs would remain 36 and even a El 63 million cost only equates to 1.6% 
of annual MoD equipment expenditure. 37 
33 French National Assembly, The Committee on National Defence and the Armed Forces, 2000, as 
quoted by Brittan, Exports and Arms Brief, October 2000. 
34 Martin, 'The Subsidy Saving from reducing UK arms exports', p. 20. 
35 Martin, 'The subsidy saving from reducing UK arms exports', pp. 17-22. 
36 Chalmers el al. The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, p. v, paragraphs 70- 
76. 
37 Based on DASA figures reporting 2000-2001 MoD procurement expenditure at El 0,408 million, 
DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2002, table 1.7. 
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Without further comment from the MoD to explain how they arrived at their 
estimated annual saving to the procurement budget, the government's claim is 
difficult to reconcile with the kinds of arguments put forward above. Similarly 
difficult to reconcile has been the rationale based on savings to the balance of 
trade to which this thesis will now turn. 
MILITARY EXPORTS DO NOT MAKE A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE 
BALANCE OF TRADE 
Arms deliveries made up only 1.5% of all UK exports in 2002 38 continuing a 
steady decline since the end of the Cold War from 3.3% in 1989 . 
39 This 1.5% 
itself may overestimate the contribution of military exports to the UK balance of 
trade since imported components typically make up a large proportion of 
exported equipment. What proportion this might be is not included in the Annual 
Defence Statistics because although MoD figures show the value of imports of 
defence equipment, DASA has "no way of identifying the value/volume of imports 
which then go on to be used in the manufacture of potential defence exports. "" 
But economists have illustrated the potential importance of these figures by 
highlighting how the average import content of exported equipment is 40%. This 
rises to 45% for the military aerospace sector, a sector that comprises about 80% 
of all UK exports. 41 
What small contribution military exports do make to the balance of trade must 
also be qualified in at least three further ways. First, many arms deals now 
include some kind of offset agreement. This may involve the supplier state 
buying goods from or investing in the recipient states' military or non military 
industries, the transfer of production to the recipient state or it may involve 
accepting goods in kind for exported equipment. This practice can mean both 
that the full value of the equipment exported is not realised and it can have a 
38 According to DASA the estimated value of deliveries of defence equipment in 2002 was E4,120 
million, UK Defence Statistics 2003, table 1.12. The Office of National Statistics report that the total 
value of all UK exports in 2002 was E273,270 million, The Office of National Statistics: Exports and 
Imports of Good and Services 1946-2003 <http: //www. statistics. gov. uk> Last accessed 27 th April 
2004. 
39 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1999-2000, 
table 11. 
4" E-mail, DASA, to author, 11 th September 2002. 
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negative impact on other UK manufacturing sectors. As an example the UK 
government accepted both bananas from Ecuador and spiral staircases and 
42 
vodka from Finland as part payment for Hawks . In 2002 
BAE Systems, 
supported by the MoD, signed an agreement reportedly worth El billion to 
modernise Thailand's armed forces by selling BAE Systems Hawks and guns. As 
part payment BAE Systems is investing and marketing Thai food in the UK and 
abroad which may include Thai chickens after the IDTI took steps to help 
Thailand remove EU import restrictions placed after harmful chemicals were 
43 found. UK Farmers claim that the deal will cost some their jobs. Offsets 
involving investment in foreign military companies or the transfer of military 
production to buyer states also raise the question of what future contribution 
military sales can make to the UK balance of trade if, in the long term, deals are 
effectively helping to create indigenous industries in UK recipient states. 
Although exporters often refrain from exporting the most key technological 
advances, the export of today's technology still works to further crowd an already 
fiercely competitive market. 
Second, the contribution from arms exports to the balance of trade is further 
affected by many recipients defaulting on their repayments. This leaves the 
ECGD and eventually the taxpayer to pay the claims. The government have 
admitted that in the last 15 years the ECGD has paid out on loans and is still 
waiting to recover their costs for arms deals with Algeria (E98 million), Egypt (F-46 
million), Indonesia (F-1 31 million), Kenya (F-1 6 million) and Jordan (f-253 
44 
million). Many more recipients have defaulted, as listed in appendix nine, 
although the costs to the ECGD have not been published in all of these cases. 
But if those ECGID costs that have been made available are offset with ECGD 
receipts, figures still show that from 1991/1992 to 1999/2000, that ECGD defence 
business has cost the taxpayer at least an average of F-52 million per year. 45 
41 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 23. 
42 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 26. 
43 Anthony Barnett, 'UK Forges Elbn Secret Arms Deal with Thailand', The Observer, 1 oth 
November 2002. 
44 House of Commons, Hansard, 16 1h February 2000, Written Answers, column 559. 
45 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, p. 21. 
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Third, the contribution to the balance of trade must also be set against the 
opportunity cost of investing an annual subsidy, possibly up to E990 million in 
identifiable costs alone in a declining capital intensive industry as opposed to 
those which may bring much greater balance of trade benefits. In 1995, in 
comparison to their share of total UK exports DESO received ten times that of 
the department promoting civil exports, the DTI's Overseas Trade Services. 46 
Given the value of military export deliveries in 2001 and updated budget figures, 
DESO now receives eleven times more. 47 
All the publicly available indicators suggest that military exports represent poor 
value for money, they contribute little to the balance of trade and are expected to 
contribute even less in the future. Given this, and earlier conclusions, the idea 
that exports may bring wider economic benefits becomes more crucial to the 
government's economic case. 
THE WIDER ECONOMIC BENEFITS ARE AT BEST LIMITED 
All the evidence suggests that the long-term impact of a reduction of military 
exports on the UK economy would be either negligible or beneficial. Research 
carried out by Chalmers et al., whose team included two MoD economists looked 
at the economic effects of a 50% reduction over two years in military exports on 
48 
the government, UK shareholders and UK workers. This included the potential 
effects on the value of sterling, on UK exports and foreign investment in the UK, 
public sector borrowing, interest rates, the "terms of trade effect" and the longer- 
term supply side consequences. They found that the initial one-off adjustment 
cost spread over the first five years would be between EO. 9 billion and F-1.4 billion 
(but possibly up to E2.5 billion if a speculative terms of trade cost is included). 
After this, national income would be "substantively the same" as it was prior to a 
reduction. Although Chalmers et al. find a continuing cost to the government of 
"' Jackson, Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, p. 12. 
47 The most recent figures (1999/00) show that the net operating cost of DESO was 21 3.6m, 
Chalmers et al The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 56. UK Trade 
and Investment Annual Resources accounts show that E72 million was spent on trade promotion 
and development, UK Trade and Investment's Resource Accounts 2002-2003 
<http: //wvvw. uktradeinvest. gov. uk/corporate. html> last accessed 6 th August 2004. 48 Chalmers et al The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports. 
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between F-40 million and El 00 million p. a. in contrast to other reports which find a 
continuing saving to government of between E228 and E990 million p. a. should 
military exports end Chalmers et al. still conclude, "the economic costs of 
reducing defence exports are relatively small and largely one off. " The final 
conclusion by Chalmers et al. that "the balance of argument about defence 
exports should depend mainly on non-economic considerations" delivers an even 
more significant blow to the government's economic rationale. 49 
CONCLUSION 
The government claims that exporting arms maintains a significant number of jobs, 
generates income to benefit the balance of trade and brings wider economic benefits 
to the UK. But the MoD's own estimates show that, at most, 65,000 jobs are now 
sustained by military exports, just 0.22% of all UK jobs. 50 This 65,000 is itself a 
reduction from the 175,000 jobs sustained by exports in 1996/7, a 63% decline which 
occurred without economists reporting any discernable costs to the national 
51 
economy. In terms of the balance of trade, arms deliveries now made up 1.5% of all 
52 UK exports. Even this overestimates the contribution that exports make because 
53 the import content of UK exported goods is an estimated 40%, because states 
often default on repaymentS54 and because the UK has accepted goods in kind like 
bananas from Ecuador and spiral staircases from Finland often at a financial loss on 
55 the original contract and often at a cost to other UK exporting sectors. In terms of 
the long term impact of a reduction of military exports on the UK economy, the 
findings of a 2001 report, written in part by two MoD economists, suggested that "the 
economic costs of reducing defence exports are relatively small and largely one 
49 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 7,86. 50 The Office of National Statistics (ONS) report that in June 2001 there were 29,516 000 jobs in 
the UK (ONS, Labour Force helpline); DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2001, table 1.11 
<http: //www. dasa. mod. uk> last accessed on 2nd June 2004. 51 DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2003, table 1.9 <http: //www. dasa. mod. uk> Last accessed on 26th 
June 2004. 
52 DASA estimate the value of military equipment deliveries in 2002 was C4,120 million. UK 
Defence Statistics 2003, table 1.12. The ONS report that the total value of all UK exports in 2002 
was C273,270 million. The Office of National Statistics: Exports and Imports of Good and Services 
1946-2003 <http: //www. statistics. gov. uk> Last accessed 26'h June 2004. 
53 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 23. 
54 See, for example, House of Commons, Hansard, 16" February 2000, Written Answers, column 
559. 
55 House of Commons, Hansard, 17 th May 2000, Written Answers, columns 133-134, - Phythian, The 
Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p 26. 
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off.,, 56 The final conclusion, that "the balance of argument about defence exports 
should depend mainly on non-economic considerations" delivers an even more 
significant blow to the government's economic rationale . 
5' Arms sales may well reap 
economic rewards for arms manufacturers but not for the treasury/taxpayer or for 
other more efficient and sustainable industries. In response to the work of 
Chalmers et al. (often called the "York Report"), Lord Bach has recently admitted 
that the MoD: 
have no difficulty with the York report's conclusion that "the 
balance of argument about defence exports should depend 
mainly on non-economic considerations" ... the government's 
prime justification for supporting defence exports has always 
been to help maintain a strong defence industry that underpins 
our own security and to contribute to the security of friends and 
allies overseas, most of whom do not have a significant defence 
production capability of their own. 58 
In light of this shift of emphasis, this thesis will proceed to examine each of the 
strategic rationales put forward here by Lord Bach. 
56 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 86. 
57 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 86. 
'8 Bach, 'MoD Has No Difficulty With York Report'. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGIC 
CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
This aim of this chapter is to consider the strategic rationales put forward by the 
New Labour government to justify the support given to arms exporting 
companies. Although less quantifiable than the economic benefits said to be 
accrued, the strategic arguments have become the second major way in which 
New Labour has defended its ongoing policy. The government has made three 
claims. Arms exports are said to underpin a strong, strategically important 
indigenous arms production capability in the UK. That capability is supposedly 
strategically necessary to supply the UK's own forces. That capability means that 
those states friendly to the UK are supplied with weapons increasing the security 
of those recipient states. ' Each will be taken in turn. 
MILITARY EXPORTS DO NOT FACILITATE THE CONTINUATION OF A 
STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AND GLOBALLY COMPETITIVE UK MILITARY 
CAPABILITY 
The government argues that the help offered to UK-based arms-producing 
companies to export enables them to remain competitive in the international 
arms market where sales provide the profits needed by firms who make up the 
backbone of a defence industrial base. 2 In turn this industry brings to the UK the 
strategically important benefit of a supply of military equipment in times of crisis. 3 
In adopting this approach the government is effectively making three arguments: 
' See, for example, DESO, Why export defence goods and services? 
<http: //www. deso. mod. uk/policy. htm> Last accessed 30th June 2003. 2 The "defence industrial base" is defined by the military economist Dunne as "a sector or groups of 
industries that are depenclant to some degree on defence spending and upon which the state is 
dependent for some degree of self sufficiency in the production of the means of defence and war" 
J. Paul Dunne, 'The Defence Industrial Base'in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds. ), Handbook 
of Defence Economics: Volume 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1995) p. 401. 
3 For example DESO, Why export defence goods and services?; The Defence Manufacturers 
Association, 'Defence Exports-General Information' <http: //www. the-dma. org. uk> Last accessed 
17 1h August 2003; House of Commons, Hansard, 28 th July 1997, Written Answers, column 26. 
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(1) that exports are critical to the continuation of a UK military industry, (2) that 
the retention of a specifically "UK" based military industry "underpins our own 
securi ty,, 4 and (3) that, helped by exports, this industry is internationally 
competitive. These three benefits said to derive from military exports are worth 
considering in some detail. 
(1) Are arms exports critical to the continuation of a UK military industry? 
MoD figures shown in appendix ten indicate that the number of jobs dependent 
on military exports as a proportion of employment from all MoD defence 
expenditure and equipment exports has increased slightly since 1980-1981. 
5 Moreover, the DTI claim that 60% of UK Aerospace output is exported. These 
figures suggest that the government is right to emphasise the importance of 
exports to the continuation of UK military industry. 
But other relevant figures are not made public making this a difficult claim to 
examine effectively. Data showing variations in levels of government support and 
how the number of companies involved in selling arms has increased, reduced or 
remained stable in comparison are not available. Neither are figures showing the 
unit price of exported equipment offered on the international market and to what 
extent government support reduces this price. DASA does not publish data 
showing what percentage of industrial sector output, such as that from aerospace 
and shipbuilding, is purchased by the MoD. 6 The Defence Manufacturers 
Association (DMA) estimates that 40% of UK-based output is for export. 
Unhelpfully, it does not comment on how much profit is derived from this 40%, an 
important point given the argument above that exports are often sold at near 
marginal costs. The DMA also does not distinguish between exports to UK 
partners, which will later form part of collaborative projects, and "real" exports. 
The Association does comment that "without export markets, some companies 
would clownsize and others would close down completely", 7 but again fails to say 
how many companies and with exactly what effects on indigenous capability. In 
4 Lord Bach, 'MoD Has No Difficulty With York Report', Financial Times, 13 th March 2002. 
5 The Department of Trade and Industry, 'Aerospace and Defence' 
<http: //www. dti. gov. uk/sectors - 
aerospace. html> Last accessed 4 th August 2003. 
6 E-mail, DASA to author, 81h July 2002. 
7 E-mail, DMA to author, 21 " November 2002. 
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sum, the three-way relationship between government support, the profits to be 
derived from military sales and UK-based military industry is far from clear. 
(2) Does UK military industry underpin UK security? 
Even if it is assumed that some kind of reduction in exports did actually have a 
detrimental effect on industry, this does not automatically translate into a 
detrimental effect on UK security. The government has argued that the 
maintenance of a strong military industry assures a relative security advantage 
because it ensures security of supply. The availability of a UK military capability 
cannot be trusted to non UK-based companies either on the basis of availability 
or price. Gerald Howarth, member of the shadow government, argues 
It is extremely important that that we maintain a viable defence 
industrial base in this country because if you don't you run the 
risk of your country being dependent for essential equipment 
upon a third party who might withhold that equipment at your 
particular hour of need. That would seriously inhibit Britain's 
capacity to defend itself and therefore that is, in my view, 
unacceptable. 8 
But this idea that the retention of a UK-based military industry underpins UK 
security ignores not only the confusion over what the UK's minimum military 
capability should be but also the consequences of increased interdependence 
amongst arms-producing companies. Both issues work to undermine the simple 
UK military industry equals UK security equation. 
The MoD does not make clear exactly what the minimum military capability that 
arms-producing companies operating in the UK should retain for reasons of 
national security. When the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
asked the 1999 Minister for Defence Procurement, Lord Gilbert, he replied that 
"the list is very short". 9 The October 2002 Defence Industrial Policy paper gave 
the examples of "nuclear technology, defence against biological, chemical and 
Interview, Gerald Howarth with author, May 2002. 
House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Fifth Report: Security of Supply and the 
Future of Royal Ordnance Factory Bishopton, 28 th May 1999, HC274, Minutes of Evidence, 24 
1h 
February 1999, questions 25 and 29 
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radiological warfare, and some counter-terrorist capabilities. "' 0 The MoD are yet 
to confirm whether the companies which may possibly clownsize or close 
following a reduction or curtailment of exports are in any way providers of this 
kind of capability. 
The MoD can confirm that it is outdated to conceive of military industry in national 
terms. " Arms-producing companies have been busy responding to military 
budget cuts and the importance of high technology solutions in two ways. First, 
they have fostered cross border arms development/production projects, like the 
Eurofighter Typhoon so that by 1999-2000 15-25% of the procurement budget 
was spent on collaborative projects or on collaboratively produced equipment. 
This level is predicted to rise further 12 because, as the MoD itself argues "it is 
increasingly evident that a national industrial base which supplies the full range 
of defence products is no longer sustainable". 13 Second, arms-producing 
companies have been following a programme of merger or acquisition with other 
companies to form, for example, EADS and AgustaWestland, MBDA and 
Eurocopter. The MoD admits that BAE Systems does more business with the US 
government than the UK government. 14 The company's North American 
operations accounted for 24% (F-232 million) of BAE Systems' 2003 profit (080 
15 million). Reportedly 40,000 of its 110,000 employees are to be found 
overseas. 16 It has removed the word "British" from the company name and now 
calls itself a multi-national. More than 50% of BAE Systems and Rolls Royce 
shareholders are not British. 17 In July 2003 Blair was lobbying George Bush to 
allow UK-based arms companies greater access to sensitive American military 
technology ahead of a possible purchase of BAE Systems by one of the large 
American military companies. The Treasury is said to be "relaxed about the 
'0 MoD, Defence Industrial Policy, October 2002 <http: //www. mod. uk/issues/industrial-policy. htm> 
Last accessed 17 th August 2003; Letter, MoD to author, 1 81h September 2002. 
" MoD, Defence Industrial Policy, paragraph 14. 
12 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence 
Major Projects Report 2000,28 th November 2001, HC 368, Questions 134-135 
<http: //Www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm200lO2/cmselect/cmpubacc/368/36802. htm> Last 
accessed 5 th August 2003. 
13 House of Commons, Select Committee on Defence, First Report: The Six Nation Framework 
Agreement, 14 th February 2001, HC 115, memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Defence (Ist 
December 2000) < http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/cm20000l/cmselect/cmdtence/i 15/1011 001. htm> Last accessed 5 th August 2003. 
14 Letter, MoD to author, 9th July 2002. 
15 BAe Systems, Annual Report 2003, p. 7. 
16 Christopher Wrigley, The Arms Industry, (London: CAAT, 2001). 
17 Letter, MoD to author, 9th July 2002. 
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plan" . 
18 Arms-producing companies are increasingly stateless. Even if a company 
wanted to ensure security of supply to the UK in times of crisis, as seen, an 
estimated 40% of equipment produced within the UK is comprised of imported 
components and materials. '9 It is reasonable to assume that a similar percentage 
of components in UK sourced MoD procurement are imported from abroad. The 
idea of a "UK" military industrial base and the idea that it can ensure UK security, 
if required, is increasingly meaningless. 
Moreover, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee commented in 
1998 that "there are likely to be few cases in the foreseeable future where the UK 
would wish to operate alone militari ly.,, 20 This questions the whole necessity for 
the maintenance of a national "defence industrial base" whose existence is 
premised on the idea of the UK being able to fight a major war dependent on its 
own weapons supply. 
The government actually faces a number of choices when determining how best 
to maintain UK security. The real options include European governments opening 
their procurement to European military companies (estimated saving between F-3 
billion and f-3.5 billion p. a. ). Other options include UK participation in a single 
European procurement agency which would either be responsible for purchasing 
common equipment for a single EU wide military capability (estimated saving E4 - 
4.5 billion p. a. ) or facilitating joint projects (estimated saving E2.4 billion p. a. ). If 
procurement was opened up to any company worldwide, the savings to the UK 
could be an estimated E4 billion p. a. 21 Just one example where this last option 
would have saved money is the Eurofighter Typhoon. According to DASA 
estimates, in 1996, the UK government was spending El 5 billion to develop, 
construct and deliver 230 Eurofighters, a cost estimated to have risen to Ell 8.9 
'a Dan Roberts and Peter Spiegel, 'Blair to ask US to share defence technology', Financial Times, 
11 th July 2003. 
" Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, (York: University of 
York Centre for Defence Economics, 2001) paragraph 23. 
20 House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Seventh Report; Aspects of Defence 
Procurement and Industrial Policy, 23 rd July 1998, HC 675, paragraph 22 
<http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- th off ice. co, uk/pa/cm 1 99798/cmselect/cmdfence/675/67502. htm> Last accessed 5 August2003. 
21 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap: British Government Financial Support for Arms Exports 
and the Defence Industry (Oxford Research Group and Saferworld, July 2001) pp. 8,58-60. 
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billion in March 2001,22 that is, roughly E324 for every adult and child in the UK. 
But in line with Michael Heseltine's comment that "there is practically nothing that 
you cannot buy cheaper from the US,,, 23 the cost would reportedly have been 
less than two thirds had similar fighters been bought from the America. 24 
For its strategic justification to be sustainable the government has to provide a 
systematic, detailed analysis of how exports contribute to that part of UK-based 
military industry considered to be strategically vital. It has to show how, in an era 
of increasingly stateless arms-producing companies, of mutual dependence for 
components and of alliances, the retention of a UK defence industrial base is 
strategically important to the country as a whole, not just to arms-producing 
companies. If it is still important, it must establish how much the UK public is 
willing to pay for it over and above the alternatives on offer. The government has 
yet to prove its case. 
(3) Is UK-based military industry "outstandingly successful" on the world stage ? 25 
As part of establishing just how much the UK public is willing to pay, the 
government must show value for money; it must show that the industry, helped 
by exports, is an international success story. But the evidence suggests that 
export and non-export related subsidies along with an increasingly monopolised 
environment in military production serve to prop up an inefficient defence 
26 
industrial base. 
Figures published by SIPRI show an increased rate of concentration in the arms 
industry, especially in the second half of the 1990s. Appendix eleven shows that 
22 DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2002, table 1.16 
<http: //www. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2002/ukds. html> Last accessed 24 th July 2003. 
23 Quoted in Neil Cooper, British Arms Exports: a vicious circle of disadvantage?, Plymouth 
International Papers, March 1995, p. 17. 
24 Joanna Walters and Peter Beaumont, 'Making a killing in the arms trade', The Observer, 24 1h 
November 1996. 
25 MoD, The Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, paragraph 162 
<http: //www. mod. uk/issues/sdr/procurement. htm> Last accessed 28 th July 2003. " Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, pp. 53-54. 
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by 2000 the five largest arms companies in the world accounted for 42% of all 
21 
arms sales. 
What has been declining is the ability of largely UK-based companies to deliver 
on budget and on time workable versions of the largest MoD projects, an inability 
affecting UK security of supply. One way of measuring the efficiency of UK-based 
military industry is to look at whether companies deliver equipment to the MoD on 
budget and on time. Appendix twelve shows the record of the 25 largest MoD 
equipment projects during the 1990s. 
The Major Projects Report 2000 and all subsequent reports are not directly 
comparable to those published between 1994 and 1999 whose details have been 
used in the table above. Amongst other changes, instead of analysing the 25 
largest projects, the reports published from 2000 onwards look at the largest 20 
projects in the demonstration and manufacture stage and the 10 largest projects 
in the assessment phase. This change reflects the introduction of the "smart 
procurement" reforms and the introduction of Resource Accounting and 
Budgeting. But the trends identified above are continuing. In 2001 the Public 
Accounts Committee found delays to two thirds of the most developed projects 
28 leading to capability shortfalls for the UK's own forces. In 2003 the committee 
found cost overruns of at least E3.1 billion and average time slippage of 18 
months per project, twice the average delay recorded in the Major Projects 
Report 2002 and one of the poorest recent performances. 29 
But using cost slippage to measure efficiency is problematic. The Public 
Accounts Committee and the National Audit office on whose figures table 2.3 is 
based both found a considerable and consistent history of cost overruns on the 
largest 25 MoD equipment projects during the 1990s, both including and 
excluding the Trident and Eurofighter projects. The Trident project was being 
reported as significantly under budget until it was no longer included in the MoD 
27 information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 'Arms Industry 
Database: Change in Concentration Ratios, SIPRI Top 100 Companies 1990-1998' 
<http: //projects. sipri. se/milex/aprod/trendstab5. html> Last accessed 28, 
ý July 2003. 
2" House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence 
Major Projects Report 2000,28 th November 2001, HC 368, paragraph 4. 
2' National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2003,23 rd January 2004, HC 
195, p. 3. 
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project reports from 1997 onwards. Savings were made on the project because 
the UK government decided to process missiles in America, to reduce the 
number of warheads on submarines following the end of the cold war and 
because the initial programme costs had been overestimated. The savings being 
made were not due to increased efficiency. 'o But in table 2.3 they work to offset 
the large cost overruns on the Eurofighter and disguise the cost overrun figures 
for the remaining 23 projects. Because of this, the National Audit Office chose to 
report both the estimated costs of overruns including and excluding Trident and 
Eurofighter. This case illustrates just one of the problems of using cost slippage 
to gauge the effectiveness of industry. Companies operating in an increasingly 
monopolised environment can inflate their cost estimates at the start of a project 
and continue to work within them without being any more efficient in production 
and clevelopment. Without being able to compare the price paid by the MoD with 
similar projects being undertaken outside of the UK, this potential is impossible to 
effectively examine. To add to this is the potential for the customer, the MoD, to 
cause cost overruns by changing operational specifications. Using cost slippage 
as a gauge of the efficiency of the UK-based military industry becomes difficult. 
A second possible measure of efficiency, time overruns, are also shown as a 
consistent feature in table 2.3. An overwhelming majority of projects fail to meet 
estimated in-service dates and they do so by an ever-increasing margin. But 
again there are problems in using time slippage as a measure of efficiency. First, 
technical problems may be expected in the development of highly complex 
weapons systems. Second, often it is not the case that it is UK-based industry 
being inefficient at producing equipment on time. It is that the MoD is an 
inefficient procurer of the equipment. In total, the 20 "post main gate" projects 
shown in the Major Projects Report 2001 are running 608 months late as 
compared to the in-service date agreed at the main gate stage of the project. 
53% of this delay is due to "technical factors" in production. Apart from a further 
12% of delays due to the "contracting process" - often delays in negotiations, and 
1% of delays due to "changes and delays in associated projects", the remainder, 
34% have little to do with the companies themselves. 17% are due to "changed 
budgetary priorities" often explained as "the need to match the programme to the 
30 Neil Cooper, The Business of Death: Britain's Arms Trade at Home and Abroad (London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1997) p. 164. 
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available departmental resources". 11 % are due to "changed requirements", 
often to align the nature or delivery of new equipment with other new 
programmes and 6% is due to "procurement strategy". To illustrate the role of 
both (mainly UK-based) industry and the MoD in the development of time 
slippages and cost overruns, appendix thirteen analyses the history of the 30 
largest MoD procurement projects in both the assessment and in the 
demonstration/manufacture phases, as at March 2001. It shows that whatever 
the role of the MoD in the development of both time overruns and cost slippages 
UK-based arms companies have played a significant part in consistently failing to 
supply dependable equipment to UK forces on time and within budget. 
One of the phenomenon to be drawn from appendix thirteen - how the equipment 
procured by the MoD, although technically demanding to produce, has not 
fulfilled the operational requirement it was made to fulfill - has been a consistent 
theme in UK procurement. Although not often information that is publicly 
available, it is possible to compile a picture of some of the problems encountered 
in the largest MoD procurement projects using information disclosed by the 
National Audit Office, by the Public Accounts Committee and by the press. 
The army's standard issue SA80 rifle made by Royal Ordnance (now BAE 
Systems) has undergone 82 repairs and modifications since it was first issued in 
1985. In the 1991 Gulf War the gun jammed and components came loose. In 
Bosnia the gun jammed again when troops were under fire. In Sierra Leone the 
gun reportedly jammed when Revolutionary United Front members fired at UK 
paratroopers. After a E92 million modification, it jammed in Afghanistan. " There 
was a 75 month delay in the introduction of BAE Systems'El. 3 billion Spearfish 
32 torpedo because of propulsion problems. The project is now running at least 
F-11 01 million over budget. The UK could have bought American MK48 torpedoes. 
But this was rejected in favour of GEC-Marconi (now BAE Systems) in 1981. The 
delay in delivery of the Spearfish cost E30 million in additional support for the 
Tigerfish torpedo and resulted in "a significant and extended capability gap in 
3' Nick Cohen, 'Our sky-high arms fiasco', The Observer, 22 nd September 2002. 
32 House Of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Sixth Report: Ministry of Defence 
Major Projects Report 2ooo - The Role of the Equipment Capability Customer, November 2001, 
HC 369, paragraph 7. 
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33 
anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare". The Vickers Challenger 2 
34 
tank, itself two years late, has trouble in deserts. Its air filters become jammed 
35 
after only four hours . The 
BAE Systems Sea Dart missile upgrade is running 
eight years late partly because it cannot distinguish a target against the sun. 36 In 
April 2000, over 44 GKN Westland Lynx Helicopters were withdrawn from service 
because of faulty rotor heads. The manufacturers had to replace all the heads 
with those made from titanium. The MoD admitted that it would take up to two 
years for the fleet to be fully operational again. Just 15 Lynxs were left between 
37 
the Navy's fleet of destroyers and frigates. In September 2000 the entire RAF 
fleet of 80 Tucano T1 basic trainers were grounded after a rubber pedal fault was 
found by engineers. "Fatigues parts" were reportedly found in the rudder 
38 
assembly . The planes were built by 
Shorts at Belfast. An upgrade to the 
Tornado GR4 bomber meant that the plane could no longer fire its precision 
39 
missiles . 
In October 2000 the Royal Navy reportedly withdrew from service all 
its nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines for urgent safety checks after a leak 
40 in the propulsion system on HMS Tireless. In the early 1990s, the Type 2400 
Upholder Submarine's torpedo system caused the submarine to flood leading to 
a three year delay and the cost of the project to double. 41 In 2000 30kph speed 
restrictions were placed on 27 tonne GKN Warrior armoured vehicles, used 
widely in the 1991 Gulf War and in Bosnia, after the drive shaft failed causing 
three accidents. These procurement difficulties may or may not be comparable to 
the French or American experience and there may be some improvements 
following the introduction of the Smart Acquisition initiative in 2000 but for now, 
and for the UK taxpayer, this history does nothing to suggest value for money or 
an efficient military industry. 
33 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, p. 129-133. 
34 Nick Cohen, 'Our sky-high arms fiasco', The Observer, 22 nd September 2002. 
35 Mark Oliver, 'MoD disasters: from Apache to Nimrod', The Guardian, 31 " October 2002. 
36 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence 
Major Projects Report 2000 paragraph 5 (vii). 
" Unnamed, 'Safety scare grounds Lynx helicopters', BBC News online, 28 th April2000 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk/729554. stm> Last accessed 30th July 2003. 
38 Francis Wheen, 'Buddy, can you spare a tankT, The Guardian, 28 th February 2001. 
" Unnamed, 'Safety scare grounds RAF training fleet', BBC News online, 4 th September 2000 
<http: //news-bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk/910396. stm> Last accessed 3 oth July 2003. 
40 Francis Wheen, 'Buddy, can you spare a tankT, The Guardian, 28th February 2001. 
41 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, appendix 5. 
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Nevertheless, the UK continues to rank as the second largest military exporter in 
the world. 42 This might be interpreted as evidence that the UK produces better 
equipment at a better price than most others do. But the UK retains this high 
market share for other reasons. The UK's major markets - North America and 
Western Europe - have remained strong since 1981 while those of their 
competitors have been weaker. The two areas that have seen the largest 
reductions in the value of military imports from 1995-1999, Central Asia and the 
Caucuses (-31.2%) and Central America and the Caribbean (-26.7%)43 failed to 
register any deliveries or agreements with the UK from 1989-1999 according to 
44 WMEAT figures. But more important to understand is the way that UK export 
figures have been kept unsustainably high because of the effects of the two huge 
Al Yamamah deals. 45 Military exports to Saudi Arabia accounted for 62% of all 
UK military exports from 1997-1 999.46 This is a reduction from the 73% they 
accounted for from 1987-1991 but these figures still illustrate the UK's reliance on 
two contracts. 47 These were contracts secured only after a congressional block 
on the original US-Saudi deal, after personal lobbying by Thatcher and Reagan 
in support of a UK bid, after high levels of secrecy and commissions were 
guaranteed and after a favourable offset package to accompany the deal was 
negotiated. 48 These kinds of features have allegedly accompanied some of the 
largest deals in prospect from the mid 1990s onwards including those between 
UK-based arms-producing companies and India, Qatar, South Africa and the 
Czech Republic. These cases are worth looking at in some detail because they 
suggest that the UK does not offer world class equipment. The UK offers world- 
beating commissions, offsets deals and secrecy to its recipient states, often 
when others will not supply. 
The prospect of a Ell billion sale of BAE Systems Hawks to India, a deal that was 
first raised 15 years ago, triggered a series of Ministerial visits to New Delhi and 
meetings within the UK. The government admits that a series of meeting were 
set up specifically to discuss the Hawk deal. In 2002 and in 2003 they included 
42 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table 111. 43 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, Highlights 
býy Indicator, p. 9. 
4 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table IV. 
45 Cooper, British Arms Exports, pp. 7-15. 
46 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table I 11. 
47 Cooper, British Arms Exports, p. 10. 
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meetings with Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (February 2002, May 2002, January 
2003, May 2003, June 2003), Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon (January 2003, July 
2003, June 2003) and with Minister for Defence Procurement Lord Bach (June 
2002, February 2003) . 
49 Research carried out by CAAT has found that the deal 
was also discussed by Defence Minister Geoff Hoon (December 2000, 
November 2001 and July 2002), Trade and Industry Secretary Stephen Byers 
(January 2001), Minister for Defence Procurement Baroness Symons (February 
2001), Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott (July 2001 and March 2002), Tony 
Blair (January 2002) and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (July 2002). In addition 
Blair reportedly discussed the deal with the Indian Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee 
in London in October 2001 and Geoff Hoon did the same with his counterpart, 
George Fernandes, in London in February 2002 . 
50 But others were also lobbying 
on behalf of the deal. When local Indian journalists disguised themselves as 
arms dealers, the treasurer of Fernandes' party allegedly admitted to them that 
an agent of BAE Systems had made corrupt suggestions to him. One country 
excluded from this effort was the US. US based companies were excluded from 
bidding for contracts as America, by far the latest arms exporter in the world, 
imposed sanctions against both India and Pakistan after nuclear tests were 
carried out by both states in 1998. Although most sanctions were lifted in 
September 2001, the absence of America as a competitor during much of the 
negotiation period together with high level lobbying by the UK and alleged bribery 
by UK-based firms preceded the Indian government's September 2003 
announcement that it intended to buy the Hawks. 51 
More substantial allegations of bribery have accompanied BAE Systems' 
dealings with the Qatar government. Until mid 2002, Jersey's Attorney-General, 
helped by the serious fraud office, 52 had been investigating two Jersey trust 
funds owned by the Foreign Minister of Qatar. The Minister, Sheik Hamad, the 
uncle of the Emir of Qatar, is reportedly one of the most powerful figures in the 
" Cooper, British Arms Exports, p. 12. 
49 House of Commons, Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report., Strategic Export Controls - 
Annual report for 2002, Licencing, Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 18'ý May 2004, HC 390 
<http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm/cmdfence. htm> Last accessed 24 th June 2004. 
50 Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, 'The Political Influence of Arms Companies', 
April 2003, p. 2 <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/other/political-influence-0403. pdf> 
Last accessed 30'h July 2003. 
51 BAe Systems, Annual Report 2003, p 8. 
52 House of Commons, Hansard, 1 9(h September 2002, Written Answers, column 234. 
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Middle East. The trusts contained more than El 00 million believed to originate 
from European arms companies. 53 All the Jersey Hearings into the Trusts have 
been held in secret but The Observer reported that senior sources close to the 
investigation believed C7 million of this had been transferred into the funds by 
BAE Systems in order to influence arms contracts from the mid 1990s onwards. 54 
Later it was reported that the payment was allegedly used to secure a deal to sell 
Piranha armoured cars to Qatar, a deal negotiated in 1996 by Michael Portillo, 
now a BAE Systems Non-Executive Director. '5 Under laws existing at the time 
BAE Systems itself was not acting illegally. Qatar suspended trade talks with the 
UK in the middle of 2000 jeopardising exports worth millions of pounds. The 
investigation was suddenly dropped in May 2002 at around the same time as 
lawyers in the Attorney-General's office had meetings with Foreign Office 
Officials . 
56 Jersey's Attorney-General said that it was not in "the public interest", it 
may "adversely affect relations" and the Sheik would be difficult to prosecute 
given his diplomatic immunity. Questions were raised in Parliament about the 
role of the government in influencing the decision along with the impact of the 
Sheik's E6 million payment to the Jersey authorities for any "damage perceived 
57 to have been sustained in the events that have happened". Other arms 
supplying governments might not be so keen to protect those in receipt of 
commissions or to retain the level of secrecy enjoyed by UK arms recipients. 
At the same time as the Jersey investigation was taking place, the South African 
government was signing arms contracts worth U-E4 billion including those for 24 
BAE Systems Hawk 1 00s, 4 GKN Westland Lynx helicopters and 28 BAE 
Systems/SAAB Gripen fighters. They were bought via highly favourable loans 
from European banks like Barclays underwritten by the ECGD . 
58 Again, the deals 
" Conal Walsh and Anthony Barnett, 'BAE in Spotlight as 'Sweeteners' Turn Sour', The Observer, 
13 th October 2002; Anthony Barnett and Conal Walsh, 'Riddle of Sheik's GDP loom Secret Fund', 
The Observer, 2nd June 2002. 
54 Anthony Barnett and Conal Walsh, 'Straw faces grilling on arms'bribes", The Observer, 9th June 
2002. 
'5 Rob Evans, Ian Traynor, Luke Harding and Rory Carroll, 'BAe faces corruption claims around the 
world', The Guardian, 14 th June 2003. 
56 Anthony Barnett and Conal Walsh, 'Riddle of Sheik's GDP 1 00m Secret Fund', The Observer, 
2 nd June 2002. 
" Anthony Barnett and Conal Walsh, 'Straw faces grilling on arms 'bribes", The Observer, 9th June, 
2002. 
58 Christopher Wrigley, 'The South African Deal: A case study in the arms trade', Campaign Against 
the Arms Trade, June 2003 <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/southatrica- 
0603. pdf> Last accessed 8th January 2004. 
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have been characterised by the lack of American competition, allegations of 
bribery, a large offset programme and personal lobbying at the highest level. 
America was never a contender in any of the deals mainly because it had an 
arms embargo in place until 1998 by which time negotiations with European 
companies were well advanced . 
59 The negotiations that led to the contracts being 
signed at the end of 1999 have been surrounded by widespread allegations of 
corruption. These allegations have triggered investigations by the South African 
Auditor General, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, the 
Ombudsman, the National Director of Public Prosecutions and the Special 
investigation Unit. The involvement of the later, the only body with the authority 
to stop the deal, was blocked by the government leading to the resignation of its 
Chair, Judge Heath . 
6' The leader of the ANC component of the Public Accounts 
Committee, Andrew Feinstein who pushed for an investigation into the deal was 
61 forced to resign . 
The allegations centre around key procurement anomalies. One of the largest 
contracts was for fighter "trainers" valued at R1 0 billion. The Italian Aermacchi 
MB339FB jet was the preferred choice of the South Africa airforce during a June 
1998 Air Force Evaluation. It was chosen for tactical and training reasons. Even 
when the Defence Minister, Joe Modise, insisted that the procurement criteria 
used to evaluate the bids also include "non-costed" options, the Aermacchi jet 
still scored the highest under both criteria. Despite this, the Cabinet awarded the 
contract to BAE Systems to provide Hawk 1 00s that, at El billion for 12, cost 
almost four times more than the Aermacchi jets. A month before Modise had 
insisted that the procurement criteria was changed, BAE Systems made a five 
million Rand donation to the Umkhonto weSizwe Veterans' Association of which 
Modise was a founding trustee. 62 To accompany this, there have been 
allegations that the ANC received money from BAE Systems for their 1999 
election campaign. 63 Reportedly BAE Systems could have paid F-1 60 million 
" Christopher Wrigley, 'The South African Deal', p. 9. 
60 Statement by the Director General in the Presidency on behalf of President Mbeki, 191h January 
2001 <http: //www. gov. za/projects/procurement/decision. htm> Last accessed 8 th January 2004. 
61 Interview, Andrew Feinstein with the author, May 2003. 
62 Paul Kirk, 'How Modise Wangled SA's Fighter Deal', Mail & Guardian, 2nd December 2002 
<http: //www. armsdeal-vpo. co. za/articlesOO/modise-wangled. html> Last accessed 31 s' July 2003. 63 Jeremy Michaels, 'Osprey Aviation names as BAe's Agent in Arms Deal', Cape Times, 2 nd jU Iy 
2003 <http: //www. armsdeal-vpo. co. za/articles04/osprey_aviation. html> Last accessed 31s'July 
2003. 
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overall in commissions to secure the deal. 64 Even more crucial in securing the 
deal was the way in which the whole arms deal package was sold to the South 
African public and to dissenting members of the Cabinet via the promise of a 
huge industrial offsets programme. South Africa was reportedly promised in the 
region of three times more in offset deals than they would spend buying the 
Hawks. Purchases would be made from and capital invested in South African 
65 companies creating 65,000 new jobs. Allegedly Aermacchi were given a week 
to match the offset deal. On a visit to South Africa Blair met with President Mbeki 
and personally signed a Joint Memorandum to guarantee to delivery of the 
offsets. 66 Blair's January 1999 visit that interrupted his family holiday is said to 
have been crucial to secure the Hawk and Gripen component of the deal. 
Aermacchi have been considering taking legal action on the basis of unfair 
procurement strategy. 
Aside from Aermacchi, BAE Systems have also angered the US Assistant 
Secretary of State, Anthony Wayne, Lockheed, Boeing and the Eurofighter 
consortium as it fought to win a E1.5 billion BAE Systerns/SAAB Grippen fighters 
order from the Czech Republic. In May 2002, just after Blair had raised the deal 
during a visit to Prague all of the above companies withdrew from the bidding 
process in a coordinated response to what they felt was a deal rigged in favour of 
BAE Systems. Senior Czech politicians from three parties claim that bribes were 
offered to them to change their votes in favour of the BAE Systems/SAAB bid, 
hours before a decision to fund the purchase, one of the largest arms deals in 
Central Europe since the end of the Cold War. Two months later Wayne 
reportedly met with MoD permanent Secretary Kevin Tebbit in July 2002 alleging 
BAE Systems corruption based on a number of sources including CIA 
intelligence reports. BAE Systems reportedly admits offering favours to a 
struggling TV station to boost its image and was fined E6,000 for the illegal 
purchase of newspaper advertising to push the deal. 67 The Czech Republic has 
decided not to go ahead with any purchase despite Blair's lobbying and BAE 
Systems' tactics. 
64 Rob Evans and David Leigh, 'BAe'paid millions'to win Hawk jet contract', The Guardian, 30(h 
June 2003. 
65 Christopher Wrigley, 'The South African Deal', p. 1- 
66 Interview, Andrew Feinstein, with author, May 2003. 
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Overall, an analysis of the MoD's major procurement projects is not suggestive of 
a highly successful and globally competitive UK military Industrial base and the 
patterns of UK military exporting along with UK tactics to secure deals in the 
industry do nothing to remedy this. But if the success of UK military industry as a 
global supplier can be queried, then so can its success as a domestic supplier. 
THE EXISTENCE OF A UK-BASED MILITARY INDUSTRY DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN 
THAT UK FORCES ARE EQUIPPED TO WORLD-CLASS STANDARDS 
Export related subsidies are helping to prop up an inefficient military industry 
from which inefficient equipment is produced. But further to this, evidence 
suggests that there is pressure to prioritise the need for export orders over the 
needs of the UK Forces. This pressure can manifest itself in the choice of 
procurement and in the type and timing of equipment supplied to UK forces. 
Military industry calls for the domestic procurement of its goods in order to inspire 
confidence in foreign purchasers. This explains why the DTi and DESO are both, 
according to concerned officials, infiltrating project groups early in the concept 
stage. DESO reportedly acts like a highly influential "virus" within the MoD, 
"infecting its operational judgement. , 68 It is, according to Tony Purton, former 
MoD Director of Contracts/Organisation (1988-1991) with 30 years of experience 
in MoD procurement, the ""Achilles' Heel" of good defence procurement ... an 
internal MoD 'buy British' lobby which distorts the sensible management of 
defence procurement within the MoD. "" One example of this distortion is the 
1995 decision to buy a mixed fleet of US Chinook and UK Westland helicopters 
instead of an all-Chinook option. Although the Westland helicopters were more 
modern, the decision to buy a mixed fleet was estimated to have cost an 
additional E300 million, resulted in one third less lift capability and was against 
67 Rob Evans, Ian Traynor, Luke Harding and Rory Carroll, 'Politicians' claims put BAe in firing line', 
The Guardian, 12'h June 2003. 
68 Oxford Research Group and Saferworld, Tackling the Subsidy Trap: Strategies for Reducing 
Subsidies to Arms Exports. 
69 Tony Purton, Memorandum submitted to Defence Select Committee, House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment of the New Head of Defence Export 
Services, 31s' March 1999, HC 147. 
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the advice of the MoUs Equipment Approvals Committee. " in a subsequent 
Commons debate the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, mentioned the 
importance of retaining an indigenous helicopter design and manufacture 
capability but heavily referenced the Westland helicopters' export potential. 71 
Alongside distortion in procurement sits distortion in delivery and potentially 
quality to UK forces from exporting needs. As part of the second phase of the Al 
Yamamah deal Saudi Arabia received 20 RAF planes. This delayed the 
establishment of the Tornado GR1 reconnaissance force. 72 
It is difficult to estimate how representative both this and the Chinook/Westland 
cases are of the impact of exporting on UK procurement. There has been little 
attention to this area and it is difficult to investigate. But on the question of 
equipment quality Purton has claimed that it is customary for the need to export 
to drive down the reliability of equipment used by the UK forces: 
A real contribution by defence exports to domestic defence 
procurement would be the exchange of the UK armed forces' 
high-cost fault-ridden early production equipment with the lower 
cost improved later production models from which our export 
customers normally benefit, leaving industry to refurbish and 
modify the early production models for export - anything less is 
window-dressing ! 73 
The evidence available suggests that at the very least, military exports have 
played a part at times in compromising the choice, delivery and quality of 
equipment used by the armed forces. But if UK exports have the potential to 
undermine UK military capability, the same can be said of UK recipient security. 
70 Financial Times, 10" March 1995, cited by Martin, 'The Subsidy Saving from reducing UK arms 
exports', p. 24. 
th House of Commons, Hansard, 9 March 1995, columns 461-468. 
Cooper, British Arms Exports, p. 29. 
73 Purton, 'Memorandum submitted to the Defence Select Committee', House of Commons 
Defence Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment of the New Head of Defence Export 
Services, 31 s' March 1999, HC 147. 
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MILITARY EXPORTS DO NOT NECESSARILY CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY OF 
UK ALLIES 
UK exported arms only contribute to the security of UK "allies" if security is 
defined in the terms used by recipient governments and only as long as 
recipients are defined as UK allies at the moment of export. For recipient 
governments who define security in their own interests, military exports can 
enhance the prospects of regime survival by enforcing political stability. This is of 
particular importance given first, the political and second, the economic situation 
of the majority of the UK's principal recipients 
The political situation of the UK's main arms recipients 
Civil order may well be a prerequisite of economic and political development but 
the governments defined as allies, whose security according to this rationale, is 
being enhanced through their possession of UK arms, are overwhelmingly 
undemocratic regimes with poor records on human rights. Appendix fourteen 
shows the 15 leading recipient states of UK arms sales from 1997 to 1999, the 
latest figures available from WMEAT, together with other political and human 
rights indicators. Amnesty International has serious concerns that widespread 
and sustained government sponsored human rights abuses are occurring in 
almost all these states and others who figure less prominently in the league table 
of UK recipients under the New Labour government. These include Algeria 74 , 
Colombia '75 
SriLanka '76 Zambia 
77 and Zimbabwe . 
78 If UK arms do contribute to 
recipient security, these are the kinds of governments that are being kept secure. 
74 The value of standard licences approved for Algeria was E5.5 million in 1999, E2 million in 2000, 
E5 million in 2001 and E 10.5 million in 2002. They covered items including explosive devises and 
military communication equipment. 42 open licences were also issued between 1999-2002. FCO, 
Strategic Export Controls Reports 1999-2002 <www. f co. gov. uk> Last accessed 26th May 2004. 
75 The government approved E2 million worth of standard licences to Columbia in 2000 for items 
including ground-based radar, stun grenades, components for both heavy machine guns and 
missiles. 68 open licences were also issued between 1999-2002. FCO, Strategic Export Controls 
Reports 1999-2002. 
76 The government approved E1.5 million worth of standard licences to Sri Lanka in 1999, B million 
in 2000 and El 5.5 million in 2001 and F1.5 million in 2002 covering components for military 
communications, heavy machine guns, submachine guns, sniper rifles, grenade launchers and 
small arms ammunition. 52 open licences were also issued between 1999-2002. FCO, Strategic 
Export Controls Reports 1999-2002. 
77 The value of standard licences approved for Zambia was El .5 million in 2000 and E3.5 million in 
2001 covering items including grenade launchers, submachine guns and components for combat 
aircraft. 29 open licences were also issued from 1999-2002. FCO, Strategic Export Controls 
Reports 1999-2002. 
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Moreover, a number of these states have gone on to use UK exported arms to 
help commit some of the human rights abuses outlined above, including 
genocide, a consequence which began decades before New Labour came to 
power. in 1960, UK made Saracens were used for riot control in the South 
African Sharpeville massacre. 79 UK communications helped the Ugandan Idi 
Amin to commit mass murder. 80 In 1973 UK made Hunter aircraft helped 
Pinochet's overthrow of elected President Allende in Chile, a coup which saw the 
deaths of 30,000 people. 81 In 1995, Channel Four's Dispatches documentary 
showed a BAE Systems salesperson claiming that 8,000 electric shock batons, 
already banned in the UK, had been exported to Saudi Arabia in 1990 as part of 
the Al Yamamah deals. The salesperson was also prepared to supply 10,000 
electro-shock riot shields and 60,000 batons to the undercover journal iStS. 82 The 
use of leg irons stamped with the UK company logo Hiatts have also been 
reported in Saudi Arabia. 83 In the mid 1990s Akrep vehicles produced in Turkey 
under licence from the UK's Landrover company were used against Kurdish 
people in Northern Iraq. 84 The UK government has authorised a continuous 
stream of spare parts for Indonesian Hawks despite their use in East Timor. The 
Labour government refused to revoke 1996 contracts to supply Indonesia with 50 
Alvis Scorpion tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The FCO reportedly now 
admit they were used against protesters in South Sulawesi (April 1996), in Jakata 
(May and November 1998) and in Ambon (December 1999 and July 2000). 115 UK 
exported arms have not increased the physical security of the people of South 
Africa, Uganda, Chile, Saudi Arabia, Kurdistan, East Timor and Indonesia against 
" Licences for Zimbabwe were approved to the value of Ell million 2000. These licences covered, 
amongst other items, components for military training aircraft and military utility vehicles. 19 open licences were issued in 1999. FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 1999 and 2000. 79 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 5. " John Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage, 1999), p. 124. 81 Ashley Stewart-Nobel, '11 September, 1973 - The day Democracy Died in Chile', BBCi 
<http: //www. bbc. co. uk/dna/h2g2/A716591> Last accessed 7 th August 2003. 82 Richard Ford, 'Salesman claims BAe sold shock batons to Saudis', The Times, 1 01h January 
1995. 
83 Amnesty International, 'Stop arming the torturers - the repression trade' 
<http: //www. amnesty. org. uk/action/camp/saudi/repression. shtml> Last accessed 7" August 2003. 84 House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixth Report: Turkey, 30 1h April 2002, 
HC 606, Memorandum from Campaign Against Arms Trade. 
15 Nicholas Gilby, Arms Exports to Indonesia, (London: CAAT, 1999) 
1h <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/indonesia-1099. php> Last accessed 17 
August 2003; Nicholas Gilby, Labour, Arms and Indonesia - Has anything changed? (London: CAAT, 2001) <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/labour-indonesia- 
0701. php> Last accessed 7 th August2003. 
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whom these weapons were used. Neither have they increased the economic 
security of many others, a subject to which this thesis will now turn. 
Buy now pay later: The economic reality of the UK's main arms recipients 
The overwhelming majority of the value of UK arms exports are received by 
"developing" countries. In such states military expenditure is paid for either by 
diverting government expenditure from other sectors like health and education, 
by borrowing foreign exchange in international markets or by following a policy 
that combines these two choices. All result in an economic opportunity cost 
adversely affecting those living under recipient governments. " it is worth noting 
that the costs of one Hawk bomber is equal to the cost of providing 1.5 million 
people with access to clean water for life . 
8' Two Merlin helicopters cost El 80 
million, just short of the E200 million it would cost to provide ten million people 
with water in their own villages. This kind of economic opportunity cost 
associated with military spending are especially relevant for the UK because from 
1997 until the end of 1999,86% (US $13.5 billion) of the UK weapons transfers 
88 
recorded by WMEAT went to developing states. Some of those exports are 
reflected in the value of standard export licences listed in the FCO Strategic 
Export Annual Reports details of which are shown in appendix fifteen. To add to 
the US $13.5 billion there is the f-28 million military air traffic control system to 
Tanzania licenced by the government in 200189 and the E3 - F-4 billion South 
African arms package signed in 1999 including 24 BAE Systems Hawks, 4 GKN 
Westland Lynx helicopters and 28 BAE Systems/SAAB Gripen fighters. Both 
deals are grossly disproportionate to the actual needs of the country. The World 
Bank criticised the air traffic control project which would support Tanzania's eight 
military aircraft as "primarily a military system and can provide limited support for 
civil air traffic control purposes". 9' It has been widely reported that a civil system 
costing a quarter of the price would have been adequate. Tanzania suffers from 
86 For example, Susan Willett, The Arms Trade, Debt and Development (London: CAAT, 1999) 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/economics/debt-and-development-0599. php> Last 
accessed 17 th August 2003. 
87 John Pilger, Salesmen of Death, 27 th May 2002 
<http: //www. medialens. org/articles_2002/Jýp_salesmen. html> Last accessed 12 th Augus12003. 
US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table 111. 
David Hencke and Larry Elliot, 'Just what they Need -a E28 m Air Defence System', The 
Guardian, 1 81h December 2001. 
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a huge debt burden. Half of its population lives without clear water. One in four 
children die before their fifth birthday. 9' South Africa has no obvious discernable 
external treat. It already has between 12 to 15 Cheater jets in service until at 
least 2012. E3 billion, represents twice the housing budget or 10 times the South 
African HIV/AIDS budget92 in a country where over 20% of adults aged 15-49 are 
HIV positive. 93 
Changes made under the New Labour government might be interpreted as 
evidence of sustainable development becoming more important to government 
when making licencing decisions. The Department for International Development 
can now refuse a licence application on the basis of its effect on sustainable 
development but it is unable to consider the impact of cumulative licences. CAAT 
has concluded that this flaw renders the department's role in the process "almost 
meaningless". 94 In 2000, Gordon Brown announced that the government would 
extend a ban on export credit guarantees for unproductive expenditure beyond 
41 states defined as "Heavily Indebted Poorer Countries" to additionally cover a 
further 22 states. These 22 are still considered so poor by the World Bank that 
they are allowed to borrow on concessional terms. But in practice, this change 
has limited effect on UK arms exports. 9' There have been no military purchases 
supported by the ECGD in any of those 63 states since 1997 and outside of 
these 63 poorer states "productive expenditure criteria" are not taken into 
consideration. Moreover, the new criteria would not preclude ECGD support for 
arms exports anyway. For these 63 states the provision of export insurance and 
90 David Hencke, 'World Bank could bar f 28 million Tanzania air traffic deal', The Guardian, 21 st December 2001. 
91 Jubilee Debt Campaign, 'Tanzania - Sale of Air Traffic Control System a "Complete Waste of Money"', 14 th June 2002 
<http: //www. j ubi leedebtcam paig n. org. uk/def au It. asp? acti on =article& ID= 198> Last accessed 17 th August 2003. 
92 Gideon Burrows, The Non-Nonsense guide to the Arms Trade, (London: Verso, 2002) p 69. 93 UNAIDS, Epidemiological fact sheets by country: South Africa, 2002 
<http: //Www. unaids , org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/fact sheets/pdfs/Southafrica_en. pdf> Last accessed 7 th August 2003. 
94 CAAT, The Arms Trade: An Introductory Briefing 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/research/IntroBriefing. pdf> Last accessed 7" August 2003. 95 Gordon Brown, Statement to Commonwealth finance ministers meeting, 16 th September 1997 
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export credit guarantees will be subject to "productive expenditure criteria" such 
that they will only be offered to support projects which 
assist social and economic development; or be of maximum 
benefit to areas most affected by poverty; or tackle problem 
areas where private investment is not available; or wherever 
possible, earn foreign exchange; or encourage viable self- 
financing projects. 96 
Arms exports could still be authorised under these criteria. The ECGD only 
requires a valid export licence after which export credit or guarantees are offered 
97 
on a "first come, first served" basis . The new Export Control Act does not 
include provisions to allow the impact of arms exports on sustainable 
development to be considered under its section on purposes for export control 
whereas all other criteria have been included. The government have justified the 
omission by arguing that the act does include a section that gives the Secretary 
of State the power to define what should be considered during the licencing 
process, a provision which will allow for issues of development to be considered. 
But Parliament has no power over the Secretary of State in this area. Unlike 
other criteria specifically included in the Act itself, the need to take account of the 
impact of exports on sustainable development could be dropped without 
reference to Parliament. 98 To date the New Labour government has refused only 
one licence application on the basis of a detrimental impact on sustainable 
development-'9 
Tanzania and South Africa have remained allies of the UK government but there 
is no guarantee that those defined as "friendly" governments now will go on 
being friendly. Since 1997, the government has approved licences allowing arms 
exports to 180 states as shown in detail in appendix three. Not all these states 
can be expected to remain allies just as in the past former "friends" became 
"enernies". Argentina was armed with UK exported Type 42 destroyers... and 
96 House of Commons, Hansard, 9" February 2000, Written Answers, Column 216. 
97 ECGD, Mission and Status Review 1999-2000 p. 40 
<http: //www. ecgd. gov. uk/missionstatusreview. pdf> Last accessed 7 th August 2003. 98 House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Fifth Report: Human Rights Annual 
Report, 2001,28 th February 2002, HC 589, appendix 5, memorandum from Saferworld. 
99 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - 
Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 18'h May 2004, HC 390, 
paragraph 59 <http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- th office. co. uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/390/39002. htm> Last accessed 18 May 2004. "0 Cooper, British Arms Exports, p. 28. 
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French Exocet missiles during the Malvinas/Falklands war. "' Iraqi troops, some 
of whom were trained in the UK -a practice that continued until March 1990 - 
were armed with UK exported weapons during the 1991 Gulf war. 10' In fact, a 
1989 MoD report reportedly concluded that UK support to Iraq during the 1980s 
had made "a very significant enhancement to the ability of Iraq to manufacture its 
own arms". 103 The Taliban's largest weapons supplier was Pakistan, a country 
that has manufactured Heckler and Koch small arms under licence from Royal 
Ordnance and that received E6 million worth of military exports from the UK 
during 2000 with few end-use controls. ' 04 
Even after these qualifications are taken into account this justification, that arms 
increase the stability of states friendly to the UK government, still does not 
always stand up. For at least two of the largest major UK recipients, arms 
purchases have also fed political instability. Saudi Arabia, the recipient of the 
huge Al Yamamah contracts in 1986 and 1988, spent an average 18% of GDP 
on military spending 1989-1999. "' Resulting budget deficits affecting the welfare 
state and social services together with the pro-western stance of the de-facto 
ruler Price Abdullah, particularly the continued presence of US troops on Saudi 
soil, reportedly led to fears from Foreign Office officials in July 2002 that there 
could be a palace coup. "' Evidence of the growing threat of Islamic 
Fundamentalism to the ruling family has come in the form of a spate of attacks 
on western targets. More widely, Saudi has witnessed increased campaigning 
from the Wahabi religious group, protests from moderate and extreme Islamists, 
increased discontent amongst the growing middle classes, increased crime and 
anti-American protests held by women and businessmen . 
107 Anti-western 
, "' Gideon Burrows, The No-Nonsense Guide, p 32. 102 House of Commons, Hansard, 1 91h February 1991, columns 136-137. 103 Robin Cook, The Point of Departure (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003) p. 119. 104 CAAT, 'Afghan Boomerangs', CAATnews, December 2001 
th <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/magazine/1201/afghanistan. php> Last accessed 17 August 
2003; FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2000. 
05 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table 1. 
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Martin Bright, Nick Pelham and Paul Harris, 'Britons Left in Jail Amid Fears that Saudi Arabia 
could Fall to Al-Qaeda', The Observer, 28 th Jul y 2002; Robin Aitken, 'Is Saudi Arabia Becoming 
Unstable? ', BBC Radio Four 
<http: //www. bbc. co. uk/radio4/today/reports/archive/international/saudi-arabia. shtml> Last 
accessed 17'h August 2003. 
107 Martin Woollacott, 'American ties are no help in Saudi's domestic crisis', The Guardian, 16 th May 
2003. 
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sentiment reached a high point in the months following the 2003 Iraqi invasion. 108 
In May 2003 Jane's Defence Weekly published a list of anti-US riots and 
occasions where preachers had incited their audience to attack the west. 109 
During 2003, more than 50 people were killed in two bomb attacks on western 
targets. In December 2003 non-essential US diplomats were told to leave 
following threats issued against western interests. Four months later, following a 
week of shootings during which several westerners were killed by insurgents, the 
US government advised all its citizens to leave, the third such call in six 
months. "O Yet Saudi instability has been widely downplayed by western 
governments eager to maintain the pretence that one of their most valued 
business partners is stable. If the Saudi government were overthrown, UK 
supplied weapons would be available for a new, as yet unknown governing 
regime which may or may not choose to honor the F-1,01 5,166,892 of debt 
guaranteed by the ECGD, most of which appear to guarantee military exports. "' 
In Kuwait the cumulative effect of a decade of arms procurement decisions, often 
based more on political alliances than on capability, and the effect on the 
domestic budget has resulted in an increasingly clestabilising rift between the 
ruling al-Sabah family and the embryonic Kuwait Parliament. ' 12 The latter have 
questioned a string of procurement choices made by the ruling family since 1991 
alleging corruption and wasteful spending resulting in a number of parliamentary 
inquiries. ' 1' A 1996 inquiry examined the decision to buy 80 British Aerospace 
Sea Skua anti-ship missiles part of a deal said to have been worth $89 million. 
British Aerospace was chosen at the expense of the French firm Aerospatiale 
even though the latter offered MM 15s missiles for a reported 25% less. In 1997 
16 Kuwaiti MPs claimed that Exoet missiles could have been upgraded at half 
the cost of a BAE Systems deal even though the deal included 20 free missiles 
"' Martin Woollacott, 'American ties are no help in Saudi's domestic crisis', The Guardian, 16 th May 
2003. 
th 109 Nick Cohen, 'Our friends the Saudis', The Observer, 18 May 2003. 
1" Unnamed, 'US citizens urged to leave Saudi', BBC News Online, 15 th April 2004 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/i /hi/world/middle - 
east/3630657. stm> Last accessed 7 th May 2004. 
11 House of Commons, Hansard, 25th j une 2003, Written Answers, column 802, House of 
Commons, Hansard, 4 th December 2001, Written Answers, column 145. 
112 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, pp. 269-274. 
"3 For example, unnamed, 'Opposition Mounts in Kuwait over Missile Deal', Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 1 9th February 1997; Roland Gribben, 'Kuwaiti MPs Question $90m BAe Contract', Defence 
Today, 6" February 1997; Richard Scott, 'Kuwaiti Committee Investigates Fast Interceptor Deal', 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 9th January 2002. 
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and a promise to cancel a disputed $11 million debt. ' " In 2002, Jane's Defence 
Weekly reported that the Kuwait Parliament's Public Accounts Committee was 
looking into the $11.5 million 1992 deal to purchase 12 fast interceptor craft from 
French based company Simonneau Marine. The committee claims that the boats 
are faulty but the Defence Ministry deliberately waited until after the warrantees 
had expired before acting, increasing still further the friction between the ruling 
family and Parliament. ' 15 The UK may be facilitating the demise of those they 
claim to be influencing. 
There has been no systematic research to show how widespread the type of 
deals seen recently in Tanzania and South Africa actually are nor the extent to 
which military exports under New Labour have contributed to political instability. 
But evidence shows that UK arms exports have at the very least been 
detrimental to sustainable development and contributed to political insecurity in 
recipient states defined by the UK government as allies. The government's 
rationale is only sustainable if the very narrowest definitions of security and allies 
are used and even then cannot be applied to two of the largest recipients of UK 
arms. 
CONCLUSION 
Bach made the claim that UK arms exports bring significant strategic benefits. 
They underpin a strategically important and globally competitive military 
capability in the UK, a capability that contributes to the security of those identified 
as allies by the UK government and enables the MoD to procure suitable 
equipment. But it is unclear which, if any, arms-producing companies would 
clownsize or fail completely without export markets. Even if a reduction in exports 
did have a detrimental effect on industry, this does not mean that the UK's 
security of supply would suddenly be compromised since it was compromised 
long ago. Arms-producing companies are increasingly stateless and far from 
outstandingly successful as any analysis of cost and time overruns on MoD 
114 Unnamed, 'Pricey Missiles', Engineer, 27 Ih June 1996; Unnamed, 'Opposition mounts in Kuwait 
over missile deal', Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 9th February 1997; Roland Gribben, 'Kuwaiti MPs 
question $90m BAe contract', Defence Today, 6" February 1997. 
11 5 Richard Scott, 'Kuwaiti committee investigates fast interceptor deal', Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 th 
January 2002. 
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projects will testify. ' 16 The UK military industrial base has appeared strong in 
global export rankings because the UK offers world-beating commissions, offset 
deals and a high level of secrecy. The chapter has pointed to tensions between 
the equipment needs and supply of the MoD versus the needs and supply of 
DESO. Where this equipment has been exported to friends and allies of the UK 
government overseas there are clearly identifiable cases where, instead of 
contributing to recipient security, arms exports have contributed to political 
insecurity and sustained underdevelopment in strategically important states. 117 
The evidence suggests that UK arms exports have been purchased at a cost to 
those who have been forced to live under well-equipped dictatorial regimes, 
abused, tortured or killed by UK equipment. The government's rationales are 
largely outdated, unproven, cannot be consistently applied or are only 
sustainable if the very narrowest definitions are used, and then not for all cases. 
Given this, the onus falls on the government to make a strong political case in 
favour of continued support for arms exports, a case which this thesis now 
considers. 
116 Chalmers et al., The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports, paragraph 23. ... See Emma Mayhew, A Dead Giveaway: A Critical Analysis of New Labour's Rationales for 
Supporting Military Exports. 
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CHAPTER THREE: CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL 
CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
It is the aim of this chapter to explore the political rationales behind continued 
support for arms exports. The case made by the New Labour government for this 
support has focused almost exclusively on the supposed economic and strategic 
benefits. There has been far less emphasis on the political capital that the 
government claims can be derived. But two of the most widely held assumptions 
have been referred to - that exports increase recipient state co-operation with the 
UK and that exports can contribute to conflict avoidance - and as such will be the 
focus of this chapter. 
MILITARY SALES DO NOT ALLOW INCREASED UK INFLUENCE OVER RECIPIENT 
STATES 
Although rarely sold to the public in this way, governments have described the 
UK's involvement in the international arms market as a way of retaining a world 
role. Exports supposedly increase UK influence abroad where it might not 
otherwise exist' although the New Labour government prefers instead to stress 
2 the increased "co-operation" which arms exports bring. It is this kind of rationale 
that encouraged the UK to propel itself into the arms market during the early Cold 
War years at a time when western arms sales were said to play both an 
important role in maintaining existing "configurations of power" and in 
establishing seller states as important world actors. That arms exports still 
denote a great power status for the UK is clearly based on the expectation that 
supplier states can still have political influence over recipient states. But whilst 
the bulk of the existing literature assumes that this should be the case, the reality 
' Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 32-33 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000). 
2 DESO, Why export defence goods and services? <http: //www. deso. mod. uk/policy. htm> Last 
accessed 30th June 2003. 
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of the international arms market is that it is more often the recipient state which 
increases its influence over the seller state. 
The problem with the existing arms influence literature is not just that it assumes 
to know in what ways the supplier state would like to see the recipient state act 
but also that it is limited. 3 There are no systematic studies considering the 
possibility of recipient influence on the UK government despite the UK being one 
of the main suppliers of arms and even though in the post Cold War era the arms 
4 industry is so often talked about as a "buyer's market". In 1997, the Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas claimed "The minute you cannot get [arms] from one 
source, the other source is already knocking on our door and saying "take 
ours ". ,5 One reason to accept Alatas'claim is that while all the market indicators 
suggest a reduction in the size of the arms market over the last 20 years, as 
shown in appendix sixteen, the number of states supplying arms has actually 
6 
remained constant. To add to this is the dramatic growth of offsets. Some 
require 100% of the value of the deal to be reinvested in the recipient state by the 
seller company or state. Although in many cases, this level of offset will never be 
realized as seen recently in South Africa, sellers very often go beyond the 
formally declared offset requirement of recipient states because of competition 
for export orders. All the indications point to a more and more favourable 
environment for recipients, an environment that undermines the utility of arms 
transfers as a tool of political influence. 
One way to explore this environment in more detail is to examine cases that are 
drawn on by proponents of the idea that arms bring influence. When asked for 
specific examples, then Shadow Defence Minister Gerald Howarth offered Saudi 
3 For examples of the existing arms influence literature see Lewis W. Snider, 'Arms Transfer and 
Recipient Cooperation with Supplier Policy References: The Case of the Middle East', International 
Interactions, 5: 2&3 (1978), pp. 241-266; John Sislin, 'Arms as Influence: The determinants of 
successful influence', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38: 4 (1994), pp. 665-689. 
4 Charles Anderton, 'Economics of Arms Trade' in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds. ) Handbook 
of Defence Economics: Volume I (The Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 1995), pp. 523-559, p. 558; 
Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 36-40. 
5 As quoted in Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 296. 6 Information from 
th 
SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, supplied on request <http: //www. sirpri. se> 
Last accessed 26 May 2004. 
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Arabia as an example while the MoD offered Kuwait as an example of "increased 
7 
co-operation" resulting from equipment sales. Both will be explored below. 
The UK: Saudi Arabia's flexible friend 
At least two well publicised events of the 1990s cast doubt on the claim that the 
UK government exercises or wants to exercise any influence over Saudi Arabia - 
the failure to publish the NAO report and government treatment of asylum seeker 
and Saudi campaigner Dr Muhammad al-Mas'ari. 
The Al Yamamah deals have maneuvered the UK government into a highly 
dependent relationship with a corrupt and absolutist dictatorship, a relationship 
that necessarily informs all UK dealings with the Saudi state. During 1989 
credible and widespread allegations arose that that E20 billion Al Yamamah 
programme negotiations had resulted in the Saudi royal family and a series of 
mediators receiving huge commissions amounting to hundreds of millions of 
pounds. The allegations triggered an investigation by the NAO, the office that 
scrutinises government and public body spending on behalf of Parliament and 
the taxpayer. The report aimed to consider the use of taxpayer's money in 
relation to the deal. It was widely believed to contain details of what commissions 
were paid to whom. Although the NAO has published more than 820 reports 
since it was reformed in 1983, the 1992 report into the largest arms deal ever has 
been the only report never to be published. " It has not only been denied to the 
public but also to almost every member of the Public Accounts Committee, the 
Committee that supervises the work of the NAO. The Chair of the Committee, 
Labour MP Robert Sheldon, simply informed the members that there was "no 
evidence of fraud or corruption". 9 The head of the NAO in 1992 when the report 
was written and the man who reportedly made the decision to withhold the report 
was John Bourne. Before he became Comptroller and Auditor General at the 
NAO, Bourne was Deputy Under Secretary of State for Defence Procurement at 
7 Interview, Gerald Howarth with the author, April 2002; E-mail, MoD to author, 11 " September 
2002. 
" Telephone conversation, NAO Press Officer to author, 81h August 2003. 
9 House of Commons, Hansard, 13 th February 2002, Written Answers, column 403. 
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the MoD'O where his responsibilities reportedly included the Al Yamamah deal. " 
Martin O'Neill, the then Labour defence spokesperson, promised to re-open the 
inquiry once Labour was in office. 12 After seven years of Labour government the 
inquiry has not been re-opened and the report has not been published although 
the rationale behind this decision has gradually been revealed. In June 1997, 
Robert Sheldon reportedly explained that "the Saudis would have been upset". 
Similarly, Gerald Howarth has said that 
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia ... 
is one of Britain's closest allies 
and I think that they might have been upset by the publication of 
that and going round gratuitously offending your allies is not a 
good foreign PoliCY. 13 
in February 2003 Adam Ingram, Minister for the Armed Forces, justified the 
continuing non-disclosure on the basis that the deal referred to "confidential 
arrangements... on a programme which is of great significance for UK jobs and 
exports . 
04 But this non-disclosure may not last much longer. In July 2003 the 
Ombudsman announced that she would investigate the suppression of the report 
after both the FCO and MoD vetoed a Guardian request to obtain the document 
under the new open-government scheme. '5 Yet to date, it has been a New 
Labour government dedicated to "open government" that will not willingly allow 
the UK taxpayer to know whether and to what extent their money has been used 
to pay huge bribes. The importance of the Al Yamamah deal has been 
paramount. 
This reaction by the New Labour government to the demands of the UK-Saudi 
relationship, to the need to appease the Saudis, simply mirrors that of the 
previous Conservative administration. From those examples available, the case 
of the Saudi dissident, Dr Muhammad al-Mas'ari, is most illustrative of this. Al- 
Mas'ari had been arrested and allegedly tortured in Saudi Arabia before he fled 
ID th House of Commons, Hansard, 14 February 2002, column 364; National Audit Office, 'Contacts- 
<http: //www. nao. gov. uk/contacts. htm> Last accessed 8 th August 2003. " Gerald James, In the Public Interest (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) p. 139. 12 Chrissie Hirst, The Arabian Connection: The UK arms trade to Saudi Arabia (London: CAAT) 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/saudi-arabia. php#22> Last accessed 8 th 
August 2003. 
13 Interview, Gerald Howarth with the author, April 2002. 
14 House of Commons, Hansard, 12 th February 2003, Written Answers, column 737. 15 Rob Evans and David Leigh, 'Inquiry into banned report', The Guardian, 281h July 2003. 
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via Yemen to the UK where he claimed asylum in 1994. He was a spokesperson 
and a founder of the London based Committee for the Defence of Legitimate 
Rights. Mas'ari and his supporters ran a campaign against the House of Saud, 
faxing newsletters to other dissidents inside Saudi Arabia and around the world 
accusing the regime of corruption and calling for limited democratic reform. In 
January 1996 al-Mas'ari's application for political asylum was refused by the 
Home Office. The department sought his deportation to Dominica. 
The move came after Saudi King Fahd had personally asked John Major, to 
expel the campaigner in September 1994 and in October 1995. It came after the 
Saudis threatened UK-based arms producing companies British Aerospace, GEC 
and Vickers, that lucrative A[ Yamamah contracts would be reduced or canceled 
should the campaigner be allowed to remain within the UK. The companies 
reacted by collaborating with ministers, Whitehall officials and the CIA to find a 
solution to the issue, according to a leaked memo printed in the Guardian in 
January 1996. The document explained how intelligence on Saddam Hussein 
had been passed to the Saudis to appease them while Mas'ari remained in the 
UK. The ambassador to Saudi Arabia had told Colin Chandler, then Chief 
Executive at Vickers, that this had "earned us many plaudits". At the same time 
Dominica's Prime Minister, Edson James, had reportedly agreed to accept al- 
Mas'ari during an unexpected meeting in December 1995 with Malcolm Rifkind 
even though Dominica's lack of police resources and political vulnerability meant 
that Mas'ari's safety and could not be ensured. The UK government increased 
the island's bilateral aid from E500,000 in 1994/95 to E2 million in 1996. The 
money was used to help the faltering banana industry on which Dominica's 
economy largely depends. " This decision to deport al-Mas'ari was finally made 
at the highest levels during a December 1995 meeting involving John Major, 
Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind, Defence Secretary Michael Portillo and the 
President of the Board of Trade Ian Lang. 17 
16 Colin Brown, Patrick Cockburn, Steve Crawshaw and Phil Davison, 'Secret deal in arms and 
bananas that condemned a man to exile', The Independent, 5th January 1996. 
17 Colin Brown, Patrick Cockburn, Steve Crawshaw and Phil Davison, 'Secret deal in arms and 
bananas that condemned a man to exile'. 
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During January 1996, Conservative Minister Ann Widdecombe, along with the 
then Home Secretary Michael Howard were justifying the refusal on the grounds 
that the government had to protect "commercial links" with Saudi Arabia. " 
Widdecombe argued "We have close trade relations with a friendly state which 
has been the subject of considerable criticism by Mr. Mas'ari. "l' Widdecombe 
denied that the government had abandoned the principal of free speech 
because, she argued, "Mr. Mas'ari can say whatever he wants to say - in 
Dominica. "'O 
In March 1996, the deportation order was overturned by the Chief Immigration 
Adjudicator who ruled that the Home Secretary at the time, Michael Howard, had 
neither proved that Mas'ari would be safe in Dominica nor had the grounds to 
refuse to consider properly his case for political asylum. The Adjudicator went on 
to dismiss Saudi guarantees that their agents would not harm Dr Mas'ari outside 
Saudi Arabia and found that Howard was trying to circumvent the United Nations 
Convention on Refugees for "diplomatic and trade reasons". " In April 1996 the 
government decided that al-Mas'ari would be allowed to stay in the UK for four 
years. During the announcement in the Lords, Minister of State, Baroness Blatch 
referred repeatedly to the government's concerns that al-Mas'ari "does not put at 
risk a very special relationship that we have with Saudi Arabia. "22 In the same 
month, Babcock International blamed the government's failure to export Al- 
Mas'ari for the loss of an estimated E220 million worth of contracts. 23 This was 
shortly followed in May 1996 by the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nayef warning 
that "we can find all our needs elsewhere in the world... a true friend does not 
harm a friend and his interests. ý124 Two months later, the UK government was 
seeking worldwide support for changes to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees 
that would allow states to deny asylum to anyone advocating terrorism. Senior 
officials reportedly explained that the move was "aimed at discouraging future 
Unnamed, 'The silencing of Al Mas'ari', The Guardian, 6'h January 1996. 
Unnamed, 'Giving in to blackmail', The Guardian, 5'h January 1996. 
20 Colin Brown, Patrick Cockburn, Steve Crawshaw and Phil Davison, 'Secret deal in arms and 
bananas that condemned a man to exile'. 
21 Seumas Milne, 'Saudi's victorý stuns Howard', The Guardian, 6 th March 1996. 
22 House of Lords, Hansard, 29' April 1996, column 1401. 
23 Tim Burt, 'Lost orders blamed on UK-Saudi tension', Financial Times, 20 Ih April 1996. 
24 James Bruce, 'Saudi warns UK again over dissident's asylum', Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 th May 
1996. 
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25 Mas'aris". All the evidence in the Mas'ari case points to a concerted and 
coordinated effort by the UK's largest arms companies, intelligence agencies and 
government, including the Prime Minister, to protect and promote the interests of 
King Fahd of Saudi Arabia as a direct result of the Al Yamamah deals. 
Kuwait: Giving the UK a run for its money 
Kuwait acts as second example put forward by proponents of the idea that arms 
sales can bring greater recipient co-operation. Although UK-Kuwaiti relations 
prior to the Gulf War were favourable, the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding 
covering arms sales and other services from UK companies and the 
establishment of the DESO Kuwaiti Programme Office in 1993 have supposedly 
brought at least two benefits. The MoD claims that the UK has acquired "(1) a 
strategic involvement with issues in Kuwait and the region in general and (2) a 
shop window for all UK products" and as such puts Kuwait forward as an 
26 example of the political benefits to be derived from exporting arms. But 
although the evidence is limited, all suggests that whatever increased 
involvement the UK has enjoyed in the region has been more than matched by 
other states, particularly America. The largely successful attempts by Kuwait both 
to secure arms deals on highly favourable terms and its seeming ability to 
manipulate procurement choices for its own political ends must also play a part in 
reducing the political capital that the UK has derived from its rearmament 
relationship with Kuwait. 
Given the limited information it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions on the 
development of the UK-Kuwaiti relationship, on what role arms transfers have 
played in it and on how this compares to Kuwait's relationship with other arms 
producing states. The UK did figure in the initial post Gulf War procurement 
decisions. These initial contracts were used by the Kuwaiti ruling family to both 
reward those states who acted in its defence and to create political alliances with 
all the states on the Security Council in order to guarantee Kuwait's future 
25 Gerald Butt, 'Saudis forgive Britain over Masari affair', The Daily Telegraph, 3 rd jU ly 1996. 
26 The Kuwait Programme Office procures military equipment and services on behalf of the Kuwaiti 
government from British suppliers. It charges 2% management fee on all contracts it negotiates. E 
mail, MoD to the author, 11 th September 2002. 
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independence. In this period, it was the UK's place on the Security Council and 
the role it played in the 1990-1991 Gulf War rather than the UK's ability to export 
arms that helped to bring any increased bilateral co-operation or "strategic 
involvement" in the region. But this opportunity would have been constrained by 
the Kuwaiti policy to form alliances with all Security Council members. By 1995, 
Kuwait had signed defence agreements not only with the UK (February 1992) but 
also with the US (September 1991), France (August 1992), a ten year agreement 
relating to joint maneuvers with Russia (November 1993) and with China (March 
1995). 27 The relative importance of the UK to the Kuwaitis within this strategy is 
indicated in a comment made by the Kuwaiti defence minister in 1996. When 
asked by reporters if the UK or France will win a contact to supply Kuwait with 
missiles for patrol boats he remarked "It will not matter which of the two allied 
countries Kuwait signs the contract with, because relations and support with both 
28 
countries are well secured". 
Beyond this initial period, the evidence suggests that the focus for the Kuwaiti 
government has been on rewarding the Americans for their actions during the 
1991 Gulf War with favourable procurement choices and reportedly on the use of 
procurement choices to persuade powerful states to maintain sanctions on Iraq. " 
In 1992 Kuwait chose to procure the American Abram Tanks above the UK 
Challenger tank. This came after Dick Cheney reportedly sent a letter including 
"an oblique threat that should America ever again need to go the defence of 
Kuwait, it would make operational sense if they were both using the same 
equipment .,, 
30 A similar level of US influence is suggested in the outcome of the 
Kuwaiti plan to buy 000 million worth of Chinese PLZ45 self-propelled guns. In 
1997 Kuwaiti officials were reportedly privately admitting that for political reasons 
a Chinese firm would win the contract at the expense of US firm United Defence. 
China had not yet been offered any significant deals since 1991 and was 
reportedly threatening to withhold support for Iraqi sanctions when the policy next 
came under review in October unless Kuwait agreed to award Beijing the 
27 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, pp. 272-273. 
28 Unnamed, 'France Tries to Beat Britain in Missile Sales', Agence France-Presse International 
News, 14 th January 1996. 
29 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 271; Ed Blanche, 'USA urges Kuwait 
to buy Paladin as Gulf aid debt', Jane's Defence Weekly, 30(h July 1997. 
30 Quoted by Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 271. 
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contract .3' Beijing denied such pressure was applied in July although did 
subsequently abstain from an October US-UK resolution calling for increased 
sanctions on Iraq for non-compliance with UN weapons inspectors. The Chinese 
firm NORINCO was awarded the contract in September despite US pressure 
including that from US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns who 
reminded the Kuwaitis 
We saved Kuwait, we saved the royal family and we saved the 
economy and the structure of society as Kuwait knows it. We 
32 
assume that Kuwait hasn't forgotten that. 
However, the deal was only for 27 of the required 75 guns. 33 Reportedly, under 
US and European pressure, the Kuwaitis widened the competition to UK firm 
Vickers and the South African firm LIW. By the end of 1998 the Kuwaiti defence 
minister announced that the remainder of the initial requirement for 75 would be 
met by US based firm United Defence and its Paladin M109A6 155mm self- 
34 
propelled howitzers in the face of stiff Kuwaiti Parliamentary opposition . It is the 
relationship with America that the Kuwaitis are most eager to maintain. 
A second role for Kuwaiti procurement seems to have been to influence supplier 
states to maintain Iraqi sanctions. A 1993 contract awarded to the Russians for 
armoured vehicles and an artillery Rocket system was seemingly a reward for 
Russia pressing other Security Council members to retain a tough stance on Iraqi 
sanctions. In 1996 BAE Systems was awarded a US$200 contract to provide 
Kuwait with Sea Skua anti-ship missiles at the expense of the French, reportedly 
because the French government were more sympathetic to the lifting of Iraqi 
sanctions. 35 In 1999 reports emerged that the Kuwaitis were trying to use 
potential arms purchases from a Russian company, Rosvooriuzheni, to persuade 
Russia not to lend support to the Iraqi regime. " 
3' Ed Blanche, 'USA urges Kuwait to buy Paladin as Gulf aid debt', Jane's Defence Weekly, 30th 
July 1997. 
32 Nicholas Burns, Department of State daily press briefing, July 1 5th 1997 
<http: //www. hri. org/docs/statedep/97-07-15. std. html> Last accessed 14 th August 2003. 
33 Ed Blanche, 'Kuwait confirms buy of 27 Chinese 155mm SPGs% Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 th 
November 1997. 
34 Ed Blanche, 'Kuwait secures Paladin guarantee from USA', Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 rd 
December 1998. 
35 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 274. 
36 Nikolai Novichkov, 'Kuwaiti delegation visits Moscow for procurement talks', Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 17 Ih February 1999. 
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But above all the Kuwaitis have been concerned to secure deals favourable to 
themselves. In February 1998, the manager of the Kuwaiti Finance department's 
Countertrade and Offset Department announced that by the end of the year at 
least 23 offset programmes would have been established. Those who have 
become involved in Kuwaiti offsets include General Dynamics that promised to 
invest $300 million in conjunction with its M1A2 tanks contract, British Aerospace 
which was to invest $28 million and the American ITT Industries which would 
invest $7.8 million. Alongside these are Raytheon which would invest $98 million 
in conjunction with a Patriot air defence missile deal, Hughes Aircraft Systems 
has a $27.6 million investment obligation and GKN has a $28.5 million obligation 
in a water proofing plant in conjunction with its $700 1993 armoured vehicle 
contract. By March 1998 the total value of offsets was reportedly an impressive 
$1.5 billion. 37 
Overall, it is likely that given the role of the US, the importance to Kuwait of 
maintaining Iraqi sanctions and the impressive levels of offsets that Kuwait has 
secured, the UK and UK-based arms producing companies have been playing a 
more minor role in the region than the MoD implies. 
Other political influence attempts have resulted in clearer outcomes. Despite the 
sale of weapons to Argentina and Iraq in the 1980s, the UK found itself at war 
with both. Douglas Hurd, then a Foreign Office minister attempted to sell Saddam 
Hussein a complete BAE Systems air defence system in 1981. He was followed 
by others. Trade minister Alan Clark (1986) and Foreign Office minister David 
Mellor (1988) also visited Iraq after the UK had officially banned the sale of arms 
38 to the state. Further secret, illegal transfers of arms, the sale of chemicals 
including three tonnes of nerve gas antidotes along with plutonium and export 
credits (the latter of which amounted to E3.5 billion from 1980 until 1990)39 did 
nothing to increase the influence of western governments over Iraq. Arms 
exports did nothing to stop Iraq using poisoned gas in 1983 and 1984 against 
37 Ed Blanche, '$340m offset projects set up by Kuwait', Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 (h March 1998. 
38 John Pilger, Hidden Agendas (London: Vintage, 1999), pp. 125-126. 
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Iranians . 
40 They did nothing to prevent the use of poisoned gas at the Kurdish 
village of Halabja in 1988 that killed 5,000 people. The government's now well 
documented reaction to this mass killing - relaxing export guidelines and sending 
trade minister Tony Newton to offer Saddam Hussein a further E340 million in 
export credits - more than suggests that the government of the day were not 
interested in influencing Iraq on human rights issue S. 4 ' But these kind of events 
did embarrass a UK government which had identified Iraq as the "biggest prize" 
in the arms export market in the 1980S4' especially when those exports were 
used against UK troops in the 1991 Gulf War. The 1992 National Audit Office 
report on the Al Yamamah deal is still being kept secret because, according to 
43 the Office's Chairperson, "the Saudis would have been upset". In 2000, Qatar 
suspended trade talks with the UK after investigators in Jersey began looking 
into an alleged payment of El 00 million in "sweeteners" by arms-producing 
companies, including BAE Systems, to Qatar's ruling family, an investigation later 
dropped amid suspicion of government pressure. 44 There was almost no support 
from any Middle Eastern state for a unilateral attack on Iraq despite the levels of 
UK and western arms exports to the region. In March 2002, to the 
embarrassment of the UK government, the Israeli government confirmed the use 
of UK sold Centurion tanks against Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in 
45 breach of end user assurances. Again, to the embarrassment of the UK 
government, Indonesia was seen to be using Alvis Scorpion tanks against 
demonstrators in Jakata in May and November 1998 during demonstrations in 
which 18 protesters were killed. The government went on to use Alvis Saladins 
against protesters in Ambon in December 1999 and July 2000.46 
39 Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit ,- 
Britain's real role in the world (London: Vintage, 2003) p. 33-35. 40 Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit, p. 33. 
41 John Pilger, Hidden Agendas, p. 126. 
42 John Pilger, 'Foreword', pp. ix-xv in Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit. 
4' The Chairperson's comments were reported in The Independent, 23 rd June 1997 as quoted in a 
CAAT memorandum submitted to the Select Committee on International Development, September 
2000 <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/issues/corruption-submission-0900. php> Last accessed 
17 th August 2003. 
44 Conal Walsh and Anthony Barnett, 'BAE in Spotlight as 'Sweeteners' Turn Sour', The Observer, 
13 th October 2002 and 'Riddle of Sheik's GDP 1 00m Secret Fund', The Observer, 2nd June 2002. 
45 David Mepham, 'We've Given in to the Arms Lobby', The Guardian, 24 th July 2002; House of 
Commons, Hansard, 1 1th March 2002, Written Answers, column 689. 
46 Nicholas Gilby, 'Labour, Arms and Indonesia - Has anything changedT (London: CAAT, 2001) 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/labour-indonesia-070l. php> Last 
accessed 7 th August 2003. 
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But the argument goes further. It is not only that the buyers' market diminishes 
supplier influence over the recipient. The reality is that UK involvement in the 
arms market has added to the need for successive UK governments to become 
public apologists for some of the worst abusers of human rights. This is a need 
which has run right through UK involvement in the arms market, a need which 
has not been interrupted by the New Labour government's rise to power. 
Margaret Thatcher was aware of this when, following a meeting with Suharto at 
the height of her arms sales drive in 1985, she said that East Timor "was not a 
matter for Britain". The Indonesian Foreign Minister at the time, Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja, confirmed that the situation was not 
even an irritant in the relationship between our countries. We 
understand that the British can not do more than abstain [on the 
East Timor vote at the UN], and they understand what 47 happened. 
After the 1991 massacre of over 400 East Timorese the UK government resisted 
calls for trade sanctions, failed to support the idea of an EU or UN arms embargo 
and in 1993 went on to suggest that some of the atrocities "have been 
exaggerated. , 48 In 1985 a member of the South East Asian department wrote in 
response to a letter on Indonesian activities in East Timor, 
The photographs enclosed with your letter, apparently taken 
some eight years ago, do not, in our view, show the [British 
armoured] vehicles engaged in combat in a meaningful sense of 
the term. Moreover, the temporary holding of an arrested person 
on an armoured car, or other vehicle, in itself scarcely constitutes 
conclusive proof of its use for "internal repression". " 
This apologist agenda is particularly relevant for the Labour government which, 
during the first two years of power, included amongst its top 15 arms customers 
persistent human rights abusers including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Malaysia, Kuwait, 
Brazil, Oman, South Korea, Turkey, America, China, and Indonesia. This agenda 
has been evident throughout Labour's two terms in office. Tony Blair pledged 
support for maintaining Indonesia's territorial integrity following continued 
47 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p. 154. 
48 House of Commons, Hansard, 10" February 1993, column 978. 
49 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, pp. 151-152. 
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atrocities in West Papua and Aceh in 2000 . 
50 After a stream of evidence 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s that Indonesian Forces used BAE Systems 
Hawks to kill East Timorese civilians" the government was still arguing in 2002 
that whilst Hawks had flow over East Timor in 1999 they "have never been used 
in a ground-attack or offensive role anywhere in Indonesia. "52 After a four-year 
major Turkish offensive against the Kurdish people, Defence Secretary George 
Robertson hoped in 1998 that the Turkish government "be as generous and 
humanitarian to the Kurds as they have been in the past. , 53 Indonesian General 
Probowa, reportedly demoted after "disappearances" in Jakarta in 1998 and now 
an important figure in Indonesian procurement was described as "enlightened" by 
George Robertson, then at the MoD. 54 Blair has refused to identify Israel as the 
prime aggressor against the Palestinians, has refused to disrupt arms exports to 
a country that the UN has condemned as committing crimes against human itY55 
and it was the UK which broke ranks with all other EU states in failing to support 
a proposed December 2001 LIN Resolution condemning Israeli actions. 56 
The claim made by the government that arms bring the UK increased influence in 
the world is impossible to reconcile with the nature of the international arms 
market, with the history of recipient states embarrassing the UK government and 
especially difficult to reconcile with the government's apologist response to rights 
abuses carried out by those recipients. But one area where arms sales do deliver 
increased UK influence, over international events, albeit a more dangerous 
influence, is through their supply to and use in conflict-vulnerable areas or to 
states experiencing conflict 
50 John Aglionby, 'Indonesian army drives rich region into rebels' arms', The Guardian, 1 1th March 
2000. 
51 See for example John Pilger, Hidden Agendas, p. 119-120,140-141; 'Flying the Flag: Arming the 
World', Carlton Television, 1994; 'Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy', Carlton Television, 
January 1999. 
52 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report., Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 2 01h May 2003, HC 474, 
appendix 6. 
5 5 House of Commons, Hansard, 9th February 1998, column 11. 
54 Alan McLaughlin and Kevin Mullen, 'Dealing in Destruction', The Guardian, 23 rd August 2000. 
55 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 9th October 2000 
<http: //www. unhchr. ch/Huridocda/Huridoca. nsf/TestFrame/Oeabc4d2dOceO97bcl 256985004fd471 ? 
Opendocument> Last accessed 17 th August 2003. 
56 The Council for the Advancement of Arab-British Understanding, Press Release, 17 th December 
2001 <http: //www. caabu. org/press/releases/us-veto. html> Last accessed 171h August 2003. 
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UK ARMS EXPORTS HAVE NOT BECOME A WAY OF PREVENTING CONFLICT 
The rationale that arms exports can prevent conflict was put forward by Foreign 
Secretary Jack Straw in February 2003 to justify the use of the government's 
"global conflict prevention pool" to buy two Mi-1 7 helicopters on the open market 
and export them, with other military equipment to the Nepalese army. He went on 
to argue 
I think that it is accepted that in order to prevent conflict, you 
have to use force in many circumstances, and that is certainly 
true in Nepal. 57 
When plans to gift two further aircraft to the Nepalese Army were announced in 
January 2004, again funded through the conflict prevention fund, Straw argued 
sometimes you have to prevent conflict and its scale by making 
use of military action. " 
Those circumstances must be relevant to many of Labour's arms recipients since 
23% of the value of standard licences and 471 new open licences approved 
during 2001 and detailed in the Strategic Export Report were approved for states 
experiencing conflict. 20% of the value of standard licences approved during 
2001 allowed arms exports to states experiencing low intensity conflict (mainly 
Turkey, South Africa and Tanzania) and 9% allowed exports to states 
59 experiencing high levels of conflict (mainly India, Indonesia, Russia and Israel). 
During 2002 18% of the value of standard licences and a total of 582 new open 
licences were approved for states experiencing conflict. 13% of the value of 
standard licences approved during 2002 were for states experiencing intense 
conflict and 15% for those experiencing low intensity confl iCt. 60 Licences 
57 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 200 1, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, question 64. 
58 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 18th May 2004, HC 390, 
P aragraph 76. "' 
These two percentages figures (20% and 9%) do not add up to 23%, the percentage of standard 
licences approved for states in conflict, because many states experiencing high intensity conflict 
also experience low intensity conflict. 
60 Again, the split figures given for intense and low intensity conflict will not add up to the total 
approved for conflict states because many states experience both low and high intensity conflict so 
are included twice in the split figures. 'Low intensity conflicts' are those which have caused from 
100 to 1,000 deaths from mid-2000-mid-2001 while 'High intensity conflicts' are those large scale 
armed conflicts which have caused more than 1,000 deaths from mid-2000-mid-2001. This 
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approved to such states since 1999 are shown in greater detail in appendixes 
two and three. 
An academic literature has built up looking at the impact of arms exports to 
areas of conflict. Work has been undertaken to look at the use of arms exports to 
reduce tension or even avert conflict via deterrence or via reestablishing the 
balance of power. Work has also been undertaken to look at the easy availability 
of cheap weapons, especially small arms, in a flooded market in encouraging 
political disagreement to turn into conflict, especially preemptive attack, and for 
that conflict to be more intense. A summary is shown in appendix seventeen. It is 
difficult to establish clear connections between arms transfers and conflict 
because the stabilising or clestabilising effects of arms is dependent on a number 
of variables. These including the types and amounts of weapons transferred, the 
intensity and cause of the conflict and the response of surrounding states and 
larger powers. To date, little systematic research has been undertaken to 
establish under what conditions arms transfers might prevent or encourage 
conflict. 
Exploring the rationale that UK arms exports can prevent conflict is made more 
difficult because, apart from the Nepalese example, the FCO have failed to name 
cases where UK arms exports have acted as a deterrence or otherwise averted 
conflict. The Nepalese example is itself problematic for a least two reasons. 
First, the use of E4 million worth of the global conflict prevention pool, of which 
JC2.6 million will be used to pay for the helicopters gifted in 2003, is a departure 
from the normal use of the fund which was established to restore civil society in 
conflict torn areas. Although the Nepalese army has assured the UK government 
that the helicopters will be restricted to medical and other humanitarian tasks, 
Jack Straw has admitted that they will add to the combat capability of the Royal 
Nepalese Army. The all party Quadripartite Committee has criticised the use of 
the fund to gift both the 2003 helicopters and the 2004 aircraft observing that 
"conflict prevention seems to have a rather looser meaning within Government 
definition follows that given by the Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human 
Rights Violations (PIOOM) World Conflict Map 2001-2002 
<http: //www. goal sf oram eri can s. o rg/publ ication s/pi oom/atf-Wo rld_co n fmap. pdf> Last accessed 
12 1h August 2003. 
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than it does in the wider world. , 61 Second, although the government has argued 
that "In some cases, the use of force by a Government within its own borders ... 
is legitimate in some cases, for example to preserve law and order against 
terrorists" this applies where force is used "only in accordance with international 
human rights standards. , 62 But Nepalese authorities have a consistent record or 
acting outside of international human rights standards. A December 2002 press 
release by Amnesty reported the Nepalese government confirming that between 
November 2001 and the end of October 2002 its armed conflict with the 
Communist Party of Nepal had claimed another 4,366 lives. Amnesty believes 
that at least half of these deaths were unlawful, the vast majority as a result of 
the Nepalese authorities believing that the civilians had supported the 
Communist Party. Amnesty also reported widespread torture and 
63 disappearances within Nepal. The FCO's own 2002 human rights report 
highlights that "there is now widespread anxiety about the level and brutality of 
abuses and violations by both sides to the confl iCt. t. 64 The inappropriate use of 
the conflict prevention fund and Nepal's record on observing internationally 
agreed human rights standards makes this a poor case for the UK government to 
put forward to defend the rationale that arms exported from the UK can prevent 
conflict. 
It is difficult to see which other cases New Labour could put forward to defend 
their rationale since the UK government has not only consistently sold arms to 
states where equipment and components have been used in existing conflicts 
but has adopted a deliberate policy of targeting conflict-vulnerable, often rival 
states as its arms recipients, frequently increasing sales at times of greatest 
tension. It is because of these motivations that any substantive study on the 
impact of New Labour's arms sales similar to those in table 3.2 would most likely 
find a detrimental affect on conflict avoidance, scale and duration. The supply of 
" House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 200 1, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph go, House of 
Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 76. 
62 House of Commons, Hansard, 28 th July 1997, Written Answers, column 28. 63 Amnesty International, '2003 LIN Commission on Human Rights: A time for deep reflection', 
Press release IOR 41/025/2002,1 " December 2002 <web. amnesty. org/aidoc/aidoc 
- pdf. nsf/Index/ IOR410252002ENGLISH/$File/lOR4102502. pdf> Last accessed 12 th August2003. 
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arms is neither interrupted by increases in regional tension nor the possibility of 
an imminent outbreak of war, characteristics of UK involvement in the arms 
market that the remainder of this chapter will examine in some detail. The well- 
documented cases of Israel and Indonesia are particularly illustrative of UK arms 
exports to areas experiencing increased tension. Exports to India and Pakistan 
together with the states involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo war are 
particularly illustrative of UK arms exports to states on the brink of, or involved in 
conflict. As such, all are worth examining further. 
Sticking to its guns: The UK's persistent supply of arms to Israel and Indonesia 
Since New Labour came to power it has authorised licences to Israel which have 
allowed for the export of machine guns, tear gas/irritant ammunition, military 
explosives, components for combat aircraft, stun grenades, anti-tank missiles, 
anti-armour missiles, assault rifles and armoured vehicles. " Not only have these 
exports been in contravention of 1991 LIN Resolution 687 that calls for the 
"comprehensive control of armaments in the [Middle East] region", " not only 
have exports increased during times of greatest conflict but much of the 
equipment has been used in a way which is in contravention of Israeli end-use 
assurances. The response of the UK government has been to increase arms 
exports to Israel. 
During 2000 Ell 2.5 million worth of standard licences were approved for arms 
exports to Israel along with 18 new open licences despite the outbreak of the al- 
Aqsa Intifacla in September of that year. 67 During 2001 Ariel Sharon came to 
power denouncing the Oslo peace accords and the Intifacla. Israeli military 
activities intensified in the Occupied Territories. The response of the UK 
government was to approve E22.5 million worth of licences, almost double that of 
the previous year as well as 20 new open licences . 
6" Throughout 2000 and 2001, 
the UK government was assuring the public of Israeli promises that 
64 FCO, Human Rights Annual Report 2002, p. 101 <http: //www. fco. gov. uk> Last accessed 15 Ih 
July 2003. 
65 FCO, Human Rights Annual Reports 1999-2002. 
66 LIN Resolution 687 (1991), 3 rd April 1991, <http: //www. un. org> Last accessed 12'h August 2003. 67 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2000. 
68 FCO, Strategic Export Control Report 2001. 
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No UK originated equipment nor any UK originated systems/sub- 
systems/components are used as part of the Israel Defence 
Force's activities in the Territories. '9 
But in August 2001 a "senior Israeli defence ministry source" told BBC Radio 
four's World at One programme that this was not the case. UK sold transit vans, 
Land Rovers, helicopter parts and components of an anti-missile system had 
been used in the Occupied Territories . 
70 The UK has almost certainly exported 
vital parts for American supplied helicopter gunships, the same gunships that 
have been shown in news reports firing into civilian areas .71 The response of Ben 
Bradshaw, then a foreign Office Minister and a member of the "Labour friends of 
Israel" group explained that the UK government took "on trust" Israeli assurances 
that UK sources equipment would not be used in the Occupied Territories. 72 
In 2002,27 new open licences were approved alongside f-10 million worth of 
standard licences. 73 Of these, twenty standard licences were approved in March 
2002, the month that Israel invaded the West Bank and the month that the 
government revealed to the House that Centurion Tanks exported to Israel 
between 1958 and 1970 have been turned into armored personnel carriers in 
74 
apparent contradiction of Israeli end-use assurances . At the end of March 
Israel formally responded to Foreign Office inquires into the use of the tanks by 
arguing that the use of the armoured personnel carriers was in response to 
operational needs. The Israel government went on to argue that their use was 
not in breach of the assurances given in November 2000, repeating that no UK- 
originated equipment would be used in the Territories before adding that it would 
not stop using the armoured personnel carriers in this way. Jack Straw admitted 
"We also have questions about other possible breaches of the assurances with 
regard to equipment supplied under previous administrations". Still a further five 
75 
standard licences were approved in April 2002. In May 2002 it was revealed 
69 House of Commons, Hansard, 11 th March 2002, Written Answers, column 689. 
70 Richard Bingley, 'The UK's Role: a friend of Israel?, CAAT News, October- December 2001 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/magazine/i 001 /israel. php> Last accessed 12 th August 2003. 
71 John Pilger, 'Salesman of Death' 27 th May 2002 
<http: //www. medialens. org/articles-2002/Jýp_salesmen. html> Last accessed 12 th August2003. 
72 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'No ban on British arms to Israel', The Guardian, 17 th August 2001. 
73 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2002. 
74 House of Commons, Hansard, 15 h April 2002, Written Answers, column 721. 
75 House of Commons, Hansard, 1 9: h June 2002, Written Answers, column 344. 
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that cooling systems exported from the UK up to 1996 had been used in Israeli 
Merkava Tanks. It was also revealed that UK originated components, like missile 
trigger systems, are incorporated into American Apache helicopters. 76 Merkavas 
and Apaches are reportedly the two main weapons used against Palestinians in 
77 the Occupied Territories. The response from the UK government was to 
approve a further eight standard licences in May and to approve the export of 
BAE Systems Head-Up Displays for American F1 6s bound for Israel in July 
2002. It has been widely reported that F1 6s have been used by the Israeli 
Defence Force to attack Palestinian civilian areas . 
7' At their annual general 
meeting in April 2003, BAE Systems Chair Dick Evans denied that Israeli F1 6 
jets were fitted with BAE Systems Head-Up Displays. But during the reception 
after the meeting, Mike Turner, Chief executive of BAE Systems admitted to 
campaigners that BAE Systems was negotiating with Lockheed to provide the 
Head-Up Displays for the Israeli planes. 79 
Even if the UK government was concerned about the end use of the equipment 
and of the parts whose export they licence, there are no specific systems 
designed to monitor their end use and no clear guidelines as to the 
circumstances when end-use monitoring should occur. The government has 
argued that 
We do not consider that it is either practical or useful to monitor 
the end use of all military goods exported from the UK over their 
lifetime with the end user, particularly where we have already 
satisfied ourselves of the end user's integrity before issuing a 
licence. '30 
Specifically with regard to Israel, the FCO's Baroness Amos has argued that 
although information from the Embassy and NGOs is, she claims, monitored, 
76 Richard Norton-Taylor, 'UK equipment being used in Israeli attacks', The Guardian, 29 1h May 
2002, 
77 Mandy Turner, 'Arming the Occupation: Israel and the Arms Trade', October 2002 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/israel-1002. php> Last accessed 17 th 
August 2003. 
78 Mandy Turner, 'Arming the Occupation: Israel and the Arms Trade'. 79 E-mail, Chris Cole, CAAT, to the author, 30th April 2003. 
" House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report. - Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 118 
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British Embassy Staff in Tel Aviv do not undertake physical 
checks on the end-use of UK licenced equipment, components 
and spare parts supplied by the UK to Israel. They do not have 
the resources to do so. 8' 
These are faults which were never rectified by the 2002 Export Control and Non- 
Proliferation Act, an omission which has been criticised by the House 
Quadripartite Committee, 82 a committee that concluded in May 2004 that "end- 
use assurances are not worth the paper they are written on. "" 
UK exported equipment and parts have consistently been used by the Israeli 
forces in the Occupied Territories despite end-use assurances from the Israeli 
government. The UK government's response has been to continue to arm the 
Israeli forces, increasing their supply in times of greatest conflict in an 
environment with little end use controls. Far from preventing conflict, UK arms 
exports and the tacit consent for Israeli activities that their continued export imply 
have helped to maintain conflict. 
The type of relationship seen between the UK as a supplier to a state in an area 
of increasing regional tension has not been restricted to the Middle East. This 
relationship has been mirrored by the UK-Indonesian relationship where the UK 
government has again seen a recipient state persistently use UK exported arms 
in conflict, again contrary to end-use assurances and again the response of the 
UK government has been to continue or to increase arms deliveries. 
When the new Labour government came to power in 1997 it famously refused to 
revoke a series of 1996 licences agreed by the previous Conservative 
administration. The licences allowed for the export of a range of components and 
military equipment including 16 BAE Systems Hawks, 50 Alvis Scorpion 
armoured vehicles and seven GKN Tactica water cannon. The decision was 
made even though in April 1996 the Indonesian government had used UK 
exported Scorpion armoured vehicles fitted with 90mm howitzers and mounted 
B1 House of Commons, Hansard, 71ý March 2002, Written Answers, Columns 30-31. 
82 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report 
'- 
Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraphs 116-122. 83 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report., Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 99. 
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machine guns against students protesting at the Islamic University of Indonesia 
in Sulawesi. Three students were killed and a number were injured. UK exported 
Tactica water cannons were then used against students protesting against the 
deaths in Sulawesi in June 1996 in the University of Bandung in Java. Ammonia 
was reportedly used in the cannons. 84 In July 1996 Tactica water canons were 
used against an opposition election march. Five people were killed. Dye was 
used in the canons so that activists could be identified and punished later. "5 The 
Labour government justified its decision to allow the 1996 contracts to continue 
by citing the importance of maintaining the reputation of UK-based arms 
companies and their lack of legal authority to revoke the existing licences 
although the latter has since been widely discredited. Robin Cook also cited 
assurances from Indonesia that UK exported arms would not be used for internal 
repression. But in 1998, Indonesian Colonel Halim reportedly told Channel 
Four's Mark Thomas that UK made Saracens and Saladin armoured vehicles 
were being used in East Timor. "6 In December 1999 and in July 2000 Saladins 
were used in Ambon where a number of civilians were killed. 87 Scorpions were 
used again against protesting students in May 1998 at Trisakti University during 
which six people were killed and in November in Jakarta during which twelve 
88 
people were killed . In the same month Derek Fatchett confirmed that the 
Foreign Office had received "many disturbing reports about disappearances, 
detentions and clashes between the Indonesian security forces and students. , 89 
Despite this, during 1998 41 standard licences covering military goods like air 
rifles, military vehicles, missile launching equipment, projectile launchers and 
thermal imaging equipment were authorised by the government. Only one for 
"small arms, machine guns or accessories" was refused. 
At the same time, a similar level of continuity between Labour and the previous 
administration existed in policy towards East Timor. Bishop Carlos Belo, who 
84 Unnamed, 'Light tanks and armoured vehicles', The Guardian, 25" January 1999. 85 Unnamed, 'Human rights or trade? ', BBC News Online, 1997 
th <http: //www. bbc. co. uk/politics97/issues/humanrights. shtml> Last accessed 12 August 2003. 
86 Nicholas Gilby, Arms Exports to Indonesia, (London: CAAT, 1999) 
th <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/countries/indonesia-1099. php> Last accessed 17 
August 2003. 
87 Nicholas Gilby, Labour, Arms and Indonesia - Has anything changed. 88 Nicholas Gilby, Arms Exports to Indonesia. 
th 89 House of Commons, Hansard, Written Answers, 13 May 1998, column 139. 
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shared the 1996 Nobel Peace Price with fellow East Timor campaigner Jose 
Ramos-Horta, said during a 1997 speech in London 
Please, I beg you, restrict still further the conditions under which 
such trade is permitted. Do not sustain any longer a conflict 
which without these sales could never have been pursued in the 
first place, nor for so very long. " 
Of most concern was the alleged use of BAE Systems Hawks by the Indonesia 
forces in East Timor. Responding to continuing allegations of this nature, the 
FCO Minister responsible for Indonesia, the late Derek Fatchett, concluded in 
1998 that 
We have studied all the information available about allegations of 
Hawks being used in East Timor. We are confident that UK 
supplied Hawk aircraft have not been used in East Timor or, 
indeed, in a counter-insurgency role in Indonesia. " 
Just over a year later, in August 1999, the government was forced to admit for 
the first time that Hawks had indeed been used in East Timor. Still, the 
govern ment-authorised invitation to the Indonesia government to attend an arms 
fair held the following month stood. 92 The UK finally agreed to an arms embargo 
against Indonesia in response to the East Timorese situation. The embargo 
came into force from 16 th September 1999 until 16 th January 2000. All licences 
were suspended but 123 days, the duration of the embargo, were added to their 
validity so that on 17 th January business effectively carried on as usual. During 
1999 and 2000 32 new open licences were approved alongside E4 million worth 
of standard licences covering equipment including components for combat 
aircraft and anti-tank ammunition. The low value of standard licences was 
probably because of the financial crisis in Indonesia rather than any tightening up 
of the application of criteria. Only one open licence was amended to exclude 
Indonesia and only one standard licence application was refused in 1999 while 
two standard licences were refused in 2000, no more than any other year. 93 
'0 Bishop Belo, 'A Time for Justice', July 1997. Transcript available at 
<http: //www. etan. org/timor/bello797. htm> Last accessed 1 s' July 2003. 91 House of Commons, Hansard, 12 th May 1998, Written Answers, column 108. 
92 Unnamed, 'British Hawks flown over East Timor', BBC News Online, 31 " August 1999, 
<http: //news-bbc. co. uk/hi/english/uk/newsid - 
434000/434201. stm> Last accessed 12 th August 2003. 
93 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Reports 1999-2000; Strategic Export Controls Reports 2000. 
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During 2001, the government was again emphasising Indonesian end-use 
assurances. In August 2001 Foreign Office Minister Ben Bradshaw confirmed 
that UK exported equipment would not be used for internal repression saying, 
14 "The assurances they [Indonesian Forces] gave us are reliable". The same 
.1 reliable" forces had guaranteed security for the process of self-determination in 
East-Timor but instead committed crimes against humanity and were continuing 
to commit acts of gross human rights abuses elsewhere. In November 2001, 
Richard Bingley from Campaign Against Arms Trade asked a Foreign Office 
Official whether reports of 30 palm oil plantation workers and nine men and boys 
aged from 13 being massacred by Indonesian armed forces in Aceh were true. 
The Official said that to the best of his knowledge the reports were true and went 
on to estimate that 1,500 people, mostly civilian had died in conflicts in Indonesia 
95 that year alone. During that year, the value of standard licences approved by 
the government rose from f-2 million in 1999 to El 5.5 million and the number of 
new open licences approved rose from none in 1999 to six in 2001.96 
In 2002 the government decided to relax its policy towards the use of UK 
sourced equipment in Aceh. Before August 2002, the Indonesian Government 
was bound by an undertaking not to use UK equipment in the province and to 
provide advanced warning of any possible deployment. During that month the 
Indonesian government informed the UK government that they would be 
deploying UK-built military equipment in Aceh against previous assurances but 
promised that the equipment would not be used to infringe human rights. In 
response the UK government accepted Indonesia's new assurances and 
assured Indonesia that it no longer required any advance warning of the 
deployment of UK sources equipment in Aceh. Parliament was informed of this 
97 change of policy some nine months later. 2002 also saw the number of new 
open licences approved rise to 15 and the value of standard licences increase 
again to E41 million, a twenty-fold increase compared to the value of those 
approved in 2000. Licences included those for aircraft cannons and components 
94 Unnamed, 'Britain ready to resume arms exports-, The Jakarta Post, 29"' August 2001 
<http: Hwww. iansa. org/oldsite/news/2001/aug-Ol/brit ready. htm> Last accessed 12 th August 2003. 95 Richard Bingley, 'An ethical blindspot,, The Observer, 1 1th May 2003. 
96 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2001. 
97 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licencing, Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 81-83. 
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for air to air and air to surface missiles. These details were revealed in the FCO's 
Annual Report in May 2003, the same week as 36 Scorpion armoured vehicles 
and Hawks were deployed in Aceh to suppress the internal conflict in the 
province. 28,000 Indonesian troops had assembled on the Island by this time 
and martial law declared after peace talks to resolve the 26-year conflict that has 
caused the death of over 10,000 people, failed to restart. The Indonesian 
government had assured the UK government in August 2002 that whilst UK Built 
armoured personnel carriers had been transferred to Aceh, they would be used 
for casualty evacuation and logistical support, not to infringe human rights . 
98 But 
the senior military spokesperson in Aceh reportedly claimed that Scorpion 
armoured vehicles "will become a key part of our campaign to finish off the 
separatists ... Maybe later the 
UK foreign minister will have a fit. "99 In January 
2004 Indonesian television had reportedly showed, several times, machine guns 
mounted on Scorpions firing at separatists. '00 A second military spokesperson 
reportedly said of the Hawks "Sure. They could well be used [in a direct attack 
role] if we wanted to ... But we haven't decided to do that yet. "'O' On 12" June 
the government admitted that the Indonesian government had confirmed the use 
of UK-supplied Hawks in Aceh on 1 9th May' 02 although the Indonesians said that 
the Hawks had not been used "offensively". 103 
Once again, arms exported from the UK have been persistently used in conflict 
situations, against end-use assurances and the response from the UK 
government has been to maintain or increase exports. This suggests that at least 
in the case of Israel and Indonesia, far from UK arms being used to prevent 
conflict, the UK government has been simply unconcerned about the impact of 
UK-exported arms in the development, maintenance and intensity of violence. 
98 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls, - 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, appendix 1: Letter to the 
Chairman from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Indonesia. 
99 John Aglionby and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Scorpions move in on rebels as Indonesia reneges on 
weapons pledge to Britain', The Guardian, 24ýh June 2003. 
100 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report., Strategic Export Controls - 
Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 95. 
"' John Aglionby, 'Indonesia uses UK Hawks in Aceh offensive', The Guardian, 20th May 2003. 
102 House of Commons, Hansard, 12 th June 2003, Written Answers, column 1039. 
103 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 88. 
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Buy the argument here is not just that the delivery of arms is uninterrupted by 
increases in regional tension. The argument is also that UK deliveries continue 
despite the possibility of an imminent outbreak of war and beyond this, that 
evidence exists to suggest the government has deliberately targeted states on 
the brink of conflict, again, increasing sales at times of greatest tension. From the 
examples available two will be looked at in further detail: UK arms exports to both 
India and Pakistan and UK arms exports to the states involved on both sides of 
the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). India is one of the UK's 
largest recipients of arms whilst the war in the DRC has been particularly brutal 
and under reported in the mainstream media. 
The "calming influence" of UK arms sales on India and Pakistan 
In June 2000, the British Defence Manufacturers Export Licensing Group claimed 
that both India and Pakistan "have been identified by the MoD (United 
Kingdom's) Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) as highly valuable 
priority markets for United Kingdom Industry to target". 114 This goes some way to 
explain the government's approach to exporting to the two nuclear states. 
In 1998 India conducted five nuclear tests provoking international outrage, 
economic sanctions and Pakistani underground nuclear tests. Although America 
implemented sanctions against both states, 1998 saw the UK government 
approve 633 licences for goods on the military list to India including anti-riot 
guns, combat aircraft components and crowd control ammunition. Only two were 
refused. The UK government also approved 99 licences for goods on the military 
list to Pakistan, including those covering components for small arms, 
components for machine guns and small arms ammunition. None were 
refused. "' 
During 1999 the government authorised 71 new open licences and F-57.5 million 
worth of standard licences to India covering armoured fighting vehicles, heavy 
gun components, combat aircraft and combat helicopter components, 
104 House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further report and prior Parliamentary scrutiny, 25' July 2000, HC 467, appendix 7. 
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submachine guns, surface to air missile components, small arms ammunition 
and tank spares. 1D6 In response to a letter from MP Edward Garnier, Foreign 
Office minister Peter Hain wrote "While there is a theoretical risk that India might 
use tanks offensively in the future, the Criteria make clear that this is not 
sufficient grounds to refuse an application. "' 0' Reportedly the tanks were later 
used on the border with Pakistan. ' 08 For Pakistan itself, from January to October 
1999, F-1 1.5 million worth of licences were authorised including those covering air 
missile control equipment, aircraft head up display components, components for 
combat aircraft and helicopters, armoured personnel carriers and fragmentation 
grenades. None were refused. On 12" October the Pakistan military coup, which 
saw the overthrow of the democratically elected government, led the UK 
government to implement unofficial arms restrictions on military exports to 
Pakistan. In May 2000 Peter Hain defended this policy following criticism from 
the Defence Manufacturers Association by arguing that 
I do not think it would be responsible for us prematurely to make 
a decision when the situation is so fluid, especially over such a 
tinderbox as Kashmir in a situation where there are pretty heavy 
arms in the region ... anything we did supply, if we did, could be 
used for terrorist purposes in Kashmir or elsewhere. It is a very 
dangerous place. 'O' 
Just two months after Hain described the Kashmir situation as "a tinderbox", in 
July 2000, the government lifted most restrictions on exporting to Pakistan, 
implemented after the military coup in October 1999. This was a change in policy 
that brought international criticism. Robin Cook later admitted "We remain 
concerned about defence exports to Pakistan, in the light of the incursion at 
Kargil, the coup, the possibility of diversion to undesirable end-users and 
continued regional tensions". 110 Although the export of small arms remained 
blocked, 88 standard export licences were approved between July and 
105 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 1998. 
106 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 1999. 
'0' Simon Kearns and Robin Oakley, 'DSEi 2001: Putting aside differences for a week of retail 
therapy', CAAT news, August-September 2001 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/magazine/0801/dsei. php> Last accessed 22 nd April 2004. 
10'3 Kearns and Oakley, 'DSEi 2001: Putting aside differences for a week of retail therapy'. 
109 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, 25 th July 2000, HC 467, Minutes of 
Evidence question 56 and 65. 
th '10 Ewan MacAskill, 'Britain lifts ban on Pakistan arms sales', The Guardian, 6 July 2000. 
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December 2000 amounting to E6 million worth of equipment including military 
training aircraft, aircraft radar and combat helicopter components. During the 
same year the government approved 34 new open licences and E64.5 million 
worth of standard licences for exports to India covering air to surface missile and 
surface to air missile components, military helicopter components, military 
communications equipment and tear gas/riot control agent. "' 
As the situation in Kashmir deteriorated during 2001 the government authorised 
a further 66 open licences and E62.5 worth of standard licences for India 
alongside 20 open licences and El 4 million worth of standard licences for 
Pakistan. The latter included those covering components for combat aircraft and 
combat helicopters, military utility vehicles, components for torpedo launching 
equipment, military communications equipment and components for large calibre 
artillery. When questioned about the large calibre artillery Pakistan licence, Jack 
Straw assured the House Quadripartite Committee that the FCO "assessed there 
to be no clear risk of aggressive use" of the equipment. ' 12 He later added 
11 approving these exports was not going to make any difference at all to the 
degree of tension or the resolution of dispute". ' 13 His colleague, Tim Dowse 
added that at the time of the decision on this licence, the artillery being fired 
across the boarder was only small arms, not artillery. ' 14 The committee 
highlighted that artillery exchanges were widely reported in both 2000 and in 
2002.1 15 In October 2001 Kashmir's state Parliament was bombed. 40 people 
were killed. In December 2001 tension rose between the two states when 14 
were killed in the Indian Parliament allegedly by Kashmiri separatists sponsored 
by Pakistan. 
... FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2000. 
112 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 57. 113 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, minutes of evidence, 
question 85. 
114 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 2001, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, minutes of evidence, 
uestion 87. 
5 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report Strategic Export Controls 
Annual Report for 200 1, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 57. 
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In response Indian defence spending reportedly increased by 28% between 2000 
and 2002. "6 In January 2002 a spokesperson at the Pakistani High Commission 
said that Pakistan was "very concerned" at India's arms purchases, that "any 
build-up of Indian equipment will aggravate the situation, as it will tilt the balance 
even more in favour of India and encourage aggression. "' 17 The same month saw 
one million troops massed along Kashmir's line of control. The head of the Indian 
army admitted that the build up of troops along the boarder had brought India and 
Pakistan "quite close to an actual war". ' 18 Later the Indian Defence minister 
warned "we are eyeball to eyeball". "9 As tensions increased further between 
India and Pakistan Blair warned during a January 2002 visit 
This is obviously a very tense, a very difficult situation. If a 
conflict were to escalate out of control then it would have serious 
consequences not just for India and Pakistan but for the whole of 
this region and for the wider world. So in so far as we can, a 
calming influence is what we should exert. 120 
Still, Blair continued to discuss a proposed El billion Hawk deal with India during 
his "peace mission ". 121 The Hawks are technically training aircraft although can 
be use as ground attack jets. There is no evidence to suggest that the 
government has sought assurances from India that should the sales of Hawk 
deal proceed, they would not be used in combat. 122 
Six weeks after Blair's departure, two UK trade missions arrived. A group from 
the Society of British Aerospace Companies hosted by the UK trade office in 
Bangalore and a groups of UK arms manufacturers hosted by the UK high 
commission in Delhi were visiting the "DEFEXPO" arms fair sponsored by the 
Indian government. The organisers of the fair were eager to highlight how arms 
manufacturers can access newly open markets arising from the Kashmir and 
Afghan conflicts. Official support for such missions, where the UK had one of the 
116 Richard Norton-Taylor and Ewen MacAskill, 'F_1 bn arms push to India', The Guardian, 12 th 
January 2002. 
117 Norton-Taylor and MacAskill, '21 bn arms push to India'. 
"8 Norton-Taylor and MacAskill, '21 bn arms push to India'. 
119 'Addicted to Arms: A Will Self Investigation' Correspondent, BBC Television, April 2002. 
120 'Addicted to Arms: A Will Self Investigation'. 
121 John Pilger, 'Salesman of Death'. 
122 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export 
Controls. Annual Report for2001, Licencing, Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, paragraph 56. 
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largest pavilions, reflects the priority given to both the Indian and Pakistan 
markets. No mention was made of UK arms being used to avoid conflict. 
By May 2002 the UK government was under pressure to announce an arms 
embargo on both states but it later emerged that during April and May 2002 
alone, 140 further standard arms licences were issues for India and 15 for 
Pakistan. It also emerged that from December 2001 to April 2002, the period of 
greatest regional tension, 101 standard licences for aircraft and related 
equipment were issued for India and 30 for Pakistan. An all-party committee was 
not impressed, arguing that 
If the situation in India and Pakistan in the Spring of this year did 
not fully engage Criterion Four [preservation of regional peace, 
security and stability], it is difficult to conceive of circumstances 
short of all out war which would do SO. 123 
By June the government advised all UK nationals to leave India and Pakistan 
because of growing fears that either side might mount a nuclear strike. October 
2002 saw further missile tests as one million boarder troops were put on a war 
footing. Still the UK approved 62 open licences and El 18 million worth of 
standard licences for India during the year including those covering aircraft 
cannons, combat aircraft and combat helicopters, military training aircraft, 
munitions launching equipment. The government also authorised 13 open 
licences and El 5 million worth of standard licences for Pakistan during 2002 
covering air to air missile components, combat aircraft components. 124 The 
tensions have continued into 2003 which, in March, saw 24 Hindus murdered by 
suspected Islamic militants in Kashmir. Three days later both India and Pakistan 
test fired nuclear capable missiles. 
All the evidence shows that far from helping to prevent conflict, UK arms exports 
to two nuclear states, highlighted by DESO as "highly valuable priority markets", 
which UK-based arms-producing companies have especially targeted at times of 
greatest tension have exacerbated the potential for conflict. This potential has 
123 House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Eighth Report from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, First Joint Report of the Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade 
pic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licenc g Policy and and Industry Committees, Straýe in 
Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny, 19' July 2002, HC 718, paragraph 61. 
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been fully realised in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to which this 
chapter will now turn. 
The UK's contribution to the 'blight" of the Congolese civil war 
During Blair's 2001 Party Conference Speech he called on the international 
community to 
sort out the blight that is the continuing conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, where three million people have died 
through war or famine in the last decade. 125 
The DRC (formerly Zaire) has suffered ethnic conflict since May 1997 when 
rebel leader Kabila toppled the government of Mobutu. Kabila's regime was then 
attacked by militia sponsored by Rwanda and Uganda in September 1998 
although troops from Chad, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the Congo all 
intervened to support Kabila. 126 Control of the state's vast natural wealth has 
been a motivating factor. A cease-fire was signed in July 1999 and a peace deal 
was agreed between the DRC and Uganda and Rwanda in 2002 but fighting and 
gross human rights abuses continue in the eastern provinces. What Blair failed 
to mention in his speech was that, this conflict has, at times, been fought 
between states which in themselves are armed, in part, by UK-based companies 
via export licences authorised by UK governments and by states whose forces 
have, in part, been trained by the MoD. 
During 1997, the year that the conflict began, the UK government authorised 
licences covering military trucks to Angola, armoured four-wheel drive vehicles to 
Rwanda and shotgun / rifle ammunition to Uganda. The UK government has no 
way of knowing what the end use of these weapons will be once they have been 
delivered. 
124 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Strategic Export Control Report 2002. 
125 Tony Blair, 2 nd October 2001 
<http: //politics. guardian. co. uk/speeches/story/0,11126,590775,00. html> Last accessed 7 th July 
2003. 
126 CIA, The World Fact-Book 2002 <http: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg. html> 
Last accessed 7 th July 2003. 
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During 1998 the government passed licences which allowed for the export of 
military cargo vehicles to Uganda, a state sponsoring Kabila's attackers. At the 
same time arms licences were authorised covering armoured vehicles and body 
armour to Angola and rifles, gun silencers and communications equipment to 
Namibia, both fighting in support of Kabila. Angola and Namibia were later joined 
by Zimbabwe. A standard recipient of UK arms throughout the 80s and 90s, 
Zimbabwe finally began direct military intervention in the DRC in August 1998 
although was steadily supplying Kabila's militia with North Korean weapons from 
the mid 1990S. 127 Until 1998, the UK government had been licencing equipment 
including helicopter spaces, submachine guns and ammunition, which was, in 
Hain's words "clearly equipment that could be used not just for defensive 
purposes but aggressive purposes . 
"12'3 During 1998, further licences were 
approved for Zimbabwe that allowed for the export of assault rifles, components 
for combat aircraft, military detonators, night vision goggles, rifles, pistols, 
shotguns and submachine guns. 129 
After Zimbabwe's intervention in August 1998 and until February 2000 the 
position of the UK government was that it "did not actually refuse licences to 
Zimbabwe for helicopter spares and sub machine guns during this period; rather, 
it did not issue any, because no such applications were received. " 130 The 
government did, in fact, refuse one licence during that period but it also 
authorised licences to Zimbabwe for military use signal equipment spares 
(October 1998), components for Canberra, Hawk, Hunter and Islander aircraft 
(November 1998), components for military vehicles (May 1999) and military air 
traffic control radar (June 1999). The House Foreign Affairs Committee 
127 Emily Mitchell, 'UK Arms Exports to Zimbabwe', September 2000, 
< http: //www. caat. org. uk/i nfo rmation/pu bl icat ion s/cou ntries/z i mbabwe-0900. php> Last accessed 
18 th July 2003. 
128 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, 25 th July 2000, HC 467, minutes of 
evidence question 11. 
129 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 1999. 
130 House of Commons Select Committee for International Development, Seventh Report: Strategic 
Export Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, 25"' July 2000, HC 467, 
Appendix 5: Memorandum submitted by the department for Trade and Industry and the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office. 
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concluded, "these licences may well have been used to supply spares for military 
131 
equipment used for intervention in the DRC". 
In 1999, the first year where the value of approved export licences and number 
of open licences are reported, the government issued 7 open licences and E3 
million worth of standard licences to Angola including those covering body 
armour and military helmets. The government also approved 4 open licences 
covering the export of military equipment to Uganda as well as a standard 
licence authorising the export of military utility vehicles. Although the Lusaka 
Peace Accords were signed in 1999, fighting between the African states in the 
DRC continued. The EU's response came in June 1999. The European 
Declaration on arms exports to the Great Lakes region stated 
Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or 
prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or 
conflicts in the country of final destination. Furthermore, Member 
States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that 
the intended recipient would use the proposed export 
aggressively against another country or to assert by force a 
territorial claim. 
The House Foreign Affairs Committee noted that the EU Declaration "does not in 
any event seem to have led to any substantial change in UK policy towards 
,, 132 licencing of arms for Zimbabwe. By the end of 1999 Zimbabwe had 11,000 
troops fighting in the DRC 133 
In response to the continuing crisis Blair announced on 9th February 2000 that 
the government would not issue licences to any country involved in the DIRC 
conflict if "there is a clear risk that it would be used in the DIRC. " 34 But two 
weeks later, on 24 th February 2000, the government announced that seven 
licences to Zimbabwe for Hawk spare parts would be allowed. No end-conditions 
were specified for the planes benefiting from these parts. It has been widely 
reported that at least two jets would not have been able to operate without the 
13 ' House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, 25 Ih July 2000, HC 467, paragraph 14. 132 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, paragraph 16. 
133 Mitchell, 'UK Arms Exports to Zimbabwe'. 
134 House of Commons, Hansard, Written Answers, 91h February 2000, column 184. 
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spares. These spares were authorised even though just seven weeks later Peter 
Hain, then Minister at the Foreign Office, admitted that some would be used to 
service Hawks in service in the Congo war. "' The Chair of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Ted Rowlands, asked Peter Hain shortly after this admission in May 
2000 "would you accept that it is not an unreasonable conclusion to draw that 
the granting of these licences was a clear breach of the terms of the European 
Union Declaration of June 1999? " Hain replied "I think that might be one 
interpretation of it; I am conceding that point. " The Foreign Affairs committee 
concluded that the need to retain BAE Systems' reputation had outweighed the 
need to stop arming Zimbabwe. 136 Hain argued that it was the need to fulfill the 
contractual obligation between Zimbabwe and BAE Systems under licences 
agreed under the previous government that lay behind the export of the Hawk 
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spares. The government's argument that there is a legal or contractual 
obligation to continue to supply parts for equipment agreed by the Conservative 
government changes from state to state and over time. In May 2000, the UK 
government imposed an arms embargo on Zimbabwe after increased violence 
against farmers, farm workers and opponents of the Mugabe regime. All existing 
contracts were revoked despite the government's previous claims that it was 
under a legal obligation to continue supplies. 
In the same year, 2000, Ell million worth of licences to Angola were passed 
covering, amongst other items, military communications equipment and military 
vehicles. A licence allowing military cargo vehicles to be exported to the DRC 
was also issued. The government revoked seven open licences previously 
approved for Namibia but allowed El million worth of standard licences which 
covered the export of assault rifles and submachine guns. Three open licences 
covering exports to Uganda were also revoked although standard licences 
allowing the export of military vehicles were authorised. 138 
135 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, 6"' November 2000, Minutes of Evidence for 
Tuesday 18 th April 2000, HC 447-1, Questions 90-94. 
136 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report: Strategic Export 
Controls: Further Report and Parliamentary Prior Scrutiny, paragraph 2 1. 
137 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Seventh Report Strategic Export 
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In 2001 the government issued four open licences alongside E8 million worth of 
standard licences to Angola covering military aircraft equipment and armoured 
vehicles. The government later claimed that they "assessed there to be no clear 
risk that goods licenced for export to Angola would be used in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo" and that much of the exports are destined for the oil 
industry. 1'9 The government also authorised licences that allowed armoured 
vehicles to be exported to Uganda (although the government claims that these 
were for peacekeeping operations). The UK army had been training members of 
the Zimbabwe army up until at least February 2001 when the team withdrew in 
protest at the repressive actions of Mugabe. "' But representatives from 
opposing sides in the war, Uganda and Angola were invited to attend the DSEI 
arms exhibition in September 2001 . 
141 During 2002 the government passed 
seven open licences and F-1 4 million worth of standard licences for Angola 
covering armoured vehicles, military communications equipment, military cargo 
vehicles and body armour. "' 
In 2003, the war was centered on the eastern provinces of the DRC where 
militia, armed, supplied and trained by the governments of the DRC, Uganda and 
Rwanda, continue to carry out the most appalling human rights abuses. By April 
2003, a leading US aid agency estimated that the number of deaths directly 
resulting from the war in the DRC over the last four and a half years, a war 
barely mentioned in the mainstream media, stood at between 3 million and 4.7 
million. The deaths mainly resulted from starvation and disease associated with 
the confl iCtl 43 although there have been repeated reports of genocide, 
mutilations, widespread rape and murder. In March 2003 there were reports of a 
massacre on the Ugandan boarder in which between 250 and 467 people were 
139 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, Second Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report for 200 1, Licencing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, appendix 6: Government 
memorandum in response to questions from the Quadripartite Committee relating to the 2001 
Annual Report on strategic export controls. 
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Telegraph, 20'h February 2001. 
141 Catherine Brown, Nick Gilby and Simon Kearns, 'Arms to Africa', CAAT news, December 2001 
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killed . 
144 Still, Uganda and Rwanda remain involved. In August 2003, a Channel 
four documentary reported that Thomas Lubanga, leader of one of the main 
militia groups, the Union of Congolese Patriots, has received arms and training 
from Uganda and later from Rwanda. 145 In May 2003 Blair announced that he 
was considering a request from the UN to send UK troops to the Congo as part 
of a peacekeeping operation. 146 
Although very little information exists as to the end-use of arms exported to the 
states involved in the DRC war since 1997, it is difficult to believe that none were 
used in the DRC. Given this, and the case of the Hawks, which were almost 
certainly used in the DRC, it is difficult to believe that UK arms exports have 
contributed to conflict avoidance and stability in a war which has seen the deaths 
of up to 4.7 million people. 
To add to this are the cases of Israel, Indonesia, India/Pakistan and states 
fighting in the DRC the case of Columbia. The government approved 68 open 
licences between 1999 and 2002 as well as E2 million worth of standard licences 
covering military communications equipment, military aero-engines, smoke hand 
grenades and stun grenades. The government also approved 52 open licences 
to Sri Lanka between 1999 and 2002 as well as F-8 million worth of standard 
licences in 2000 and El 5.5 million in 2001 covering heavy machine guns, 
armoured vehicles, grenade launchers, semi-automatic pistols and submachine 
guns. 14' Both Columbia and Sri Lanka are engaged in protracted internal 
conflicts. In July 1999, Royal Ordnance (now part of BAE Systems) began 
refurbishing 30 large field guns in Morocco after a licence was approved. 
Reportedly the guns are now used on the front line of the 27-year-old conflict 
over the Western Sahara region. 148 To add to this are signs that the government 
has no plans to reassess their response to the use of UK exported arms in 
conflict situations. Since September 2001, the government has emphasised the 
144 House of Commons, Hansard, 6 1h March 2003, columns 359-360. 
145 'Congo's Killing Fields', Dispatches Channel Four Television, 17 th August 2003. 
146 House of Commons, Hansard, 2P May 2003, column 974. 
147 FCO, Strategic Export Controls Report 2000. 
148 Paul Eavis, 'Analysis arms trade -A question that won't go away for Labour - is it ethical to sell 
arms to countries at war? ', The Independent, 28 May 2002. 
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right of every state to eliminate terrorist activities from within its boarders. During 
a Labour Party Conference fringe meeting, the then Foreign Office Minister 
responsible for arms exports, Ben Bradshaw, challenged the idea of refusing 
export licences to Indonesia, Algeria and Sri Lanka since all are run by 
democratically elected governments facing internal terrorist threats. 149 
The points of concern identified above - the use of UK sourced arms in conflict, 
their increased availability in times of crisis and the way that they are funneled to 
rival states - are persistent characteristics of UK involvement in the international 
arms market. UK arms exports are supplied to states in conflict vulnerable 
situations or already engaged in conflict all the time. The government claim that 
the arms exports it authorises help to avert conflict is simply inconsistent with 
this. 
CONCLUSION 
The government finally claims that exporting arms brings political benefits - they 
buy the UK political influence over recipient states and facilitate international 
peace and stability. 150 Yet all the evidence points to how, in a buyers' market, 
seller states are forced to offer increasingly favourable deals to recipient states, a 
necessity that underlies the need for successive UK governments to become 
public apologists for some of the worst abusers of human rights. This need is 
particularly relevant for a Labour government which, during the first two years of 
power, included amongst its top arms customers persistent human rights 
abusers. As part of New Labour's contribution to international peace, it has 
approved export licences to states experiencing conflict. it has consistently sold 
arms to states where UK sourced equipment and components have been used in 
existing conflicts. It has seemingly adopted a deliberate policy of targeting 
conflict-vulnerable, often rival states as its arms recipients, frequently increasing 
sales at times of greatest tension sometimes just weeks after concerns over 
regional tension have been expressed at the highest level. In particular, the UK 
149 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Second Report: British-US Relations, 
18 th December 2001, HC 327, appendix 5: Memorandum from Saferworld. 
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government has supplied arms to Israel, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and to states 
who became involved in the Democratic Republic of Congo war, often after the 
use of equipment in contravention of end-user assurances. 
These first three chapters have examined the rationales offered by the New 
Labour government to justify continued support for arms exports. They have 
found the economic, strategic and political justifications offered to be either 
unproven or unsustainable. If arms exports are about pursuing the UK's 
economic and strategic interests whilst buying political influence and contributing 
to international peace, the government's case does not hold up. What has held 
up however is the unique relationship between government and the UK-based 
arms industry, a relationship that the remainder of this report will examine. 
150 See House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment of the 
New Head of Defence Export Services, 31 s' March 1999, HC 147, paragraph 10; House of 
Commons, Hansard, 28th July 1997, Written Answers Col. 26. 
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PART TWO 
Why New Labour Support Arms Exports: The 
RealReasons 
INTRODUCTION 
The problem does not lie itself in the arms industry trying to engage with and 
influence government. Arms-producing companies, like all corporations and other 
interests groups, have a democratic right to do so. Company directors are, in 
fact, under a legal obligation to establish and foster a corporate friendly 
environment within government as a result of their legal obligation to "act in the 
best interests of the company as a whole" widely interpreted in UK courts as in 
the best interests of shareholders. ' The problem is that the levels of influence 
enjoyed by military industry over government are highly disproportionate to the 
requirements of the UK public interest. The second part of this thesis puts 
forward the claim that the industry enjoys this influence because of its political 
power, rather than just its democratic right. There exists a self-serving, mutually 
reinforcing relationship between government and a politically powerful industry 
which enjoys a level of influence disproportionate to that enjoyed by the non- 
corporate constituency and which appears disproportionate to that enjoyed by 
other industrial sectors. This part of the thesis explores by what means military 
industry has attained and retained this power under the New Labour government 
by looking at the impact of a variety of different mechanisms through with the 
industry is linked to New Labour. It begins, in chapter four, with an attempt to 
map out, in-depth, how arms-producing companies are linked to the Labour 
Party, primarily to consider whether there might exist a mutually beneficial 
relationship between the two. Chapter five outlines the relationship between the 
MoD and the IDTI on the one hand and current or former arms-producing 
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company employees on the other. This is undertaken primarily to consider 
whether military industry enjoys influence disproportionate to the non-corporate 
sector or to other industries and whether the two are so deeply interconnected 
that this amounts to a situation whereby military industry is increasingly able to 
integrate itself with those on the inside of government. Chapteý six considers new 
elements in government industry relations. It asks whether the use of Labour 
linked think tanks, domestic lobbying groups, international corporate pressure 
groups and Labour initiated privat, isation schemes also point to the same themes 
-a mutually beneficial relationship, disproportionate influence and the existence 
of an integrated elite, Corporate involvement in these aspects of governance is 
nothing new and each link may not in itself be objectionable but what can be 
assumed is that there is a cumulative impact of all this activity and particularly, a 
cumulative impact on the way in which the interests of industry and the state 
interplay. 
This part of the thesis begins with a consideration of how the links between arms- 
producing companies and the Labour Party might impact on the polifical, power of 
the industry. 
1 Rebecca Spencer, 'Corporate Law and Structures Exposing the roots of the problem' 
<hftp: ltwww. corporatewatch. org. uk> Last accessed 1" May 2004. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: LINKS BETWEEN ARMS- 
PRODUCING COMPANIES AND THE LABOUR 
PARTY 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to look at what kind of relationships exist between 
arms-producing companies and the Labour Party. The chapter looks first at the 
relationship between arms companies and Labour MPs, specifically at MPs who 
have registered interests with arms-producing companies and at whether those 
Members have the potential to be significant to arms export policy, It then 
compares this to the situation in the Lords as the links between arms companies 
and Labour Peers are mapped out. The chapter then turns to the Labour Party 
itself with a focus on the overt and more covert ways in which arms companies 
have funded the party. The chapter concludes on a wider note, with a discussion 
of the importance of corporate funding for the party in the last two decades and 
the potential for this importance to have affected Labours attitude to big business 
in general. 
CONTINUING ARMS INDUSTRY INVESTMENT IN MPs 
One of the most obvious places to start looking for an understanding of 
govern ment-indu stry relations is at MPs and at the interests that they have in 
arms-producing companies. But the Commons appears to lack effective 
democratic controls over military policy. MPs are able to question Ministers and 
scrutinise government via Select Committees but the budget and activities of 
departments most involved in determining export subsidies are largely outside 
the control of MPs. These MPs do not enjoy prior parliamentary scrutiny of arrns 
export licencing decisions, parliamentary debate is often stifled by governments 
withholding information on arms exports on the basis of commercial 
confidentiality, they have no voice in deciding whether to impose or lift 
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international arms embargoes or on their severity. To add to this is Blair's 
typically presidential style of leadership and the scope for MPs to make a real 
impression in export policy appears minimal 
Equally minimal are the numbers of IVIPs who register interests with arms- 
producing companies. The Observers Nick Cohen was wrong when he wrote 
"the registers of members' interests are peppered with MPs ... who are 
directors 
of defence companies or recipients of their hospitality. -2 They are not. Appendix 
eighteen shows at that time, from 659 MPs, only five registered interests with 
such companies and only one of these was a Labour Mp. 3 This pattern is very 
typical of the registers since Labour came to power. When it comes to 
constituency instead of personal interests, research has shown that 124 Labour 
MPs from a total of 410 have BAE Systems sites within 20 miles of their 
constituencies. Yet this group are neither over represented amongst MPs with 
government jobs, nor amongst MPs signing Early Day Motions in favour of the 
arms induStry. 4 More substanbve links between government and industry are 
likely to be found elsewhere but those between the arms industry and MPs 
cannot be dismissed 
Arms-producing companies clearly think that MPs are worth investing in. Barry 
Jones MP, Labour MP until 2001 for Alyn & Deeside, which includes the BAE 
Systems Broughton factory and a Raytheon Systems plant, visited Toulouse in 
5 1998 as a guest of British Aerospace. In 2000 Jones, and his wife, were also 
guests of BAE Systems at the Royal Opera House in London. 6 Jones, who was 
the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales (1983-92)7 had lobbied for both 
Government launch investment loans for civilian BAE Systems projects and for 
the MoD to buy Raytheon air-to-air missiles to equip the Eurofighter. " In the same 
2 Nick Cohen, 'Our sky-high arms fiasco', The Observer, 22"d September 2002. 
3 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at November 2001 
<http: /twww. padiament. the-stationery-office. co. uk> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
4 Judith Rattenbury, BAe Systems and MPs, Campaign Against Arms Trade internal report, March 
2004 
5 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 2 nd December 1998. 
6 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 14 th May 2001. 
7 BBC Wales, Lord Barry Jones 
<http: //www. bbc. co. uk/wales/northeast/guides/halloffame/public-life/lord_barry_jones. shtml> Last 
accessed 26th June 2004. 
8 House of Commons, Hansard, 28 th June 2000, column 895 
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year Labour backbencher, David Borrow MP, declared a January trip to Airbus 
Industrie in Toulouse. His return flights from Chester were paid for by British 
Aerospace. In June 1999, British Aerospace also paid for Borrow's trip to the 
Pads Air Show. 9 The company has a large plant at Samlesbury within Borrows 
constituency, South Ribble, in the Northwest of England. 10 Also in 1998 Labour's 
Gordon Marsden MP left his Blackpool constituency, which includes many 
employees of BAE Systems'Warton plant, to aftend an EU enlargement 
conference in Slovenia at the expense of British Aerospace. " The BAE Systems 
plant at Warton has benefited from the Eurofighter programme. " In January 
2001 BAE Systems provided Dr John Reid MP with a helicopter to fly to a 
shipyard in Glasgow. He was upgraded to the Chair's private jet for the return 
journey to Northolt. 13 Reid, who was Secretary of State, Scotland Office at the 
time had been Junior Minister of Defence (1997-1998) and is currently Secretary 
of State for Health. 14 A few months later Labour MP for Nottingham North, 
Graham Allen, was sponsored in part by Rolls Royce as a representative of the 
UK and Irish Parliamentary Rugby Team to play the Australian Parliament Rugby 
Team. 15 Sport was also on the agenda for the Secretary of State for Trade and 
industry, Patricia Hewitt MP, who attended the Wimbledon ladies tennis finals in 
July 2003 as a guest of Boeing UK, part of the American arms giant Boeing, 16 
Arms-producing companies have also shown interest in Parliamentary Groups. 
Part of the expenses incurred by former Prescott and Blair policy advisor Roger 
Casale MP in the course of his work for the All-Party British Italian Parliamentary 
Group have been paid by the groups' sponsors - military helicopter manufacturer 
GKN. 17 In this capacity GKN also made a contribution to the expenses of Bruce 
9 House of Commons, The RegIster of Members'Interests as at 2 nd December 1998 and 31'2 
January 2000. 
10 BAe Systems, Locations and Links <hftp: //www. jobsatbaesystems. co. uk/air/main. htm> Last 
accessed 26th June 2004. 
11 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 2 nd December 1998. 
12 House of Commons, Hansard, 10"' January 2001, Written Answers, column 544, 
13 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 14t" May 2001. 
14 Guardian Unlimited: Ask Aristotle biography search engine at 
<hftp: //poiftics. guardian. co. uk/person/parliament/0,9307, -4372,00. html> Last accessed 26th June 
2004. 
15 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 14th May 2002. 
16 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 21 " May 2004. 
17 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 4"' December 2003. 
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George MP during a 1999 trip to Italy. 8 George has been Chair of the Select 
Committee on Defence since 1997.19 A fellow Defence Committee member and 
former Parliamentary Private Secretary to Stephen Byers MP, Rachel Squire IMP 
who visited Barrow in Furness in March 20G4 at the expense of BAE Systems 
also received remuneration from GKN for travel expenses to Italy. 20 In total, the 
British-Italian Parliamentary Group receives E10,000 p. a. from the company. 21 It 
is one of only nine all-Party country specific Parliamentary Groups registering 
receipt of external financial support from a total of 114 in June 2004. Another is 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Japan that registered E500 from Rolls 
Royce although BAE Systems was sponsoring the All-Party Group on Iran 
f-2,000 until at least October 2003.22 
The members of the parliamentary group on Iran, along with all MPs until at least 
June 2001, also had a more personal interest in BAE Systems. MPs were 
holding an undisclosed amount of BAE Systems shares in their pension fund until 
at least June 2001 according to the BBC. The trustees of the Parliamentary 
pension fund are legally bound to invest in firms that offer the best return and as 
such do not take account of ethical issues. 23 Their value went up after NATO 
began bombing Serbia in 1999 and after September 11 th. 24 
MoD activities in these conflicts and more generally are scrutinised by the Select 
Committee on Defence. Michael Mates, former Chair of the Committee (1987- 
1992) is now an advisor on military matters to ABS Aircraft AG, a Swiss company 
manufacturing hovercraft and to Matra Hachette. Little information is available on 
ABS Aircraft but Matra is a French company involved in "defence co-operation" 
with the UK. As Chair of the Defence Committee, Mates was reportedly 
18 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 10 th November 2000. 
'9 DoD, MPs Biographies - Bruce George <http: //www. polýicallinks. co. uk> Last accessed 26"'May 
2004. 
20 House of Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 10 th November 2000, House of 
Commons, The Register of Members'Interests as at 21s' May 2004. 
21 House of Commons, The Register of a/I Party Groups as at 25"June 20G4 
<http: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/cm/cmparty/040625/memi0i -htm> 
Last accessed 6th 
July 2004. 
22 House of Commons, The Register of all Party Groups as at 24th October 2003- 
23 Unnamed, 'Commons pension fund under fire', BBC news online, 24tfi June 2001 rd 
<httpI/news. bbc. co, uk/1/hi/uk politics/1404629. stm> Last accessed 3 December 2003 . 24 CAAT, BAe Systems 2002: Aternative Report (Londoný CAAT, 2002) <http: /Avww. caat. org. uk> 
Last accessed 3W December 2003. 
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financially linked to a military consultancy that dealt with the government, a 
conflict of interest which came to light when Jonathon Aitken leaked information 
25 
about Mates. Up until November 2003 the Committee included Gerald Howarth, 
Conservative Shadow Defence Minister. His Farnborough and Aldershot 
constituency includes the headquarters of BAE Systems and QineýQ - formed 
from the majority of what used to be the government's own defence research 
establishment, 33.8% of which has now been sold to the Carlyle group. Although 
both the company and Howarth deny the claim, Gerald James, former Chair of 
arms firm Astra Holdings alleges that Howarth received sponsorship from British 
Aerospace and had, as a consultant to Astra, attempted to influence James' 
evidence to the Iraqi supergun inquiry. 26 Howarth's secretary/research assistant 
is Michael Wood. Wood is a military consultant and Managing Director of 
Whitehall Advisors whose clients include BAE Systems and missiles systems 
company MBDA. 27 Howarth left the committee at the same time as Conservative 
MP Patrick Mercer. Mercer's secretary/research assistant, Caroline Flynn- 
MacLeod, was head of Parliamentary Affairs and Senior Business Analyst at 
GEC (now owned by BAE Systems) from 1997 to 1999.28 She is currently a 
partner in the lobbying company TerTington Management Consultancy whose 
clients inc-lude the worlds largest weapons contractor Lockheed Martin as well as 
BAE Systems . 
29 Terrington's other partner is Geoffrey Pattie, former Minister for 
Defence Procurement (1983-1984), former Director of Communications at GEC 
(1998-1999) and former Chair of Marconi Electronics (1990-1999), now owned 
by BAE Systems. 30 
Given Caroline Flynn-MacLeod's background she probably has no need for the 
IT training offered to the staff of MPs, one way in which all MPs are able to 
25 Richard Norton-Taylor and Kamal Ahmed, 'How the golden world of a man who would be king 
turned to dust', The Guardian, 21sJune 1997. 
26 Gerald James, In the Public Interest (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1995) p 298. 
27 House of Commons, The Register of Interests of Members' Secretaries and Research Assistants 
as at 25"' May 2004 <hftp: /Iwww. publications. parliament. uk> Last accessed 26 th June 2004 
28 House of Commons, The Register of Interests of Members' Secretaries and Research Assistants 
as at 24" October 2003 <hftp: //www. publications. parliament. uk/pa/crn/cmsecret/memi04, htm> Last 
accessed 5"' April 2004; Terrington Management Caroline Flynn-MacLeod 
<hftp: /Mww. terringtonmanagement. com/people. html> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
29 House of Commons, The Register of Interests of Members' Secretaries and Research Assistants 
as at 24h October 2003. 
30 Terrington Management, Geoffrey Pattie <http: /Avww, terringtonmanagement-com/people. htmi> 
Last accessed 26"'June 2004. 
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benefit from the work of arms-producing companies. Via a partnership between 
BAE Systems, The Centre for Employment Initiatives and The Industry and 
Parliamentary Trust, the "Learning for Work in the Parliamentary Workplace" 
programme guides Parliamentary staff through CD-ROM courses at BAE 
System s''Virtual University" at a base in Westminster. 31 
But overall the potenfial for the arms export lobby to increase its influence in 
government via MPs appears limited. It is unclear how the majority of MPs could 
be influential, there are very few members linked to arms-producing companies 
and not all will have a significant influence on arms export policy. More significant 
has been the hospitality enjoyed from arms companies by MPs who are 
themselves higher in the Labour hierarchy and by those who have sat on the 
Defence Committee. The numbers involved are comparable to the number of 
Labour Peers with links to arms companies. But in the Lords, the connections are 
much more substantial. 
INDUSTRY LINKED LABOUR PEERS IN INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS WITHIN THE 
PARTY 
The Lords may be peppered with directors - in 2002 one in three Peers held a 
directorship - but, like the Commons, very few members have links to arms- 
producing companies. This is shown in appendix nineteen. 32 Unlike the 
Commons, this small number of Labour Peers linked to arms-producing 
companies have all enjoyed influential govemment jobs and/or have links to 
some of the highest echelons of the New Labour movement. 
Labour Peer Lord Simpson of Dunkeld is best known for reportedly enjoying 
more than F-1 million p. a. between 1998 and 2000 as Chief Executive of GEC 
(renamed Marconi in 1999), and a F-300,000 pay off, reportedly reduced from El 
31 Matthew Donaghy, 'Parliament becomes a learning organisation'<www. epoldix. Com>; Unnamed, 
'Improving the democratic process with Projectplace 
rd <hftp: //www. projectplace. co. uk/case/case/IPT. htm> Last accessed 3 December 2003; Matthew 
Donaghy, 'Training and networks for Parliamentary workers February 2001 
<http: //www. nw. wea. org, uk/padiam. htm> Last accessed 23 December2003. 
32 Unnamed, 'Peer Defends having 21 directorships', The Guardian, 13 th August 2002. 
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million after shareholder protests. 33 GEC/Marconi did not do so well. 
34 Shareholders enjoyed a 98% fall in the value of their shares during his reign. 
Simpson is less well known as having been Deputy Chief Executive of British 
Aerospace (1992-1994). 35 He had been described as one of the ten most globally 
influential people in military industry. 36 In June 2004 he was still registering 
shares in BAE Systems worth E219,220.37 Up until December 2002, he was also 
registering half a million shares in Marconi. 38 Made a Peer by Blair in August 
1997 '39 
Simpson was called an "impeccable Blairite" 40 a "corporate titan" whose 
"support was eagerly sought and gladly given to New Labour at the election "41 He 
was one of 58 Chairs/CEOs who wrote to The Times in May 2001 claiming, 
somewhat ironically in Simpson's case, that the Labour Party had created a 
"stable business environment ... for businesses to grow; 'and as such urged all 
business leaders to support the party. 42 
Another signatory of the Times letter was Labour Peer Lord Swraj Paul. Paul 
owns the steel manufacturing group Caparo, both a major Labour donor and a 
supplier of parts to military industry. Caparo reportedly made donations to the 
Party in 1996 (El 09,000), 1997 (C76,000), 1998 (El 01,000), 2000 (over C5,000), 
43 
2001 (over F-5,000) and 2002 (C5,500). Lord Paul was ennobled at Blair's 
request in 1997. He reportedly became an ambassador for UK industry and has 
since acted as an "unofficial envoy" between the UK and India, unaccountable to 
33 Red Star Research, The 58 Business Supporters, <http: //www. red-star-research-org. uk> Last 
accessed 26h June 2004, - Unnamed, 'Marconi pay-off is 'outrageous", BBC News Online, I 1th 
October 2001 <hftp: //news. bbe. co. uk/l/hVbusineWl593l7l. stm> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
34 Andrew Rawnsley, 'Time to bring reckless tycoons to account', The Observer, 9 1h September 
2001. 
35 DoD, House of Lords - Lord Simpson <hftp: //www. politi call inks. co. uk> Last accessed 26 th May 
2004. 
'6 Unnamed, 'The defence industry's most influential individuals' Defence Daily Network, August 
1998 <hftpýl/www. defensedaily. conVdefensebusiness/owens. htm> Last accessed 26 1h June 2004 . 37 House of Lords, The Register of Lords'Interests as at 22 nd June 2004. 
38 House of Lords, The Register of Lords'Interests as at May 2002. 
39 'List of Peerages created since 1997', e-mail, Information Service, House of Lords, to the author, 
8th April 2003. 
40 Ian Bell 'Proof that the public sector doesn't have a monopoly on basket cases', Business a. m, 
6' September 2001 <hftp-. Ilwww. businessam. co. uk/BreakingNews/articles/0,1909,48961,00. html> 
Last accessed le May 2003. 
41 Rawnsley, 'Time to bring reckless tycoons to account'. 
42 'Business names support Labour' (letters to the editor), The Times, 14th May 2001 ý Red Star 
Research, 'The 58 Business Supporters'. 
43 Red Star Research, Lord Swraj Paul; Labour Party, Annual Report 2001 and Annual Reporl 
2002; The Electoral Commission, Register of donations to political parties 
<http-: //www. electoralcommission. gov. uk> Last accessed 26" June 2004. 
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Parliament. "Since 2002 he has expand his involvement with government by 
becoming a member of the DTI Industnal Development Advisory Board, a 
member of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Panel 2000 that promotes the 
UK image abroad and the Competitiveness Working Party. 45 
Labour's Lord Clark of Windermere continues to have a considerable interest in 
military policy. Clark was Shadow Defence Secretary from 1992 to 1997. He has 
been enjoying his posibon as a Non-Executive Director of the French based 
military electronics company Thales since 1999.46 A member of Blair's first 
cabinet in 1997 as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Clark became a Labour 
Peer from 2001 and continues to sit as a strong supporter of the government in 
47 the House of Lords. In April 2002, Lord Clarke voted against an amendment to 
the Export Control Bill that would have strengthened the requirement for the 
government to take account of sustainable development when making export 
licence decisions. 48 
Now sifting alongside Lord Clark is Labour Peer Lord Taylor of Blackburn. Lord 
Taylor, who donated E2,000 to the Labour party in May 2001 49has been a 
consultant to BAE Systems since 1994.50 Taylor appears to have particularly 
strong links to Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, cont6buting more than 25% of the 
Foreign Secretary's election expenses incurred during the 2001 general 
election. 51 
Much closer to the heart of BAE Systems was Labour Peer Lord Clive Hollick. 
Hollick had been a Director of British Aerospace from 1992 until 1997.52 His 
Directorship ended just as he became a Special Advisor to Margaret Beckett at 
the DTI from May 1997 and after her departure, to Peter Mandelson until October 
44 Red Star Research, Lord Swraj Paul. 
nd 45 The Register of Lords' Interests as at 2 December 2003; Caparo, 'Caparo PLC' 
<http: //www. caparo. co. uk/contactus asp> Last accessed 3 rd December 2003 
46 Who's Mo, 2003: an annual biographical record (London ýA&C Black, 2003), p 404. 
47 The House of Lords, Attendance and Voting Records for Session 2001-2002,180' November 
2002. 
48 The House of Lords, Hansard, 18th April 2002, column 1106. 
49 The Electoral Commission, Register of donations to political parties. 
50 House of Lords, The Register of Lords'Interests as at 22 nd June 2004, DoD, House of Lords - 
Lord Taylor <http: //www. politicallinks, co. uk> Last accessed 26'ý' a 004. 
51 House of Commons, The Register of Merribers'Interests as at 14ý May 2002. 
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1998. Robin Cook's unofficial biographer, John Kampfiner claims that by this time 
Hollick was already an "important behind the scenes player in the Labour 
hierarchy" not just at the DTI but also to Blair. 53 Andrew Rawnsley, associate 
editor of The Observer, and others, have reported that Cook privately blames 
Hollick's influence in Downing Street for his failure to push through tighter 
regulation of arms exports. 54 Kampfner reports that Blair's principal private 
secretary, John Holmes, sat with Cook's officials for four hours toning down, line 
by line, Cook's new criteria. These criteria, announced to the House on 28 th July 
1997, were not only watered down but would not apply to licences issued under 
the Conservatives. This allowed the late 1990s export of 16 BAE Systems Hawk- 
209s, 50 Alvis armored vehicles and 8 Tactica water canons to Indonesia despite 
the continuing genocide in East Timor and their potential use in Aceh and West 
Papua. Hollick, reportedly made a Labour Life Peer on Neil Kinnock's 
recommendation in 1991,55 became the Director of US military technology 
company TRW Inc, in February 2000.5'6 Now owned by global military corporation 
Northrop Grumman, TRW had reportedly been facing charges of fraud in 2000 
over manipulating the results of tests carried out on the National Missile Defence 
Programme . 
57 But Hollick retained his links with UK-based industry emerging as 
one of the leading contenders to take over from Dick Evans as Chair of BAE 
Systems when his contract expired in July 2004.58 
Hollick is also well known as the former Chief Executive of TV and print empire 
United News and Media which included Anglia, HTV, Meridian, the pro-Labour 
Express, Daily Star and PR Newswire (a major news distribution company in the 
US). In mid 2000 Hollick began selling off his TV and newspaper companies 
most controversially selling The Express to soft pom publisher Richard Desmond 
52 DoD, 'Biographies - Lord Hollick'. 53 John Kampfner, Robin Cook (London: Phoenix, 1998) p. 145. 
54 Andrew Rawnsley, Servants of the People: The inside Story of New Labour (Suffolk: Penguin 
Books, 2001), p. 170, - Nick Cohen, 'Our sky-high arms fiasco'; David Osler, Labour Party p1c: New 
Labour as a Party of Business, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2002) p. 188. 
55 Kampfner, Robin Cook p- 145. 
5'3 DoD, 'Biographies - Lord Hollick'. 57 William D. Hartung and Frida Berdgan, Lockheed Martin and the GOP Profiteering and Pork 
Barrel Politics with a Purpose <http: ltwwwwoddpolicy. org/projects/arms/reports/lockheedgop. htm> 
Last accessed 4th December 2003. 
' Unnamed, 'Parker takes pole position at BAe', Daily Mail, 12th January 2004. 
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for El 25 million. United Media reportedly wanted a quick sale. 59 Notably Stephen 
Byers at the DTI followed the advice of the Director General of Fair Trading and 
did not refer the sale to the Competition Commission. 60 The Commission could 
have blocked the sale on public interest grounds if it had judged Desmond as an 
unfit person to own a national newspaper. This new policy was in line with Byers' 
announcement in October 2000 that further merger and takeover decisions would 
be left to the Office of Fair Trading, a policy heavily promoted by the Institute of 
Public Policy Research (IPPR), of which Lord Hollick is coincidentally a founding 
trustee . 
6' Things were different three years earlier when Byers reportedly ignored 
even the advice of the Director General of Fair Trading on the C7.7 billion 
purchase of GEC by British Aerospace. The Director suggested referral to the 
Competition Commission but Byers overruled it. 62 The Express deal was passed 
in the same weeks as Desmond donated E100,000 to the Labour Party. 63 This 
donation was itself made just days before new rules came into force which finally 
required all those donating more than E5,000 to any party to be identified. Hollick 
himself had already joined Desmond in donating large sums to the party, a move 
symptomatic of the growing dependence of the Labour Party on a few wealthy 
individual and corporate backers to which this thesis will now turn. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARMS-PRODUCING COMPANIES TO THE NEW LABOUR 
PROJECT 
At the same time as Labour has been shifting its ideology towards big business, 
Labour's fundraisers have been shifting their focus towards big business. Over 
the last 15 years corporate donations from a few wealthy individuals and 
companies have gradually overtaken those from the millions who make up 
organised labour, the people whose interests the Labour Representation 
Committee was established to represent in Parliament over 100 years ago . 
64 Still, 
5g Patrick Wintour, 'Baffling generosity after fait accompli', 'The Guardian, 13 Ih May 2002. th 00 Dan Milmo, 'Desmond Deal never under threat from competition watchdog', The Guardian, 13 
May 2002. 
61 IPPR, IPPR Trustees' <hftp: /twww. ippr. org uk/about/index. php? current=trustees> Last accessed 
23 rd December 2003. 
62 Red-Star-Research, British Aerospace/BAe 
63 Labour Party, Annual Report 2002, p. 32-, Amanda Day, 'Labour's farewell to morals', Tribune, 
17'h May 2002. 
64 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 11. 
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as at 2002, the party's overdraft was at least C6 million. 65 So serious have 
Labour's financial problems been that "former Labour Party insider' David Osler 
is just one of those who make the case that without Lord Sainsbury and his, to 
date, E12 million worth of donations to Labour since 1996, "the party simply 
would not be a going concem. "66 This section shows not only how this situation 
may have been worse had it not been for Hollick, arms-producing companies and 
others linked to them, but more importantly shows how this shift has fed into the 
more subtle corruption of the political environment in which parties are obliged to 
remain business friendly. 
It should be noted that any investigation into the overall input of corporate money 
is restricted by a lack of information. Until the Polibcal Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act (2000) required the publication of specific figures, Labour were 
only voluntarily disclosing all donors giving C5,000 or More without specifying 
exact amounts. There is no way of knowing whether an individual or company 
before that time was donating C5,000 or C5 million except in a small number of 
cases where levels of donations have been reported in the press. This section 
should be read with this caveat in mind. 
One case where the press uncovered more accurate estimates of donations 
before the new act came into force is Lord Hollick. Journalists reported that 
Hollick donated between C25,000 and E50,000 himself to the party sometime 
during 1997, a year which he began as a board member of BAE Systems. More 
importantly, Hollick became one of the very central players bringing corporations 
closer to Labour. 67 Hollick was running the party's Business Relations Unit at 
Millbank from 199668 where he kept corporate money flowing into Labour's 
current account at a time when the party was faced with an overdraft of C620,000 
(1996) increasing to E4.5 million in 1997.69 
65 Labour Party, Annua/ Report 2002, pý 26. 
66 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 33. 
67 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998, p. 55; Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 239. 68 Kampfner, Robin Cook, p 145; Mark Hollingsworth, 'An Infestation of Lobbyists', rhe Guardian, 
6' June 2001. 
ý59 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998, p. 55; Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 239. 
151 
Cash donations 
Part of that corporate money has come in the form of straight donations from 
arms-producing companies and those linked to them. Lord Paul's Caparo Group 
has reportedly donated more than C300,000 since 1996. David. Brown, Managing 
Director of commercial and military vehicle manufacturer Multidrive has made 
donations anywhere in excess of C5,000 in 1997 and in 1 E)99.70 Professor 
Bhaftacharyya, director of the Warwick Manufacturing group which has long term 
relationships with BAE Systems and Rolls Royce, has donated anywhere in 
excess of E15,000 between 1998 and 2000 . 
7' He became a Labour Peer in May 
72 2004 . 
Corporate sponsorship 
Corporate funds have also come in the form of sponsorship of Labour Party 
events/activities. Those who have sponsored the party in excess of E5,000 since 
1997 include Raytheon Systems Ltd. whose parent company is America's fourth 
largest military contractor and the world's largest missile makers. 73 Raytheon still 
credits its Patriot missile as "changing the course" of the 1991 Gulf war despite 
widespread acceptance, even in an official Congressional report, that the Patriot 
74 
succeeded in stopping only a few, if any Scuds . 
Sponsors also include 
Bergmans, a lobbying company that has represented Lockheed Martin, Thales, 
75 Boeing, BAE Systems, GKN and Babcock International. Sponsors also include 
GKN Westland representative GJW, BAE Systems representative Bell Pottinger 
76 and military trade association UK Defence Forum . The UK Defence 
Forum later 
reportedly explained that donations from Thomson-CSF (now Thales), Lockheed- 
Martin, Boeing, BAE Systems and Babcock International were given to Labour, 
70 Multidrive Limited, 'Welcome to Muftiddve'<hftp /Avww. multidnve co. uk> Last accessed 3'd 
December 2003. Labour Party, Annual Report 1998 and Annual Report 2000. 
71 Warwick Manufacturing Group, WMG overview' <httpý//www. wmg. warwick. ac. uk/page-13, phtml> 
Last accessed 9th December 2003, Labour Party, Annual Reports 1999-2001. 
72 Unnamed, 'Labour dominates new Peers list', BBC News Online, 1" May 2004 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk politics/3674543 stm> Last accessed 27"' May 2004. 
73 
74 
Labour Party, Annual Report 1998, p, 56 
Raytheon, 'Technology Leadership' <http 11www raytheon coryVabout/tech. htm> Last accessed 
24t" December 2003, For example see Raytheon Watch at 
<www. gis. nett-larrabee/raytheonwatch. htm> Last accessed 24"' December 2003. 
75 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998, Bergmans, 'Bergmans Defence Consultancy' 
<hftp: //www. north-house. com/htmVdefence/home htm> Last accessed 4 th April 2004. 
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some channeled through the Forum so that the names of the companies did not 
appear on Labours official list of donors. At least one company involved - 
Thomson - claimed that its contribution to the Labour Party was made 
P'unwittingly". '7 BAE Systems itself spent anywhere in excess of E5,000 
"sponsoring Labour Party events/activities or commercial marketing" in 1998, in 
76 1999 and again in 2000 . 
The party has also benefited from corporations purchasing tickets for Labour 
Party events and by contributing prizes at Labour Party dinners. Those who have 
made such a cont6bution worth anywhere in excess of E5,000 since 1997 include 
GKN representative GJW, Rolls Royce representative Citigate Public Affairs and 
BAE Systems representative Bell Pottinger Public Affairs. 79 
To add to all this is BAE Systems' sponsorship of Labour conference events from 
1998 to 2000 including the sponsorship of a question and answer session on 
employment and education in 1999.80 BAE Systems were sponsoring similar 
events at Conservative Party conference and claim that all involve modest 
amounts. Despite this, BAE Systems has since decided to end this kind of 
activity because of the adverse publicity generated. 
In the face of this kind of publicity, BAE Systems did sponsor the mind zone at 
the millennium dome reportedly at a cost of F-12 million (tax deductible) at a time 
when the Labour most needed the project to attract corporate money. 81 New 
Labour's C1 billion master project that effectively subsidised each of its visitors by 
C128 and could barely be given away at the end of the project was intended to be 
76 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998 and Annual Report 2000. 
77 Chris Hastings, David Leppard and Jason Burke, 'Foreign arms firms gave cash to Labour, The 
Sunday Times, 23d April 1997. 
78 Labour Party, Annual Report 1999, Annual Report 2000 and Annual Report 2001, 
79 (3jW, 'Public Affairs in Wales' 
<http: //www. webershandwick. co. uk/publictcontent. cfm? cid=3&sid=106> Last accessed 4 th 
December 2003; Labour Party, Annual Reports 1996-2001; The Association of Professional 
Political Consultants (APPC), Register of Members 15' December 2001-31" May 2002, p. 6 
<http: //www. appc. org. uktregisters/APPC register 31_05 02. pdf> Last accessed 7h January 2004- 
Labour Party, Annual Report 2000andXn-nual Re-port 2CTOI, Gidon Freeman, 'BAe Systems hires 
second firm amid media onslaught', PR Week, 21 s' February 2003; Labour Party, Annual Report 
2000. 
80 Red Star Research, British AerospacelBAe Systems. 
81 Red-Star-Research, British AerospacelBAe, House of Commons, Hansard, 25 th June 2002 , column 232. 
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a great example of Labour Parly/corporate collaboration "2 Other sponsors 
included Marks and Spencer, Tesco and Camelot- All were both regulated by 
Peter Mandelson as Secretary of State of Trade and Industry and at the same 
time pressed for huge sums to sponsor the Dome, by Peter Mandelson as 
Minister without Portfolio responsible for the project. 83 Even Wth this corporate 
sponsorship, the Dome had serious budget problems. The projected visitor 
numbers fell short. Only 5.5 million people visited in 2000 instead of the projected 
12 million leaving the board of the New Milleniurn Experience Company, made 
up of corporate executives, to apply for lottery handouts. So in the unlikely event 
that BAE Systems has not been a significant financial backer of the party via 
donations and sponsorship it has, at the very least, been a significant SUPpofter 
of a huge Labour project when the government most needed it. 
Leaving BAE Systems sponsorship of the dome aside, appendix twenty shows all 
donations, sponsorship and other financial benefits which Labour have derived 
from arms-producing companies and those associated with them as far as is 
publicly known. 
Blind Trusts 
The exact value of donations or benefits that the Labour Party has derived from 
arms-producing companies shown in this appendix is largely unknown before 
2001 due to the lack of information noted above. But the lack of forthcoming 
information on donations is in no way comparable to the secrecy surrounding#-* 
use of blind trusts in the Labour Party. Operated by the party until the Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act banned their use, some have links to 
military industry. Used to fund specific projects or people like Tony Blair, Gordon 
Brown, John Prescott and others, blind trusts referred to an arrangement 
whereby donations would be made to politicians via an independent trustee 
without the politicians knowing the identity of their backers to avoid any potential 
conflict of interest. These kinds of donations did not have to be disclosed in 
Labour Party annual reports nor in company reports if the donation was made 
- ----- - ----- 82 Osler, Labour Party pic, p 164 
83 Osler, Labour Party pic, p 165 
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from a corporate source. But as Conservative MP David Shaw pointed out in the 
House in February 1997, newspapers were already revealing the identity of some 
of the donors to Blair's Trust, a reflection of the widely held understanding that 
"the donors rarely remain silent; sooner or later, they seek recognition for their 
donations". 84 
One of the seven Labour trusts listed by Shaw in his Commons attack was the 
Industrial Research Trust. This trust was listed as providing funding to the offices 
of Tony Blair and "office research help" to Gordon Brown in the Register of 
Members' Interests in January 1995.85 The trust, which began in 1993, was 
established for the benefit of John Smith. Lord Gregson was reportedly the Chair 
of the trustees alongside his other role as president of the Defence 
Manufacturers Association (1984-2000), the central arms industry trade 
association in the UK. 86 At least E47,000 of the money collected by the trustees 
87 
reportedly came from the military supplier Caparo . 
Central to much of the funds flowing into this and other blind trusts, about which 
less if known, was the Labour Finance and Industry Group, a group of business 
leaders who had encouraged links between the party and business since it 
began in 1972. The group claims to have established "close working 
relationships with a number of Secretaries of State and senior ministers" via 
regular behind the scenes meetings. 8" One of its Honorary Life Presidents and 
reportedly the group's Deputy Chair for over twenty years (1972-1993) is Sir 
Sigmund Stemberg. 89 Sternberg is also Chair of ISYS, a software company 
whose clients include BAE Systems. 90 He donated f-100,000 in May 2001, 
El 10,000 during 2002 and F-91,664 in 2003.91 These can be added to other large 
donations reportedly made in 1977 and in 1979 and the sum somewhere in 
84 House of Commons, Hansard, 12'h February 1997, column 344. 
85 The Register of Members' Interests as at 315t January 1995. 
86 Osler, Labour Party plc p 61: Mo's Mo, 2003, ppý 874-875. 
87 Red-Star-Research, Lord Swraj Paul; Osler, Labour PartYp1c, p 61. 98 Labour Finance and Industry Group, LFIG History, ýýhttp: //www. Ifig. org/history. htm> Last 
accessed 9th June 2004. 
89 Labour Finance and Industry Group, Executive Committee <http: ltwww Ifig. orglexecutive. htm> 
Last accessed Wh June 2004; Red Star Research, Sir Sigmund Sternber 9 90 ISYS, Company Overview <http: /Amww. isyspIc. com/> Last accessed 9 June 2004; Red Star 
Research, Sir Sigmund Sternberg. 
91 The Electoral Commission, Register of Donations to Political Parties. 
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excess of f-5,000 which Sternberg spent on "tickets for dinners" in 1998 . 
92 
Another Honorary Life President of the group is Lord Gregson, President of the 
Defence Manufacturers Association for 16 years. 0 The group reportedly lost 
much of its influence when Blair took power and negotiated directly with large 
corporations as its financial problems have escalated. 
The general lack of publicly available information makes it difficult to gauge the 
significance of the arms sector relafive to the overall input of corporate money. 
Because Labour has also benefited from donabons from most major 
supermarkets, a number of national newspapers, publishers, political lobbying 
companies, Enron, BT, Greg Dyke, Ben Elton, Mick Hucknall and Eddie Izzard . 
94 
This phenomenon, that is the widespread appeal of donating to the party, is in 
itself important in understanding Labours approach to big business as the next 
section goes on to explore. 
THE PARTY THAT LIKES TO SAY YES: THE WIDER DEPENDENCE OF THE LABOUR 
PARTY ON CORPORATE MONEY AND ITS EFFECTS 
During the 1980s and early 1990s the Labour Party needed to reinvent itself as 
the natural party of business. It had to be credible to big business for its political 
survival and it needed to attract the flow of corporate money for its physical 
survival. New Labour, and particularly Blair, have systematically set about to 
deliver both to the Party. Appendix twenty one shows just how much the sources 
of Labour Party funding have changed since 1987. The Party has gone from 
almost exclusive reliance on trade unions to being hugely dependent on 
donations from mainly corporate benefactors and commercial activity from mainly 
corporate sources in just the last 15 years. 
Until as late as 1987 trade unions were the source of 90% of Labour's income. 
The decline of union funding in real terms has come about, according to Labour 
Party annual reports, because of the long-term decline in union membership. 
Thatcher's anti-union laws and a series of union defeats in the 1980s led to four 
02 Red Star Research, Sir Sigmund Sternberg. 
93 Who's Mo, 2003, pp. 874-875- Labour Finance and Industry Group, Executive Committee. 
94 Red Star Research, dimmy Boýe. 
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million less union members if 1979 is compared to 1991.95 By 2001, trade unions 
were the source of only 17% of Labours income and this figure is set to fall even 
lower given recent relations between the party and major unions. For example, in 
June 2002, the RMT union reduced its affiliation fees to the party by 80% from 
El 12,000 to C20,000 and withdrew financial support from senior MPs including 
John Prescott and Robin Cook. In the same week the Postal Workers Union 
reduced party funding to a minimum. The Communications Workers Union had 
already voted to reduce contributions by C500,000 over three years while the 
GM13 reduced its contribution by C2m over four years. 96 Because of the financial 
uncertainties resulting from these kind of decisions, in January 2003, the party 
tried to change the system of union funding from annual donations to guaranteed 
funding for the next five years. This would have secured C40 million for the party. 
But representatives from some of Labour's largest union donors withheld their 
support because of Government insistence that the fire brigades union adhere to 
the recommendations of the Bain report. 97 For the party the future of union 
funding is precarious. 
At the same time Labour's financial difficulties have been increasing. In 1991, 
Labour Party officials were privately expressing concern that the party may 
become bankrupt when their co-operative bank overdraft had to be increased to 
C2.5 million. At the time, the bank itself was in difficulty. 98 Yet the most recent 
annual report, for the financial year 2001, shows that the party owes far more 
than it did in 1991. The party was just over 0 million in the red. By January 2003 
the debt reportedly stood at C10 million. 99 In the same month the party asked all 
its members to donate at least E20 each to help pay off a C5.5 million mortgage 
on the new Queen Street headquarters. 100 The party moved from Millbank in 
95 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 26. 
96 RMT, 'Political Matters, 16th August 2002 
<hftp: /twww. rmt. org. uk/gfx/political-mafters-augustl351. shtml> Last accessed 31sDecember 
2003; Kevin Maguire and Patrick Wintour, 'Rail union cuts cash support to Labour', The Guardian, 
26'h June 2002. 
97 Unnamed, 'Union anger stalls Labour funding deal', The Guardian, 24" January 2003. 
ýý Os ler, Labour Party p1c, p. 25. 
99 Maguire and Wintour, 'Rail union cuts cash support to Labour'; Kevin Maguire, 'Party Plea for 
Donors', The Guardian, 17th January 2003. 
'Do Kevin Maguire, 'Party Plea for Donors', The Guardian, 17th January 2003. 
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August 2002 to save costs. 'O' Appendix twenty two shows how unstable the 
party's accounts have been since 1991. 
The state of the party's finances put together with the need for Labour to appear 
as the party of economic competence go some way towards explaining not only 
the need for Hollick's business relations unit but also other features of the New 
Labour movement. The potential for a mutually endorsing business-government 
relationship also explains, for example, why corporate participation at Labour 
conference is widespread and open to all. Whereas duhng the 1980s the Party 
tightly controlled commercial exhibitors - companies linked to South Afhca or to 
tobacco were automatically excluded and those engaged in union disputes 
barred'02 - during the 2002 conference, 220 corporations, lobbying companies 
and campaigners from all sectors hired stands. They cost from f 3,500 to 00,500 
depending on size and location. 103 Opportunities, in addition to sponsorship of 
fringe and social events, include advertising in the conference brochure, 
sponso6ng dinners, sponsoring parties and seemingly any other aspect of the 
conference. One company who took up one of these opportunities is Enron. The 
company paid C15,000 to sponsor the conference gala dinner in 1998 as part of 
its ongoing lobbying effort. 'c4 Later, the govemment decided not to refer the 
proposed takeover of Wessex Water to the competition commission. Many linked 
the two. Another case, that of McDonalds, demonstrates how corporations wish 
to attract the implied endorsement of the party. The evening before Blair's 
keynote speech at the 2001 conference, he attended a food and drinks reception 
hosted by party chair Charles Clark and sponsored by McDonalds. The 
corporation, which uses lobbyists Weber Shandwick (see chapter six), paid 
El 5,000 to sponsor the reception for 450 guests reportedly only after it was 
assured that the Prýime Minister would attend. Although Blair refused to wear a 
McDonalds hat as requested, McDonalds was expected to film the entire event 
for their own publicity video. 105 The possibility of sponsoring the evening had 
101 Labour Party, Annual Report 2002, p. 21. 
1 02 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p. 27. 
103 Telephone conversation, Labour Party conference organiser, to author, 3 rd March 2003. 
1 04 Unnamed, 'Power Politics', Corporate Watch Newsletter, 12 Ih February 2002 
<http: //www. corporatewatch. org/newslefterfissue7/nl7_enron. html> Last accessed 310 December 
2003. 
'c'5 Kevin Maguire, 'New Labour: out with the red rose and in "th the Big Mac', The Guardian, 30"' 
August 2001. 
158 
been published in a 2001 Millbank brochure, along with 30 other "sponsorship 
opportunities". The Guardian subsequently obtained the brochure. Although it is 
no longer available from the journalist involved his article quotes the brochure 
advertising the dinner as "NEW! 8pm to late. A major reception celebrating the 
1 00th Labour conference. The event will be hosted by the party chair and 
General Secretary and will be attended by up to 450 guests in the Hilton 
Metropole's Balmoral Suite". Other opportunities listed in the brochure included 
"NEW! Enjoy a positive profile through an association vAth the vital emergency 
service provided by the local ambulance service. " The estimated cost of this 
sponsorship made by the journalist was C5,000. Another opportunity was 
described as a "Branding opportunity on every flower arrangement provided for 
the 700 guests". The estimated cost was C3,500. Another was "A unique 
promotional opportunity for the special video screen provided for hundreds of 
delegates to watch the leaders speech" at an estimated cost of C4,000. '06 All 
aspects of the Labour Party conference are now open to any corporate bidder. 
This is not just a financial relationship. As "former Labour insider' David Osler 
explains "For New Labour, the symbolism is even more important than the 
bottom line. #007 One of the most symbolic reaffirmation of Labour's business 
credentials was a letter to the Times written during the 2001 general election 
campaign. 58 Chairs and Chief Executives, led by Terence Conran, wrote to the 
Times calling on all UK business people to support the Labour Party. Clive 
Hollick, former Non-Executive Director of BAE Systems and Lord Simpson, 
former CE of Marconi joined others from mining, food, clothing and media 
corporations in praising the party. They said that Labour had created "the stable 
business environment that British companies and overseas investors need ... we 
believe that business should support the party that since May 1997 has done so 
much to promote stable economic growth and a renewed spirit of enterprise in 
the British people. "'08 Gordon Brown immediately responded by making the letter 
the main focus of his daily election press meeting on the same day as his launch 
of a series of pre-election pro-corporation proposals. Brown claimed that the 
letter was "a sign of the relationship this New Labour government is forging with 
'06 Maguire, 'New Labour. out with the red rose and in with the Big Mac'. 
107 Osler, LabourPartyplc, p. 99. 
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business" and that he was "grateful" to the signatodes. ", 9 The next day the 
Guardian reported that Millbank had arranged for the letter to be written and sent 
from Terence Conran's office, a move indicative of the importance of continued 
big business endorsement of the party. "O 
The relationship between the party and business appears largely one of mutual 
gain. Labour has become increasingly dependent on arms company and wider 
corporate funding as its financial problems have escalated at the same time as it 
has felt the necessity of matching the business friendly credentials of the 
Conservatives to attain and retain political power. Concentrating only on the 
actual amounts donated to the Labour Party by arms-producing companies, 
although they might be substantial, rather misses the more important point.. 
Labour must refrain from pursuing policies detrimental to the wider interests of 
big business or risk political obscurity and potential financial ruin. The risk of 
bankruptcy and political obscurity gives the party an incentive not to start 
undermining the corporate agenda of promoting commercial interests and not to 
start demarcating the boundaries between corporate and party/govemment 
interests that any investigation of arms export support would start to uncover. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to consider the nature and the significance of 
the relationships between arms-producing companies and the Labour Party - with 
Labour Peers, with Labour MPs and with Labour Party funding. It has argued that 
the register of MPs' interests is not littered with Members links to arms-producing 
companies. Although some well placed MPs, particularly those on the Defence 
Select Committee, have links to or have enjoyed hospitality from such companies 
it is the House of Lords where there exists much more potential for arms 
companies to increase their political influence. This chapter has shown how a 
small number of Labour Peers who have run or have worked for the UK's largest 
108'Business names support Labour (letters to the editor), The Times, 14, h May 2001. 
109 Steve $chifferes, Who's Backing Labour', BBC News Online, 14 th May 2001 
<http , //news . 
bbc. co. u k/vote200 1 thi/engli s h/newsi d_1329000/1329419. stm> Last accessed 31"t 
December 2003. 
110 Kevin Maguire Ewan MacAskill and Nicholas Watt, 'Blair under pressure to silence Mandelson', 
The Guardian, 15 ih May 2001. 
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arms-producing companies either now hold influential government jobs and/or 
have links to the highest echelons of the New Labour movement. Above all, this 
chapter argues that the risk of bankruptcy and political obscurity gives the party 
an incentive not to start undermining the corporate agenda of promoting 
commercial interests and not to start demarcating the boundaries between 
corporate and party/government interests that any investigation of arms export 
support would start to uncover. Given these relationships between arms- 
producing companies and the party, continuity in supportive export policy is to be 
expected. 
But this expectation is based on much more than just the nature of the 
relationship between arms-producing companies and the Labour Party. This 
expectation is based on the industry's relationship with the more permanent 
facets of governance. The next chapter explores just how deeply interconnected 
military industries are with those government departments that play a lead role in 
establishing, interpreting and implementing guidelines for further export support 
and export control policy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: LINKS BETWEEN ARMS- 
PRODUCING COMPANIES AND GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four focused on the connections between arms-producing companies 
and the Labour Party. But Arms-producing companies have gone much further 
than funding outings for MPs, the training of Westminster staff and a largely 
undefined amount of party funding. This chapter considers how the distinction 
between government and the private arms sector has become blurred and it 
does this by looking at the connections between arms-producing companies and 
government departments. In particular, the chapter looks at those departments of 
most relevance to the interpretation and implementation of arms export control 
policy and arms export support policy, namely the MoD and the DTI. The first 
part of the chapter looks at the seamless progression of top ex MoD and Service 
Staff into the employment of arms-producing companies and vice versa, a 
phenomenon commonly known as the revolving door. The second part largely 
focuses on the "task force phenomenon" at work within those departments - on 
the membership of the countless and uncounted groups affiliated to the MoD and 
DTI. ' The chapter ends with an analysis of the implications of all this on the 
maintenance of supportive export policy. 
THE REVOLVING DOOR IN FULL SWING BETWEEN ARMS-PRODUCING 
COMPANIES AND THE MOD 
The relationship between UK based arms exporters and the MoD is 
incomparable across government. The Select Committee on Defence concluded 
in 1999 
' The "task force phenomenon" is a phrase used by Tony Barker in Tony Barker with lain Byme 
and Anjuli Veall, Ruling by Task Force: Politico's Guide to Labour's New Elite (London: Politico's 
Publishing, 1999). 
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While the DTI (and probably many other departments) see 
it as a perfectly proper part of their role to promote the 
UK's commercial interests abroad, they are not in the 
same close customer/client relationship with the firms they 
support as is the MoD with defence manufacturers. ' 
One way of understanding this close customer/client relationship is by looking at 
the interchange of employees between government and industry. A large number 
of key arms industry figures have moved into positions of significant power within 
the MoD while a large number of MoD ministers and senior officials have moved 
into positions of significant pay within the arms industry. This phenomenon is so 
well established within the MoD that, as one commentator has observed, the 
term "revolving door"has actually now become a misnomer because it assumes 
that a barrier exists between the MoD and its military contractors when there is 
no actual division. 3 There is no suggestion that any individual mentioned here 
has acted improperly. Yet there is an ongoing concern with any activity of this 
kind to ensure that serving officials do not act with a view to securing future 
employment and that privileged policy or commercial information as well as any 
special access to influential officials is not made use of by an employer. 
These are exactly the concerns of the Advisory Committee on Business 
Appointments - the main body standing in the way of those from senior levels 
taking up private sector employment. The Committee makes recommendations 
to the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on the acceptance of private sector 
employment by the most senior civil servants, diplomats, special advisors and 
other Crown Servants in the two years after they have left Crown Service 
employment. The Committee also advises former ministers on the uptake of 
private sector employment under the ministers' voluntary system. In certain 
cases, the Committee recommends a period of time elapses before an 
appointment is taken up or imposes restrictions on the work undertaken within an 
appointment for a period of time. 
2 House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Second Report: The Appointment of the New 
Head of Defence Export Services, 31" March 1999, HC 147, paragraph 12. 
3 Tim Webb, The Armour-Plated Ostrich: The Hidden Costs of Britain's Addiction to the Arms 
Business (Kent: Comerford & Miller, 1998) p 84. 
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Arms-producing companies still clearly feel that it is worthwhile to secure and 
retain the services of former MoD Crown Servants. On average, between 1997 
and 2004,39% of applications from Crown Servants from all government 
departments to the Committee were made by individuals working in the MoD. 
This is an ongoing feature of a department that plays a significant role in the 
delivery of various forms of arms export subsidy outlined in the introduction. This 
phenomenon has not gone unnoticed. In 2004, the Committee acknowledged 
that there was a particular problem with this department warning "In the case of 
the MoD, it can be argued that the numbers seeking such employment are so 
significant as to amount to a 'traffic' from the Department to the defence 
contractors who supply it. " In response, the MoD argue that almost all senior 
departmental staff have acquired some commercial or policy knowledge but that 
they had put extensive safeguards in place within the procurement procedure to 
minimise the risk of impropriety. In response, the Committee reiterated their 
concerns that suspicion is increased where there is a "regular passage of 
significant numbers of staff' and signaled their intention probe applicants wishing 
to transfer to the private sector in greater detail and to recommend longer waiting 
periods in the future. 5 But in 2004 Blair personally overruled the Committee's 
recommendation that RAF Air Chief Marshall, Sir John Day wait a year before 
taking up a post as military advisor to BAE Systems because there was a "wider 
national interest". 6 In the same year Blair announced that the Appointment Rules 
themselves were to be reexamined by an external body established to ensure 
that they "are compatible with a public service that is keen to encourage greater 
interchange with the private and other sectors which is essential for effective 
delivery in today's public service. 0 Both moves are suggestive of Blairs 
frustration at the restrictions governing the interplay between the public and 
4 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 10. 
5 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 10. 
6 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 15. 
7 The Cabinet Office, News: 22 ýd July 2004 <httpJ/www. cabinet- 
office. gov. uk/news/2004/1)40722_sixthreport. asp> Last accessed 29th July 2004. 
164 
private sectors and point to the likelihood of greater interchange between public 
and private sectors in the future. 8 
Some of those who have already passed once, sometimes twice through the 
industry/govemment revolving door are listed here. Not all are linked to New 
Labour but all help to illustrate the environment in which the government is now 
working. 
Since the start of the 1990s at least seven senior political MoD figures have gone 
on to employment with private arms companies - three Defence Secretaries and 
four Defence Procurement Ministers. 
Defence Secretaries now working for arms-producing companies 
George Younger, Defence Secretary (1986-1989), became Chair of Siemens 
Plessey Electronic Systems in 1990, the military electronics firm bought by BAE 
Systems. 9 Michael Portillo, Defence Secretary (1995-1997) joined BAE Systems 
in September 2002 as a Non Executive Director. "' Portillo earns F-36,000 per 
year alongside his salary as an MP'l but the appointment was less profitable for 
BAE Systems. On the day his directorship was announced, BAE Systems shares 
fell by 11 p. 12 After Labour came to power in 1997 Portillo's successor as Defence 
Secretary was Labour's George Robertson. Robertson remained in the post until 
1999 when he was invited to serve as Secretary General of NATO. As his 
contract with NATO was ending Robertson accepted a position as Non-Executive 
Director of military aerospace firm Smiths to start in February 2004.13 In the same 
month he also became Strategic Advisor to the Royal Bank of Canada's 
8 Andrew Sparrow, 'Blair overruled watchdog on RAF chiefs defence job', Daily Telegraph, 26 th 
July 2004. 
1 Who's Who, 2003, p 2407-2408, BAE Systems, About US 
<http: //www. BAEsystems. corTVaboLitus/evolLdion. htm> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
10 BAE Virtual Newsroom press release 
<hftp: /twww. BAEsystems. com/newsroom/2002/sep/1 10902newsi. htm> Last accessed 26th June 
2004ý 
" BAE Systems Annual Report 2003, p 44. 
12 Pippa Gallop, 'The Invisible handout of the markeV, Corporate Watch Newsletter 11, December 
2002 -January 2003 <hftp: //www. corporatewatch. org. uk/newslefter/issuellfisuell_part5. htm> 
Last accessed 26h June 2004. 
13 Smiths Press Release, Smiths appoints Lord Robertson as non-executive, 10 th September 2003 
<http: //www. smfths-group-com/PressReleases_hand. asp? aLftonum=104> Last accesses 9th June 
2004. 
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European operation just as the company was reportedly trying to raise F-500 
million in a private finance deal to modemise the Army's barracks at Colchester. 
14 
Also in February 2004, Robertson became Non-Executive Director of the Weir 
group, the Glasgow based engineering firm who are a major supplier of weapons 
systems for Royal Navy submarines. 15 
Defence Procurement Ministers now working for anns-producing companies 
Sir Robert Walmsley, Chief of Defence Procurement in the MoD from May 1996 
until April 2003, became a Member of the US Board of Directors of General 
Dynamics. A 12 month waiting period between his retirement from the MoD and 
the first day of his new job was required by the Committee on Business 
Appointments. This was because General Dynamics UK, part of the General 
Dynamics Corporation, is the pdme contractor for the Bowman radio project, a C2 
billion contract awarded dudng Walmsley's time as Chief of Defence 
Procurement. Walmsley assured the committee that his personal role in the 
award of the contract was limited. 16 One of Walmsley's predecessors was 
Geoffrey Pattie. Pattie, Minister of State for Defence Procurement (1983-1984) 
became Joint Chair of major UK-based arms exporter GEC-Marconi in1991. He 
became sole Chair (1996-1999) as well as Marketing Director from 1997.17 Pattie 
is now the senior of two partners at Terrington Management, a political lobbying 
company that includes BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin as clients. 18 Roger 
Freeman, Minister for Defence Procurement (1994-1995) went on to become 
Non-Executive Director of Thomson-CSF/Thales and Non-Executive Chair of 
Thomson CSF-UK/Thales in 1999.19 Freeman took the job over from Jonathan 
Aitken, Minister of State for Defence Procurement (1992-1994). Aitken had been 
on the board of BMARC (1988-1990), a company allegedly involved in supplying 
14 Terry Macalister, 'NATO chief to join city firm', The Guardian, 23 rd September 2003; Kevin 
Maguire, 'Lots of bemoaning', The Guardian, 28 th November 2003. 
15 Weir Group, Group facts and figures 
<http, /twww. weir. co. u k/groupthome. nsf/luPages/profilefactsheet> Last accessed 12'h June 2004. 
16 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Commfttee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 14. 
17 Who's Mo, 2003, p 1676 
'8 Terrington Management, Geoffrey Pattie 
19 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998- 
1999, p 15. 
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arms to Iraq, Iran and Burma in breach of government arms ernbargoes. 20 Aitken 
moved to GEC Marconi in 1998 as a consultant, reportedly hired to help the 
company sell arms to the Middle EaSt. 2' His contract was terminated when he 
received an 18-month prison sentence for perjury and perverting the course of 
justice in 1999. He denied that aides of the Saudi Royal family paid a C1,000 
Pads Ritz hotel bill in 1993 but this was subsequently exposed as a lie. Because 
he was Procurement Minister at the time of his stay, he was officially banned 
from accepting any benefits that may affect his judgement. 22 Guardian journalists 
have since ciaimed that the Ritz weekend was used by Said Ayas to negotiate 
the (legal) payment of millions of pounds worth of commissions from GEC, 
Marconi and shipbuilder VSEL as his reward for securing contracts. Ayas was 
principal aid to Prince Mohammed, son of the King of Saudi Arabia and a close 
friend of Aitken. 23 
More overt about its operations on behalf of UK-based weapons companies and, 
just like Aitken, accused of becoming involved in the payment of "special 
commissions" has been DESO. 
DESO: The arms company marketing and sales department within the MoD 
DESO, or The Defence Sales Organisation as it was known before 1985, the 
arms export marketing and sales organisation operating within the MoD, has 
always either seconded its head from or delivered them back to military industry 
employment, particularly BAE Systems employment. Their careers prior to and in 
the aftermath of their appointment as head of DSO/DESO are shown in appendix 
twenty three. 
Others who have been seconded from arms-producing companies to work at 
DESO include Rolls Royce employees R. Douglas (1984-1986) and H Meyers 
20 James, In the Public Interest, p 123- Unnamed, Jonathan th I Aitken'. A Timeline, The Guardian, 4 March 1999, John Pilger, Inside Burma: Land of Fear International Response 
th 
<hftp: //pilger. carlton. cortVbun, na/response> Last accessed 24 June 2004 . 21 Tim Webb, The Armour-Plated Ostrich, p. 85. 
22 Guardian staff and agencies 'Aitken Jailed for 18 Months', The Guardian, 81h June 1 999 
23 David Pallister, David Lei 0 and Jamie Wilson, 'Aitken, the fixer and the secret million pound 
arms deal', The Guardian, 5 March 1999. 
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(1986-1989), Westland's S. Bari(er (1989-1991) and Trafalgars M. Faulkner 
(1992 - at least 1994). Trafalgar House was a contractor in the Pergau 
hydroelectric dam, the dam involved in aid for arms sales controversy under 
Thatcher. The company also allegedly sold South African arms firm Armscor 
155mm shells, subsequently sold on to Iraq from 1980_1990.24 Others seconded 
to DESO include British Aerospace employees John Weston (1982-1985), 
D. Mitchell (1993-at least 1994), S. Brett (1988-1989), and David Hastie (1988- 
25 1989). David Hastie, was seconded to DESO for 18 months as "Business 
Development Advisor'during which time his salary continued to be paid by 
British Aerospace. Hastie was later singled out in the Scott report as a man %vith 
an ambiguous role. When the FCO reportedly protested at MoD plans to back 
UK-based arms firms exhibiting at the April 1989 Baghdad arms fair, the MoD 
eventually promised that it would not send any DESO staff. Instead, it send David 
Hastie arguing that between London and Baghdad, Hastie had been de- 
seconded from DESO, back to British Aerospace for the course of the fair. 26 
At an equally fast pace, arms-producing companies have offered senior MoD and 
Service staff outside of DESO positions within the private sector. They have also 
bolstered their own numbers within the department by lending the MoD their own 
staff, a dual strategy which this next section will explore. 
Arms companies forging links beyond DESO 
Outside DESO at least 23 senior MoD and Service Staff have moved into 
employment with arms-producing companies since Labour came to power in 
1997. BAE Systems has attracted more former MoD civil and Forces staff than 
any other arms-producing company but details of all those for Mich there exists 
publicly available information are outlined below. 
24 Gerald James, In the Public Interest, p 62, p. 193. 
25 House of Commons, Hansard, 1 s' March 1994, Written Answers, column 668-669. 26 Webb, The Armour-Plated Ostrich, p 12& 
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0 Air Marshal Graeme Robertson, Chief of Staff RAF Strike Command until 
September 1998, became a Military Adviser to British Aerospace in March 
1999.27 
e Professor Sir David Davies, Chief Scientific Advisor in the MoD until April 
1999 became a Member of the Strategy Board at British Aerospace Virtual 
University in December 1999. In his MoD role, Davies had chaired a senior 
committee that recommends the procurement of military equipment to 
ministers. The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments advised 
Davies to wait six months between his departure from the MoD and his 
appointment with BAE Systems and to avoid discussion of BAE Systems' 
strategy for the first two years in the poSt. 28 
Mr. Bell, who had been on secondment from the MoD to BAE Systems for 
two and a half years, left the MoD permanently to became Group Head of 
Strategic Analysis in April 1999.29 
Lord Inge, former Chief of Defence Staff (1994-1997), 30 has been hired by 
BAE Systems as a consultant. 31 Inge, has also become a Non-Executive 
Director of Racal Electronics (1997-2000). 32 
o Vice Admiral McAnally, Commandant of the Royal College of Defence 
Studies until December 2000, took up a position of Naval Adviser to Flagship 
Training in July 2001. Flagship, jointly owned by BAE Systems and VT 
Group, markets Royal Naval training abroad. 33 
0 Admiral Sir Jock Slater, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff until 
December 1998, became both Non-Executive Director of Vosper Thomycroft 
Holdings p1c, in July 1999, owner of warship manufacturer VT Shipbuilding, 
and a Senior Military Advisor of Lockheed-Martin UK Ltd. in January 2000.34 
27 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998- 
1999, p. 29. 
28 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Third Report 1999- 
2000, pp. 13-14,31. 
29 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Third Report 1999- 
2000, p 31, 
30 MoD, 'About us' <http: /Iwww. mod. uklaboutus/staff/f_cds. htm> Last accessed 3 rd December 
2003. 
31 House of Lords, The Register of Lords'Interests as at 22 nd June 2004 
32 Who's Who, 2003, p. 1096, 
33 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fifth Report 2001- 
2002, p. 28. 
34 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Third Report 1999- 
2000, p. 34; House of Commons, Hansard, 10"'July 2000, Written Answers, column 375, Mo's 
Mo 2003, p. 1995, 
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0 General Sir Roger Wheeler, Chief of the General Staff until April 2000, 
became Non-Executive Director of Thom son-CSF/Tha le s in February 2001., 35 
Sir Scott Grant, Quartermaster General until March 2000, was appointed by 
Thomson Racal Defence Ltd. as Customer Support Director in January 
2001.36 
9 Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Graydon, Chief of Air Staff until August 1997, 
became Non-Executive Director of Thomson CSF-UK/Thales in January 
1 E)99.37 
Graydon's predecessor as Chief of Air Staff was Sir Peter Harding who went 
on to become Deputy Chair of GEC Marconi from 1995 until 1998.38 
Air Chief Marshall Sir William Wratten, former Comm an di ng-in- Chief, RAF 
Strike Command until November 1997, became Chief Military Advisor to 
Rolls-Royce Military Aero Engines in May 1998.39 
Air Chief Marshall Sir John Day took up an appointment as a military advisor 
to BAE Systems in December 2003 subject to restrictions laid out by the 
Prime Minister. Day had been involved with the Air Force Board which affects 
MoD business with BAE Systems although he had taken steps to ensure that 
he was excluded from discussions on a contract BAE Systems was bidding 
f 40 or 
. 
Sir Robert Hayman-Joyce, Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement until 
October 1998 became Non-Executive Chair of Raytheon Systems Ltd. in 
September 2000.41 
0 Air Marshall Sir Peter Norriss was Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement 
(operations) until October 2000. He became Defence Advisor to Alenia 
Marconi Systems in June 2001 and Advisor to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., in 
35 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fourth Report 2000- 
200 1, p. 31 - Who's Who 2003 p. 2302. 
36 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fourth Report 2000- 
2001, p. 29. 
37 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998- 
1999, p. 28- Who's Mo 2003, p. 861. 38 Who's Who 2003, p, 930. 
39 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998- 
1999, p. 30. 
40 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 14-15. 
41 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fourth Report 2000- 
2001, p 29. 
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December 2001, a Swiss company that make civil and military single-engine 
turboprops. 42 
0 Vice Admiral Sir John Dunt, former Chief of Fleet Support at the MoD until 
March 2000, became Principal Defence Advisor to Defence Business and 
Marketing International Ltd. in January 2001.43 
e Air Marshal Sir Roger Austin was Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement 
(operations) until May 1997. In June 1998 he became a Fellow of Strategic 
Forum at Serco Defence which provides the MoD with support services. 44 
0 Air Marshal Sir Colin Terry, Air Officer Commanding in Chief at RAF Logistics 
Command until April 1999 became Group Managing Director of Inflite 
Engineering Ltd. in November 1999,45 a small company which supplies parts 
to BAE Systems and other military contractors. 
Former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Systems) until September 1999, 
Edmund Burton, became a consultant for TRW Inc in November 2000.46 
TRW, now owned by America's second largest arms corporation Northrop 
Grumman, supplies high technology products to the automotive, space and 
military industries and included Lord Hollick amongst its Directors until 
2002.47 
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff until March 2002, Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy 
Blackham, took up a position as Senior Advisor in March 2003 and 
subsequently Country President %Mth EADS in October 2003, subject to 
restrictions placed on him by the Business Appointments Commiftee. 48 
0 Air Marshall Sir Christopher Coville took up an appointment as a Non- 
Executive Director of AgustaWestland in October 2003 after having left a post 
as Commander-in Chief, Personnel and Training Command in April 2003. At 
AgustaWestland, Coville was advising a team which was engaged on a major 
42 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fifth Report 2001- 
2002, p 29. 
43 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fourth Report 2000- 
2001, p 2& 
44 House of Commons, Hansard, I O'h July 2000, Written Answers, column 375; The Cabinet Office, 
The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998-1999, p 27. 45 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Third Report 1999- 
2000, pp. 14,34. 
46 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Fourth Report 2000- 
2001, p 28. 
47 DoD, House of Lords - Lord Hollick. 48 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 33. 
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MoD project to achieve savings in the Defence Logistics Organisation. Coville 
assured the Committee before taking up the position that he would not be 
lobbying the MoD on behalf of the company and as such, the Committee 
recommended the appointment should be taken up providing he did not begin 
work before the end of July 2003.49 Coville also accepted the position of 
Military Advisor to Defence Strategy and Solutions to begin in July 2003, and 
as Defence Advisor to British Telecommunications Defence, also in July 
2003.50 
0 Admiral Sir Nigel Essenhigh, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff until 
September 2002, became Non-Executive Chair of Defence Strategy and 
Solubons in March 2003, Non-Executive Director of Babcock International 
Group pic in March 2003 and Military Advisor to Northrop Grumman 
International Inc. in November 2003.51 
9 Admiral Sir James Perowne, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
(NATO) until January 2002, became an Advisor to Thales Underwater 
52 Systems in July 2003 
. 
0 General Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) 
until September 2001 became Military Advisor to Airborne Systems in 
September 2002 and Military Advisor to Defence Strategy and Solutions in 
June 2003.53 
These are just some examples of the revolving door in action under the New 
Labour Government. The cases listed above, and others, have met with little 
criticism from the Conservative opposition. One reason may be that these are 
examples of a phenomenon that has been typical of the relationship between the 
MoD and private arms companies for at least the last two decades. As an 
example, between 1984 and 1994,2,002 individuals of officer rank in the armed 
4'9 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, pp 12-13. 
50 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 34. 
51 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, pp. 34-35. 
52 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 37. 
53 The Cabinet Office, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Sixth Report 2002- 
2004, p 38. 
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forces took up employment with companies in military industry. 54 The details of 
some of these individuals, and others that moved into the private sector from the 
MoD during the 1980s about which there is publicly available information, are 
shown below. 
0 Permanent MoD Under Secretary (1976-1982) Frank Cooper immediately 
became Director of Westland, Babcock International and armoured vehicle 
manufacturers United Scientific Holdings after retirement from Whitehall. 55 
e Coopers' predecessor at United was Sir Peter Levene who left to become 
Chief MoD Procurement Officer. 
Just as Cooper left United, in 1989, Sir Colin Fielding joined the board. 
Fielding was MoD controller of research and development establishments. 56 
e Peter McLoughlin, First Secretary for Aviation and Defence in the Paris 
Embassy (1975 - 1979), who remained in the civil service until 1987, became 
the Managing Director of BAE Systems' UK/customer/govemment relations 
department until the winter of 2002. McLoughlin, who received an OBE from 
Blair in the 2002 New Years Honors list, has been described by former MoD 
Minister John Spellar as "one of the most effective operators in Whitehall". 57 
0 MoD information officer (1975-1981), Hugh Colver, become Press Officer at 
number 10 before returning to the MoD as Deputy Chief of Public Relations in 
1985 and then Chief Information Officer in 1992. Colver is now Head of 
Group Communications at BAE Systems. 58 He admitted to Journalists in 
1995 that the two Royal Ordnance employees at BAE Systems who offered 
undercover Channel Four Dispatches investigators 5,000 electric batons and 
10,000 electric shields in breach of the 1968 Firearms Act were still employed 
by the company. 59 
-54 House of Commons, Hansard, 8h December 1994, Written Answers, column 308. 
55 David Fairhall, 'Sir Frank Cooper', The Guardian, 31st January 2002. 
56 David Pallister, 'Arms and the man in the revolving door, The Guardian, 27"' September 1989. 
57 SBAC, 'Aerospace in Parliament', Winter 2001; Unnamed, Socialist Worker, 'Blessed are the 
bomb makers', 19'h January 2002 <hftp-: //www. socialistworker. co. uk/1783/swl7831 I. htm> Last 
accessed 5th January 2004. 
58 House of Commons, Hansard, 24th January 1995, Written Answers, column 117. 5' Unnamed, 'Rogue Traders Reinstated', Private Eye, March 1995, 
<http: //users. cliq. com/-bayvulture/yarbles/tt. htmi> Last accessed 5'ý'January 2004. 
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0 Nicholas Prest worked for the MoD's Export Services Organisation until 1982. 
He left to become Head of Export Marketing at Alvis from 1983, Marketing 
Director from 1985, Chief Executive in 1989 and finally Chair in 1996. r'O 
Sir Michael Beethan, former Chief of the Air Staff, the professional head of 
the Royal Air Force (1977-1982) became Chair of GEC Avionics Ltd. (1986- 
1990) and Director (1984-1991). 61 
9 Sir Brian Tovey, the former head of Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ), was appointed consultant to Plessy, the company 
that supplied GCHQ with electronic equipment. 
0 Former Deputy Commander of NATO General Sir Henry Tuzo, was appointed 
Chair of Marconi Space and Defence systems 
62 " Cabinet Minister Lord Prior becoming Chair of GEC (1984-1998). 
" Former Chief of Naval Staff Sir Edward Ashmore became Director of Racal 
* Former Controller of the Navy, Sir Lindsay Bryson, became Deputy Chair of 
GEC-Marconi. '3 
The movement of staff ex-MoD and Services staff to private industry now seen 
under New Labour is not a recent phenomenon, but typical of the last two 
decades. 
Secondments between military industry and the MoD 
It is less clear whether the provision of arms company staff to the MoD is a 
recent phenomenon or standard practice. In June 2002 it was revealed that BAE 
Systems had eight staff working on secondment at the MoD. Standard 
government practice is for the receiving organisation to reimburse the employer 
up to the level at which a Civil Servant would be paid. 64 These eight were 
probably part of the MoD run Interchange Programme through which the 
department encourages reciprocal secondment and job swaps between the MoD 
60 Alvis, Annual Report 2001, p. 3. 
61 Who's Who 2003, p. 149 
62 House of Commons, Hansard, 9t" March 1989, column 1067, Marconi, 'GEC Announced New 
Chairman', Press Statement, 27th January 1998 
th <httpý//Www. marconi. com/htmi/news/gecannouncesnewchairman htm> Last accessed 5 January 
2004. 
M David Pallister, 'Arms and the man in the revolving door', The Guardian, 27 th September 1989. 64 House of Commons, Hansard, 25"' June 2002, column 232. 
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65 
and industry. In response to a Parliamentary Question in November 2002 Dr 
Moonie, Minister of State for Defence, offered a complete list of all the staff 
seconded to the MoD from the private sector since April 2000. From the 29 staff 
listed, 13 were seconded from BAE Systems (for pehods between six and 36 
months) and two were seconded from Rolls Royce (for 24 and 36 months). A full 
list is given in appendix twenty four. More recently, in May 2003, the government 
disclosed that at least 38 from of a total of 79 individuals seconded to the 
department between April 1997 and January 2003 came from arms-producing 
companies. From these, 22 were seconded from BAE Systems for periods of 
between six and 37 months. 66 The government has also published the numbers 
of those employed by the MoD who have been seconded to industry. Appendix 
twenty five shows how between April 2000 and November 2002, two MoD 
employees went to work at BAE Systems, one for 6 and one for 24 months, one 
went to Rolls Royce for 24 months and two went to Thales for 24 months, 67 One 
of those who was seconded to Thales shown in the table probably refers to John 
Howe, former Deputy Chief of Defence Procurement. Howe was seconded to 
Thales where he became Senior Defence Advisor. He later retired from the civil 
service altogether to become Vice Chair of Thales UK, where, according to 
Thales UK Chief Executive, they will be able to use Howe's "intricate 
understanding of the UWs MoD Procurement policy". 68 It is difficult to see how 
Thales and the other arms companies involved will gain no advantage from 
activities that blur the institutional boundaries between each body. 
But the traditional revolving door between the Ministry and industry is not now the 
only way in which industry representatives work alongside the state. The 
provision of top-level industry figures to head new offices and to sit on a variety 
of new groups established to contribute towards government policy is a new 
feature of industry-government relations to which this report will now turn. 
65 MoD Interchange website at <hftp: /twww. mod. uk/businessfinterchange/> Last accessed 26 th 
June 2004. 
68 House of Commons, Hansard, 7th May 2003, Written Answers, column 722. 
87 House of Commons. Hansard, 25th November 2002, Written Answers, columns 10-12, ' Unnamed, 'John Howe on UK team', Thales Roundup, September 2002. 
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THE OVERREPRESENTATION OF ARMS COMPANY INTERESTS IN BLAIR'S TASK 
FORCE PROLIFERATION 
One of the more distinctive features of the New Labour government has been its 
passion for the establishment of task forces, policy review and advisory groups. 
This passion has led to the establishment of numerous bodies, a phenomenon 
that raises at least three major points of concern. First, since the existence of 
these groups has not been property catalogued, their operation seemingly 
uncoordinated or largely secret and membership details often difficult to obtain, 
their existence raises important questions on accountability and transparency. 
Second, from those membership details that are available, business interests 
appear to be disproportionately represented at the expense of the non-corporate 
community. Third, evidence suggests that there is a quantitative difference 
between bodies advising on military policy as compared to those advising on 
other areas of policy like construction and biotechnology indicating that those 
from military industry enjoy more access to policy-makers than those from other 
sectors. This section begins by addressing the first of these concerns. 
First, a huge number of new groups have been established since Labour came to 
power but there has not been an equally huge effort to keep track of them even 
in the Departments to which they are affiliated, or to make details of their 
existence and operations publicly accessible. Between May 1997 and December 
1998 at least 295 new task forces were created drawing in some 2,500 Whitehall 
appointed members who were neither officials nor ministers. 69 These figures are 
even more notable since they exclude any internal policy reviews and the 834 
non-departmental public bodies, often called quangos, listed in the Cabinet 
Office's annual Public Bodies Directory. Quangos, or Quasi-Autonomous Non- 
Governmental Organisations) which include the BBC, the Research Councils, 
The Teacher Training Agency and employment tribunals are all permanent 
69 Tony Barker vvith lain Byrne and Anjuli Veal), Ruling by Task Force. Politico's Gulde to Labour's 
New B#e (London: Politico's Publishing, 1999) p 12 
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70 bodies. In contrast, task forces, policy reviews and advisory groups are a new 
breed invented by the Blair government which are defined as groups of people 
drawn from the private and public sectors with a lifetime of less than two years 
which focus on a single issue. These largely publicly unaccountable bodies have 
been created to provide a forum in which non-governmental actors can advise on 
the formation or implementation of potential New Labour policies as part of a 
more "inclusive" style of goveming. Although they allow the government to claim 
that it consults widely during the policy-making and policy-implementation 
process, their existence has not been comprehensively catalogued, their 
deliberations are largely secret and membership information is difficult to obtain. 
These and other problems associated with researching such groups have been 
outlined by one of the very few researchers to look at this phenomenon, Tony 
Barker, who explains 
Central government has no across-the-board rules for 
establishing such bodies or co-ordinating their existence. 
Departments create and log them in often informal fashion and by 
varying practices. The definitions of such bodies are unformed, 
their titles vary considerably, official practices on consulting 
outsiders differ, and minor sub-groups proliferate but may meet 
only once or not at all ... 
Departments sometimes fail to issue 
press releases, or to post details on their websites, and may even 
have no record of their existence. " 
Since this was written in 1999, a list of live task forces established from May 
1997 to October 2000 has been issued in response to two Parliamentary 
Questions. 72 But in the case of MoD groups, at least two are not listed which 
seemingly should be - the Defence and Aerospace Systems Panel and a 
subgroup of the Defence Task Force, the Research and Technology Task Force. 
The MoD has not been able to explain these omissions. As at 2003, neither the 
MoD not the DTI could offer a comprehensive list or any kind of organisational 
diagram of those bodies relevant to military policy. linked to it- A member of the 
70 Cabinet Office, 'Frequently Asked Questions' <http: /twww. cabinet-office. gov. uk/index. htm> 
Quango index page <hftp //www. cabinet-office. gov. uktquangorindex/qorg. htm> Last accesseý on 
20' March 2003. 
71 Barker, Byrne, Veall, Ruling by Task Force, p. 10. 
72 List of live task forces, ad hoc advisory groups and reviews established between 2 May 1997 and 
31 October 2000 <hftp: /Avww. cabinet-office. gov. uk/centrai/20OOfTaskForces. pdf> Last accessed 
5th January 2003. 
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MoD explained "unfortunately, it is not possible to provide a comprehensive list 
because this information is not held centrally. ý73 
There is one consistency, a consistency that leads to a second area of concern. 
Publicly available information suggests that military industry and its trade 
associations enjoy a disproportional advantage in securing membership of 
affiliated bodies. Amongst the 301 places on MoD and DTI task forces 
established between May 1997 and December 1998 for those outside central 
government, private business interests and their trade associations occupied 
68% of places. Trade Unions made up less than 5% of membership while 
voluntary/charity bodies made up 1%. 74 In 1998, an undercover journalist 
reported that two former Blair advisors, now lobbyists, had described how it was 
no problem securing advisory body places for their corporate clients. The 
problem was supplying enough to satisfy Labour's appetite. 75 These new breed 
of groups sit alongside a number already in existence advising government, 
some initiated by industry, some by government and some European based, but 
all of which include representation from both circles. However valuable the input, 
membership composition of both new advisory bodies and existing groups 
alongside the continuing expansion of the advisory structure raises important 
concerns about favourable access to ministers at the expense of the non- 
corporate constituency. 
These are real concerns in the case of the MoD and the DTI where a whole 
series of bodies include the directors and staff of arms-producing companies. 
Appendix twenty six shows how there have been at least five groups and 17 
subgroups relevant to military policy based in the UK that have, to date, played a 
part in advising government on various aspects of military policy. All but one 
national advisory body and one working group operate with at least one member 
from BAE Systems and almost all include a representative from Rolls Royce and 
73 
74 
Letter, Directorate of Policy Planning, MoD, to the aLAOor, 14"' February 2003. 
Barker, Byrne and Veall, Ruling by Task Force, p 27. the overall composition of membership 
across the MoD and DTI found by Barker is as followsý National public body-2.7%, Judiciary-0.3%, 
Health-0.3%, Local government-2.7%, Local public body-0.7%, Education-0.7%, Private buiness- 
56.5%, Trade associabons-12%, Professional associations-2%, Voluntary/charity bodies-I%, Trade 
unions-4.7%, Acadernics-13.6%, Independents-3%.. 
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SBAC. The diagram is in no way comprehensive because, as noted above, 
neither department could offer any kind of organisational diagram showing wbich 
bodies are affiliated to them. Amongst the 298 known places on MoD and DTI 
bodies, 48% were occupied by individuals from arms-producing companies and 
their trade associations, the remainder of places largely taken by government 
representatives. The membership composition may be understandable for some 
advisory groups like the Smart Procurement Partnership Group whose remit it is 
to look at how the procurement process can be improved. This group was made 
up of one government representative and four military industry trade association 
representatives while at least four staff from military industry or those supplying 
military industry have been seconded to the MoUs Procurement Executive to 
advise on Procurement work. 76 Only industry has the technical and commercial 
information required, a case where the collaborative approach appears justified. 
But from the following list of other groups, it is not only unclear why so many 
groups exist with what appears to be the same purpose but also how alternative 
views other than those put forward by military industry are heard by senior 
ministers and officials. 
The National Defence Industries Council 
At the MoD, the National Defence Industries Council has been singled out by the 
department as the most important forum for coordinated planning on military 
industrial poliey. 77 As at January 2003, this industry/government body, which 
identifies and funds work of importance to military industry, was led by the Chair 
of BAE Systems until July 2004, Dick Evans. Evans was joined by eight other 
arms company or arms industry trade association and lobbying representatives 
who have privileged access to the high ranking departmental representatives 
who make up the remaining ten spaces. These representatives include the 
Defence Secretary, the Minister for Defence Procurement and the Chief 
Executive of the Defence Procurement Agency as shown in appendix twenty 
75 Gregory Palast, 'Lobbygate: "There are 17 people that count. To say that I am intimate with every 
one of them is the understatement of the century' ', 777e Observer, 5th July 1998. 
76 Barker, Byrne and Veall, Ruling by Task Force, p. 66. 
77 MoD, Defence Industrial Policy, Paper number 5, October 2002, paragraph 57. 
<hftp: //www, dti. gov. uk/pdfs/dip. pdf> Last accessed 26"' June 2004. 
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seven. 78 One sub-group of the Council is the National Defence Industries Council 
Research and Technology Group- 14 representatives of arms-producing 
companies, their trade associations and lobby groups sit with nine government, 
mainly MoD representatives as shown in appendix twenty eight. 79Helping to 
prepare a coordinated view from industry in preparation for dialogue with 
government at the National Defence Industries Council meetings is the Defence 
Industries Council. Also Chaired by Dick Evans, until Autumn 2004, the Council 
is comprised solely of military company executives and trade association 
representatives. 80 
The Defence Export and Market Access Forum 
Elsewhere within the MoD a new Export and Market Access forum has been 
established to improve UK-based industry access to foreign markets. In recent 
meetings, the forum has discussed export control legislation and the contribution 
of military exports to the UK economy. 81 It is chaired by Alan Garwood, head of 
82 
DESO and former Deputy Chief Executive of Matra BAE Dynamics. The names 
of other individual members are not available. It is known that the forum includes 
senior representatives of the MoD, FCO, DTI, the Cabinet Office, the Treasury, 
BAe Systems, Rolls Royce and Smiths and SBAC, "3 all appointed in consultation 
between government and industry. 
The Aerospace Committee 
At the DTI, the Aerospace Committee advises the government on future industry 
direction durling quarterly meetings with DTI officials, and whenever possible, 
with ministers since it was established in 1999.84 The Committee is Chaired by 
Colin Green, President of Defence and Aerospace at Rolls Royce and President 
78 House of Commons, Hansard 23" January 2003, Written Answers, Column 446. 
79 House of Commons, Hansard: 23"j January 2003, Written Answers, Column 447. 
80 SBAC, The Defence industries Council <http: //www. sbac. co. uk/Defence. htm> Last accessed 26ýh 
June 2004. 
8' House of Commons, Hansard, 8"' June 2004, Written Answers, Column 825. 
82 House of Commons, Hansard, 10th June 2004, Written Answers, Column 598-599, House of 
Commons, Hansard, 30th June 2004, Written Answers, Column 350. 
83 House of Commons, Hansard, 8h June 2004, Written Answers, Column 825. 
'34 Telephone conversation, DTI, 3rd February 2003. 
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of SBAC. 85 In 1999 at least 12 members out of a total of 19 worked for arms- 
producing corporations or their trade representatives. By 2003 this had increased 
to 14, as shown in appendix twenty nine, and four others have links to the 
industry - Spectrum Capital acts as a financial advisor to aviation and shipping 
companies. QinetiQ used to be the government's own defence research 
establishment It still works closely with UK military contractors. Professor Bill 
Dawes works in an engineering department with extensive links to Rolls-Royce. 
Professor Ian Poll has been involved in collaborative research with BAE 
Systems, Rolls-Royce and the MoD and now heads the College of Aeronautics at 
Cranfield, a Department which runs a number of BAE Systems staff only MSc 
courses in a university which is a "strategic partner"of BAE Systems. ' The 
Committee is Chaired by Colin Green, President-Defence Aerospace at Rolls 
Royce and Vice President of SBAC. 87 
The National Defence and Aerospace Systems Panel 
The Aerospace Committee provides the medium through which the National 
Defence and Aerospace Systems Panel reports to the DTI. Established in 2002, 
the panel's remit is to make sure that UK-based military industry is prepared for 
the challenges of the future and as such, the panel will, according to a 
government website "continue to have the ear of Government decision makers at 
the highest levels. ""8 It is composed of nine representatives of arms-producing 
companies and their trade associations, four government representatives and 
five involved in research or academia. Membership information for one of the 
panel's own task forces - the Research and Technology Task Force - shows that 
it includes five representatives from arms companies from a total of 13 members 
85 Rolls Royce, Biographies <hftp: //www. rolls-royce. conVabouUbiographies/green c. jsp> Last 
accessed I 5'July 2004; House of Commons Library, Aerospace Committee Memb-ers and their 
Employers, entered 23 d January 2003 ref Dep 03/289 following Parliamentary Question 91919 
Cohen/Johnson, column 500. 
86 House of Commons Library, 'Aerospace Committee Members and their Employers', entered 23d 
January 2003 ref. Dep 03/289 following Parliamentary Question 91919 Cohen/Johnson, column 
500. 
87 Rolls Royce, 'Biographies' <hftp: //www. rolls-royce. com/media/biogsigreen. htm> Last accessed 
5"' January 2004. 
8'3 Peter Holtby, 'New Foresight Panel Picks up the Challenge', Vlsion: The newsletter of the 
Foresight and Link initiatives, Issue 3, Summer 2002 
<hftp1/www-ost. gov. ukAink/news/issue03/storyO6/index. htm> 
Last accessed 26"n June 2004. 
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as shown in appendix thirty. 89 The National Defence and Aerospace Panel is also 
responsible for a series of National Advisory Committees which advise the 
government on the direction of new research funding. They aim to promote 
collaborafion between major "stakeholders" - Government, industry and 
academia. Where their membership is known, about one third Qf places are taken 
by representatives of arms-producing companies and their trade associations, 
the reminder being taken largely by government and academia. 'O This is shown 
in appendix thirty one. 
The Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team 
The most recent creation at the DTI has been the 2002 Aerospace Innovation 
and Growth Team. The Team, along with its working groups, was established 
followed intensive lobbying by SBAC and others from the aerospace industry-o' It 
is designed to foster agreement between the aerospace industry and government 
on the future of the industry. The team is Chaired by Dick Evans, Chair of BAE 
Systems until July 2004. Evans is joined by nine colleagues from arms-producing 
companies and their trade associations, six from government and five others 
from academia, private companies, unions and development agencies, all 
92 
chosen by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The team's webpages 
are hosted by military trade association SBAC and its secretariat is made up of 
those seconded to the DTI from arms-producing companies or their trade 
associations. In 2002, at least 48% of the places on its five working groups were 
taken by representatives of the military sector. 93 By 2004, the proportion had 
risen to 54% as shown in appendix thirty two. 94 
89 House of Commons, Hansard, 23"' January 2003, Wntten Answers, columns 447- 448. 90 NDASP, NACs <hftp: //62.173.95.10/> Last accessed 111ý' July 2004 91 SBAC, Aerospace in Parliament Farnborough Special Issue, July 2002 
<http: /twww. sbac. co, uk/files/newsdocs/221/Aerospaceý/ý20iný/ý2OPartiamentO/o20-ý/ý20FI2002. pdf> 
Last accessed 5h January 2004. 
92 Department of Trade and Industry, Aerospace Innovation and growth Team 
<hftp: /twww. dti. gov. uk/aeros ace/aigt. htm> Last accessed 26 tý June 2004. 93 
P 
E-mail, DTI, to author, 31' October 2002, House of Commons Library, Aerospace Innovation and 
Growth Team Working Groups, Members and their Employers', entered 23rd January 2003 ref. 
Dep. 03/289 following Parliamentary Question 91919 CohenlJohnson, column 500. 94 Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team, VVorking Groups' 
<hftp: //www. aeigt. co. uk/workinggroup5. shtml> Last accessed 16t" June 2004, 
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European Advisory Groups 
The profile gained by arms-producing companies from their involvement with 
domestic advisory groups is complemented by that gained from their involvement 
with new European advisory bodies. The Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21" 
Century (STAR 21), a European advisory group established in 2001 after intense 
lobbying from aerospace industry, has advised EU member state governments 
on the future of the industry in Europe. It was comprised of seven &airs of 
aerospace companies, including BAE Systems' Dick Evans, five European 
Commissioners, a European Union High Representative and two Members of 
European Parliament. 95 The European Advisory Group on Shipbuilding was 
established in 2003 designed to address issues relevant to the future of 
shipbuilding in Europe. It is comprised of seven European Commissioners, two 
members of the European Parliament, reportedly ten industry directors and chief 
executive officers, and one trade union representative. 96 The Group of 
Personalities, an advisory body established in 2003 to discuss security 
ýsearch 
strategy, is comprised of two European Commissioners, four members of the 
European Parliament and reportedly, a series of both European think tanks 
representatives and industry representativeS. 97 This new momentum signifies a 
shift to the institutionalisation of links between industry and the European political 
field. 
Both domestic and European groups typically leave no space for input from 
opposing positions. As far as is known there has never been any representation 
in any of these kind of groups from organisations like CAAT or the UK Working 
Group on Arms representing Amnesty, BASIC, Saferworld, Christian Aid, 
g5 European Commission, STAR 21. - Creating a coherent market and policy framework for a vital 
European industty<http: //europa. eu. int/comrTVenterpdse/aerospace/report star2l screen. pdf> 
Last accessed 1 O'h August 2004. 
96 European Commission Press Release, 28h October 2003 
<hftp: //europa-eu. int/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do? reference=SPEECH/03/496&format=HTML&ag 
ed=o&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> Last accessed I 1'h August 2004, - Isabelle Emcke, 
European Union and defence industries to establish closer relationships, CAAT internal report, 
2004. 
07 European Union Business, Group of Personalities discusses a security research strategy for 
Europe, 7h October 2003 <hftp: //www. eubusiness. com/eunews/EUNews. 2003-10-07.3949> Last 
accessed 1 I'h August 2004; Emcke, European Union and defence industries to establish closer 
relationships. 
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Intemational Alert and Oxfam. 98 These groups tend to rely on less formal access 
with less influential departments in arms issues like the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Department for Intemational Development, " 
access which is in itself constrained by a lack of resources, This, together Wth 
Lord Smith of Clifton's waming that these groups tend "to de-politicise many 
issues and problems which propedy lie within the political sphere"100 heighten 
concems about unequal access to govemment within the two departments. 
Concern over what appears to be unequal access has led one report to 
undertake a comparative study between groups advising on military policy 
affiliated to the MoD and DTI with groups advising on policy in other 
departments. Its findings raise a third major concern with Blair's task force 
phenomenon. The report compared groups advising on military policy affiliated to 
the MoD and DTI with groups advising on policy in other departments. A 
comparison between the DTI's use of advisory groups in the military and 
information and communications technology field suggests that the DTI has 
fostered similarly close relabons with both industries and that the seniority of 
ministers attending groups affiliated to both industries are comparable. Although 
the network of bodies linking the DTI to both industries operate under 
qualitatively similar principles, they are not quantitatively similar. Advisory groups 
operating in the military field are more extensive. Evidence suggests that similar 
conclusions can be drawn from a comparison between these advisory bodies 
and those working in the automotive, biotechnology and construction fields. 'O' 
These quantitative differences suggest that military industry has more access to 
the MOD and to the DTI than other industrial sectors have with government 
departments. 
In sum, the establishment of an extensive network of new groups advising on 
military policy under New Labour raise important concerns about under- 
representation from the non-corporate constituency, privileged access to senior 
98 E-mail, Ian Prichard, CAAT, to author, 27"' March 2003. 
99 Anna Stavdanakis, (Big) Business as Usual. Sustainable Development, NGOs and UK Arms 
Export Policy, unpublished paper, 2004. 
100 Trevor Smith, 'preface', Barker, Byrne and Veall, Ruling by Task Force, p 7. 
'01 Dan Lewer, UK Advisory Bodies and Milftary Industry Campaign Against Arms Trade internal 
report, June 2004. 
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policy-makers and disproportionate influence compared to other industrial 
sectors. The establishment in the last two years of the Aerospace Innovation and 
Growth Team as well as the Defence Export and Market Access Forum suggests 
that the growth of advisory bodies will continue without these concerns being 
addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to look at the activities of the arms export lobby 
within government departments, principally within the MoD and the DTI with a 
view to adding to an understanding of why arms export support continues. It has 
focused on the links between arms-producing companies on the one hand and 
the DTI and MoD on the other both in terms of the traditional revolving door 
phenomenon and on the impact of a new round of advisory groups. It has 
argued that given the number and position of former MoD Secretaries of State, 
Ministers of State and senior civil servants who have been through the MoD- 
arms company revolving door, sometimes twice; given the figures consistently 
appointed head of DESO; given the wider employee interchange programme, it is 
impossible to see how arms-producing companies are not gaining considerable 
influence in government. In some cases, principally with DESO, it is difficult to tell 
where government ends and military industry begins. This is a central concern of 
the second half of the chapter which outlined how the same arms-company 
executives and anonymous personnel appear repeatedly in the proliferation of 
groups advising on military policy affiliated to the MoD and the DTL Industrial 
figures, especially military figures, appear to have more access to policy-makers 
via advisory groups than the non-corporate constituency. The danger is that 
military industry does not have to rely on exerting its political influence from the 
outside because it is able to progressively integrate itself with those on the inside 
to the benefit of those looking to maintain arms export subsidies. 
The explosion of advisory groups is not the only recent phenomenon to have had 
an impact on govemment policy-making. Of particular interest is growth of the 
political lobbying industry, the development of Labour linked think tanks and one 
of the most defining features of policy-making in the UK to date, the transfer of 
185 
services from the public to the private sector. All are relatively new features of the 
UK political landscape, with potential relevance to military policy, to which this 
thesis will now turn. 
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CHAPTER SIX: NEW ELEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT- 
INDUSTRY RELATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter four considered the relationship between arms-producing companies 
and the Labour party. Chapter five considered the relationship between arms- 
producing companies and government departments. The purpose of this final 
chapter is to consider the impact of a number of new phenomena on industry- 
government relations. The chapter looks first at the possibility that Labour linked 
think tanks have been a way of reaffirming access for those linked to arms- 
producing companies. The chapter then looks at UK-based political 
consultancies listing arms-producing companies as their clients, at their links with 
the party, at the role that arms company executives play within international 
lobbying groups and at the level of influence that such groups enjoy. The chapter 
concludes by outlining the role that arms-producing companies are playing in the 
transfer of services from the public to the private sector and the implications of 
this development on industry-government relations. Primarily the chapter is 
considering whether these new elements continue to raise concerns that that 
industry enjoys disproportionate influence over government and that there exists 
a mutually beneficial industry-government relationship both of which feed into the 
political power of the industry to maintain arms export support. 
INDUSTRY LINKED THINK TANKS AND CORPORATE ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 
In June 2002, Anthony Barnett of the Observer ran a story claiming that 
corporations were gaining access to influential policy-makers via sponsorship of 
think tanks close to the Labour Party. ' The allegations were rejected by all the 
think tanks involved and from information in the public domain, it is unclear 
whether, even if true, think tanks are relevant to an understanding of the 
relationship between arms-producing companies and government. No mention 
' Anthony Barnett, 'Labour face 'cash for access'claims over think-tanks', The Observer, 30'h June 
2002. 
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was made of such companies in the story and it appears that only the Foreign 
Policy Centre has received sponsorship from any company involved in the 
military sector. The Centre, whose patron is Tony Blair, has received sponsorship 
from Control Risks Group and Armor group which some reports have claimed are 
suppliers of mercenary forces. 2 Control Risks Group sponsored a 26 th November 
2002 launch event called "The Unlikely Counter-Terrorists", an event also 
sponsored by BAE Systems. The Centre insists that money is accepted with "no 
strings attached". ' 
Elsewhere, two think tanks reported to be close to Labour do have links with 
some of the more important figures in military industry yet both have reportedly 
also made a conscious effort to employ those with alternative views who have 
been critical of the government's record on arms export support. ' 
Reportedly Blair's favourite think tank, The Institute for Public Policy Research 
includes amongst its trustees former BAE Systems Director and Labour Peer 
Lord Hollick, regular Labour donor Warwick Manufacturing group's Professor 
Bhattacharyya as well as Chris Powell, advisor to BAE Systems Chair until July 
2004, Dick Evans and advisor to the Chair of Thales. 5 Chris Powell used to head 
Labour's old advertising company' and his brother is Blair's Chief of Staff 
Jonathan Powel 1.7 These figures, who are all linked in some way to arms- 
producing companies are working in a organisation which has also attracted 
individuals linked to New Labour. The Secretary at the Institute is Gail Rebuck, 
wife of Philip Gould, one of Blair's most influential advisors on public opinion. She 
is widely reported to be the most influential woman in UK publishing as Chair and 
Chief Executive of the Random House Group, the UK's biggest trade publishing 
company. Rebuck is also widely reportedly to be close to Blair. Other trustees 
' Osler, Labour Party p1c, p 108. 3 Solomon Hughes, 'Business agenda', Red Pepper, April 2002 <http: //www. redpepper. org. uk> 
Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 4 Interview, Ann Feltham, Campaign Against the Arms Trade, with author, July 2004. 5 Institute for Public Policy Research, About IPPR 
<http: //www. ippr. org. uk/about/index. php? current=trustees> Last accessed 27 th June 2004; Anthony 
Barnett, 'Labour face 'cash for access' claims over think tanks', The Observer, 3 oth June 2002; 
House of Lords, The Register of Lords'Interests as at 22"' June 2004; Labour Party, Annual 
Report 1999, Annual Report 2000 and Annual Report 200 1. 6 0sler, Labour Party p1c, p. 211. 7 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p 211. 
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include Labour Peer Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe and former economic advisor to 
Neil Kinnock Labour Peer Lord Eatwell. 8 Another is Lord Gavron, Chair of the 
Guardian Media Group 1997-2000.9 He donated f-500,000 to the Labour Party in 
1996 and F-500,000 on 25 th June 1999 just six days after he was made a Labour 
Peer. " Trustees also include "Third Way" guru Anthony Giddens and Labour 
Peer Lord Putnam. David Milliband, former Research Fellow at the IPPR (1989- 
1994) went on to head Blair's Policy Unit until 2001 and eventually became 
Minister of State for Education and Skills. " Milliband was not alone in moving 
from the Institute to the party. The Observer reports that when Labour came to 
power in 1997,15 staff members left to take up policy and special advisor roles 
adding to the reputation of the Institute as a "civil service in waiting". 12 Yet the 
Institute has also employed David Mepham as Associate Director, Head of 
international Programme, co-author of the Saferworld and IPPR report "The 
missing link in Labour's foreign policy". This 2002 report challenges the idea that 
arms exports are vital to the UK economy, finds Labour's overall record on arms 
policy a disappointment and points to "an unwillingness or inability" to control 
arms exports effectively. 13 In a Guardian article the same year Mepham went on 
to blame the government's "poor" record on arms exports on an "outdated 
Atlanticism and the power of the defence industry lobby within Whitehal 1.04 
Mepham went on to co-author a 2004 report, "Promoting Effective States", which 
calls for tights arms export controls, an updated EU Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports and agreement on an International Arms Trade Treaty. 15 In 2004, the 
Institute criticised the government's announcement that India was to buy 66 
16 Hawk jets as "a source of serious concern not celebration". Despite its links to 
high profile figures in the industry, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
Institute has refrained from criticising the government on its arms export record. 
8 DoD, 'Biographies - Lord Eatwell' <http: i/www. politicallinks. co. uk> Last accessed 91h October 
2003. 
9 DoD, 'Biographies - Lord Gavron'. '0 Red Star Research, 'Lord Robert Gavron'; David Cracknell, 'Revealed: Labour's Paymasters', 
Sunday Telegraph, 5 th September 1999. 
" DoD, 'Biographies - David Milliband'. 12 Unnamed, 'Path to Influence? The think-tanks', The Observer, 30th June 2002. 
13 David Mepham and Paul Eavis, The Missing Link in Labour's Foreign Policy: The Case for 
Tighter Controls over UKArms Exports (London: IPPR and Saferworld, 2002). 
14 David Mepham, 'We've Given in to the Arms Lobby', The Guardian, 24 th July 2002 
'5 David Mepham and Gero Maass, Promoting Effective States: A Progressive Policy Response to 
failed and Failing States, (London: I PPR and FES, January 2004) 
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Military and security think tank The Royal United Services Institute claims 
"unrivalled access to senior figures in the MoD and other Government 
Departments" and has been described by Tony Blair as "second to none. 07 One 
of two institutes hosting a speech by Bush during his November 2003 visit, the 
institute can also boast connections with a number of high profile UK figures. Its 
Corporate Advisory Council, a group which advises on developing "mutually 
advantageous" relationship between the institute and corporations, is Chaired by 
Stephen Henwood, BAE Systems Group Managing Director Programmes. 18 Five 
out of seven current vice-presidents of the institute's Council have worked for 
arms-producing companies or their trade associations. " Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy 
Blackham is a Senior Military Advisor to EADS. '0 He spent 41 years in the Navy 
rising to Vice Admiral and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Equipment Capability). 
He has been described as very successful at "exploiting excellent relationships 
with senior political, official and industrial figures" .21 Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick 
Hine was a military advisor to British Aerospace until he retired in 1999,22 Lord 
23 Levene was Chair of the DMA (1984 - 1985), personal advisor to the Defence 
Secretary (1984) and to the President of the Board of Trade (1992-1995). Levene 
was Chief of Defence Procurement (1985-199 1), advisor to John Major (199 - 
1995). Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald became a Director of BAE SEMA 
(1993-2001) and Chair (1999-2001) after 46 years in the Navy. 24 John Weston is 
25 a former Chief Executive of BAE Systems (1998-2002). Yet the Royal United 
16 Institute for Public Policy Research, Press Release, 3 Id September 2003 
<http: //www. ippr. org. uk/press/index. php? release=249> Last accessed 1" August 2004. 17 Royal United Services Institute, Introduction <http: //www. rusi. org/about. html> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
18 Royal United Services Institute, Corporate Advisory Group <http: //www. rusi. org/about-cag. html> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
'9 Royal United Services Institute, RUSI Council <http: //www. rusi. org/about-council. hlml> Last 
accessed 271ý June 2004. 
20 SBAC, 'SBAC News', 2 61h April 2003 <http: //www. sbac. co. uk/newsview. asp? n=176> Last 
accessed 8 1h December 2003. 
21 Atmaana, ýPeople'<http: //www. atmaana. com/almaana/people. php? showpage=sjb> Last 
accessed Ih January 2003. 
22 Air University, 'Patrick Hine' <http: //www. au. at. mil/au/goe/eaglebios/99bios/hine99. htm> Last 
accessed 8 th December 2003. 
23 DoD, 'Biographies - Lord Levene'. 24 
h 
European Atlantic Group, 'Julian Oswald' <http: //www. eag. org. uk/CVOswald. htm> Last accessed 
8' December 2003. 
25 BAE Systems, 'BAE Systems Organisation and Structure' 
h <http: //www. BAEsystems. com/newsroom/2002/J*an/l 70102news 1. htm> Last accessed 8t 
December 2003. 
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Services Institute also employs Dan Plesch as a Senior Research Fellow. Plesch 
has accused Blair of allowing gunrunners "to act with impunity" in a 2002 
Guardian article 26 In 2003 he concluded in another Guardian article that 
New Labour has, in fact, been working to make the world 
worse. Tony Blair personally intervened to weaken 
legislation to stop British companies selling arms to what 
he and President Bush call the world's worst leaders ... Those who talk of Britain doing good in the world should 
explain why the government has still failed to implement 
effective arms export controls promised in opposition. 27 
Despite its Chair and the composition of its Council, Dan Plesch continues to 
publicly attack the government on its arms export control record. 
Barnett may have found grounds for alleging that donations to think tanks gain 
corporations access to policy-makers but there is no evidence to suggest that 
this is the case for military industry. Elsewhere, even those think tanks whose 
council and trustees are composed of some of the most high level figures in 
military industry, have employed some of the most outspoken critics of the 
government's record on arms exports. It is difficult to see how industry- 
government relations are helped by think tanks when there is neither evidence to 
suggest that trustees/council composition equate to suppressed debate nor that 
donations equate to access. It is far easier to see how the lobbyists that arms- 
producing companies employ achieve this kind of access, an issue to which this 
chapter will now turn. 
ARMS FIRM LOBBYISTS AND CORPORATE ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT 
For between E5,000 and F-20,000 per month lobbying companies aim to present 
the interests of their clients to government and raise awareness of their client's 
interests in the media. Several studies on policy-making written in the mid 1990s 
had already identified business interests in the UK as having a position within 
26 Dan Plesch, 'Beware Peacemakers Selling Arms', The Guardian 21 " July 2002. 
2' Dan Plesch, 'A Con Trick for Western Liberals', The Guardian, 7t March 2003. 
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government unrivaled by other interest groups . 
2" The rapid expansion of the 
political consultancy sector during that decade appears to have improved this 
potential. The 1998 "lobbygate" affair exposed three lobbyists, former aides of 
Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and Peter Mandelson, distributing confidential 
government papers and offering to arrange both meetings with ministers and task 
force membership for their clients . 
29IDespite this, lobbyists do not publicly claim 
that they can gain "cash for access" and there is no evidence of clients asking or 
paying for inside information. But the very point of lobbying companies is to 
create an environment favorable to their corporate clients to the disadvantage of 
what is usually the non-corporate community. Small, under resourced 
campaigning groups simply cannot afford to pay for lobbyists. This is a 
disadvantage because if lobbying companies did not in some way benefit their 
fee paying clients the industry would collapse. In reality, the number and size of 
lobbying companies has increased dramatically over the last 15 years. The 
majority of members of the Association of Professional Political Consultants, 
which represents 80% of the industry, were established after 1990, figures which 
suggesting a thriving national industry. They are able to do this more effectively 
because a large proportion of those involved at all levels of the UK's major 
lobbying companies, including those representing UK-based arms-producing 
companies, used to work for the Labour Party. A search limited to senior staff 
whose biographies have been posted on company websites immediately reveals 
40 former Labour Party advisors or former advisors to Labour MPs now at work 
within the lobbying industry. Many are now effectively working to promote the 
profile and interests of the arms industry. 
Bell Pottinger 
Labour Party sponsor Bell Pottinger Public Affairs reportedly started work both on 
BAE Systems' corporate reputation and on attracting more R&D funding as well 
as ECGID support for its client Rolls Royce in 2003. Bell was created, in part, by 
28 Wyn Grant, Business and Politics in Britain (London: MacMillan, 1993); Neil Mitchell, The 
Conspicuous Corporation: Business, Public Policy and Representative Democracy (Michigan, 
University of Michigan Press, 1997). 
29 Gregory Palast, 'Lobbygate: "There are 17 people that count. To say that I am intimate with every 
one of them is the understatement of the century" ', The Observer, 5 th jUly 1998. 
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Thatcher campaigns manager and Labour Peer Tim Bell . 
30 Thatcher awarded 
Bell a Knighthood in her resignation speech in 1990 before Blair awarded him a 
Peerage in 1998 . 
3' The following year Bell Pottinger spent more than f-5,000 on 
"sponsorship activity and commercial marketing" with the Labour Party before 
spending another sum in excess of E5,000 on tickets or gift prizes for Labour 
32 Party dinners during 2001. One of Bell's directors is a former Special Advisor to 
then Agriculture Minister Jack Cunningham and another, Rhoda MacDonald is a 
former Special Advisor to then Secretary of State for Scotland, Helen Liddel 1.33 
Bell's Associate Director, Howard Dawber, who specialises in military and 
aerospace, is a former employee of Labour Party HQ and unsuccessful Labour 
Parliamentary candidate. 34 Until recently, another of its Associate Directors was 
Malcolm Gooderham, former Chief Press Secretary to Michael Portillo who is 
now a BAE Systems Non-Executive Director. 35 
The director of Bell's sister company, Good Relations, was David Hill. Hill 
interrupted a 26-year career in the Labour Party to join Bell in 1998, reportedly on 
a El 00,000 plus salary. 36 Hill was a former Chief of Staff to Deputy Labour leader 
Roy Hattersley, former Director of Labour Party Communications (1991-1993) 
and former Chief Labour Party Media Spokesperson (1993-1998). He ran 
Labour's media division during both the 1997 and 2001 election campaigns and 
for both the Scottish and Welsh referendum campaigns. During the 2001 election 
Hill reportedly claimed, along with other seconded lobbyists at Labour 
headquarters in Millbank, that he was taking unpaid leave. As journalists from the 
30 Giclon Freeman, 'BAE Systems hires second firm amid media onslaught', PR Week, 21s' 
February 2003; Ravi Chandiramani, 'Rolls Royce hires BPPA to step up lobbying', PP Week, loth 
October 2003; Chime Communications PLC, Biographies 
<http: //www. chime. plc. uk/who - 
we-are/biographies. html> Last accessed 26 th June 2004; Labour 
Party, Annual Report 2000 and Annual Report 2002. 
31 Chime Communications PLC, 'Biographies'. 
32 Labour Party, Annual Report 2000; Labour Party, Annual Report 2002. 
33 Bell Pottin 9 er Public Affairs, Tim Walker, Director <http: //www. bppa. co. uk/tw. html> Last 
accessed 17 June 2004; Bell Pottinger Public Affairs, Rhona MacDonald 
<http: //www. bppa. co. uk/rm. html> Last accessed 17 th June 2004. 
34 Bell Pottinger Public Affairs, Howard Dawber <http: //wwvv. bppa-co. uk/hd. html> Last accessed 
17 th June 2004; BBC News, Results and Constituencies 
<http: //news-bbc-co. uk/hi/english/static/vote200l/results-constituencies/constituencies/1 36. stm> 
Last accessed 26'h June 2004. 
35 Bell Pottinger Public Affairs, Malcolm Gooderham, Associate Director 
<http: //www. bppa-co. uk/mg. html> Last accessed 17 th September 2003. 
36 David Osler, Labour Party p1c: New Labour as a Party of Business, (Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing, 2002) p. 104. 
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Guardian pointed out though, Labour was benefiting from weeks of work which 
would normally be charged out at up to E225 per hour. " This work was later to 
benefit David Hill himself. In August 2003 the Labour Party announced that he 
would replace Alastair Campbell as Labour Communications Chief for a salary of 
at least El 00,000 p. a. His long-term partner is Hilary Coffman, a number 10 
Special Advisor/press officer. 38 Hill's deputy at Good Relations was Associate 
Director James O'Keefe. A former research assistant to David Blunkett, O'Keefe 
was temporarily seconded from Good Relations to the Labour Party to work on 
the general election campaign in 1997.39 
Neither Bell Pottinger Public Affairs employees nor employees of its parent 
company Chime Communications nor those of its sister company Good Relations 
have been found explicitly claiming that they can exploit their contacts to promote 
the interests of BAE Systems or Rolls Royce. But the groups' employees have 
been reportedly doing exactly that for other clients. In 1999, Bell Pottinger Good 
Relations, a company that counts Monsanto as one of its major clients, 
reportedly claimed that it could use the contacts made by a former employee 
Cathy McGlynn. 40 McGlynn was one of two special advisors in the Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 1997 who reportedly spent six years as an 
41 advisor to Agriculture Minister Jack Cunningham. Similar claims of gaining 
direct influence have been by a series of other lobbying companies representing 
arms companies, including GJW government relations to which this chapter will 
now turn. 
GJW Government Relations 
GKN Westland representative GJW Government Relations gave upwards of 
F-5,000 in "sponsorship of party events or activities" in 1997 and in "tickets for 
37 Hollingsworth, An infestation of lobbyists. 
38 Red Star Research, Special Advisors Downing Street 2002. 
39 Good Relations, 'James O'Keefe, Associate Director' 
<http: //www. goodrelations. co. uk/people. asp> Last accessed 6" January 2003. 40 
Antony Barnett, 'Monsanto's Lobby Firm Pays Key MPs', The Observer, 4 
th July 1999 
41 House of Commons, Hansard, 3 rd July 1997, Written Answers, column 260; Osler, Labour Party 
p1c, p. 104 
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dinners" in 1998, in 1999 and in 2000.42 It additional to the GKN contract, GJW 
claims to have worked on a "large number" of procurement bid campaign 
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strategies within Westminster and Whitehall since the early 1980s. The 
company website does not identify any employees involved in this activity but 
does refer the reader to Wilf Weeks for further information. Weeks is a partner in 
GJW who, like Bell Pottinger employees, has reportedly claimed that the firm has 
been able to directly influence key policy-makers on behalf of clients. In 1999 
Weeks was reportedly hired by Cape PIc- His job was to lobby Whitehall and 
Downing Street in order to influence the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, to overturn 
a prior Lords ruling which allowed legal aid to be given to a Namibian employee 
suing UK company Cape in the UK. At the time Cape was facing potential 
damages of El 00 million from 1,500 South African miners suffering from 
asbestosis and lung cancer who could only sue if granted legal aid. Leaked 
documents that seemingly support Weeks' claim that he has access to policy- 
makers reportedly reveal off the record discussions between Weeks and 
important civil servants in the Treasury, DTI, FCO, the Society of Labour Lawyers 
and the Cabinet Office during which they supported Weeks' position. There was 
concern amongst them all about the costs of legal aid and should the Lords ruling 
stand, the potential for multinationals to be discouraged from basing themselves 
in the UK. 44 
Another GJW employee who claimed that the firm had influence over 
policymakers is Karl Milner. A former Communications Manager for Gordon 
Brown as Shadow Chancellor, Milner was working to exempt his client, Enron, 
from government plans to stop the building of private gas fired power stations to 
45 help the coal industry. He reportedly explained "We have many friends in 
government" who "like to run things past us some days in advance, to get our 
view to let them know if they have anything to be worried about, maybe suggest 
42 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998; Labour Party, Annual Report 1999; Labour Party, Annual 
Report 2000; Labour Party, Annual Report 200 1. 
43 GJW, 'Defence' <http: //www. bsmg. com/gjw/index. html> Last accessed 17'h September 2003 
44 David Hencke, 'Mining firm tries to change law to block Ci 00m claims', The Guardian, 1 9th March 
1999. 
45 GJW, 'Defence' <http: //www. bsmg. com/gjw/index. html> Last accessed 17 th September 2003. 
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some changes. ', 4" He then reportedly faxed Palast, who posed as a 
businessman, an unpublished Trade and Industry Select Committee report on 
energy policy. Milner then claimed that he could manipulate energy policy, 
The way that you go about it is that you play on the existing 
prejudices within the Cabinet for coal, you play on the existing 
prejudices within the Cabinet for competition, and you play the 
forces off against each other. It's intimate knowledge of what's 
going on that produces results in the end. That's how GJW makes 
money. 47 
During the summer of 1999 the government announced that it would allow Enron 
to build a Teeside gas fired plant. 
GJW is now a part of PR giant Weber Shandwick Worldwide whose clients have 
included Northrop Grumman, MBDA and GKN. 48 Chief Executive Officer of 
Weber Shandwick UK is Colin Byrne who reportedly used to share a house with 
Peter Mandelson. Mandelson employed him as his Deputy Press Officer 49 but 
Byrne became Labour's Chief Press Officer (1988-1991). He became Managing 
Director of Shandwick in 1995 but took unpaid leave to work on the 1997 and 
2001 general election campaigns for the Labour Party. During the 2001 
campaign he reportedly worked closely with former BAE Systems Director Lord 
Hollick in the Business Endorsement Unit to built up support and donations from 
the corporate sector. 50 Byrne's old boss was David Hill, now Labour's 
Communications Chief (see above). The Associate Director Weber Shandwick is 
Cameron Jones who worked as a civil servant, advising ministers at the 
Department of Transport for 16 years .5' Director of Weber Shandwick until 
February 2003, Jeremy Fraser was Frank Dobson's campaign manager during 
46 Gregory Palast, 'Lobbygate: "There are 17 people that count. To say that I am intimate with every 
one of them is the understatement of the century" ', The Observer, 5'ý July 1998. 47 Nick Cohen, 'So grease and water do mix after all', The Observer, 13 th September 1998; Gregory 
Palast, 'Lobbygate: "There are 17 people that count. To say that I am intimate with every one of 
them is the understatement of the century" ', The Observer, 5 th July 1998. 
48 Weber Shandwick Worldwide, Luke Akehurst 
<http: //www. webershandwick. co. uk/public/content. cfm? contentid=162&cid=3&sid=68 > Last 
accessed 27 th June 2004. 
49 Red Star Research, Former Special Advisors. 
50 Weber Shandwick Worldwide, 'Colin Byrne' 
th <http: //www. webershandwick. com/overview/sub/bio. cfm? emplycode=52540> Last accessed 17 
September 2003; Mark Hollingsworth, 'An infestation of lobbyists', The Guardian, 6 th June 2001. 
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his bid to be London Mayor and an unsuccessful Labour candidate for North 
52 Southwark and Bermondsey. This was an experience shared by Fraser's 
colleague at Shandwick, Luke Akehurst, an unsuccessful candidate in 2001 for 
Gerald Howarth's Aldershot constituency (see chapter one). Akehurst now 
represents military sector clients for the PR firm. 53 Weber Shadwick employee 
Roger Sharp used to head Millbank's Business Relations Unit. He now works at 
the DTI as a special advisor to Lord Sainsbury and Patricia Hewitt. " 
Bergmans 
Labour sponsor and specialist military PR company Bergmans claim to have 
represented Lockheed Martin, Thales, GKN and Babcock International in the last 
12 years. 55 Its Managing Partner is Robin Ashby, also founder and head of the 
UK Defence Forum which organisies meetings between industry executives, 
politicians and civil servants and whose patrons include Thales, Non-Executive 
Director Lord Clarke of Windermere. 56 The motto of Bergmans' specialist "red 
team" which deals with MoD tenders is "When losing isn't an option, get yourself 
57 an unfair advantage". Team members include Brigadier Bill Kincaid who spent 
18 years at the MoD in the Procurement Executive and Operational 
Requirements before he became Director of Operational Requirements (land 
systems) responsible for the direction of research and specifying equipment 
capability. Another is Dr. Alan Fox, Assistant Under Secretary - export policy and 
finance (1995-1998) who now sits on The Review Board for Government 
51 Weber Shandwick Worldwide, 'People' 
<http: //www. webershandwick. co. uk/careers/article. cim? contentid=51&cid=28> Last accessed 17 th 
September 2003. 
52 Four Communications, 'Four Communications Scoops top public affairs team from GJW Weber 
Shandwick', January 2003 <http: //www. fourplc. com/jan_l 4- 03. htm> Last accessed 6 th January 
2004; David Hencke, Seumas Milne, Will Woodward, 'Man behind Livingstone complainant linked 
to Dobson mayoral campaign', The Guardian, 18 th March 2000. 
53 Weber Shandwick Worldwide, 'Luke Akehurst' 
<http: //www. webershandwick. co. uk/public/content. cfm? contentid=162&cid=3&sid=68> Last 
accessed 6 th January 2004. 
54 Red Star Research, 'Special Advisors, Cabinet Office'; Weber Shandwick GJW Public Affairs, 
'Guide to Government', September 2003 
<http: //www. webershandwick. co. uk/upload/docs/public/Government Guide June 2003. doc> Last 
accessed 6 th January 2004. 
55 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998, - Bergmans Public Relations, Portfolio of Clients 
<http: //www. north-house. com/html/bergmans/portfolio - 
clients. htm> Last accessed 201h May 2004. 56 UK Defence Forum <http: //www. ukdf. org. uk> Last accessed 20th May 2004. 
57 UK Defence Forum <http: //www. ukdf. org. uk> Last accessed 20th May 2004. 
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Contracts, the MoD Quango which polices mainly military contracts ensuring 
companies do not generate excessive profits. "' 
Citigate Public Affairs 
Citigate Public Affairs, whose clients include Rolls-Royce, has employed Carole 
Tongue, Labour MEP for London East and Deputy Leader of the European 
Parliamentary Labour Party (1989-1991). 59 Citigate bought more than E5,000 
worth of tickets for Labour Party events in 1999 and in 2000 and donated F-5,450 
60 to the party in October 2002. Citigate advertises "We will position you with 
relevant audiences". 61 Its sister company Citigate Westminster sponsored the 
Labour Party in 1997 and 1998 62 and is directed by Rex Osborn, former Deputy 
Director of Campaigns at the Labour Party. 63 
APCO UK 
A former Director of Raytheon representative APCO UK, Simon Crine is 
described as playing a "prominent role in the modernisation of the Labour Party" 
in his previous job as General Secretary of the Fabian Society and as having 
maintained "close links with the party in government at a senior level, '. 64 APCO 
was linked with Beattie Media, a PR firm which became famous when employee 
Kevin Reid, son of John Reid, then Secretary of State for Scotland, reportedly 
implied to undercover Observer reporter that he could gain access to Scottish 
Ministers. He explained I know the secretary of state very, very well, because 
"' Bergmans, Bergmans Red Team <http: //www. north-house. com/html/defence/red-l. htm> Last 
accessed 22 nd May 2004; MoD, Review Board for Government Contracts 
Ih <http: //www. mod. uk/business/protit formula/members. htm> Last accessed 27 June 2004. 59 The Association of Professional Political Consultants, Register of Members 1"' December 2001 - 
3 1s' May 2002 <http: //www. appc. org. uk/registers/APPC_register 31 05_02. pdf> Last accessed 
27 th June 2004; Carole Tongue <http: //www. poptel. org. uk/carole-tongue/index2. html> Last 
accessed 27 th June 2004. 
60 Labour Party, Annual Report 2000 and Annual Report 2001, ' Electoral commission, Register of 
Donations to Political Parties. 
61 Citigate <http: //www. citigatepa. com/mainPresentation3. swf> Last accessed 26"' June 2004. 
62 Labour Party, Annual Report 1998 and Annual Report 1999. 
63 Osler, Labour Party p1c, p 106. 
64 APCO UK, People <http: //www. apcouk. com/pc/our- people. asp> Last accessed 8 
'h December 
2004; The Association of Professional Political Consultants, Register of Members 1s' December 
2001-31s' Mar 2002 <http: //www. appc. org. uk/registers/APPC -register 
31 
_ 
05 02. pdt> Last 
accessed 27t June 2004. 
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65 he's my father" . Beattie also 
hired Malcolm Robertson, son of former Secretary 
of Defence George Robertson and Christina Marshall, daughter of MP David 
16 Marshall. 
GPC Intemational 
BAE Systems representative GPC International employs Andrew Lappin, former 
Special Advisor to Labour Shadow Defence Secretary David Clark and to Mo 
Mowlem. 67 Its Associate Director who works on BAE Systems' PR, Nick Williams, 
was seconded back to Millbank as Senior Political Advisor in 1997 and to the 
Prime Minister's private office during the 2001 election campaign. 68 Williams has 
been a Senior Political Advisor to the Labour Party Defence Department (1993- 
1997). Until 2001 GPC employed former Labour Party Director of 
Communications Joy Johnson and Anna Healy, Ministerial Advisor and Senior 
Labour Parliamentary Press Officer now a Special Advisor in the Cabinet 
Office. 69 It also employed Dan Fox as a Senior Consultant. Most famous as being 
the author of the USA-independence revoked spoof US 2000 election e-mail, he 
reportedly also worked as an aide to a "senior Labour Party figure" . 
70 This was an 
exaggerated description as he actually made the tea in Blair's office before he 
became Prime Minister. 
Less clearly exaggerated were the claims of GPC employee Derek Draper, 
formerly a Chief Aide to Peter Mandelson. Draper claimed that he could find 
clients places on task forces. He claimed that he had given merchant bank 
clients insider information on Gordon Brown's spending plans and that one of his 
best friends was Liz Lloyd of the Downing Street Policy Unit. He claimed that I 
65 Dean Nelson and Ben Laurance, 'How Scotland's Lobbygate was Exposed', The Observer, 26'h 
September 1999. 
66 Dean Nelson and Ben Laurance, 'How Scotland's Lobbygate was Exposed', The Observer, 26'h 
September 1999. 
67 The Association of Professional Political Consultants, Register of Members Is'December 2001- 
31s' May 2002<http: //www. appc. org. uk/registers/APPC-register_31_05_02. pdf> Last accessed 
27 th June 2004; GPC, Our People-Andrew Lappin 
<http: //www. gpcbrochure. com/people/lappin. html> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 68 GPC, Our People-Nick Williams <http: //www. gpcbrochure-com/people/lappin. html> Last 
accessed 27 th June 2004. 
rd 6' Julian Day, 'PR Week', The Guardian, 3 May 2001; Red Star Research, Special advisors, 
Cabinet Office. 
7' Dan Fox, 'US independence revoked: the truth', VOVoliticS, 16 Ih May 2001 
<http: //www. voxpolitics. com/news/voxfpub/story257. shtml> Last accessed 8th October 2003. 
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can have tea with Geoffrey Robinson", the Paymaster-General, that I can get 
into Ed Balls", the Chancellor's economic adviser and, now infamously, that 
"There are 17 people that count ... And to say I am intimate with every one of 
them is the understatement of the century. " At a GPC dinner in June 1998, 
Draper then reportedly went on to introduce the undercover journalists to Roger 
Liddle one of Blair's most senior advisors who worked in the number 10 Policy 
Unit in Foreign Affairs and Defence. Liddle assured the journalists that "There is 
a circle and Derek is part of The Circle ... Derek knows all the right people". 
71 He 
then reportedly offered "Whenever you are ready, just tell me what you want, 
who you want to meet and Derek and I will make the call for you. " 
There is no evidence that any arms industry clients of lobbyists have solicited 
inside information or privileged access and many large arms-producing 
companies will run their own in-house lobbying effort. But the use of lobbying 
groups with links to Labour by arms-producing companies can only raise the 
industry's profile within the domestic decision making field. 
This is a profile that is raised further by the international lobbying movement 
which has grown alongside the national political consultancy sector. Arms 
company representatives have been quick to participate. Of particular interest is 
BAE Systems' move to become a prominent player within the Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue Lobby Group (TABD) whose aim is to "boost transatlantic 
trade and investment opportunities through the removal of barriers. "72 A highly 
secretive organisation, the TABD appears to play a major role in formulating the 
demands of the US and EU put to meetings of the World Trade Organisation. 73 In 
1998 the TABD mid-year report was even presented as a "scorecard" evaluating 
US government and EU progress on TABD recommendations. In it, the TABD 
found that there had been "significant, concrete action" on almost one third of 
7' Gregory Palast, 'Lobbygate: "There are 17 people that count. To say that I am intimate with 
everyone of them is the understatement of the century" '. 
72 The TABD, The TABD in 2002 <http: //www. tabd. org/about/about. html> Last accessed 1" July 
2004. 
73 Greg Palast, 'Tony rushes in where Bill fears to tread', The Observer, 21 sl May 2000; Andy 
Griguhn, 'The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Putting business before everything else', 
th <http: //www. pocketbook. org/sky/i ns ide-out/i n sideo ut-bu sines s1 st. htm> Last accessed 7 January 
2004. 
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recommendations and that half were under "active discussion, '. 7' Despite being 
the scene of large protests since 2000, TABD conferences have attracted the 
most senior figures from the World Trade Organization, European leaders, EU 
Commissioners and senior members of the US government including US 
Secretary of Commerce William Daley. In 1997, Daley privately met UK Trade 
Secretary Margaret Beckett. His briefing notes, released under the US Freedom 
of Information Act, reportedly show him outlining four changes to UK law 
requested by US corporations, before referring Beckett to the TABD for further 
details. He described the organisation as "the most influential business group 
advising government on US-EU commercial relations. , 75 In 1996, US 
Undersecretary of Commerce, Stuart Eizenstat reportedly observed that "no one 
would have quite imagined the degree to which the TABD has influenced 
government decision-making on both sides of the Atlantic ... It has become 
deeply enmeshed and embedded into the US government decision-making 
,, 76 
process . The 
TABD's 2002 leadership team, the most recent published, shows 
that the TABD was co-chaired by representatives of two of the world's largest 
arms manufacturers - Phil Condit, Chief Executive Officer of Boeing and Sir 
Charles Masefield, Vice-Chair of BAE Systems. They have joined Bob Bott of 
Boeing and Anthony Parry of BAE Systems who act as the 2002 Working 
Chairs. 77 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) which represents 7,000 
corporations worldwide shares the TABD's anti-regulation ai MS. 78 Large 
corporations from every sector are represented at the ICC79but ICC's Chair 
Jean-Ren6 Fourtou also sits on the board of weapons manufacture EADS 
(European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company). 80 EADS and BAE 
Systems were joint partners in the missile company Matra BAE Dynamics and 
74 TABD, '1998 Mid-Year Scorecard Report', pp. 2-3 
<http: //www. tabd. org/recommendations/MYM98. pdf> Last accessed 20 th May 2004. 7' Gregory Palast, 'Tony rushes in where Bill fears to tread', The Guardian, 25'h May 20oO. 
76 Andy Griguhn, 'The Transatlantic Business Dialogue: Putting business before everythinp else' 
<http: //www. pocketbook. org/sky/in side_out/insideout-bu sin ess I st. htm> last accessed 20' May 
2004. 
77 TABD, 2002 Leadership Team <http: //www. tabd. org/about/leadership. html> Last accessed 27 th 
June 2004. 
78 International Chamber of Commerce, The ICCs origins 
<http: //www. iccwbo. org/home/menu - what - 
is 
- 
icc. asp> Last accessed 27'h June 2004. 
" International Chamber of Commerce, ICC membership 
<http: //www. iccwbo. org/home/intro - 
icc/membership. asp> Last accessed 27 1h June 2004. 
"" International Chamber of Commerce, Leadership 
<http: //www. iccwbo. org/home/intro-icc/leadership. asp> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
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are now the principal owners Of missile makers MBDA. 3' BAE Systems' 
prominence within groups designed to place public policy-making choices in 
corporate hands can only further raise the company's profile within the domestic 
decision making field. This is a profile that can only be raised further by the 
government's growing dependence on the corporate sector to fund areas 
previously provided by the state, a phenomenon to which this chapter will finally 
turn. 
ARMS EXPORTER INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
One of the most defining features of future corporate-state relations in the UK will 
be the transfer of services from the public to the private sector. " Public- Private 
Partnership", the catch all term which means that Labour looks to corporations to 
fund vital services instead of the state so that manifesto pledges are delivered 
with minimum initial cost to the public budget and great benefits for private 
corporations. To date, this wave of change is increasing in scale and in reach. 
Areas previously considered core government-run sectors like those linked to the 
armed forces are now being considered candidates for "Public- Private 
Partnerships". In this environment it is a necessity for Labour to remain 
corporate-friendly and it will be a necessity for the state to retain much of the 
financial risk because allowing a corporation responsible for core public services 
to fail would be politically impossible. This is particularly relevant when contracts 
involve services or equipment of strategic importance. Arms-producing 
companies have been eager to participate so the future of the already close 
industry-government relationship looks more certain. 
PPP: The new element in government-industry relations 
At the MoD private contractors are being considered as possible contenders to 
run all but a few of the department's core duties despite warnings from unions 
that the "anticipated benefits of public-private partnerships are at best 
8' MBDA, Company profile 
<http: //www. mbda. net/site/FO/scripts/siteFO_contenu. php? lang-EN&noeu id=33> Last accessed 
27 th June 2004. 
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questionable and at worst disastrous. , 82 The MoD's most favoured form of Public- 
Private Partnerships are Private Finance Initiatives in which it is the private 
sector which own the assets, often buildings, and provide the services required, 
for which they are compensated by the public purse. As of June 2004 the MoD 
has signed 46 Private Finance deals which between them involve more than F-2.3 
billion in private sector investment. These contracts have covered the 
redevelopment of accommodation, logistics, equipment, training and 
communication. Companies involved include Thales, Flagship, Serco and 
Bombardier whose Aerospace division is involved in military aviation training. A 
further 40 to 50 projects worth El 2 billion are either underway or are being 
considered. 83 Unions have found it difficult to identify an area that is not a 
84 
potential candidate for privatisation . 
This represents an advanced encroachment of the private sector into what was 
the preserve of the state and private companies have openly played a role in 
forming these plans. A recent government report found at least 900 reviews 
being conducted within the MoD. Many form part of an initiative to examine the 
prospects for extensive privatisation. The Partnered Defence Supply Chain 
Initiative even involved bringing 24 military companies into the department. In 
response, unions have expressed concerns about the prevalence of industry 
representatives at the heart of MoD review groups whose findings may open up 
new business opportunities which those who have sat on the groups will be in 
85 advantageous position to pursue. 
One such new business opportunity is in military training. A consortium including 
BAE Systems, Vosper and construction/support services company Carillion has 
reportedly expressed an interest in taking over one of seven major MoD run 
military training schools. They could be competing against at least one 
consortium which includes Babcock as well as part QinetiQ owners Carlyle. 
82 AMICUS, GMB, PCS, Prospect, T&G, LICATT, Still Daft, Damaging and Demoralising: The trade 
union response to the MoD revolution in military support and logistics capability, February 2003 
<http: //www. prospect. org. uk/doclib/download/1 98-0611676223. pdf/as/mod+strat. pdf> Last 
accessed 11 " June 2004. 
83 MoD Public Private Partnerships in the MoD <http: //www. mod. uk/business/ppp/intro. htm> Last 
accessed 1 9th June 2004. 
84 AMICUS et. al, Still Daft, Damaging and Demoralising, p. 4 
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Other key military training schools which the government is ready to privatise 
include those involved in Logistics. Aeronautical Engineering and 
Communication, Information Systems and those training MoD Police. These 
contracts would be worth hundreds of millions of pounds. 86 
Carlyle has already fought off competition from 40 other venture capitalist 
companies to buy a 33.8% share in QinetiQ from the government in a hugely 
controversial PPP agreement carried out against the advice of the Select 
Committee on Defence. 87 Carlyle paid E42 million for the stake in QinetiO, which 
incorporates most of the MoD's non-nuclear equipment testing and evaluation 
establishments, even though the business had been valued at El billion in the 
past and even though QinetiQ has assets valued at E342m net of its liabilities. "" 
Carlyle's ownership of US giant United Defence effectively makes it the 11 th 
largest military contractor to the US government. It includes on its payroll former 
US Secretary of Defence (1987-1989) Frank Carlucci, former White House Chief 
of Staff (1981-1985,1992-1993) James Baker, former UK Prime Minister John 
Major, former US President (1988-1996) George Bush and Afsaneh Masheyekhi, 
a former Treasurer of the World Bank. 89 
Banking has also attracted the attention of BAE Systems. The company has 
recently introduced a new service dedicated to loaning the MoD and other 
government departments the cash they need to pay for long-term equipment and 
service acquisitions from the arms-producing giant. BAE Systems Capital Ltd. 
launched in January 2002 is a wholly owned subsidiary of BAE Systems, a 
company which also exists to co-ordinate BAE Systems entry into public private 
85 AMICUS et. al, Still Daft, Damaging and Demoralising, pp. 3-4. 
86 Nick Mathiason, 'School for Spies to be Privatised', The Guardian, 30"' March 2003. 
87 House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Sixth Report. The Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency, 6 Ih July 1998, HC 621. summary of recommendations 
<http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/cml99798/cmselect/cmdfence/621/ý62107. htm> Last accessed 25"' May 2004. 88 Jamie Doward, "GinetiQ stake was sold on the cheap'claim MPs', The Guardian, 26 th January 
2003. 
89 Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, 'The ex-presidents' club', The Guardian, 31" October 2001; 
The Carlyle Group, Frank Carlucci <http: //www. thecarlylegroup. com/eng/team/15-team3g9. html>; 
Carlyle Group, James Baker <http: //www. thecarlylegroup. com/eng/teatýn/15-team39 I. html>; Carlyle 
Group Advisory Boards <http: //www. thecarlylegroup-com/eng/company/13-company738. html>; 
Carlyle Group, Afsaneh Masheyekhi <http: //www. thecarlylegroup. com/eng/team/15-team8O I. html> 
Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
204 
partnership projects as a whole. 90 A BAE Systems spokesperson told Jane's 
Defence Weekly that BAE Capital would allow the MoD to "approach 
procurement differently" in a move away from "traditional" spending patterns 
whereby the department received funding before buying systems or services. 
Commenting on the launch of BAE Systems Capital Ltd. in January 2002 Keith 
Hayward of SBAC said "The customer is increasingly strapped for cash ... it's an 
evolution as systems integrators become service providers. " " Campaign 
Against Arms Trade described the move as "the most militant form of PFI 
imaginable , 92 but city analysts have suggested that other arms manufacturers will 
follow suit. 
The provision of procurement loans and securing MoD PFI contracts are only two 
aspects of arms-producer involvement in the delivery of public services. 
Education and training have attracted particular interest from military industry. 
Education and Training 
Warship manufacturer Vosper Thornycroft, whose diversification into support 
services now accounts for two thirds of all the arms company's turnover, 93 now 
boasts of being "the largest provider of careers guidance services in the UK" for 
the Department of Education (DfES) after the sell off of the Local Education 
Authorities run Careers service in the mid 1990S. 94 Vosper also offers central 
government and Local Education Authorities a range of services from personnel 
to procurement to payroll and, after acquiring Westminster Education 
Consultants in 2001, is one of the largest supplies of school inspectors to 
Ofsted. 95 Vosper has become part of a DfES funded "school improvement 
" BAE Systems, BAE Systems Capital 
<http: //production. investis. com/BAEsystemscapital/mediacoverage/> Last accessed 27 th June 
2004. 
91 David Mulholland, 'BAE establishes financing arm', Jane's Defence Weekly, 30th January 2002. 
92 Unnamed, 'Arms Trade Shortsý Neither a borrower or a lender BAE', CAAT News, April-May 
2002 <http: //www. caat. org. ukiinformation/magazine/0402/shorts. php> Last accessed 27 th June 
2004. 
93 CAAT, Vosper Thomycroft' 
<http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/companies/vosperthornycroft. php> Last accessed 
15 th January 2003. 
14 Vosper Thomycroft <http: //www. vtplc. com/careersmanagement> Last accessed 27" June 2004. 
95 Elizabeth Creer, Vosper Thornycroft, 2002 <www. caat. o rq. uk/campaigns/clean - investment- I campaign/ vosper-thornycroft-2002. php> Last accessed 271 June 2004; VT Education 
<http: //www. vosperthornycroft. co. uk/education/> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
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service", 96 it has been contracted to the Learning and Skills Council as "the 
second largest private sector provider of vocational training in the UK" and at FIE 
colleges offers government funded work-based modern apprentices for 16-24 
97 
year olds. In March 2002, Vosper started to build and partially run a F-60 million 
training centre for the Fire Brigades of Somerset, Gloucestershire and Avon in 
what is one of the largest fire service PFI projects and Vosper's largest civil 
PFI. 98 
BAE Systems runs a Schools Systems Network through which schools receive 
curriculum materials, visits from BAE Systems and to BAE Systems sites, 
placements, access to the BAE Systems Schools education website which 
includes A level revision material and past exam questions. '9 BAE Systems' 
"Primary Engineer" programme issues free research and design CDs to 5-11 
year olds. "0 For those designated "specialist engineering colleges" BAE 
Systems has partly or wholly funded new technology facilities in science and 
maths. "' This is not new. In the mid 1990s BAE Systems established financial 
partnerships with a variety of schools - donated cash and computers, contributed 
to video conference suites and interactive whiteboards, offered the occasional 
use of BAE Systems staff, sponsored sporting events and ran after school 
clubs. ' 02 In Hull, BAE Systems has become a main private sector investor in the 
Education Action Zone and the official partner for all design and technology 
courses. 103 
96 Department for Education and Skills, The Standards Site 
<http: //www. standards. df es. gov. uk/lea/capacitybu iId in g/newways/casestud ies/h am psh i re/? version 
1> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
97 Vosper Thomycroft, VT Group PLC <http: //www. vtplc, com/files/532. pdf> 
Last accessed 27 th June 2004; Vosper Thomycroft, VT Plus Training 
<http: //www. vtplc. com/plustraining> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 98 Vosper Thomycroft Press Release, Vosper Thomycroft starts new fire fighting training centre, 
21 st March 2002 
<http: //www. vosperthornycroft. co. uk/supportservices/newsdetails. asp'? s=&ItemID=94> Last 
accessed 27 th June 2004. 
99 BAE Systems, BAE Systems Schools <http: //www. engineeringourfuture. co. uk/home. asp> Last 
accessed 27 th June 2004. 
"0 Setpoint, INSET workshops <http: //www. setpointleicestershire. org. uk/Programes/I N SET. htm> 
Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 
101 For example see Devonport School, Welcome to Devonport High School for Boys 
<www. dhsb. org> Last accessed 27'h June 2004. 
102 For example see Lancaster Girls Grammar, BAE Systems 
<http: //www. lancastergirlsgrammar-lancs. sch. uk/BAE. htm> Last accessed 27ýh June 2004 
103 Kingston-upon-Hull Education Action Zone, Partners 
<http: //www. eazhull. org. uk/Partners/index. html> Last accessed 27"'June 2004. 
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In higher education increasingly under-funded university departments have come 
under pressure to supplement government funding with private sector money 
which has come in the form of sponsored buildings, sponsored staff, donations 
and equipment. Having once been discouraged, govern ment-f uncled researchers 
in many fields and the universities in which they work are effectively forced to find 
support from the industrial sector. Arms-producing companies have met much of 
this need since Labour came to power. In 1998, Rolls Royce pledged El 70,000 
to fund a professorship at Oxford University. 104 Rolls-Royce also sponsors two 
professorships in the Engineering Department of Cambridge University together 
with a number of lectureships, half of whose costs are funded by Rolls-Royce. 105 
It has been reported that Cambridge additionally houses a laboratory owned by 
the company. "' Cambridge has also received funds from GKN who paid the 
university E750,000 in 2000 to fund a ten-year "GKN professorship". US Giant 
Boeing, exporter of military aircraft and a company involved in the US missile 
defence project, reportedly gave El 5 million to Sheffield University for research in 
2001 and in 2002 was pouring millions more into collaborate research and 
development projects with Sheffield, Cranfield and Cambridge Universities. 107 
More recently it has been revealed that a computer research centre at the 
University of York is funded by BAE Systems. The same company also agreed a 
research and training partnership with Loughborough University in June 2003 
worth E60 million in which 35 senior scientists will start to work on projects 
alongside existing academic staff. "8 
There are clear benefits to corporations from engaging in all this kind of activity - 
prestige, the subtle influence over the way in which children and students view 
the company and the world in which they operate as well as value for money. 
104 Unnamed, 'Benefactors back Oxford excellence', Oxford gazette, 15 th October 1998 
<http: //www. ox. ac. uk/gazette/l 998-9/weekly/l 51098/news/story_l. htm> Last accessed 27 th June 
2004. 
105 University of Cambridge, Department of Engineering: Annual Report 2000-2001 
< http: /Iwww. eng. cam. ac. uk/an nualreports/ar000 1 /Preface. htm> Last accessed 27 th June 2004. 106 Angela Grainger, 'Ethical Guidelines for University', Varsity, 6 th October 2000 
<http: //www. varsity. cam. ac. uk/8025694EO073CFEB/Pages/61 02OoO-. html> Last accessed 1" July 
2004. 
107 Ben Fountain, 'Boeing invests millions in our top universities', Business Weekly, 2 nd August 
2002. 
108 Ronan McGreevy, 'University and BAE in E60m project', The Times, 16 Ih June 2003. 
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Many academics argue that corporate funding can be accepted whilst 
maintaining academic freedom. " Engineering academics have found that much 
corporate funding in their field is small scale. Companies donate time and some 
materials. They do not own any intellectual property but just have access to the 
results of the research that interests them. Yet the incorporation of academia into 
the economy has the potential to represent a fundamental challenge to academic 
freedom and honesty. Funding from the corporate sector can steer the research 
agenda by being more readily available for research that has the potential to 
boost corporate profit than for that with wider social benefits. As an example, a 
recent Corporate Watch report found that university research looking at 
renewable energy received one fifth of the funding offered to research looking at 
oil and gas energy. The report estimated that this effectively represented a F-40 
million subsidy from public funds to benefit oil and gas corporations despite the 
government's own commitment to reduce fossil fuel emissions. "O It is unclear 
whether this kind of discrepancy is duplicated elsewhere but what is clear is that 
outsourcing the kind of research activities that corporations once used to 
undertake themselves over to universities and then benefiting from them often 
means that research is carried out at a discounted price. There is a more 
substantial cost to the political environment from the transfer of public services to 
the private sector and increased public sector reliance on private cash. It is in the 
government's own interests to follow policies which do not challenge those of big 
business, including those of military industry who have been so eager to become 
involved. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this chapter was to look at how a number of more recent 
phenomena in British politics may impact on govern m ent- industry relations. The 
chapter has found that there is little evidence to support the idea that the industry 
gains access to influential policy-makers as a result of the growing need for think 
tanks to attract corporate money. It has found equally little evidence to support 
109 Various, 'Corporate cash is better than antiquated labs and other letters', The Guardian, 141h 
September 2000. 
Andrew Simms, Degrees of Capture: Universities, the oil industry and climate change, Februar 
I 2003 <http: //www. corporatewatch. org. uk/publications/degrees_ of capture. pdf> Last accessed 161 
January 2004. 
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the idea that think tanks work to suppress debate as a result of the make-up of 
their trustees or boards. The chapter has shown how arms-producing companies 
are able to employ well-connected lobbying companies to reinforce corporate 
access to decision-makers to the exclusion of the non-corporate community. It 
has found that the transfer of services from the public to the private field within 
the MoD, and elsewhere, reemphasises Labour's need to remain corporate- 
friendly in order for it to continue to participate in the mutually beneficial 
relationship that the entire PPP philosophy invokes. Both the use of domestic 
and international lobbying as well as the involvement of arms-producing 
companies in the PPP evolution work to reduce the potential for informed debate 
on the value of continued arms export support. 
209 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
In this concluding chapter the main findings of the thesis are summarised in order 
to directly address the central research question, why does New Labour continue 
to support arms exports. The chapter then outlines the implications of these 
conclusions both for the existing body of knowledge outlined in the introductory 
chapter concerned with New Labour's involvement in the arms trade as well as 
that concerned with state-corporate relations, and for those interested in policy 
making under New Labour. The chapter concludes by identifying further areas for 
research in this field. 
ARMS EXPORT SUPPORT: A CONSEQUENCE OF THE SELF-SERVING 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NEW LABOUR AND POLITICALLY POWERFUL ARMS- 
PRODUCING COMPANIES 
To answer the central research question, why does New Labour support arms 
exports, this thesis begins by critically examining the rationales offered by the 
New Labour government. The government claims that support for military exports 
provides employment, brings budgetary savings, benefits the balance of trade 
and delivers other wider economic benefits. It claims that arms exports underpin 
a strong, strategically important indigenous arms production capability in the UK, 
a capability needed to supply both the UK's own forces and UK allies abroad. 
The government finally claims that exporting arms brings political benefits - they 
buy UK political influence over recipient states and are a means to prevent 
conflict. In short, the government claims that maintaining support for arms 
exports is all about pursuing economic, strategic and/or political interests. Yet the 
thesis has shown that when critically examined the government's claim that 
support for arms exports is all about pursuing these economic, strategic and/or 
political interests are in the vast majority of cases unsustainable and in the 
remainder, are unproven. 
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This begs the question why does New Labour continue to support arms exports? 
The few alternative explanations on offer are either anecdotal or are based on 
the idea that the government is deluded. They fail really to engage with how the 
interests of the arms export lobby relate to those of the New Labour government. 
This thesis has argued that the continuation of arms export support must be 
understood in this context. As such the report has attempted to expose the ways 
in which UK-based arms-producing companies are connected to the Labour 
Party, to government departments under Labour and what the use of Labour 
linked lobbying groups, think tanks and privatisation schemes actually means to 
the way that their interests interplay. 
It is of course not enough to assume that any set of personal economic or 
political benefits absolutely predetermine individual behaviour or to assume that 
the UK-based arms industry or New Labour represent a monolithic single-minded 
block. Even when an individual, body or party have a set of identifiable interests 
those interests will not necessarily be able to determine policy. Each connection 
outlined here is not necessarily in itself objectionable and there is certainly no 
suggestion of impropriety against any individual or company named here. What 
is being suggested is that there is a cumulative impact of all this activity. After all 
if there is no political value here, then why are arms companies spending so 
much time and money becoming so involved with New Labour and its 
environment, especially when the leaders of the corporate community are under 
a legal obligation to pursue profit on behalf of their shareholders? 
Taken together, all the evidence suggests that there is a momentum towards 
forging and reinforcing links between arms-producing companies and 
government across the political environment. Although much of the detail can 
never be known, a picture emerges both of an overly close arms industry - New 
Labour relationship and of an overly high political profile for the arms industry in 
the environment where the government operates. This is an "overly" close 
relationship and an "overly" high profile because no other industry is so 
dependent on the government to define the parameters in which it operates and 
as such, no other industry has such a huge incentive to become as involved as it 
can be in government. This activity is so open to suspicion not just because no 
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other industry receives such huge levels of financial support from government but 
also because this support is based on an a largely unsustainable set of rationales 
which claim that arms exports are crucial to the UK. 
This is an industry in which a number of the most senior executives now enjoy 
influential government jobs and/or have links to some of the highest echelons of 
the New Labour movement. This is an industry that has both contributed largely 
undisclosed amounts of cash to the Labour Party and to one of its major projects 
at a time of financial crisis and in doing so has fed into the more subtle distortion 
of the political environment in which parties are obliged to remain business 
friendly. There is the seamless progression of top ex MoD and Services Staff into 
the employment of arms-producing companies and the unending generosity of 
arms-producing companies in offering their own staff to the MoD for up to three 
years, blurring the institutional boundaries between each body. This is an 
industry that is heavily represented within a network of groups advising the 
government on military policy. The lack of transparency means that the 
electorate simply do now know what bodies are involved in the formation and 
implementation of policy and in many cases which industry participants might be 
enjoying privileged access to government. From what is known, this network 
appears quantitatively different from those working to advise the government in 
other sectors, contributes further to blurred state-corporate boundaries and works 
to the exclusion of the non-corporate constituency. The volume and pace of 
employees passing through the revolving doors between industry and the policy- 
making environment both in terms of MoD and Services Staff as well as advisory 
bodies blurs state-corporate boundaries so much that to a significant extent, they 
are the same body. Industry representation by lobby groups undermines further 
an ostensibly level advocacy playing field while the transfer of core services from 
the public to the private sector contributes further to the maintenance of a 
political environment in which Labour is again motivated to remain corporate- 
friendly. The picture that emerges is one where New Labour and military industry 
are so deeply interconnected and their interests are so tied up with each other 
that simply by acting rationally, New Labour will be inclined to support military 
industry because in a way by doing this, it is supporting itself. 
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This convergence of interests and blurred institutional boundaries feed into the 
thinking of those involved with the New Labour government. It appears they have 
assumed that at least part of the case for maintaining arms export support is still 
sound even though it is not. But there is also evidence that those involved with 
New Labour consciously recognise either the unsustainability of some of the 
rationales - reportedly even amongst MoD officials it has been acknowledged 
that on a macro-economic level the employment argument is "a red herring"' - or 
at least that there is a debate to be had. In February 2000 the government did 
agree, for example, to initiate a study on the economic costs and benefits of arms 
exports following a request by the Select Committee of Defence. At the same 
time the government appeared to attempt to close down the debate. When the 
study was announced the government preempted its findings by listing the 
benefits they believed exports bring to the UK and when the study was 
published, the government misrepresented its findings to the House. 2 So it is not 
enough to end the analysis by concluding that those involved with the New 
Labour government are ideologically driven; in other words, that they assume the 
case for supporting arms exports is true even though they know that they are not 
in a type of false consciousness. Although this might apply to the majority of 
those involved with New Labour, there is the possibility that for a few, continuing 
with some government rationales effectively represents a form of propaganda; 
that is, they know a number of rationales are bogus but they claim they are true. 
Whether those involved are driven by ideology or engage, a least some of the 
time in a form of propaganda, both are functional for a government in a self- 
serving, mutually reinforcing relationship in which the disincentives to challenge 
the existing ways of thinking are very powerful. Any attempt to force a really 
significant advance towards the reduction of arms export subsidies, like the 
establishment of a multilateral conventional arms control regime mentioned in the 
introduction, will fail as long as UK-based arms-producing companies and the 
New Labour government remain deeply interconnected. 
' E-mail, Roy Isbister, Saferworld, to the author, 1 gth February 2002. 
2 House of Commons, Hansard, 28'ý'February 2000, Written Answers, column 35; Compare Lord 
Bach's description of the report, House of Lords, Hansard, 8 Jan 2002, column 515 and House of Lords, Hansard, 7 Feb 2002, Written Answers, column 109 with Malcolm Chalmers, Neil Davies, 
Keith Hartley and Chris Wilkinson, The Economic Costs and Benefits of UK Defence Exports (York: 
University of York Centre for Defence Economics, 2001). 
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A political party following this path is, of course, nothing new. The introduction to 
this thesis indicated that New Labour's approach to arms exports is, despite the 
rhetoric, a case of policy continuity between the previous Conservative 
government and the current Labour administration. This thesis has argued that 
the case for maintaining this support in New Labour's era does not hold up. But 
whether arms sales ever reaped these economic, strategic and political rewards 
for the UK and if so, at what point did these rewards begin to fall away is unclear 
and deserves researching in its own right. The evidence available, particularly 
that from the 1996 report Gunrunners Gold, does suggest that those rewards 
have not been forthcoming from at least the mid 1990s onwards. This means that 
regardless of the unique aspects of the connections between arms-producing 
companies and New Labour set out in detail in this thesis, they are part of a 
broader pattern that results from a structural connection between industry and 
government. This finding is both inconsistent with the existing literature and has 
particular repercussions for those involved in arms export advocacy work, two 
areas to which this concluding chapter will now turn. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVOCACY 
Given that arms export subsidies do not bring the benefits claimed, it is important 
to shift the terms of the debate away from the government's preferred framing of 
the situation on exports as national interest versus ethical choice. If the support 
given to arms exporters is not about the pursuit of UK economic, strategic and 
political interests, if it is about the government's relationship with arms-producing 
companies then that is what the public debate should be about. This is what the 
debate should be about for both advocacy groups whose relationship with 
government requires them to present a more moderate face and those whose 
relationship does not. The former can accept the disproportionate influence of 
arms-producing companies contributing to the maintenance of arms exports 
support without having to accept the analysis of underlying causes put forward by 
this thesis. The latter are free to shift the debate so that it is about whether the 
public want their money spent funding UK-based arms-producing companies, 
and to an extent their largely institutional shareholders, because the interests of 
industry and government converge. 
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Given this relationship it is spurious for the representatives of arms-producing 
companies to argue time and time again that it is the government, not them, who 
set the criteria for arms export licencing so it is with the government, not them 
where exclusive responsibility for arms exports rests. Directing campaigners to 
redirect their anger rests on an argument that presupposes that the two can be 
divided. It fails to address the realities of arms company-government relations 
spelled out here and, as such, rests on the bogus assumption that arms- 
producing companies sit outside the policy-making process. 
To begin to challenge this relationship, it would make sense to prevent MPs, 
salaried representatives of the people, receiving additional regular remuneration 
from the private sector as well as any other perks that might be on offer. It would 
make sense to restrict funding of political parties to capped donations from those 
individuals who believe in them enough to offer financial support. It would make 
sense to bar senior MoD staff from entering employment with arms-producing 
companies for a set number of years, to demand that all advisory bodies be 
carefully catalogued, their aims, membership and existence justified to the public 
and to call for a complete rethink of the entire PPP project. 
These kinds of initiatives would start to address the means through which a 
mutually self-serving relationship between UK-based arms-producing companies 
and New Labour is allowed to continue. But they would not represent a complete 
solution because some aspects of corporate power run deeper still. The deeper 
problem is that with Labour's super majority in Parliament, the only thing standing 
in their way is the corporate community. This is a community whose leaders are 
under a legal obligation to pursue profit on behalf of their shareholders. They are 
effectively under a legal obligation to enforce and reinforce their influence over 
government so as to nurture a favourable corporate environment and thereby 
increase profits. 
The leaders of the Labour Party are under a political obligation to remain both 
solvent and electorally viable. This means that in financial terms, party prospects 
have to come rely on corporate beneficiaries. Labour must refrain from pursuing 
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policies detrimental to the wider interests of big business because big business is 
exactly where most of their money comes from. In political terms, corporations 
wield the real power in the UK. That is why Blair was eager from the moment that 
he became leader of the party to start accommodating the business sector, as 
one former Labour party insider has concluded "not just to neutralise business 
opposition, but to bring business fully onboard. "' This is why Blair had repeatedly 
reaffirmed Labour as "the natural party of busine SS,, 4 and that is why Blair strives 
to reaffirms Labour's ongoing business credibility. As an example, in 2000 he 
said 
I'm delighted that we have business people and 
entrepreneurs who can today support the Labour Party. 
5 And I never ever want to see that situation change again. 
All this rhetoric has been underpinned by actual policy-change in favour of big 
business. The UK has seen the transfer of control of interest rates to the Bank of 
6 England's Monetary Policy Committee, changes to union recognition law, the 
reduction of corporation tax to what is reportedly the lowest levels in the western 
world and the relaxation of planning laws and environmental standards. 7 In 2004, 
with the government's public credibility weakened, it is even more important for 
the party to avoid weakening its credibility with business, especially given the 
importance it has placed on its support from the very beginning. 
A policy which begins to question the economic and political support given to any 
sector of big business, like a policy which looks to reduce arms export support, 
undermines the overall agenda of big business - to maintain the function of 
government as a promoter of corporate commercial interests. It undermines a 
major agenda of the Labour party - to remain economically viable and to be as 
credible as a party of big business as the Conservatives. In sum, any attempt to 
demarcate clearer industry-government lines would set a precedent that all major 
3 David Osler, Labour Party PLC. New Labour as a Party of Business (Edinburgh: Mainstream 
Publishing, 2002) p. 45. 
4 Downing Street News Room, 14 th April 1998 as quoted by Wyn Grant, Globalisation, Big Business 
and the Blair Government, August 2000. 
5 The Financial Times, 16 th March 2000 as quoted by Wyn Grant, Globalisation, Big Business and the Blair Government, August 2000. 
6 Wyn Grant, Globalisation, Big Business and the Blair Government, August 2000. 7 George Monbiot, 'The Business of Power', The Guardian, 5 th February 2002. 
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companies and the Labour Party elite would prefer to avoid. Corporations are 
powerful and Labour must follow the path of least resistance in order to survive. 
The only way to counter this enormous pull for Labour is via a well-resourced and 
organised alternative movement working to expose the ways in which New 
Labour promotes the interests of big business at the expense of the public that 
they were elected to represent. 
The most important mechanisms through which these corporate interests are 
promoted and to which such groups must turn their attention are global trade 
rules. Without exception they exclude military spending and direct financial 
support for arms-producing corporations from liberalising restrictions and as such 
protect and promote military spending at the expense of social spending. The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would have taken this level of 
protection to a new level. Corporations and the richest states in the world were 
negotiating to remove all barriers to the free movement of investment. If 
successfully implemented, the agreement and specifically its provision that 
governments must treat foreign investment in the same way as domestic 
investment would have threatened social programmes. But because the entire 
agreement would have exempted military spending, it would have encouraged a 
reliance on military spending to achieve social goals, it could have discouraged 
arms export controls and it could have prevented the continuing imposition of 
many existing arms embargoes. None of these issues have been addressed by 
the existing literature examining New Labour and arms exports. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
The finding of this thesis are inconsistent with existing literature which accepts at 
face value the government's claims that arms exports are good financially, 
strategically and politically for the UK. In particular, the conclusions put forward 
here suggest there is no need to continue to frame arms exports as a dilemma, a 
delicate balance between promoting the UK national interest on the one hand 
and taking into account ethical issues on the other. The findings suggest that an 
understanding of the continuance of supportive arms export policy needs to draw 
on more than that part of Phythian's conclusion that frames the policy as the 
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result of delusion or addiction, more than Will Self's "addict Britain's arms sales 
fix" or Samuel Brittan and Adair Turner's "economic myths". " A better 
understanding of arms export support must also move beyond anecdotal 
references to the relationship between industry and government like those made 
by Burrows, Rawnsley or Kampfner. 9 It must move beyond the idea of rational 
policy-makers choosing optimum outcomes for the good of the country or 
pluralist theories where a variety of competing groups influence policy-making. 
MIC theories which focus on the rise of powerful interest groups attempting to 
promote their own vested interests provides an alternative although the 
conclusions of this thesis indicate the need for a revision of this approach in the 
Post Cold-War era. The specific form of economic globalisation being pursued 
has both undermined the powers of the nation state and protected and promoted 
the power and wealth of huge multinational corporations. In particular, the arms 
industry is increasingly operating beyond the control of those in government and 
the political power once enjoyed by nation states is increasingly being transferred 
to corporations. Canadian researcher and campaigner Steven Staples talks of 
the replacement of the military- industrial complex with a "military-corporate 
complex" characterised by the "dominance of corporate interests over those of 
the state. "'O Staples has argued that in the new global economy 
The weakened state is no longer able to reign in weapons 
corporations and is trapped increasingly by corporate interests: 
greater military spending, state subsidies, and a liberalisation of 
the arms trade. " 
The evidence put forward in this thesis suggests that in the UK, the party 
governing the state is now effectively as captive to corporate interests as Staples 
describes. It appears that arms-producing companies have not had to work hard 
to be highly successful in engaging with government at the expense of the non- 
'3'Addicted to Arms: A Will Self Investigation Correspondent, BBC, Television, April 2002; Samuel 
Brittan, 'Why exports are bad for Britain', The New Statesman, 31 " January 2000 and Exports and 
Arms Brief, October 2000 <http: //www. samuelbrittan. co. uk>: Adair Turner, Just Capital, pp. 43, 
360-361. 
9 Gideon Burrows, The Non-Nonsense Guide to the Arms Trade, p. 90; Andrew Rawnsley, 
Servants of the People: The inside story of New Labour (London: Penguin, 2001) p. 170; John 
Kampfner, Robin Cook (London: Phoenix, 1998) p. 145. 10 Steven Staples, 'The Relationship between Globalisation and Militarism', Social Justice 
Magazine, 27: 4 (2000). 
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corporate constituency and where information is available, at the expense of 
other industrial sectors. In terms of their relationship with government, it may be 
mutually beneficial and self-serving but the benefits derived from this relationship 
for the Labour Party come about as a result of the power now wielded by 
corporations. The party has to be credible to big business for its political survival 
and it needs to attract the flow of corporate money for its physical survival. 
Neither of these needs would have been so vital if corporations did not wield 
such political power. 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
At the very start, this thesis presented the findings of a number of recent studies 
which have estimated the levels of subsidy on offer to UK-based arms exporters. 
First, there is a requirement to continuously re-examine the levels of support 
offered in the UK in the light of changes in governing party, in policy and in the 
international market. Second, there is a requirement to conduct comparative 
studies examining how the levels of financial and political support outlined above 
vary between major arms exporting states and between different UK-based 
industrial sectors. William Hartung at the World Policy Institute has been 
estimating the levels of subsidy offered to military industry by the American 
government. 12 But as far as is known, there is a lack of publicly available 
information detailing the levels of support available to those based in any of the 
other major exporting states like Russia, France, China and Germany. of 
particular interest here are the rationales used by other major exporters in 
defence of any support offered and whether these justifications are substantiated 
and sustainable. Further comparative research would also be welcome which 
comprehensively compared and contrasted the support enjoyed by the military 
sector relative to that enjoyed by other civil sectors, especially those sectors 
which export broadly similar amounts and which employ a broadly similar number 
of people. 
" Steven Staples, 'The Relationship between Globalisation and Militarism'. 
12 William Hartung, Military-Industrial Complex Revisited: How Weapons makers are Shaping U. S. 
Foreign and Military Policies <http: //www. foreignpolicy-infocus. org/papers/micr/index. html> Last 
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Given the findings of the first section of the thesis, namely that those rationales 
offered by the UK government cannot be substantiated, further research is 
needed to understand why the non-military corporate sector has seemingly 
adopted a permissive approach to New Labour's support for arms exports. This 
thesis put forward the argument above that any policy starting to question wide 
ranging support given to any industry would begin to demarcate clearer industry- 
government lines setting a precedent all major companies would prefer to avoid. 
But this statement is only part of the story. What needs to be understood is the 
way in which the non-military sector directly profits from arms exports and as 
such is unlikely to call for a reduction in subsidies which would harm the profits of 
both the military sector and their own, which they are legally obliged to pursue. 
Two ways in which the non-military sector directly profit is via investment and 
banking. One example of the former is the relationship between BAe and 
Barclays. Significant interests in the issued ordinary share capital of BAe are held 
by a number of investment advisory firms and Barclays PLC. In September 2001, 
Barclays Bank Pic owned 93,632,529 shares in BAe 13 while the BAe annual 
report 2003 showed that Barclays PLC owned 3.96% of issued ordinary share 
14 
capital. Barclays not only holds a significant number of shares in BAe but is part 
of a group of high street banks that play a pivotal role financing arms deals in the 
international arms market. Banks considered this not only a lucrative market 
during the 1980s but a risk-free lucrative market given the levels of government 
protection on offer via the ECGD. In this way they make an unknown amount of 
profit through government subsidised and insured loans to arms buyers. The 
City/Whitehall alliance was highlighted in 1995 by the World Development 
Movement's report Gunrunners Gold. This report exposed the revolving door 
between the MoD and banks involved in financing the arms trade, particularly, 
banking secondees placed into DESO, bankers appointed onto the ECGD 
Advisory Council and the involvement of high street banks in specific deals. 
These included Lloyds' alleged financing of Alvis tanks to Indonesia in 1995, 
Midland's alleged financing of Hawks to Indonesia in 1993, Nat West's alleged 
accessed 23 rd April 2004 and William Hartung, 'Welfare for Weapons Dealers', March 1998 
<http: //www. worldpoIicy. org/projects/arms/reports/natocost. htmI> Last accessed 23 rd April 2004. 13 House of Commons, Hansard, 25" June 2002, column 229. 14 BAe Systems, Annual Report 2003, p. 3 1. 
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refinancing of Al Yamamah and Barclays' alleged lending in support of Iraq in the 
1980s, part of which was earmarked for military sales. 15 Little follow on research 
has been conducted on how, and to what extent, banks are continuing to benefit 
from their involvement in the arms trade. It is not known to what extent this close 
City/Whitehall relationship has continued, particularly, how it has all panned out 
under New Labour and to what extent banks are involved in and profit from non 
UK-based arms exporting companies given that arms deal finance or brokering 
can be done by banks based in a state other than of the buyers or seller. " 
It is in these states that other UK-based industries may well be benefiting, on a 
much wider scale, from the conditions promoted by the arms exports of UK- 
based firms. The three-way relationship between globalisation, militarism and 
non-military corporate profits is coming under increased scrutiny. On the one 
hand the economic policies associated with the form of globalisation being 
pursued promote economic inequality and resource competition, often the root 
cause of conflict. The same economic policies have been built into international 
trade agreements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and other 
agreements operated by the World Trade Organisation. These, without 
exception, exempt military spending from spending restrictions. In this way, 
international trade rules effectively protect and promote the industries that 
produce the weapons needed for participants to engage in the economic conflicts 
they fuel. This weaponry can then be used, or its use threatened in order to 
protect the interests of the non-military corporate community abroad. 17 In a 1999 
New York Times article, Thomas Friedman argued that 
For globalism to work, America can't be afraid to act like the 
almighty superpower that it is ... The hidden hand of the market 
will never work without a hidden fist - McDonald's cannot flourish 
without McDonnell Douglas, the designer of the F- 15. And the 
hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's 
15 Gunrunners Gold: How the Public's Money Finances Arms Sales, pp. 35-42 (London: World 
Development Movement (WDM), 1995). 
16 Neil Cooper, 'The pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy', in Richard Little 
and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds. ), New Labour's Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? 
ýManchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
' Steven Staples, 'The Relationship between Globalisation and Militarism', Social Justice 
Magazine, 27: 4 (2000). 
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technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy 
and Marine Corps. " 
Military power protects overseas investments from national i satio n, conflict and 
indigenous uprisings. The corporate elite profit from the economic effects of 
globalisation yet are protected by the military sector from its violent effects. UK 
arms exported under New Labour may have been working to repress indigenous 
opposition to resource exploitation. They could maintain the rule of a recipient 
state elite who might give western corporations access to their resources. UK 
sourced exports could facilitate conflict that provides cover for resource 
exploitation or lead to the replacement of hostile leaders with those who are more 
favourable to the west and neo-liberal policies, encouraging further commercial 
expansion by western corporations. Post-conflict states typically offer low wages 
without western workers' rights protection, ideal for the manufacturing needs of 
western corporations. The role of UK exported arms in all of this is unclear but a 
number of recent cases may prove to be revealing. These include part UK owned 
Rio Tinto and BP's coal exploitation of Borneo at the Kaltim Prima coal mine. 
They include Rio Tinto's gold and copper mines and BP's gas plant at the 
Tangguh project in Bintuni Bay, Irian Jaya/West Papua. They include the work of 
12 UK-based multinationals including Barclays and DeBeers in their exploitation 
in the DRC of diamond and Coltan, a mineral needed to manufacture mobile 
phones and laptops. Without further research the true extent and the nature in 
which the non-military corporate community has profited under New Labour 
remains unclear. 
Another reason for apparent non-military sector complicity in the levels of arms 
export support received may lie in the idea that corporations coordinate. On large 
corporations, Mills pointed out in 1956 "would it not be strange if they did not 
consolidate themselves, but merely drifted along, doing the best they could". 19 
One indictor of coordination is interlocking directorships amongst the most 
powerful UK-based corporations. A study of interlocking directorships and the 
effects would require a thesis in its own right but as an illustration, appendix thirty 
three shows some of the directorships held by those who were Directors or Non- 
'8 Thomas Friedman, 'What the World Needs Now', New York Times, 28 th March 1999 as quoted 
by Karen Talbot, 'Backing up globalisation with military might', Covert Action Quarterly, 68 (1999). 
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Executive Directors of BAe Systems during 2004. At a minimum this kind of 
finding suggests formal linkages between corporations exist from which potential 
channels of communication are opened between industries. 
The findings of the first half of this thesis not only raises questions about the 
seemingly permissive approach of the non-military corporate constituency and 
what they might be gaining from UK arms exports but also raises question about 
the real costs of international arms control treaties. This is especially pertinent 
given the recent pressure on the international community to ratify an International 
Arms Trade Treaty. At present a coalition of specialist development and arms 
trade NGOs supported by 19 Nobel prize winning individuals and groups led by 
former President of Costa Rica Oscar Arias are pressing governments around 
the world to adopt an International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers based on 
existing principles of international law. This is the latest in a series of attempts to 
legally obligate all arms transferring states to work within a set of universally 
applied minimum standards. In particular these standards would prohibit the 
sales of arms where they could be used to commit serious violations of human 
rights and would include a presumption of denial where sustainable development 
and regional stability could be adversely affected. As of February 2004 the 
proposal had attracted the support of Brazil, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, 
Macedonia, Mali and the Netherlands, none of which are major arms exporters. 
The UK government supports a treaty in principle but only if it could attract the 
support of all major arms exporting states . 
20 An important contribution to the 
debate surrounding the treaty would be a reappraisal of the costs and benefits 
the UK is likely to derive from fully complying with the Code should it be agreed. 
The second half of the thesis highlights the need for further research on task 
forces, advisory groups and review groups. In order to properly monitor their 
impact on democratic accountability in the UK, a comprehensive list of all existing 
groups, their aims and their membership must be compiled and continuously 
19 Mills, The Power Elite, pp. 122-123. 
20 House of Commons Quadripartite Committee, First Joint Report: Strategic Export Controls - Annual Report for 2002, Licensing Policy and Parliamentary Scrutiny, 18th May 2004, HC 390, 
paragraph 175 <http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/cm2003O4/cmselect/cmintdev/390/39009. htm> Last accessed 181h May 2004. 
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monitored as and when further details are made public. Tony Barker engaged in 
just this kind of research in 1999. But a study which can offer a more 
contemporary list, an analysis of the changing nature of the task force 
phenomenon throughout Labour's two terms in office and a survey showing what 
kind of representatives make up the membership of these groups would be 
valuable. 21 
The second half of the thesis also drew heavily on the numbers and nature of 
personnel moving between arms-producing companies and government. 
Touched on here but not specifically focused on or comprehensively studied for 
reasons of space has been the numbers of military personnel passing through 
the revolving door between the forces and arms-producing companies. A study of 
this sort would complete an analysis of the three major groups involved in the 
arms export process. Such a study could be complemented by further 
comparative work looking at what kinds of relationships exist between these 
groups, between the military, political and arms-company elite, in other major 
arms exporting states. Hartung has undertaken extensive research on this issue 
in America but little work appears to have been undertaken to compare the UK 
with neighboring European exporters like France or Germany. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The relationship between UK-based arms-producing companies and New Labour 
represents a unique client/customer relationship. In principle, the government 
has absolute control over the commercial activities of an entire industry but the 
government re-empowers the position of industry by remaining publicly 
committed to a largely unsustainable set of rationales which claim that arms 
exports are crucial to the UK. Arms exporting companies and New Labour are so 
interconnected, their interests so bound up in each other that continuity in 
supportive export policy is to be expected. But these findings relate to more than 
just those who are concerned with UK involvement in the international arms 
market. They have relevance for those interested in the changing relationship 
' Tony Barker with lain Byrne and Anjuli Veall, Ruling by Task Force: Politico's Guide to Labour's New Elite (London: Politico's Publishing, 1999). 
224 
between the Labour Party and corporations, at how this corporate-party 
relationship has panned out now that Labour are in power, at the extent to which 
New Labour is a "party of business", why it remains so and what policies are in 
place as a result. For the arms industry this is clear. Support is offered at levels 
incomparable with almost all other UK-based industries for arms exports, exports 
which in both financial and political terms represent more clearly than ever 
before, a dead giveaway. 
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<http: //www. ox. ac. uk/gazette/1998-9/weekly/151098/news/story-l. htm> 
Unnamed, 'Light tanks and armoured vehicles', The Guardian, 25 th January 1999 
Unnamed, 'Jonathan Aitken: A Timeline', The Guardian, 4 th March 1999 
Unnamed, 'British Hawks flown over East Timor', BBC News Online, 31" August 1999, 
<http: //news. bbc-co. uk/hi/english/uk/newsid-434000/43420 l. stm> 
Unnamed, 'Safety scare grounds Lynx helicopters', BBC News online, 28 th April 2000 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk/729554. stm> 
Unnamed, 'Safety scare grounds RAF training fleet', BBC News online, 4 th September 
2000 <http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk/910396. stm> 
Unnamed, 'France pays heavy price for Armenian genocide recognition', The Guardian, 
14 th February 2001 
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Unnamed, 'Commons pension fund under fire', BBC news online, 24 th June 2001 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk_politics/1404629. stm> 
Unnamed, 'Britain ready to resume arms exports', The Jakarta Post, 29th August2001 
<http: //www. iansa. org/oIdsite/news/2001/aug_O1/brit-ready. htm> 
Unnamed, Socialist Worker, 'Blessed are the bomb makers', 1 9th January 2002 
<http: //www. socialistworker. co. uk/l 783/swl 7831 l. htm> 
Unnamed, 'One step ahead of the taxman, and it's legal', The Observer, 24 th February 
2002 
Unnamed, 'India Offered Training in the UK', Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 th March 2002 
Unamed, 'Defence exports - BAe Systems - Brief article', New Statesman, 8 th July 2002; 
Unnamed, 'Q&A: Arms equipment failures', BBC News Online, 1 st August 2002 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk/2165539. stm 
Unnamed, 'Peer Defends having 21 directorships', The Guardian, 13 th August2002 
Unnamed, 'John Howe on UK team', Thales Roundup, September 2002 
Unnamed, 'PR chief takes top tory strategy job', BBC news online, 1 1th December 2002 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk-politics/2567569. stm> 
Unnamed, 'Union anger stalls Labour funding deal', The Guardian, 24 th January 2003 
Unnamed, 'Bell Pottinger recruits Jennifer Gerber from UK Labour Party Press Office', 
The Public Affairs Newsletter, April 2003 <http: //www. bppa. co. uk/press. html> 
Unnamed, 'Boeing appointment bolsters UK presence', Flight International, 1-7 April 2003 
Unnamed, 'Boeing', Defence News, 7 th April 2003 
Unnamed, 'Alvis Vickers', Defence News, 21 sApril 2003 
Unnamed, 'BAe 'budget warning' over new aircraft carriers', The Guardian, 14"'July 2003 
Unnamed, 'Parker takes pole position at BAe', Daily Mail, 12 th January 2004 
Unnamed, 'Labour dominates new Peers list', BBC News Online, 1 s, May 2004 
<http: //news. bbc-co. uk/l/hi/uk_politics/3674543. stm> 
Unnamed, 'An arms sales ban would cost nothing', The New Statesman, 14 th June 2004 
Unnamed, 'Lord Barry Jones', BBC Wales, 
<http: //www. bbc. co. uk/wales/northeast/guides/halloffame/public_life/lord-barry_jones. sht 
ml> 
Unnamed, 'Improving the democratic process with Projectplace 
<http: //www. projectplace. co. uk/case/case/IPT. htm> 
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Unnamed, ' Results and Constituencies' BBC News 
<http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/static/vote200 1 /results- constituencies/constituencies/1 
36. stm> 












-0 7C3 -0 
c) C\j Ul- 








(D :3 r r 9) 0 C -ý 2c 





(D 0 2 
0 
2 - r "' 
0 




. 0 . 0 
_ 
CL Z 'In U) Z Z Z 
< 
Co Co 73 -0 -0 -0 '0 










CD FD ý c u) (n 
CD (n (0 
0 ä 0 0 0 0 L) C) 0 (1 
t 'ö Z) Z 
Z Z Z Z 







E cm 9 C, ý CD 0 Q) 
a 




(n ca CL 
Z) , :ý g 0 Z 
.- >- 




.-> -a 2 m 2 '0 2 2 2 
0 
















tn 0U cn 
cm 





0 0 0 
u 0 = rL 0 Z Z Z 15 Z t Z (D 
t v5 
0 

















0 !3 0 
z, E E r- C) 














0 0 0 ý2 k> 
E 
(D -F0 b- > 
r 2 0 .2 
A 9 
, CI) > 
. 













0 Ln (A 2 -T 2 
E ia 



































a) E 12 -0 0 
E CL 
E0 
(0 >, Q) 
(L) 10 
-0 i k-Z (L) --. 




'Z crm 0 
:3 C) -0 6 cy) -; -- Q) ý; - LL- (0 U) 
," -0 Z -0 o a) - 
r a) :3> 
0- -a Q) -r- c2.0 , '= U) Q) = 
r-- U-an 
E ho M ýID - 
CD (U > C: ) 
. cr) - CU a) cm= m- 
Q) 
.2 0m 
ýE :, -0 E 0E cn 0Z 
u) 
E :3 (3 
ü '0 eq- in Z 13- :3 a- Q) u) . Cr 





'21 C, 4 
,D- C) T» 
-0 C. ) 
C3) CY) . - 









.N -0 -0 91 cis 1) (2 0 70 CD CD 
-g -g c 
00 
zz 
C(0 U) D0 
E 
cz 




- '5 -0 
E 

















-6 C(nz C: Cl- V5 
W CD 0 'tý =E 0- 
L) - a) C 











CO (3) -a C) 
Eu CL Z5 CL - 
0) 






m Z -0 
CU 
.2 0 cz 
'n co CD 
M0 
cli 
0 Q- V; (. 0 
E q)' jz '0- 7 L) -- ca- c 
-6 E 
c U) 0 
-, r :ý!; CL 5 C) 0 () 
0 
a- 0 (L) 
x 
UJ 0 - CZ 0) Ea "I' 
a) .- :D > cz M C)) 0Z a) C: Q 




E i5 CL 
0 ca Cc C. ) >x >1 iý: 0) CU (D "0 
co E 
(Z 0 cn a) 
CZ 0 





0ý Z5 - _0 (1) U) cc CU '0 0- c 'iE 
(D > 0> 
x cz 
CD 0)- 
-0 (n W W0 cn -Z: ' cli 
42) >, ts 5, 
> C: !E0 





rC 4) 4) U 
CL r- 16 

















00 1: t It U cn C o 
I 
C ) M ( ) LI) r W . - 'i 2 73 (1) L) - Z 
D 
0 IL 0 
o Lq CD C: ) Lo 
LO C\l to C\j Lo U') LO LO 
LO C\j C) LO Cý LO C\j U') CD Lr) LQ Lcý C\j C) t >. CL 0.2 C\J 6 CY5 6 cz; C; Lr) Lo 6 cý 
CD C: ) 6 (. 6 C5 6 CL 
cd _j LU 
v v v v v v 
c, Cl r 4) a) a) CD CD (D (A M 
4) CM 
I 










- C') C\j m 0 
c CD 9 
o 4) 
c; .2 
z z z z z 'D ýo -s ' . 4) C) - Z 4) Vi 0) Ivi a) T t5 t5 
M 
0 CL 





C) c 0 
LD 0 Lr) C\l 
Lf) C\j 0 C) q q q 
U ) 
U') LO Cý Cý 
z 
> 
0 Ci C\j C) 0 0 C\j 00 
q 
co (. 0 C\j C\j CD (6 (C) C\j (D 0 CL 
cd LU 






c ID (1) CD (3) 











. - z z N C j cm d 
z V) 
z B 
> - a. Cý 




0 C5 c; ý2 C\J "': Lri CD ui 
Cý 
-: 0 C\l 6 :! l C l cý ! !ý C\j 6 0 O > O in - 0 c v v v (D - - Z cm v \ : v Z 
l U. C', 3: 0 (D Z 0 00 C (D C0 CD 0 1 C. 4 1 . 2L c '*' r, (1) C\1 - C\j LO C\j CY) C) C: 0 LO r- - LO r- CY) It CY) CY) CY) 1 5 o 4) C\j C\J - 'D - - - C\j - M - - c 
41) E 62 (1) (D IV) v 




Cý LO cq C) LO C\l LO U) C\j LO CD 06 C) i U') 6 
o LO C\l Lo N (1) C: CD LO C\j Cý C? LO ('ý C: 
> CL U) j 
Lf) (y) 6 6 0 6 Lr ci C; ci 0 Z C) - Lci 6 LO r- c) FZ CL cc 
_ UJ v v v v V v v Z 
C) CD 0 C) 0 C) 0 
CD C) 0 
0 CD 
C) C) 
Z E> C C) 0 0 0 o CD Cý 25 C) - 6 
0 Cý 
- 
C) 0 U) c = 0 0 q C: ý 
0 C: ) 0 C:: > 6 C) CD 0 CD 0 C: > C) C) C CZ) 
& 
C) o 0 o 0 U') C) (D ýý C) C) 0 CD C) z 75 V- w 
Cý o 0 0 CT CY) co C9 Cý o 25 0 (D 0 V) C\1 C) o cf) q CD CD (Z) cD 





C:, C) Ci q A A A 0 A A 
Cý 
Cý A 7 A A 
Ni 0 
A ' o & LO 
0 
- 0 E 
0 
Cl) 
co (1) 0 LO DI 
X LU 
ui 









0 o c) cý CD CD C> CD C: ) C) C) (D C) CD C) 
2 

















A A 7 A A A CY) A A 
7 
A A v A A A A A A A LIJ rN 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Is t C) 00 CY) 00 ýt CY) (Y) 0 r- CF) 0 (3) 7 0 0) Cl) co o U-) - - r- = 0) 0) Co rl (c 00 co C) a) 0) 0) 0) 




(3) (3) w 0 
. . 



























Ca -0 . fu E' 
0 m - , -Vý L -ýc C: EE Cuff 
M -O 0 (r 
0 
(1) M .- -0 . - cj) -S :3 o m - 
(1) 
Z C) -sc, ý- c 
5 
(3) 
O 'D ,E co E 0 cz j cz = ::?, -c 
C: a) cz 
m 
, cu .- . S? 6. c: > --j 
(1) 
in c Z) c 
ý 
ý 
EL C: 0 - .9 
05 m0 c = I- - - -. 5 (n - cU , -2) 3: (1) Z6 2 
- (3) 
- 
- , ) CU M , - b C) 0 < 
C/) _ 0 r m :2 , .: t Cc ch ( C 
62 Z3 
Cm . 
ffi :3 CD -V) 
a) 2 0) a cu 
U) E 'D cn i2 
D c 0 '0 
CL 0 c Eo (5 - if) D- mý ca -CL ýR _C ) 0 70 C - cl) ca- M Z 
I 
C 
I a- C: 
- 
0 




. . -- I 1 1 1 1 - 
-i LA I I I I I 
All EXPERIENCI NG LOW INTENSITY CONF LICT DURING 2001-2(W2 
Value of licences 
approved during 2002 
value of licences 
approved during 2001 
value of licences 
approved uring 2000 
Value of ficences 
approve uring 1999 
State SIELs (GBP 
millions) 















No. of nevb 
Open 
licences 
Central an South rn America 
Columbia n ,)5 22 <0.25 15 2.0 5 <0.25 
26 
Ilomirmarl H., I) n 8 0.0 1 <0.25 None <0.25 6 
Haitl () 3 Not listed Not listed 0.0 4 
Honduras n 2s 8 <0 
= 2 0.00 1 <0.25 5 
Janillic"I r) 25 10 1 1.0 51 <0.25 11 0.5 1 i 
C, 
Wes =, entral and Eastern turo 
AzoibaijIm n 25 15 <0,25 4 <0.25 2 <0.25 ic 
Atnieni, i r0 5 0.0 0 <0.25 None 0,5 None 
lvlacodooia nn 4 1.0 0 <0.25 None 2,0 3 
Turkey 2, .5 76 179.0 72 34.0 37 188,0 6Z 
F 71-1 S7,771 X 
Monlorwqro 3 7 0.5 None 4.5 1 2.0 2 
Sub-Sahara Africa 
-- (', anlo. roorl 
--F-i n <0 25-T 3 <0.25 
T2 0.0 
Ciinlfýil Attw, w Hop Not listed ot listed N Not listed <0.25 
Holmhh( of 0n 4 _ 0.0 2 <0.25 None 1.0 6 
DHC n 25 7 0.0 2 <0.25 None 0.0 5 
Ivory Coast 25 13 <0.25 8 0.00 1 <0.25 10, 
Kony, i 0 22 25 1 30 1.5 13 0.5 -; 
7 
L ibe fa Not hsted Not listed Not l isted 2 
Nigona 70 13 10,0 9 4.5 2 6.0 8 
Senegal n 25 4 0.0 1 <0.25 None <0.25 8 
Sorymha 025 2 <0.25 None Not listed <0ý25 2 
Sotiff, Atfica 45 5 95 29.0 96 63.5 52 11,0 65 
T; wzania . -n 25 9 19.5 2 <0.25 3 0.5 11 
Uganda -n 25 1 <0.25 1 <0.25 3 <0ý25 4 
North Africa and M iddle East 
Algeria 10 5 10 5.0 13 2,0 4 5.5 1-5 
Iran 11 0 2 19.5 0 12.0 1 39.0 None 
raq 20 None <0.25 0 <0.25 None <0,25 None 
Iran 11n 2 19.5 0 12.0 1 39.0 None 
Atghamstafi n, 5 1 <0.25 None <0.25 None <0.25 1 
Iran _ 11n 2 19.5 0 12.0 1 39,0 None 
Pakistan 15 0 13 14.0 20 6.0 3 11.5 38 
Iran 11 0 2 19.5 0 12.0 1 39.0 None 
Iraq 2n None <0.25 0 None None 
job, -inori 110 11 <0.25 3 2.0 4 5 
7 
Palestine I Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed 
Geniral ana 5ou1n Asia 
Bangladesh 90 23 1.5 15 1.0 4 5ýO 26 
India 1180 62 62.5 66 64.5 34 57.5 -11 
Kyrgy,, slan n 25 None 2.0 1 Not listed 1,5 1 
Nepal 0546.0 1 1,0 None 1.0 4 
Pakistan 150 13 14.0 20 6.0 3 11.5 38 
Tajilkstan 00 2 <0.25 1 <0.25 None 0.0 3 
Wbekisl 0050.0 5 1.5 None 2.0 7 
Far East ana 1MW- 
Indonesia 41 0 15 15.5 6 2.0 None 2ýO 32 
Burnia no 2 1 <0.25 None <0.25 None <0.25 2 
PI, 1111ppines < 34 2ýO 26 2.0 17 1.5 36 
Sot)rces: Data derived trom World Conflict Map (cols. 1-4). Strategic Export Control Reports '99, '00. '01 and '02 lcols 5 71 
Only the AnnLial Strateqic Export Control Reports published between 1999-2002 detail the values of SIELS Previous reporls 
published by the government in 1997 arid 1998 only specifies how many licensing decisions were authorised without lurlher de'la 
All are available at http www, fco. gov uk. 262 
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TOTAL SIELs approved 
2002 2001 2000 1999 
Afghanistan 
Albania <0.25 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antiga and Barbuda <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Argentina 1.5 1.0 7.5 <0.25 
Aruba <0.25 
Australia 16.0 25.0 20.0 77.0 
Austria 2.0 5.0 9.0 3.5 
Azores <0.25 
Bahamas 11.0 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Bahrain 3.0 4.5 3.0 1.5 
Barbados 0.5 <0.25 2.0 <0.25 
Belarus <0.25 0.0 
Belgium 4.0 16.0 7.0 22.5 
Belize <0.25 <0.25 
Bermuda <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Bhutan <0.25 
Bolivia 11.5 <0.25 
Bosnia <0.25 <0.25 3.0 
Botswana 1.0 4.5 2.0 3.5 
Brazil 11.5 73.0 22.5 82.0 
British Virgin Islands <0.25 
Brunei 5.5 1.5 3.5 6.0 
Bulgaria 1.5 0.5 1.5 <0.25 
Burkina Faso 
U. _j 
Cambodia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Canada 19.0 43.0 14.5 212.0 
Canary Islands <0.25 
Cayman Islands <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Channel Islands 1.0 2.0 0.5 
Chile 0.5 1.5 1.5 2.0 
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Costa Rica <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Croatia 1.5 1.0 <0.25 7.0 
Cuba <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Cyprus 0.5 10.0 1.0 2.0 
Czech Republic 4.0 5.5 14.0 10.0 
Denmark 3.0 5.5 38.5 4.5 
East Timor <0.25 <0.25 
Ecuador 0.5 <0.25 <0.25 0.5 
Egypt 27.5 7.5 36.5 14.0 
El Salvador <0.25 0.5 <0.25 <0.25 
Equatorial Guinea 1.0 1.0 
Eritrea 1.5 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Estonia 1.5 2.0 1.0 <0.25 
Ethiopia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Falkland islands <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Faroe Islands <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Fiji <0.25 <0.25 
Finland 5.5 4.5 54.5 4.5 
France 170.0 33.5 157.5 83.5 
French Guyana 
FOT <0.25 <0.25 
Gabon 0.5 3.5 1.5 <0.25 
Gambia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Georgia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <025 
Germany 81.0 30.0 48.5 170.0 
Ghana <0.25 1.0 0.5 4.5 
Gibraltar 4.5 <0.25 
Greece 36.0 5.5 229.5 14.0 
Greenland <0.25 
Grenada <0.25 <0.25 
Guatemala <0.25 
Guam <0.25 
Guyana <0.25 2.0 <0.25 
Honduras <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Hong Kong 2.5 4.0 5.0 3.5 
Hungary 2.5 1.0 4.5 1.0 
Iceland <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 1.5 
a. C.; 62-1 6 -1. 57.5 
c 41.0 15.5 '. 0 L 2.0 
Iran 11.0 19.5 12.0 39.0 
Iraq 2.0 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Ireland 4.0 4.5 33.5 16.0 
I G. 0 2', l - ýý, _ __ __ 
12. -5 11.5 
264 
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Ivory Coast <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Japan 53.5 49.5 40.0 45.0 
Jordan 17.5 55.5 12.0 3.5 
Kazakhstan 4.5 3.0 6.0 17.5 
North Korea <0.25 <0.25 
South Korea 61.0 161.5 30.0 353.0 
Kuwait 14.5 16.0 21.5 75.0 
Kyrgyzstan <0.25 2.0 1.5 
Lao <0.25 <0.25 
Latvia 0.5 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Lesotho <0.25 
Libya <0.25 2.0 0.5 6.5 
Liechtenstein <0.25 
Lithuania 0.5 1.0 1.5 <0.25 
Luxembourg 0.5 4.0 2.0 3.0 
Macau <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Malawi <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Malaysia 67.5 23.0 138.5 495.5 
Maldives <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Malta 4.5 1.0 <0.25 1.5 
Mauitius 1.5 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Mexico 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 
Moldova <0.25 
Mongolia <0.25 <0.25 
Monserrat <0.25 
Morocco 20.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 
Mozambique <0.25 <0.25 0.5 <0.25 
Namibia <0.25 <0.25 1.0 <0.25 
6,0 1 
Netherlands 61.0 19.5 44.5 52.5 
Netherlands Antilles <0.25 <0.25 
New Zealand 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.5 
Niq, ýý :, ,ý 
-1.0 161 ýo 4., ý f-ýA 
Norway 8.5 11.5 7.5 14.5 
Oman 304.0 121.0 96.5 65.0 
Pak! ýAý 15,0 - -14.0 _6 ki, 
11.1-1 
Panama <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Papua New Guinea <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Paraguay <0.25 <0.25 
Peru <0.25 2.5 0.5 
Phihppines . 0.25 C, -) 0 - 
Poland 6.0 5.5 24.0 18.5 
Portuaal 1.0 3.5 1.0 2.5 
Puerto Rico <0.25 <0.25 
Qatar 3.0 1.5 3.5 1.0 
Romania 3.5 10.5 5.0 4.5 
. Russi, i 
35.0 17,0 ,- 1ý f ', I 12... 5 
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2002 2001 2000 1999 
Saudi Arabia 29.0 20.5 13.0 8.0 
Serbia and Mont. 3.0 
Singapore 24.0 38.5 27.5 29.0 
Slovakia 1.5 <0.25 1.5 0.5 
Slovenia 1.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 
Somalia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
South Africa 45.5 29.0 63.5 11.0 
Spain 20.0 13.5 48.0 8.0 
St Helena <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
St Luba <0.25 
St Vincent <0.25 
Swaziland <0.25 <0.25 
Sweden 48.0 24.5 16.5 43.5 
Switzerland 60.5 8.0 11.5 53.0 
Syria <0.25 0.5 <0.25 1.0 
Taiwan 37.0 86.0 35.5 180.0 
T f7, 
Thailand 7.5 27.0 3.5 27.0 
Togo <0.25 
Trinidad and Tobago <0.25 <0.25 1.5 <0.25 
Tunisia 1.0 1.5 <0.25 1.0 
Turkmenistan <0.25 <0.25 
Turks and Caicos Islands <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
Ukraine 1.5 1.0 10.0 <0.25 
UAE 18.5 81.5 48.0 174.5 
USA 256.5 304.5 367.5 350.5 
Uruguay 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.0 
ta n ý, k) Iý 20 
Venezuela 1.5 2.5 13.0 3.5 
Vietnam 2.0 <0.25 <0.25 0.5 
Yemen <0.25 0.5 <0.25 0.5 
FP01 0 :7 FT 20 
Zambia <0.25 3.5 1.5 0.5 
Zimbabwe <0.25 1.0 <0.25 
Total excluding 
values <0.25 
1928.5 1853.5 2021.0 3166.0 
and 353.0 435.0 255.0 367.5 
Non-Conflict 1575.5 1418.5 1766.0 2798.5 
JTotal 1928.5 1853.5 2021.0 3166.0 
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Military sales as 
% of total sales 
Employees In Uk- 
BAE Systems 12,145 76% 43,100 
Rolls-Royce 5,788 32% 22,000 
GKN 4,452 28% 10,900 
Smiths Group 3,070 29% 9,200 
Vosper 476 71% 7,500 
Cobham 735 49% 4,149 
Ultra Electronics 240 77% 2,376 
Alvis 226 100% 1,100 
Meggitt 435 23% 4,328 
Source: CAAT' 
CAAT, 'Companies' <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications. php> Last accessed 3 rd October 2003 
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APPENDIX FIVE: 
Briefing of the maaor arms-producing companies and associated qroups 
mentioned in the thesis 
BAE Systems, whose motto is "innovating for a safer world" is 
the largest UK-based arms-producing company and the third largest globally. 
78% of the $18.5 million worth of sales made in 2000 were from arms sales. 6 
BAE Systems sells completed weapons systems including air, land and sea 
capabilities. Air capabilities include the Tornado, the Hawk and the Eurofighter 
Typhoon as a major partner, head up displays, military helicopter avionics, and 
navigation systems. Land capabilities include electronic identification systems, 
battlefield radar, battlefield communication, artillery and guided weapons. Sea 
capabilities include the UK Navy's Type 45 destroyer, the three new Astute Class 
submarines and the Future Carrier Project. ' 
BAE Systems has joint ventures or is a major shareholder in hundreds of 
companies. It fully owns ammunitions firm RO Defence 8 it ýointly owns Grippen 
International - the prime contractor for the Grippen aircraft, the military 
electronics firm Alenia Marconi Systems, " Navy ship repair firm Fleet Support 
Limited" and training firm Flagship Training. 12 BAE Systems holds a 37.5% stake 
in missile systems firm MBDA, 13 35% of high-tech manufacturer SAAB 
technologies 14 and 33% of Eurofighter GmbH, the consortium established to 
handle the management and production of the Eurofighter. 15 It is increasingly 
moving into the American market in the form of BAE Systems North America. 
BAE Systems is designing and manufacturing the rear fuselage stabilisiers and is 
involved in the avionics of the cost-plus contract for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
programme. 16 With a 20% interest in the passenger airline manufacturer Airbus, 
a joint venture with EADS established in 1970, BAE Systems is also involved in 
civil aerospace. 17 
6 SIPRI , 'The 100 
largest arms-producing companies in the OECD and clevelopin 
ly 
countries, 
2000', <http: //projects. sipri. se/milex/aprod/1001argest2000. pdf> Last accessed 28 April 2004 
7 BAe Systems, 'Capabilities' <http: //www. baesystems. com/capabilities/index. htm> Last accessed 
28 th April 2004 
' BAe Systems, 'Operational/Capital/Services: RO Defence' 
<http: //www. baesystems-com/ocs/others/rodefence> Last accessed 281h April 2004 
9 BAe Systems, 'International Partnerships: Gripen International' 
th <http: //www. baesystems. com/ocs/intpartners/gripen. htm> Last accessed 28 April 2004 
10 AMS, 'About AMS'<http: //www. amsjv. com/html 
- 
eng/default. asp> Last accessed 28" April 2004 
11 Fleet Support, 'Welcome' <http: //www. fleet-support. co. uk> Last accessed 28 th April 2004 
12 BAe Systems, 'BAe Systems and VT Group extend shareholding in Flagship' 
th <http: //www. baesystems. com/newsroom/2002/sep/260902newsl. htm> Last accessed 24 May 
2004 
13 BAe Systems, 'International Partnerships: MBDA' 
91h <http: //www. baesystems. com/ocs/intpartners/mbda. htm> Last accessed 2 April 2004 
14 BAe International Partnerships: SAAB <http: //www. baesystems. com/ocs/intpartners/saab. htm> 
Last accessed 29th April 2004 
15 Eurotighter GmbH, 'The organisation'<http: //www. eurofighter. com/Organisation/> Last accessed 
25 1h May 2004 
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BAE Systems is no stranger to controversy. From the 1980s British Aerospace 
have been the main beneficiaries of the two UK-Saudi Al Yamamah deals from 
which BAE Systems have reportedly been making E2 billion a year. " in 1996 
four women were found not guilty of illegal entry and criminal damage after three 
caused damages costing f-1.5 million to a Hawk destined for Indonesia. At their 
trail they defended their actions by arguing that they were disarming a fighter 
plane destined to be used against the civilians of East Timor and in doing so that 
they were legally "using reasonable force to prevent a greater crime", that of 
genocide. 19 In September 1999 the then Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry Stephen Byers rejected the advice of John Bridgeman, the Direct 
General of Fair Trading, to refer the purchase of GEC Marconi by British 
Aerospace to the Competition Commission. 20 Until the end of 2002 BAE Systems 
owned small arms manufacturer Heckler and Koch which enjoy licenced 
production agreement of their MP5 sub-machine guns and G3 rifles in Burma 
and Turkey. In 2001 the DTI issued BAE Systems with a licence allowing it to 
export a E28 million air traffic control system to Tanzania, one of the poorest 
countries in the world despite opposition from Clare Short, Gordon Brown the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation and the World Bank. To add to the 
controversy, Barclays lent Tanzania money at concessional rates to enter into 
the deal at a time when Barclays owned 93,632,529 ordinary shares in BAE 
Systems and shortly after the bank secured a banking licence to work within 
Tanzania 
. 
21 In 2002 a two year investigation by the Jersey attorney-General into 
trusts set up by the Foreign Minister of Qatar linked to the alleged payment of E7 
million from BAE Systems to secure large arms contracts was suddenly dropped. 
He said that the investigation was not in "the public interest" and may "adversely 
affect relations" after the minister donated C6 million to Jersey for "damage 
perceived to have been sustained in the events that have happened. 122 Between 
December 2000 and February 2003,12 separate ministerial visits took place 
during which the Indian government were reportedly pressed to agreed to the 
purchase of 60 BAE Systems Hawks at a time when Blair hoped that the UK "can 
have a calming influence" on tense India-Pakistan relations. 23 During the April 
2003 AGM, the then Chair of BAE Systems Dick Evans confirmed that BAE 
Systems had been making depleted uranium ammunition up until "several years 
24 ago". A sub group of the UN Human Rights Committee had classed "depleted" 
Uranium weapons together with nuclear, chemical, biological and cluster 
weapons as "weapons of indiscriminate effect .,, 
2 5 Last September The Sunday 
Times published an article alleging that BAE Systems had paid a company to 
18 Friends of the Earth, 'UK Democracy PLC' 
<http: //www. foe. co. uk/pubsinfo/briefings/html/20020618112555. html> Last accessed 29th April 
2004 
'9 Ploughshares Action, 'Seeds of Hope-East Timor Ploughshares, 
<http: //www. plowsharesactions. org/webpages/weba-htm> Last accessed 29 th April 2004 
20 Red-Star- Research, 'British Aerospace/BAe' 
21 Barclays owned 93,632,529 shares in BAe as at September 2001. House of Commons, Hansard, 
25th June 2002, columns 228-233 
22 Anthony Barnett and Conal Walsh, 'Straw faces grilling on arms 'bribes', The Observer, 9th June 
2002 
23 Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, 'The Political Influence of Arms Companies', 
April 2003 <http: //www. caat. org. uk/information/publications/other/political-influence-0403. pdf> 2' Dick Evans, BAe AGM, Queen Elizabeth 11 Conference Centre, London, 291h April 2003 
" Campaign Against Depleted Uranium, 'Introduction' <http: //www. cadu. org. uk/intro. htm> Last 
accessed 29'h April2004 
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employ spies who had successfully infiltrated CAAT. When asked directly "Has 
BAE Systems paid for information on CAATT' during BAE Systems'2004 AGM, 
then BAE Systems Chair Dick Evans' reply "I'm not going to answer that" spoke 
for itse If. 26 
ruwý the car business, Rolls Royce is Rolls-Royce A separate entity from the second largest arms-producing company based in 
the UK. It employs 35,000 people worldwide, 21,000 in the UK. 27 Rolls Royce's 
total sales in 2000 were worth $8,890,24% of which were military sales . 
28 Rolls 
Royce does not produce end products like BAE Systems but supplies essential 
parts to weapons systems. The company engineers, sells and provides after 
sales care to 25% of all engines used in military aircraft. Rolls Royce engines 
power fighters like the Hawk, combat helicopters like the AgustaWestland 
EH101, the UK Apache and half military transport aircraft. The company also has 
a major stake in the Eurofighter and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. 29 It has also 
become involved in marine propulsion systems. It is developing all those required 
for Royal Navy platforms including the Type 45 Destroyer, the Future Carrier and 
the Future Attack submarine. In 1998 the company won the contract to supply 
the Navy's new Astute class nuclear submarines with reactors. 30 
Like BAE Systems, Rolls Royce is no stranger to controversy. The company was 
facing an appearance in the High Court in 2003 to face charges that it offered a 
C 15 million bribe in order to win the contract for a gas-fired Indian power station 
in 1993. The bribe was allegedly paid to a company controlled by Kishan Rao. 
Rao was also the Managing Director of power plant company, Spectrum Power 
responsible for issuing the contract . 
31 In 2002 Rolls-Royce investors were calling 
for the removal of Chairman Ralph Robins in the face of alleged irregular 
accounting procedures although the company claims it's practices are 
unimpeachable. 32 
In March 2001 Channel Four News exposed how Rolls Royce has supplied 34 
diesel engines used to pump oil along a Sudanese oil pipeline in the Western 
Upper Nile. The company also provided engineers to maintain the pipeline. Both 
are vital for the continued flow of oil. The pipeline was built following a 'scorched 
earth campaign' conducted by the Sudanese government in which at least 
55,000 Sudanese villagers have been made homeless and some reportedly 
murdered. All were villages lying near a 50 mile road leading to what European 
firms have called excellent quality oil. The profits from the estimated 2 billion 
barrels of oil which could be sold are being ploughed back into indigenous 
Sudanese arms production that supplies troops involved in the 20 year civil war 
and for further arms imports. Christian Aid, in their report, The Scorched Earth: 
26 Dick Evans, BAe AGM, Queen Elizabeth 11 Conference Centre, London, 5 th May 2004 
27 Rolls Royce, 'Overview' <http: //www. rolls-royce. com/about/overview/detault. jsp> Last accessed 
29'h April 2004 
28 SIPRI 
, 'The 100 
largest arms-producing companies' 
'9 Rolls Royce, 'Defence Aerospace' <http: //www. rolls-royce. com/defence-aerospace/default. jsp> 
Last accessed 29th April 2004 
h Rolls Royce, 'Marine' <http: //www2. rolls-royce. com> Last accessed 2 April 2004 
Anthony Barnett, 'Rolls-Royce accused of bribery', The Observer, 2 nd February 2003 
32 Julia Finch, 'Investors seek Rolls Chairman's scalp', The Observer, 15 th February 2002 
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Oil and War in Sudan, asked all companies, including Rolls Royce, to suspend 
their involvement in their fields immediately on the basis that they were 
33 bestowing legitimacy on the actions of the Sudanese government. Rolls Royce 
refuse to comment on whether they still operate in Sudan. 
GKN is the third largest UK-based arms-producing 
company employing 43,000 worldwide. Total sales in 
34 
GKN pie 
2000 were US$7,700,23% of which were arms sales. 
GKN acts as a first tier supplier though GKN Aerospace 
Services which supplies components and design services 
to military aircraft including the Eurofighter and the F22. But GKN's 50% stake in 
the world's second largest helicopter firm, AgustaWestland, also makes it a prime 
contractor. Augusta's products include EM 01 machines for the Royal Navy and 31 Airforce and the Apache, made under licence from Boeing. 
It was GKN subsidiary Glover Webb which made 303 Tactica armoured vehicles 
exported to Indonesia in the mid 1990s subsequently used against pro- 
36 democracy demonstrators in 1996 in which protesters were killed and injured. 
GKN sold this part of the business to armoured vehicle manufacturer Alvis in 
1998. GKN retained a 30% shareholding but exited the entire market when it 31 finally sold its 29% share in Alvis to BAE Systems in 2003. 
Up until 1999 Marconi was listed as the fourth largest arms 
., 06ýa rco nj 
related company in the UK. In the 1990s, the GEC empire 
owned a number of companies which went under the 
Marconi name. GEC had made steady profits under its previous Managing 
Director, Arnold Weinstock. The company reportedly enjoyed close relationships 
with successive governments, a relationship that helped the company to attract 
cost-plus equipment contracting with the MoD. GEC lost the bulk of its lucrative 
military work when Lord Simpson cle-merged GEC from Marconi Electronic 
Systems in 199938 and sold it to BAE Systems that represented almost all of 
GEC's involvement in the military sector. GEC then renamed itself Marconi, in 
part to resolve a dispute with the General Electric Company in America over 
trade names. Marconi then went on to merge with British Aerospace to form BAE 
Systems. The limited military communications work that remained was sold off to 
39 Italian firm Finmeccanica in 2002 . 
33 Julie Flint, 'British firms fan flames of war', The Observer, 11 th March 2001; Christian Aid, 'The 
scorched earth: oil and war in Sudan', <http: //www. christian- 
aid. org. ukýindepth/0103suda/sudanoil. htm> Last accessed 291h April 2004 
34 SIPRI , 'The 100 largest arms-producing companies' 35 GKN, 'This is GKN'<http: //www. gknplc. com> Last accessed 29th Apri12003 
36 Mark Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales, p. 169 
37 GKN, 'History' <http: //www. gknplc. com/Groupoverview/History. asp> Last accessed 29" April 
2004; GKN News, 'GKN Sells Alvis Stake for C73 million' 
<http: //www. gknplc. com/news/NewsItem. asp? LastPage=Search&NewsID=209> Last accessed 291h April 2004 
38 Telegraph online, 'Lord Weinstock', 24 th July 2002 
<http: //www. telegraph. co. uk/news/main. jhtml? xml=`/`2Fnews`/`2F2002`/`2FO7ý/ý2F24ý/`2Fdb2401. x 
ml> Last accessed 23 rd December 2003 
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Smiths Group PIc is an engineering firm involved in four 
sectors, one of which is aerospace. Military related sales 
mainly relate to the Aerospace division that supplies large 
prime contractors with parts, an activity that contributes 31 % of company 
turnover . 
40 These supplies include the propellers on the C1 30-J Hercules 
Transport, electrical systems of the Apache helicopter, a range of systems in the 
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the GKN Westland Super Lynx, the SAAB JAS 39 
Gripen, BAE Systems Hawks, the Eurofighter and many other military 
helicopters, combat and transport planes. " Smiths also provide components and 
systems on all major military turbine engines. Major customers include BAE 
Systems, Rolls-Royce, Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon. Smiths merged 
42 with the TI Group in 2000. The TI Group owned Matrix Churchill until 1997, the 
company which became famous in the arms to Iraq scandal. 
Insys Ltd. was formed after a management buyout of 
Hunting Engineering Ltd. from Hunting Pic after the latter 
decided to concentrate on its oil interests . 
43 Insys designs 
and develops weapons systems and installs military 
communications systems. The company were involved in the development of 
BL755 anti-armour cluster bombS44 and also tests mobile rocket launchers along 
with developing and testing warhead designs. Hunting Engineering were involved 
in the European consortium making the Multiple Launch Rocket System which 
15 propels the AT2 anti-tanks land mine. 
Devonport Management both owns and runs Devonport 
Royal Dockyard in Plymouth The yard services and 
updates the Navy's submarines and warships. It is the 
major support contractor to the UK Navy employing 4,800 
people. In 1987 Devonport Dockyards began to be run by 
Devonport Management after the government decided to allow a private 
management firm to run the yard to improve productivity and make further 
investment with the hope of reducing the Navy's procurement costs. In 1997, 
Devonport Management bought the yard . 
46 Devonport now refit the new 
Vanguard Trident-carrying submarines, a contract which came about via a 
dramatic U-turn by the government which had already authorised that work start 
on facilities to refit the Vanguard submarines at Rosyth. This followed two years 
of intense lobbying by Devonport Management after it realised that a reduction in 
40 Smiths Aerospace, 'Financial Information' <http: //www. smiths-aerospace. com/about/financial/> 
Last accessed 2 9th April 2004 
41 Smiths Aerospace 'Products' <http: //www. smiths-aerospace. com/Products/> Last accessed 29'h 
Apri12004 
42 Smiths Aerospace 'History' <http: //www. smiths-aerospace. com/about/history/> Last accessed 
29 th April 2004 
43 The Defence Suppliers Directory, 'INSYS' 
9th <http: //www. armedforces. co. uk/companies/raq3f7O542b5d6fe> Last accessed 2 Apri12004 
44 Oxfam, 'Eritrean Refugees live among UK cluster bombs' 
<http: //www. oxfam. org. uk/what_you-can_do/campaign/conflict/cases/eritrea. html> Last accessed 
29 th April 2004 
1h '5 Paul Donovan, 'Making a Killing', The Guardian, 7 February 2001 
46 DIVIL Devonport, 'About DML'<http: //www. devonport. co. uk/about-toplevel. htm> Last accessed 
29 th April 2004 
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the Navy fleet meant that only one of the two existing yards would be required in 
the future and as such the Vanguard contract was essential. 
The company itself is owned by three shareholders - Halliburton KBR (51 %), 
Balfour Beatty (24,5%) and The Weir Group (24.5%). 47 Halliburton is famous for 
its top level links with US governments. Halliburton was reportedly paid tens of 
millions of dollars by the Pentagon to build roads and military bases in southern 
Vietnam from 1962 - 1972. It was also reportedly one of the main companies 
involved in building the Diego Garcia air base on a forcibly depopulated Indian 
Ocean island. In the early 1990s, Dick Cheney as US secretary of State for 
Defence gave Halliburton US army contracts. On leaving the Pentagon he 
became Halliburton's CEO until he left in 2000 to become the Vice President. 
Cheney declared in 2001 that he was being paid up to $1 million per year by 
Halliburton. 
A CorpWatch report claims that more recently Halliburton's subsidiary Brown and 
Root received $16 million for the contract they won to build the Guantanamo Bay 
detention centre for allegedly Taliban prisoners who are kept in conditions almost 
universally condemned. Brown and Root have been investigated by the 
Government Accounting Office for huge over billing in military contracts and have 
been taken to court by the US Justice Department for defrauding the government 
although this was settled out of court when Brown and Root paid $2 million. In 
2001 the company was awarded a 10 year cost plus contract to provide logistics 
support to the US military reportedly worth $830 million. As part of this Brown 
and Root began setting up tent towns in northern Kuwait complete with Burger 
King outlets in September 2002. The company was also reportedly engaged in 
logistics operations in Turkey to supply the troops who were patrolling the 
northern Iraqi 'no fly zone', a base in Uzbekistan housing troops patrolling 
Afghanistan as well as in operations in Jordan and in Georgia. " 
71EMENALM Engineering and avionics Group Cobharn boats total sales 
of $832 million (2003), 50% of which were military sales. It 
supplies key aircraft components to some of the largest procurement projects like 
the Eurofighter, the Joint Strike Fighter and the BAE Systems Hawk. The group 
also trains military helicopter PilotS. 50 
VTGI-OuP 
PIc Vosper Thornycroft, now VT Group, whose shipbuilding 
division is a prime MoD warships contractor, has a turnover of E400-E500 million 
51 per annum of which about 30% comprised of mainly military shipbuilding. VT 
47 IDIVIL Devonport, 'Background' <http: //www. devonport. co. uk/about-toplevel. htrn> Last accessed 
29'h April 2004 
48 CorpWatch, 'H allibu rto n' < http: Hwww. co rpwatch -o rg/article. ph p? I ist=type &type= 1 5> Last accessed 25 th May 2004 
49 Pratap Chatterjee, 'Halliburton makes a killing on Iraq war', CorpWatch, 20th March 2003 
<http: //www. corpwatch. org/issues/PID. jsp? articleid=6008> Last accessed 29th Apri12004 
h "' Cobham, 'Annual Report 2003'<http: //www. cobham. com/homePage. asp> Last accessed 2t 
April 2004 
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used to derive 70% of its turnover from military sales 52 but the new services 
division that includes school inspectors and careers services, has increased 
turnover dramatically. Vosper shipbuilding designs and manufacturers frigates, 
patrol vessels, attack craft and minesweepers not only to the UK Navy but to 
more than 30 Navies throughout the world. 53 Vosper is both working alongside 
BAE Systems in the design and manufacture of the Type 45 Destroyer and jointly 
with BAE Systems ship repair firm Fleet Support Limited and MoD training firm 
Flagship Training. 54 In June 2000, the group took over Bombardier Defence 
Services, now renamed VT Aerospace, which brought the group a stake in 55 
aircraft services. 
ýi Alvis PLC makes completed armoured vehicles. 100% Of their 
turnover is make up of these military sales which, in 2002, were 
worth C225 million. The group employs 2800 people in the UK, 
Scandinavia and South Africa. During its history, Alvis has exported more than 
20,000 vehicles from battle tanks to armoured personnel carriers to more than 60 
states. 56 It is now involved in European Consortium building the new Multi Role 
Armoured Vehicle. 57 
Once owned by United Scientific Holdings the group merged with GKN's 
armoured car division in 1998 although GKN has now sold its remaining shares 
in Alvis to BAE Systems. In 2002 Alvis PLC acquired Vickers Defence Systems 
from Rolls Royce. Vickers, the makers of the Challenger 11 tank, the Scorpion 
58 light tank and the Tactica vehicle was renamed Alvis Vickers Limited . 
Alvis' more infamous products include the Saladin and the follow up Saracen 
vehicles which were reportedly used in the late 1960s Nigerian war. Saladin 
upgrade kits and Scorpion armoured vehicles were exported from the UK to 
Indonesia in the mid and late 1990s on the basis that Suharto had assured the 
UK government that they would not be used in East Timor or for internal 
repression. 59 Later they were reportedly used to end demonstrations during 
60 which students died and were also seen on the streets of East Timor . 
5' Vosper Thomycroft, 'Annual Report 2002' 
<http: //www. vospe rth orn ycrof t. co. uk/i r/produ ct. asp? Item ID =532&s = &catid =2 54> Last accessed 24 
th 
May 2004 
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54 Fleet Support, 'Welcome' <http: //www. f leet-supporl. co. uk>; BAe Systems, 'BAe Systems and VT 
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Babcock International Group offers engineering support and facilities 
management to the civil and military sectors. Based at the Rosyth 
Dockyard, Babcock repairs and refits ships, services the Hercules 
fleet at RAF Lyneham, maintains RAF flight simulators and manages 
facilities like RAF Cranwell. It had an annual turnover of f-423 million 
in 2002. In the past SIPRI has estimated that about 44% of turnover has 
represented military sales. 61 
MEGGRTPLC Meggitt PLC design and supplies components to the aircraft and 
military industries worldwide. 
Ultra Electronics Holdings PPL is a group of companies designing 
and manufacturing electronic systems for aerospace and military 
markets. It supplies prime contractors with products used in military 62 
airplanes, armoured vehicles, submarines and ships. It employs 
2,300 people and had an annual turnover of $344 million in 2000. SIPRI found in 
2000 that 75% of Ultra's turnover represented military sales. 63 
The Chemring Group is made up of a series 
of companies which supply the commercial 
marine sector and military sectors. These 
companies are involved in air, land and naval defensive countermeasures and 
protechnic products. The group includes PW Defence. The company, which sells 
military pyrotechnics, explosive devices and de-mining equipment, was accused 
in 2002 of continuing to market anti-personnel landmines although the company 
deny the claim. 64 
In addition to UK-based arms-producing companies this thesis THALES 
refers to a series of non UK-based firms, one of which is Thales. 
Based in France, Thales is a huge global electronics company operating in 
aerospace, military and IT in more than 30 countries. Formerly Thomson-CSF, 
Thales is now the eight largest arms-producing company in the world employing 
57,000 people with registered total sales worth 10.6 billion Euros in 2003,64% of 
which were military sales. 65 
Between 1999 and 2000 Thales bought Shorts Missile Systems and Racal giving 
it entry into the UK market. 66 The company now acts as a prime contractor, 
systems integrator and services provider involved in a series of major MoD 
projects including the Type 45 Destroyers, the Aster missile, the new Astute 
class submarine, the Challenger 11 tank, the MultiRole Armoured Vehicle and 
61 SIPRI, '100 Largest Arms Producing Companies' 
62 Ultra Electronics, 'Ultra at a glance' <http: //www. ultra-electronics. co. uk/aboul-ultra. htm> Last 
accessed 28 th Apri12004 
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64 David Pallister and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Landmine claims dog UK arms firm', The Guardian, 
14th May 2002 
65 Thales, 'Key Figures' <http: //www. thalesgroup. com/ga/profile/figures. htm> Last accessed 27 th 
April 2004 
66 Thales, 'UK profile' <http: //www. thalesgroup-co. uk/> Last accessed 28 th April 2004 
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Hellfire missiles. Thales Electronics is also one of five owners of Camelot, the UK 
lottery operator. In 2001 Thales along with fellow owners, shared a E70 million 
dividend pay out (f-21.2 in 2000). 67 
US based giant Lockheed Martin is a 
systems integrator boasting sales of US$311.8 
billion in 2003, employing 130,000 
worldwide . 
68 The company was classed at the world's largest arms-producing 
company in 2000 by SIPR 1.69 It manufactures the F-16 jet, the Hellfire missile, the 
Patriot missile and the F-1 17 stealth attack fighters. It has attracted controversy 
with its contributions to federal candidates and parties as well as allegations of 
bribery and insider trading. 70 
Alongside commercial aircraft, Boeing is also the 
Pentagon's second largest military supplier behind 
Lockheed. The products on offer include Apache helicopters, F1 8 fighters and F 
22 fighters and the Brimstone which Boeing is developing as a major contractor 
to MBDA. 71 Controversy has surrounded what is reported to be $1.6 million in 
major campaign contributions in 2002, the quality of parts sold by the company 72 for the Apaches and the revolving door between it and the US government . 
The fourth largest US based weapons contractor 
Haut" behind Lockheed, Boeing and Northrop, Raytheon is eon involved in military and commercial electronic 
systems, space and IT, although military sales 73 
reportedly account for 80% of all sales. Makers of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile 
the company owns Raytheon Systems Limited. Based in the UK, the subsidiary 
is the prime contractor for ASTOR. " 
The Italian based Finmeccanica group is 
principally involved in aeronautics, 
helicopters, space and defense. The 
company manufactures combat aircraft and military transport planes, it is 
involved in the design and manufacture of missile systems and is the world 
leader in manufacturing rotorcraft helicopters for civilian and military use. The 
67 David Teather, 'Huge Payouts for Camelot Chiefs', The Guardian, 27'h July 2001 
68 Lockheed Martin, 'About Us' 
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Italian Ministry of the Economy owns 32.3% of all shares. In 2001 the company's 
net profit was 188 million euros and consolidated group turnover was 6.8 billion 
euros of which aerospace and defence contributed 65%. Finmeccanica's major 
partners include GKN Westland (AgustaWestland), BAE Systems (Alenia 
75 Marconi Systems) and BAE Systems/EADS (MBDA) . 
German based Heckler and Koch manufacture 76 11m41&dQ pistols, submachine guns and rifles. In 1991 the 
company were bought by Royal Ordnance, a 
subsidiary of BAE Systems. In December 1999, a UK documentary provided 
evidence of the Turkish company MKEK manufacturing Heckler and Koch MP5 
machine guns under a licenced production agreement with BAE Systems and 
exporting them to Indonesia. 500 MP5 sub-machine guns were reportedly 
exported to Indonesian police in late August/early September 1999, a time when 
any UK sourced export would not probably not have secured a licence from the 
government. 
77 
The Carlyle Group's ownership of US giant 
THE CARLYLEGROUP United Defence together with other arms- 
11 Ih 
producing companies has effectively meant 
that the Group is the largest military contractor to the US government. 
In December 2002 the Carlyle Group fought off competition from 40 other 
venture capitalist companies to buy a 33.8% share in QinetiQ from the 
government in a hugely controversial PIPP agreement carried out against the 
advice of the House of Commons Defence Committee. QinetiQ, most of which 
was formerly known until 2001 as the Defence Evaluation Research Agency 
(DERA) incorporates most of the MoUs non-nuclear equipment testing and 78 
evaluation establishments. The MoD will receive E45 million, even though 
QinetiQ has been valued at El billion in the 
7? 
ast and even though QinetiQ has 
assets valued at E342m net of its liabilities. Further to this, Carlyle were 
reportedly given up to El 00 million worth of warrantees to sweeten the deal. 80 
The Defence Committee considered the PPP idea in a 1998 report and 
concluded "we would regard the risks to DERA's impartiality and critical mass of 
75 Finmeccanica, 'Corporate info' <http: //www. finmeccanica. it/finmeccanica/default. htm> Last 
accessed 23 rd May 2004 
76 Heckler and Koch, 'The products' <http: //www. heckler-koch. de/htmI/index. htm1> Last accessed 
24'h May 2004 
77 Saferworld, 'Export Control Bill Briefing-December 2001' 
<http: //www. saferworld. co. uk/exportý/ý20controlý/ý20peers`/`2Obrief. htm> Last accessed 24ýh May 
2004 
78 The Ministry of Defence, 'MoD Selects the Carlyle Grou R as preferred bidder for QinetiQ 
partnering arrangement', Press notice, notes to editors, 3' September 2002 
<http: //www. mod. uk/dpa/pressoff icefqinetiq_partnering_arrangement_announced. htm> Last 
accessed 28 th Apri12004 
79 Jamie Doward, "QinetiQ stake was sold on the cheap'claim MPs', The Guardian, 26 th January 
2003 
"' David Hencke, 'Minister accused over F1 00m sweeteners', The Guardian, 7 th January 2003 
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even partial privatisation, in the shape of Public Private Partnerships, as 
unacceptable and against the public interest. "8' 
Highly controversial and one of the most powerful, well connected and secretive 
companies in the world, Carlyle buys faltering companies, mostly those involved 
in government regulated industries, turns them around and resells them for a 
prof it. 82 Carlyle currently manages around $14 billion of capital in the US. It has 
reportedly made millions for investment pension funds and a number of high 
profile multi-million dollar investors including global financier George Soros, the 
Saudi Royal family and the bin Laden family. Reportedly partners in the group 
have earned, on average, C25 million in eq Uity. 83 
The group is Chaired by Frank Carlucci, former US secretary of Defence (11987 - 
1989), former Deputy Director of the CIA (1978-1980) and former Princeton 
wrestling partner and reportedly good friend of the current US Defence 
Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld. Carlucci also sits on the board of United Defence. 
'Senior Counsellor' to the group is James Baker. Baker was Chief of Staff at the 
White House under Reagan (1981 - 1985) and under Bush senior ý1 992 - 1993). He reportedly helped Bush junior during the Florida votes scandal. 4 George 
Bush junior was on Carlyle's payroll from 1990 when he was placed on the board 
of Caterair-one of Carlyle's bi early purchases. His father is senior advisor to the 
Carlyle Asian Partners Fund 8pand gives speeches for the company for which he 
is reportedly paid at least $80,000 for each appearance. 86 George Bush senior 
also visited the Saudi King in March 2000 reportedly, in part, on behalf of the 
Carlyle group. 87 One of Carlyle's founders and still a Managing Director is David 
Rubenstein who, at 27, became Deputy Domestic Policy Assistant to the 
President until 1981.8' Since 2001 the Chair of Carlyle Europe has been John 
Major. 89 Another Managing Director is Afsaneh Mashayekhi Beschloss, former 
Treasurer of the World Bank. 9" 
" House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Sixth Report. - The Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency, 6 th July 1998, HC 621, summary of recommendations 
<http: //www. parliament-the-stationery- 
h office. co. uk/pa/cm 1 99798/cms el ect/cmdf ence/621/621 07. him> Last accessed 25' May 2004 82 House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Minutes of evidence for Tuesday 2 1" 
January 2003, HC 322-i, paragraph 1 <http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/cm2002O3/cmselecUcmdfence/322/3012101. htm> Last accessed 25"' May 2004 83 Greg Palast, 'The Best Democracy Money Can Buy' <http: //tompaine. com/feature. cfm/ID/7310> 
Last accessed 24 th May 2004 
84 Robert Scheer, 'Making money the Bush way', LA Times, February 1 91h 2003 
85 Bush News, 'Bush watch' <http: //www. bushnews. com/bushmoney. htnl> Last accessed 24'h May 
2004 
86 Oliver Burkeman and Julian Borger, 'The ex-presidents' club', The Guardian, 31 " October 2001 
87 Bush News, 'Bush watch' 
88 The Carlyle Group, 'Team: David Rubenstein' <http: //www. thecarlylegroup. coin/eng/team/15- 
team446. html> Last accessed 24" May 2004 
89The Carlyle Group, 'Team: John Major' <http: //www. thecarlylegroup. com/eng/team/15- 
team439. html> Last accessed 24'h May 2004 
90The Carlyle Group, 'Team: Afsaneh Mashayekhi Beschloss' 
<http: //www. thecarlylegroup. com/eng/team/15-team8Ol. himl> Last -accessed 24"' May 2004 
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Appendix Six 
Estimated UK employment dependent on military exports 
Year 1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 1996/97 1 97/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 
Direct 75,000 60,000 75,000 70,000 90,000 45,000 50,000 35,000 30,000 30,000 
Indirect 65,000 50,000 75,000 75,000 85,000 65,000 60,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 
Total 140,000 110,000 150,000 145,000 175,000 110,000 110,000 75,000 70,000 65.000 
Source: DASA 
Appendix Seven 
Updated export market trends usinq Neil Cooper's trend indicators 
% Change 
1990 1995 1999 from 
1990-1999 
Value of all arms exports calculated by the US 
State Department's World Military 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) in 
67,163 46,087 51,570 -23% 
millions of $ million (1999 prices) 
Value of all UK arms exports calculated by 
WMEAT in millions of $ million (1999 prices) 
5,568 5,551 5,200 -7% 
Value of deliveries of defence exports 
calculated by DASA in millions E (2001 prices) 
4,467 4,723 4,250 -5% 
Arms exports as a% of all UK exports as 
calculated by WMEAT 
2.5% 2.1 %1 1.9% -24% 
Value of UK defence export orders calculated 
by DASA in millions E (2001 prices) 
4,735 4,970 5,044 +7% 
Number of jobs in the UK dependant on 
defence exports as estimated by DASA 
150,000 145,000 75,000 -50% 
Sources: WMEAT 7 and DASA8 
0 DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2003, table 1.9 
<http: //www. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/ukds/2003/chapiframe. html> Last accessed 27 th April 2004; UK Defence 
Statistics 2002, table 1.11 <http: //www. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2002/ukds. htm1> Last accessed 24 th 
July 2003; DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2001, table 1.11 
th <http: //www. dasa. mod. uk/natstats/stats/ukds/2001/section1. html> Last accessed 17 August 2003. Totals 
may not add up because DASA has rounded the figures to the nearest five thousand 7 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), 1999-2000, table 11 8 DASA, UKDefence Statistics 2001, tables 1.13,1.14; UKDefence Statistics 2002, table 1.11 
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Appendix Eiciht 
Summarv of studies on the exgerience of former defence workers post redundancy 
Report Area of study Findings 
Career Change 344 clients made By October 1993,37.8% were employed 
Guidance Service- redundant in the Fife 43.9% were unemployed 
Evaluation Report, Fife regions from February 16.3% were in training 
Regional Council, 1992 - June 1993. 1% were self-employed 
1993.9 
Workers'experiences Redundant defence By 1995,48.3% were employed 
ofredundancy: workers experiences in 29.4% were unemployed 
Evidence from Scottish the West of Scotland in 20.6% retired 
defence-dependent the early 1990s. 3.3% were self-employed 
companies, Donnelly 2.8% were training 
and Scolarios, 1995.10 
A Survey of Former Redundant workers 32% were employed 
Swan Hunter Shipyard experiences up to 18 48% were unemployed 
Workers, Tomaney et. months after 15% were registered sick or disabled 
al., 1995.11 redundancy in 4% were training 
Tyneside, 1995. 
Defence Industry The effects of 10,000 50% were re-employed within 12 months (of 
Redundancies in the defence worker which 61.5% received a lower salary in their new 
South West Region, redundancies from jobs) 
Hooper et al., 1996.12 1989-1994 in the South 25% were unemployed for 2yrs or more 
West. 20% retired or pursued further education 
Redundant Defence The experiences of 180 By 1995 half of those made redundant were re- 
Workers'Surve y, Ian 
' 
former workers, part of employed but had encountered a shift towards 
Goudie, 1996. a wider focus on the short-term and part-time work and have, on 
local economic impact average, suffered a reduced monthly income, 
of the loss of 1,950 from C975 to 2850. One third remained 
defence sector jobs in unemployed. One fifth retired, most before the 
Strathclyde from 1993. statutory requirement and most living on an MoD 
pension at 36% of take home pay. Multiplier 
effects meant that the local economy lost over 
229 million per year from a reduction of former 
workers expenditure. Former defence workers 
have highly desirable and transferable core skills. 
Fife Regional Council, Career Change Guidance Service-Evaluation Report, 1993, Fife, as referenced by 
Ian Goudie, The employment consequences of a ban on arms exports 
'0 Donnelly and Scolarios, 'Workers' experience of redundancy: Evidence from Scottish def en ce-cle pendent 
companies', Personnel Review, 27: 4 (1998), pp. 325-342 as referenced by Ian Goudie, The employment 
consequences of a ban on arms exports 
" Tomaney, Pike, Hayward, Thomas and Comford, A Survey of Former Swan Hunter Shipyard Workers, 
University of Newcastle, 1995 as referenced by Goudie, The employment consequences of a ban on arms 
exports 
12 Nick Hooper, Barbara Butler, Keith Hartley, Derek Braddon and Paul Dowell, Defence Industry 
Redundancies in the South West Region (University of York Centre for Defence Economics, 1996) 
13 Ian Goudie, The Redundant Defence Workers Survey, 1996, report commissioned by Strathclyde Defence 
Industries Working Group, Glasgow, <http: //acp. gn. apc. org/acpframe2. html> Last accessed 17 th August 
2003 
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Appendix Eight continued 
Report Area of study Findings 
The Subsidy Trap, The experience of 400 Vickers, the City Council the Employment Agency 
Ingram and former defence workers and other local training groups worked together 
Davies, 2001 . 
14 
after being made within an existing "jobroute project" to offer a 
redundant from the range of support to redundant workers. 378 of the 
Vickers tank factory, 400 workers joined the project. Within 12 months 
Leeds, in 1998. of the project being established, 80% of the 400 
redundant workers had achieved a "positive 
outcome" - they were re-employed, studying or 
not seeking work. 
The Employment The effects of a total Because the number of export depenclant jobs 
Consequences of ban on exports on the are so small and are mainly situated in areas 
a Ban on Arms most affected regions experiencing labour shortages, the effects on 
Exports, Ian and towns in the UK. employees would be limited especially if company 
Goudie, diversification were encouraged and a multi- 
commissioned by agency approach to employee retraining were 
CAAT, 2002 . 
15 adopted. 
Appendix Nine 
Recipient states who have defaulted on arms sales 1990-2000 
Year Defaulting arms sales recipient 
1990-1991 Algeria, Arg entina, Brazil, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria 
1991-1992 Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Jordan, Kenya 
1992-1993 Brazil, Egy pt, Jordan, Kenya, Venezuela 
1993-1994 Brazil, Eg pt, Jordan, Kenya, Venezuela 
1994-1995 Algeria, Eg ypt, Jordan, Kenya, Venezuela 
1995-1996 Algeria, Eg ypt, Jordan, Kenya, Venezuela 
1996-1997 Algeria, Eg ypt, Jordan, Kenya 
1997-1998 Algeria, Eg ypt, Jordan, Kenya 
1998-1999 Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya 
1999-2000 , Indonesia, Zimbabwe 
Source: House of Commons 16 
" Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, p. 40 
15 Goudie, The employment consequences of a ban on arms exports 
16 House of Commons, Hansard, 17 th May 2000, Written Answers, columns 133-134 
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Appendix Ten 















Estimated total UK employment dependent on defence expenditure and 
equipment exports 
Employment from military exports 
Year 
level agree level Iw" 1001`01 
Estimated total UK employment dependent on 740 625 555 410 300 defence expenditure and equiLment exports 
Employment from military exports 140 110 150 145 70 
Employment from military exports as a% of total 19% 18% 1 27% 35% 23% I employment from MoD expendfture & exports 
Source: DASA, UK defence statistics 200 1, table 1.1117 
17 All figures exclude MoD service and civilian personnel 
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'80/'81 '85/'86 190/191 '95/'96 100/101 
Appendix Eleven 
Change in Concentration Ratios, SIPRI Top 100 Global Arms-Producinq Companies, 
1990-1998 
% of all global arms sales made by 
corresponding groups of 
companies 
1990 1995 2000 
5 larg est arms-p roducing companies 22 28 42 
10 lar gest arms- producing companies 37 42 58 
15 lar gest arms- producing companies 48 53 66 
20 lar gest arms- producing companies 57 61 72 
Source: Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)"3 
Appendix Twelve 
Delays and cost overruns on the largest 25 MoD equipment proeects 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Projects which have 
failed to meet estimated 90%+ 84% 80% 88% 92% 92% 
in-service dates 
Average slippage 
amongst major projects 37 31 40 37 43 47 
(months) 
Number of projects 
which will be delivered 5 - 7 6 8 
over 5 years late 
Cost overruns on major 
projects excluding 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.6 1 3 4 1 Trident and Eurofighter . . 
(billions C) 
Cost overruns on major -1.7 -1.7 -0.7 
projects Including (Trident (Trident (Trident 3+ 2.8 2.7 
Trident forecast -f 3.5b, -f 3.6b, -f 3.4b, (Euro (Euro (Euro 
reductions and Euro Euro Euro fighter fighter fighter 
Eurofighter cost fighter fighter fighter 4-1.4b) 41.5b) +E1.4b) 
increases (billions E) 41.1b) 41.3b) +E1.4b) 
Expected cost of 25 
argest projects (billions 30 32 33 36 38 38 
E) 
Sources: National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports" 
"' SIPRI, 'Arms Industry Database: Change in Concentration Ratios, SIPRI Top 100 Companies, 1990-1998' 
<http: //projects. sipri. se/milex/aprod/trendstab5. html> Last accessed 281h July 2003 19 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1994,24 th May 1995, HC 436, press 
notice; National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1995 , 9th August 1996, HC 677, press notice; National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1996,15 th Aurst 1997, HC 
238, press notice; National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1997,13 May 1998, 
HC 695, press notice; National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence., Major Projects Report 1998 , 30th June 1999, HC 519, press notice; National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Report 1999,6 th July 
2000, HC 613, press notice. Figures have been rounded. 
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Appendix Thirteen 
Tor) current 20 mamor procurement promects gost "main clate" stage and top 10 pre "main- 
gate" stage of development as at 31 " March 200 120 
Weapon ' Contractor Progress 
The new E809 million bomb, known as Brimstone, has been delayed by 
10 years after project funding was withdrawn in the 1980s. The delay has 
meant an extra cost of at least E48 million 2' and has left the army relying 
on the BL755 cluster bomb. This bomb is "only effective against soft- 
skinned targets , 
22 not modern tanks. Only 0.5% of all BL755 bombs were 
used during the first Gulf War because they had to be dropped from only 
Air 
23 500 feet. After being updated and renamed RBL755, they were used in 
launched MBDA(BAE Kosovo but the manufacture estimates that at least 5% of the bomblets 
anti- 
Systems/EAD 24 dropped will not detonate becoming, in effect, landmines. The current 
S/ air launched anti-armour weapon project was awarded to then GEC armour Finmeccanica) Marconi (now MDBA) in 1996. It was to be in service by September 2001 weapon 
at a cost of F849 million. By 2002 the project was running at least 13 
months late because the MoD requested that the Brimstone in-service 
date be aligned with the availability of its Tornado platform at an 
additional cost of E48 million . 
25 But during 2003 the project suffered 
further time and cost slippages so that by 2004 the project was expected 
to cost C988 million (El 39 more than ap? roved) and be delivered by April 
2004 (31 months more than approved) . 
British ASRAAM began as a collaborative project in 1980. It was af 857 million ASRAAM Aerospace short-range fire-and-forget missile designed to replace the Sidewinder. Advance 
Defence Deliveries were to begin in December 1998 but were delayed until at least d air-to- Division (now June 2001 mainly for technical reason 
S. 
27 The RAF continues to use the 28 
air Matra BAE less able Sidewinder . BAE Systems announced service entry 
for the 
missile Dynamics) missile dur nq 2002 but it is reportedly f 250 million over budget and may 9 be scrap ed. 
Raytheon 
ASTOR- Systems. major A theatre surveillance system comprising of 5 aircraft and 8 ground 
Airborne sub contractor- Bombardier stations. The system was estimated to cost E938 million although it will 
stand-off (now owned by cost at least an extra E75 million more, mainly because of changes in the 
radar Vosper 
30 f-$ exchange rate. 
Thornycroft) 
20 'Main gate' refers to projects where "performance, time and cost targets for the demonstration and 
manufacture phase are set" while "pre-main gate" refers to those projects yet to reach that stage. Major 
project reports consider the thirty largest projects, 20 post main gate and 10 pre main gate. Those presented 
are those listed in DASA, UK Defence Statistics 200 1, table 1.16 
<http: //Www. dasa. mod. uk1natstats/stats1ukds1200 I Isection I. html> Last accessed 17'h August 2003 21 House of Commons, Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report- Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 2000, HC 368,28 th November 2001, minutes of evidence, question 2; Ingram and Davis, 
The Subsidy Trap, Appendix 5 
22 House of Commons, Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 2000, paragraph 21 
23 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 2000, Minutes of evidence, question 54 
24 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Thirty-third Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 1998,16 th August 2000, HC247, supplementary memorandum submitted by the Ministry of 
Defence, PAC 00-0 1 /170 
25 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002,4 1h December 2002, HC 91, p. 6, 
? P. 44-47 
rd National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2003,23 January 2004, HC 195, p. 32 
27 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001,23 rd November 2001, HC 330, 
pp. 35-40 
nd National Audit Office, Ministryof Defence Major Projects Report 2000,22 November 2000, HC 971, p. 
12 
29 Nick Cohen, 'Our sky-high arms fiasco', The Observer, 22 nd September 2002 




Weapon 1 Contractor Progress 
Three new nuclear attack submarines were to replace the aging Swiftsure 
submarines in 2005 at a cost of E2.7 billion. The contract, including both 
design and production, was accepted on a fixed price basis early on. BAE 
ASTUTE 
Systems has renegotiated with the MoD to separate the type of 
BAE Systems contracting used for design and for production. Design is now contracted 
class 
attack 
Astute Class on a target cost incentive fee to reward good performance but removing 
submarine 
Ltd. some of the risks to BAE Systems. BAE Systems claims that because of 
the risks associated with such a highly technical programme, they have 
borne "significant additional costs" which has caused at least a 43 month 
delay to the project and a cost overrun of E886 million of which BAE 
Systems is paying C250 million. 31 
The MoD is buying 67 Apache helicopters at an estimated cost of E3.17 
billion, El 71 million more than approved and 13 months late. The dela y 
3 Prime was mainly caused by the need to meet the MoD's available budget. 
contractor- Supporting the existing Lynx helicopters until the Apaches are in service 
Apache 
Westland 
Heli ters will 
cost an extra E2 million. 33 But there have also been technical problems 
attack 
cop . Main sub- with 
the helicopter. The Hellfire rocket that the Apache uses causes, 
hellicopte contractor- according 
to a leaked MoD report, "damage to the aircraft from motor 
" 
r Boeing. Main 
debris on firing which means the helicopter cannot fly once it has fired a 34 
ammunition missile . 
Also, problems on the Apache pilot training programme have 
supplier Hunting meant that no pilots will be able to fly the MoD's new US-designed 
(nowINSYS) Apaches until 2007 instead of 2005. This training contract was givento the 
private sector. The extra cost to the MoD of storing the helicopters until 
that time is estimated to be C6 billion. 35 
Otherwise known as Storm Shadow, this is an air-launched missile carried 
by Harrier GRT Eurofighter and Tornado GR4 aircraft costing C981 
CASOM million. The project will cost E47 million less than approved after the MoD 
stand off MBDA decided not to integrate the missile onto Harrier aircraft36 but will be 
missile operational 11 months later than expected because of contractual 
negotiations, technical problems and to align the missiles' in-service date 
with the availability of TornadoS. 37 
Costing E188 million, E48 million more than approved, this is an upgrade 
- 
ER01MCS Royal 
of the AS90 self-propelled Howitzer gun. The Howitzer suffered from 
[ 
u 
plastic air filters melting in the desert which meant that it could only be gun Ordinance 38 II used at night. The increased cost of the upgrade has been due to L 
componen Defence (BAE technical problems and additional MoD requirements. The project is also tt ms t Systems) 62 months late because of technical problems, contractual negotiations 39 
! 
ý2nt4, 
-hnnnPrI MdoetarVoriorities at 
the MoD 
3' National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2003, p. 27-29 
32 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 6 
33 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, pp. 7,69-70 
34 Jonathon Carr-Brown, 'No 10 tells generals how to spin', The Sunday Times, 7th April 2002 
35 Mark Oliver, VoD disasters: from Apache to Nimrod', The Guardian, 31 s'October 2002 
36 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 6 
37 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 81 
38 Mark Oliver, 'MoD disasters: from Apache to Nimrod', The Guardian, 31 s October 2002 
39 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 74-75 
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Appendix Thirteen continued 
Weapon Contractor Progress 
This is a collaborative project between BAE systems, EADS based in 
Germany, Alenia Aerosazio based in Italy and EADS based in Spain. BAE 
Systems are providing the systems integration, airframe manufacture and 
are heavily contributing to the electronic systems. 40 The MoD has ordered 
Airframe: 232 to replace the Tornado F3 and the Jaguar even though the project has 
BAE Systems, been heavily criticised. Alan Clark said the Eurofighter is "essentially 
Eurofighter EADS, Alenia 
flawed and out of date ... we must 
find a less extravagant way of paying 
4' people to make buckets with holes in them ,. The plane was s ecifically P2 
Typhoon Engine: designed to defend against the Soviet MiG and Sukhoi planeS. In 2000- 43 FIAT, ITP, 2001, the MoD estimated that the project would cost Ell 8.9 billion but 
MTU, Rolls 44 during 2002 the cost of the project increased by a further El billion . Royce These increases have arisen mainly because of technical problem S. 45 The 
project is also running nine years late 46 following technical problems, 
budgetary problems, the changed strategic environment and negotiation 
delays. The delayed in-service date is costing at least El 68 million in 
supporting the Tornado and Jaguar. 47 
The introduction of the Ell billion aircraft fleet has been delayed for 23 
Hercules Lockheed months due to technical difficultieS48 despite Lockheed-Martin and the RAF 
C130J Martin categorically assuring the Public Accounts Committee that the in service 
date timeframe would be met. The Head of procurement admits that 
Lockheed-Martin is amongst the worst for delays to in-service date S. 49 
The E933 million HVM project, otherwise known as Starstreak, was 
HVM 
Shorts Missile 
Systems (now delayed from 
December 1990 to September 1997. This left the 1 s' (U NO 
' " missile Thales Air . very short-range 
Air Defence capability Armoured Division without a 
Defence) The project is costing El million more than aVproved. 
5' It is currently 81 5 
months late because of technical problems. 
Landing HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark were to replace the aging HMS Fearless 
platform BAE Systems and HMS Intrepid at a cost of E786 million but the former is four and a half 
dock-HIMS Marine & years late and the later is three years late. 53 The MoUs head of 
Albion and Thales procurement admits that he made "a wrong judgement" in overloading BAE 
HMS Communications Systems Barrow shipyard with contracts which caused the majority of the 
Bulwark 54 55 delays. It will cost an additional E25 million to run on HMS Fearless . 
40 BAE Systems, Annual Report 2002, p7 41 House of Commons, Hansard, 9th July 1997, column 855 
42 Tim Webb, The Armour-Plated Ostrich, (Kent: Comerford & Miller, 1998) pp. 15-16 
43 DASA, UK Defence Statistics 2002, tables 1.16 
44 Richard Norton-Taylor and David Gow, 13 billion hole in defence budget', The Guardian, 23 rd January 
2004 
45 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, pp. 86-87 
46 Mark Oliver, 'MoD disasters: from Apache to Nimrod', The Guardian, 31' October 2002 
47 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 89 
48 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001 pp. 80-82 
49 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 2000, Minutes of evidence, questions 285-287 
50 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 109 
51 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 6 52 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 7 53 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, Appendix 5 
54 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
Projects Report 2000, Minutes of evidence, question 289 
55 National Audit Off ice, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 94 
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Appendix Thirteen continued 
Weapon Contractor Progress 
Merlin MK3 
The MoD is buying 22 MK3 (also known as the EH101') helicopters at a cost 
support GKN Westland 
of f-755 million. There has been a two-year delay to the in-service date from 
helicopter 
June 2000 to June 2002 after technical and resource problems with 56 industry. 
Augusta, GKN 
The IVIK1 will cost F-4.18 billion, E970 million above approved costs because 
Merlin MKI Westland, of 
technical problems, including the loss of three prototype helicopters, 
helicopter Lockheed improved safety 
features and inflation. The project is running at least 63 
Martin months late, again, mainly because of technical problems but also MoD 57 budget restrictions and contracting issues . Alvis, Krauss- This is af 335 million UK/German/Dutch collaborative project. The armoured 
Multi-role Maffei Wegmann utility vehicles are expected 
to enter service in 2008. The Project will cost 58 
armoured , Rheinmetall El 10 million less than approved because the MoD has reduced its order. 
vehicle Landsysteme & Programme completion will be eight months late following technical problems 
STORK PWV and management difficulties. 59 
The Nimrod IVIK4 aircraft will replace the Nimrod MR2. Although the contract 
was placed with BAE Systems in 1996, technical and resource problems led 
to it being renegotiated in 1999. BAE Systems was suffering from the same 
Nimrod Prime contractual problems experienced with the ASTUTE submarines and 
MK4 
contractor - 
renegotiated the contract with the MoD in the same way. The C2.8 billion 60 
Maritime BAE Systems project will now cost at 
least E3.4 billion even though in 2002 the MoD cut 
61 
surveillance Sub contractor 
its order from 21 to 18 planes . 




. its in-service date at approval. Reportedly part of the setback has arisen 
63 aircraft because the wings, made by BAE Systems, were the wrong size . 
In 2003 
Sir Kevin Tebbit, permanent Secretary at the MoD admitted that the 
department lost up to El billion bailing out BAE Systems on the Nimrod 
contract because of "the damage that this was doing to the company". 64 
Sea-Wolf Alenia Marconi 
This is an upgrade to the existing sea-wolf system that will cost F284 million. 
update Systems 
The project was running at least 13 month late because of MoD budgetary 65 
constraints . The f 1.3 billion Spearfish project provides heavyweight submarine-launched 
GEC Marconi torpedo capability. The project is running F1 01 million above approved costs 
Spearfish 
Underwater 66 because of technical factors and inflation . 
The project suffered from a 75- 
torpedo 
Systems (now month in-service date delay which, according to the MoD, resulted in a 
" BAE Systems significant and extended capability gap in anti-submarine warfare and anti- 
Electronics) surface warfare". The delay was caused by technical problems. It cost an 
extra 00 million to support the existing Tigerfish torpedo during this time. 67 
Sting Ray GEC-Marconi Upgrading the capability and extending the life of Sting Ray torpedo to keep 
torpedo life Underwater it in service until 2025 will cost at least El 89 million. That is C43 million more 
extension Systems than was approved because of changes to MoD safety policy, budgetary 
and Group (now adjustments and because of an in-service delay. It is 41 months late beyond 
capability BAE Systems its in-service date at approval because of lengthy contractual negations and 
upgrade I Electronics) I because of a lack of MoD resources. 68 
56 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 97-101 
" National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 104-107 
58 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 6 
59 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 111 
60 Richard Norton-Taylor and David Gow, T3 billion hole in defence budget', The Guardian, 23d January 
2004 
61 Oliver Morgan, 'Friendly fire downs BAE', The Observer, 15 th December 2002 
62 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 7,120 
63 Nick Mathiason, 'The First Privatised War', The Guardian, 2 nd March 2003 
64 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Accounts, MoD Major Projects Report 2003, Corrected 
Evidence, 23 rd February 2004, HC 383-i, question 42 
65 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 124-125 
66 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2ool, pp. 129-131 
67 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 131-132 
68 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 134,135 
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Armendix Thirteen continued 
Weapon Contractor Progress 
Prime 
Updates to contractor-BAE 
Swiftsure Systems. This project will cost an estimated E687 million, E68 million more than 
and 
Sonar-GEC- 
Marconi Naval approved 
because of additional requirements and changes in an associated 
Trafalgar Systems (now project. This final phase of the project is running 24 months late because of 
submarine Thomson technical problems and because of a delay to an associated project. 
69 
S Marconi Sonar 
Systems) 
This is an update of the Tornado aircraft's avionics and armaments. 144 
planes will be modified. Cost and in-service date slippage forced the MoD to 
Tornado BAE Systems, reduce the programme in the mid 1990s. The project cost is estimated to be 
update EADS, Alenia 
F943 million, E330 million more than approved mainly due to technical 
problems. The project is running 63 months late also due to technical 
problems but also contractual issues and a revised requirement from the 
MoD. 70 
The missile project, a collaborative E1.4 billion European venture, is 
BVRAAM designed for the Eurofighter. The project is currently running C40 million 
missile 
IMBDA under budget7 1 but over three years late because of the complexity of the 
missile and the need to accommodate all participants during the 
assessment phase. 72 
The Bowman data and voice communications system was to replace the 
cumbersome and insecure 1970s Clansman combat radio in 1985. But the 
MoD varied the amount it was prepared to pay and suffered from 
specification creep. So when the two competing consortia ITT together with 
Siemens Plessay / Racal presented their bids they were both rejected. Each 
bid cost "hundreds of millions of pounds each", half of which was paid by the 
(ITT Siemens MoD and half paid by the consortia. 73 In response the consortia merged on BOWMA 
,N 
, Plessay/Racal) this project in 1996 to form the Archer company but the MoD rejected new 
communic Computing bid in July 2000 and reopened the competition. Computing Devices Canada 
ations Devices won. The assessment phase has cost E397 million, C267 million more than 
system Canada Ltd. approved. 
74 Operational impacts have been severe. In Kosovo UK army 
commanders complained that all their personal communications could be 75 listened to by the Serbs. Nicknames had to be used by soldiers. In the 
huge 2001 Sail Sareea 11 exercise in Oman, the Clansman radio system 
failed in the heat and dust of the desert. Because there is no coverage for 
mobile phones in the Oman desert, as there was in Kosovo, tank squadrons 
were forced to disembark their tanks to consult, in person, with those from 
other tanks. 
76 
The two new carriers will replace the three invincible class carriers. Each will 
carry up to 50 aircraft including the future carrier borne aircraft. The carriers 
Future will enter service between 2012 and 2015. BAE Systems won the lead role 
aircraft 
BAE Systems in January 2003. In July 2003, BAE Systems informed the MoD that the two 
carrier Thales new aircraft carriers it was building, which were to cost C2.8 billion in January 2003, would now cost up to E4 billion. The MoD may have to design 
smaller ships carrying as few as 20 aircraft instead of 48 as no further 
money is forthco ing. 77 
` National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 142-143 70 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2001, pp. 147-150 71 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 7 
72 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2000, p. 1 61; National Audit Office, 
Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 77 
73 Interview, former Bowman project officer, with author, April 2002 
74 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 158 
75 Richard Norton-Taylor and David Gow, 'Culture of Failure', The Guardian, 12'h January 2000 
76 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Exercise Saif Sareea //, 1" August 2002, HC 1097, p. 20 
<http: //www. nao. gov. uk/publications/nao_reports/01-02/01021097. pdf > Last accessed 5 th August2003 77 Unnamed, 'BAE 'budget warning'over new aircraft carriers', The Guardian, 14 th July 2003 
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Appendix Thirteen continued 
Weapon I Conbador Pmgress 
This is a ground-based aircrew training facility for the Eurofighter fleet. The 
project is forecast to cost E4 million less than approved and be in-service 
Eurofighter Eurofighter three months earlier than expected because the risk assessment has been 
training aid GmbH recalculated . 
78 There was a delay of 58 months cluring the assessment 
phase as the MoD explored the idea of using a Private Finance Initiative 
instead of a collaborative approach. 
Future joint Lockheed This aircraft will replace the Sea HarHer and . 
Harrier GR7. The UK has 
combat Martin contributed 
$200 million to the Joint Strike F9 hter project as a collaborative 
aircraft partner. The current in-service date is 2012. 
The MoD are buying 25 A400M aircraft to replace the remaining Hercules 
Future 
C130K from a European consortium (Germany, France, Turkey, Spain, 
transport 
Airbus Military Portugal, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the UK). The project is running at least 
ircraft 
Company 6 months later than the initial in-service date because of changed budgetary 80 a procedures. It will cost the MoD E33 million to keep the Hercules aircraft in- 
service for those 6 months. 01 
The project involves towed 155mm guns and lightweight rocket launchers. 
Lightweight The part of the project developing 155mm guns was reviewed in February 
artillery BAE Systems 2002 because of changed MoD priorities and lack of resources and it was weapon 
system 
decided to defer the programme for three years. The rockets launchers are 82 still at a concept stage. 
Matra -Marconi 
SKYNETS 
Space(now This satellite communications system will meet its in-service date in February 
83 Astrium) & 2005 instead of May 2003 as first thought. 
Lockheed 
The US and UK have jointly decided to end the Tactical reconnaissance 
TRACER Not applicable armoured 
combat equipment requirement programme in October 2001 
' because of the potential cost. The project s assessment phase cost E 131 
million. 
84 
Prime Six Type 45 destroyers were to have entered service to replace the Type 42s 
contractor- BAE in 2002 but have been delayed until at least November 2007. It will cost an 
Systems 
85 extra IE565 million to support their predecessors until they are ready. This 
Type45 Electronics. Sub- predecessor, the Type 42, relies on the Sea Dart missile. Although operating 
destroyer contractors - in conjunction with other systems this only has "limited effectiveness against 
BAE Systems modem sea-skimming missiles . 
The Sea Dart missile upgrade is running Marine & Vosper eight years late partly because it cannot distinguish a target against the Thornycroft sun. , 
78 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 94 
79 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, pp. 169-170 
80 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2oo2, p. 36 
8' National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 39 
82 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, pp. 171-172 
83 National Audit Office. Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 174 
84 National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence: Major Projects Reports 2002, p. 178 
81 Ingram and Davis, The Subsidy Trap, Appendix 5; House Of Commons Select Committee on Public 
Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major Projects Report 2000, Minutes of Evidence, question 41 
and 42 
86 House of Commons Select Committee 
Projects Report 2000, paragraph 5 vi 
a' House of Commons Select Committee 
projects Report 2000, paragraph 5 vii 
on Public Accounts, Fifth Report: Ministry of Defence Major 
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Sources: WMEAT (cols. 1-2), CIA (cols. 3-4), Amnesty International an(-l FC(, ), Col. 5). 
89 US Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1999-2000, table 111; CIA, The 
CIA World Factbook 2001 <http: //www. cia. gov/cia/publications/factbook> Last accessed 7 th August 2003; 
Amnesty International Annual Report 2003 <http: //web. amnesty. org/report2003/index-eng> Oman entry from 
Amnesty International Annual Report 2002 <http: //web. amnesty. org/web/ar2002. nsf/home/home> Last 
accessed 7th August 2003; FCO and DFID, Annual Human Rights Reports and FCO Country Profiles FCO 
<www. fco. gov. uk> Last accessed 23 rd April 2004 
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Appendix Fifteen 
Values of UK standard licences approved from 1999-2001 to states classified as medium and 
low on the UN's Human Develogment Index 
Values of licences approved to states classified as medium on the UN's Human Development 
Index 
UN Devel- 










Examples of sales ordered from 
1997 onwards 
54 Mexico 1 1 1.5 1.0 0.5 10.1 
55 Cuba <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 
56 Belarus <0.25 0.8 
57 Panama <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 9.4 
58 Belize <0.25 <0.25 8.1 
59 Malaysia 67.5 23.0 138.5 495.5 6.7 
In'01, the gov. of Malaysia ordered 
and estimated 48 Sea Skua anti-ship 
missilesfor 6 Lynx helicopters. An 
estimated 48 were delivered in '02. 
60 Russia 35 17.0 23.0 12.5 4.6 
61 Dominica 3.8 
62 Bulgaria 1.5 0.5 1.5 <0.25 9.9 
63 Rornania_ 3.5 10.5 
- 
6.4 
64 Libya <0.25 2.0 0.5 6.5 n/a 
65 Macedonia 1.0 <0.25 2.0 4.5 
66 Lucia <0.25 5.7 
67 Mauritius 1.5 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 12.6 
68 Columbia <0.25 <0.25 2.0 <0.25 6.4 
69 Venezuela 1.5 2.5 13.0 3.5 4.9 
70 Thailand 7.5 27.0 3.5 27.0 11.5 
In 1997, the Thai government 
ordered 3 Khamronsin Class OPV's. 
They receied 2 in 2000. 
71 Saudi Arabia 29 20.5 13.0 8.0 n/a 
In 1998, the Saudi government 
received an estimated 10 Batteltield 
radars from the UK and 25 in 2000. 
72 Fiji <0.25 1 1 <0.25 2 
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Appendix fifteen continued 
Value of SIELs approved (GBP 
UN Devel- 
millions) Total 
opment debt les of sales ordered from Exam State p Ranking servIce 1997 onwards 
(total 173) 2002 2001 2000 1999 as %GDP 
In 2000, the Brazilian gov. ordered 
73 Brazil 11.5 73.0 22.5 82.0 10.5 an estimated 12 L-11 18 105 mm towed guns. They were delivered in 
'01. 
74 Suriname 
75 Lebanon 1 <0.25 2.0 0.5 11 
76 Armenia <0.25 0.5 2.2 
In 1997, the onian government 
ordered 20 Challenger-2 battle tanks 
78 Oman 304 121.0 96.5 65.0 7 7 in a deal worth $172 million. They . were delivered in 2000. In 2000.80 
Piranah APCs were ordered. They 
were delivered in 2000 and 2001. 
79 Kazakhstan 4.5 3.0 6.0 17.5 10.1 
80 Ukraine 1.5 1.0 10.0 11.5 
81 Georgia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 3.9 
82 Peru <0.25 2.5 0.5 8.1 
83 Grenada <0.25 <0.25 2.9 
84 Maldives <0,25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 3.6 
in 1999, the Turkish gov. ordered 
840 Rapier MK-2 SAMs in a deal 
85 Turkey 27.5 179.0 34.0 188.0 10.6 worth$130-150 m. Reportedly 50 
were delivered in 2002 and the rest 
will be delivered over the next 8 yrs. 
86 Jamaica <0.25 1.0 <0.25 0.5 8.7 
87 Tukrnenistan <0.25 10.9 
88 Azerbaijan <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 3.4 
In'98, Sri Lanka orderedan 
89 Sri Lanka 1.5 15.5 8.0 1.5 4.5 C, 130K Hercules 7 ranspoo a, I I 
weto delivered in '00 
90 Paraguay <0.25 <0.25 4.4 
91 St. Vincent <0.25 4.6 
92 Albania <0.25 1 0.7 
93 Ecuador 0.5 <0.25 1 <0.25 0.5 9.4 
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Appendix fifteen continued 
Value of SIELs approved (GBP 
UN Devel- millions) Total 
m nt debt Examples of sales ordered from op e 
Ranking State service 1997 onwards 




Republic <0.25 <0.25 
2.6 
95 Uzbekistan 1.5 2.0 11.7 
96 China 50 32.0 51.5 42.0 2 
97 Tunisia 1 1.5 <0.25 1.0 9.8 
98 Iran 11 19.5 12.0 39.0 3.3 
In 1999, the Jordan government 
ordered an estimated 288 ex-UK 
army Challenger battle tanks from 
99 Jordan 17.5 55.5 12.0 3.5 8 the UK. They were delivered over the 
following two years. In 2000,4 Aigis 
APCs were ordered and delivered 
between 2000 and 2001. 
100 C11pe Vorde 2.9 
ini S0 17 1 C), 1 3,6 
In 200 . the government ordered at) 
103 Gtiyann n 25 2.0 <0.25 16.2 e. x-UK river class minesweeper. It 
was clelivered in 2001. 
104 EI-Salvador <0.25 0.5 <0.25 <0.25 2.8 
105 Moldova <0.25 - 
10.5 
106 Algeri 110.5 1 5.0 2.0 5.5 8.4 
107 South Africa 45.5 1 29.0 63.5 11.0 3.1 
108 S rI a <0.25 1 0.5 <0.25 1.0 2 
109 vj(ýttj M VI ON 1,1 1T 
2 -5 1 05 4.2 
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Armendix fifteen continued 
Value of SIELs approved (GBP 
UN Devel- millions) Total 
opment State debt Examples of sales ordered from 
Ranking service 1997 onwards 
(total 173) 2002 2001 2000 1999 as %GDP 
In'97, the Indonesian gov. ordered 
an estimated 45 Scorpion-90 Light 
tanks in a deal worth $134 million. 30 
were delivered in '98 and 15 in '99. 
110 Indonesia 41 15.5 2.0 2.0 12.2 Also in '97, an estimated 14 Tactica 
APC with water canons for police 
were ordered. 12 were delivered in 
'97 and 2 in '98 although more than 
100 could have been delievered. 
Equatorial 
Guinea 1 1.0 0.4 
112 Tajikstan <0.25 ý0.25 8.8 
113 Monqolia <0.25 0.25 3 
114 Bolivia 11.5 <0.25 8 
115 Egypt 27.5 7.5 36.5 14.0 1.8 
116 Honduras <0.25 _<0.25 <0.25 
9.7 
117 Gabon 0.5 3.5 1.5 <0.25 9.5 
118 Nicaraqua 12.5 
119 Sao Tome 9.5 
120 Guatemala <0.25 2.3 
Soloman 121 Islands 3.3 
122 Namibia <0.25 <0.25 1.0 <0.25 
123 Morocco 20.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 10 
In 1997, the Indian government 
124 India 118 62.5 64.5 57.5 2.2 ordered 2 Harrier T-4 trainer aircraft. 
1 was delivered in 2002. 
125 Swaziland <0.25 <0.25 2.2 
In'97, the Botswana gov. ordered an 
126 Botswana 1 4.5 2.0 3.5 1.3 estimated 18 ex-UK army L-1 18 105mm lowed guns. 18 were 
reportedly delievered in '99. 
127 Burnia <0.25- 1 <0.25 1 <0.25 __71 
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Amendix fifteen continued 
Value of SIELs approved (GBIP 
millions) 
UN Devel- Total 
opment State 
debt Examples of sales ordered from 
Ranking service 1997 onwards 
(total 173) 
2002 2001 2000 1999 as %GDP 
11 2000. the government ot Ghana 
ordered an estimated 10 Tactica 
129 Ghana <0.25 1.0 0.5 4.5 9.1 APCs in a deal worth $9 million. 
They were all delivered in 2000 Hrid 
2001. 
130 Cambodia 0 25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 1 
131 Vanuatu 1 
132 Lesotho <0.25 7.3 
133 
Papua New 
<0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 8 Guinea 1 
134 Kenya 1 2.5 1.5 0.5 4.6 
_ 135 Cameroon <0.25 <0.25 6.3 
Republic of 136 <0.25 1.0 1.3 Congo 
Comoros 1.3 
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Values of licences approved to states classified as low on the UN's Human Development 
Index 
UN Devel- 
t St t 







2002 2001 2000 1999 
service 
% GDP 
139 Sudan <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 0.5 0.5 
140 Bhutan <0.25 1.4 
141 <0.25 2.4 
142 Nepal 0.5 6.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 
143 Lao <0.25 <0.25 2.5 
144 Yemen <0.25 0.5 <0.25 0.5 2.6 
145 Bangladesh 9 1.5 1.0 5.0 1.7 
146 Haiti 1 
147 Madagascar 2.4 
148 Nigeria 7 10.0 4.5 6.0 2.5 
149 Djibouti 2.4 
150 Uganda <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 2.6 
151 Tanzania <0.25 19.5 <0.25 0.5 2.4 
152 Mauritania 10.7 
153 Zambia <0.25 3.5 1.5 0.5 6.4 
154 Senegal <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 5.2 
155 DRC <0.25 <0.25 0.3 
156 Cote d'lvoire 10.9 
157 Eritrea 1.5 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 0.5 
158 Benin 3.5 
159 Guinea 1.0 <0.25 0.4 
160 Gambia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 4.4 
161 Angola 14 8.0 1.0 3.0 13.6 
162 Rwanda <0.25 2 
163 Malawi <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 3.5 
164 Mali 4.2 
165 CAR <0.25 1.5 
166 Chad 1.9 
167 Guinea- Bissau 2.9 
168 Ethiopia <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 <0.25 2 
169 Burkino Faso 2.5 
170 Mozambique <0 25 <0.25 0.5 <0.25 2.3 
171 Burundi <0.25 3.1 
172 Niger 1.6 







Column A- UN Development Ranking and classification: This is taken from the 2001 annual Human Development 
Report, table 1. This report classifies all member states according to a Human Development index which takes into 
account life expectancy at birth, adult literacy, school enrolement and GDP per Capita. 
Columns C, D and E- The value of UK government approved SIELs are taken from the annual Strategic Export 
Control Reports published at www. fco. gov. uk. These figures exclude Government to Government transfers of 
weapons, for example, under the Al Yamamah Saudi deal, but do include the sale of suplus equipment. They are 
based on HM Customs and Excise figures showing the movement of equipment through ports based on EC Tariff 
Codes which means dual use goods are also not included. The total values of the SIELs shown here are much 
lower than the total value of 'defence exports' recorded by DASA. See the introduction for further information on 
differences between various published data. 
Column F- These figures are also taken from the 2001 annual Human Development Report, table 16. 
Column H- This Column shows where details of specific exports have become public and as such, have been 
entered into the SIPRI database of conventional weapons transfers at www. first. sipri. org. 
Kev 
Z, Imbo 
All states in red are those that form 63 excluded from receiving British Export Credit from January 
2000 onwards. The full list is 1. Afghanistan 2. Albania 3. Angola 4. Bangladesh 5. Benin 6. Bhutan 7. 
Bolivia 8. Burkina Faso 9. Burundi 10. Cambodia 11. Cameroon 12. Cape Verde 13. Central African 
Republic 14. Chad 15. Comoros 16. Cote d1voire 17. Democratic Republic of Congo 18. Djibouti 19. 
Equatorial Guinea 20. Eritrea 21. Ethiopia 22. Ghana 23. Guinea 24. Guinea-Bissau 25. Guyana 26. 
Haiti 27. Honduras 28. Kenya 29. Kiribati 30. Lao People's Democratic Republic 31. Lesotho 32. 
Liberia 33. Madagascar 34. Malawi 35. Maldives 36. Mali 37. Mauritania 38. Mongolia 39. 
Mozambique 40. Myanmar 41. Nepal 42. Nicaragua 43. Niger 44. Republic of Congo 45. Republic of 
Yemen 46. Rwanda 47. Samoa 48. Sao Tome and Principe 49. Senegal 50. Sierra Leone 51. 
Solomon Islands 52. Somalia 53. Sri Lanka 54. Sudan 55. Tajikistan 56. Tanzania 57. The Gambia 58. 
Togo 59. Tonga 60. Uganda 61. Vanuatu 62. Vietnam 63. Zambia 
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Appendix Sixteen 
Graphs to show the value of global arms transfers compared to the number of supplier 
states 1982-2001 
SIPRI trend-indicator value of worldwide 
















cm Tr W0 C*4 ItT ýo co 0 
co 00 OD 2 'm 'm mm 0) 8 0) cm mm a) 0) 0) 0) 0) V- ýý T- T- ýý T- T- 
Year 
Source: Date taken from SIPRI arms transfers database9o 
90 Information from SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, supplied on request. The trend-indicator values reflect 
actual deliveries of major conventional weapons. For further details and comment on SIPRI's data and 
methodology see the introduction. 
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Number of supplier states in the arms market 1982- 
2001 
or 8 sailem & reddents Area of Study Toneframe Conclusions 
Impacts of arms transfers on 3maldone All suppliers to Sub- Sub-Saharan regional wars Arms transfers correlate with duration du a n r tio k Saharan African 
J 
, rs and and major internal conflicts in 1972-1991 casualties and refugees of wars and knderton states terms of duration, casualties internal conflicts 1995) and refugees 
impact of US and USSR 
USSR transfers, more than US transfers, 
(insella US & USSR to Israel, transfers on the Arab/Israeli 1949-1985 acerbated Middle East rivalry & 
1994) Egypt & Syria conflict encouraged compensatory transfers by 
. the other 
Aaniruzza All suppliers to 80 
Impac of transfers on coups (arms transfers/GNP) significantly re ated 'I ý 
man and length of military rule in 1963-1980 with coups and nearly significant wit 
1992 
developing states developing states length of military rule 
Military aid hinders the restoration of 
Jefer All suppliers to 87 
Relationship between arms 
imports as fraction of GNP 1968-1980 
peace. There is a positive, but 
1988) developing states and inter-state war 
insignificant, relationship between arms 
imports and war outbreak. 
NATO aircraft and WTO tank transfers 
laugh & NATO and WTO to Impact of transfers on war occur contemporaneously with wars; 
; quires selected developing outbreaks and impact on war 1950-1965 NATO aircraft transfers occur prior to 
1983) country war dyads outbreaks on transfers wars 
All suppliers to Transfers correlate strongly with ýchrocft selected states in the Correlation of transfers with 1948-1978 conflict/cooperation; transfers seem to 
1993) Arabian Sea area and cooperation/conflict cause behavior rather than vice versa Middle East 
_ - In most cases, conflict and transfers not 
ýherwin All suppliers to 87 
Correlabon of transfers with linked causally; variations in the two 
1983) developing states 
conflict. Extent to which 1967-1976 occur simultaneously. For a small subset 
transfers cause conflict of countries, arms imports precede 
conflict. 
Military assistance not significantly 
correlated with domestic conflict in 
Impact of military assistance recipient nations 
in most cases; a few 
obrow et 5 "great powers" to on recipient. political strife 1955-1966 
cases have robust correlations, but in 
1. (1975) 15 Asian nations and foreign policy 
both directions. Military assistance 
correlated to increased international 
cooperation in recipient nations in 6 of 7 
cases of robust results. 
US and USSR to Impact of US/USSR 
Violent behaviour between Israeli and 
lilstein selected Middle East economic and military aid on 1948-1967 
Arabs is dominated by unresolved 
972) states Arab/Israeli violence conflict 
issues; US/USSR aid and trade 
have little impact on Arab/Israeli violence 
Source: Andertong' 
9' Charles Anderton, 'Economics of Arms Trade' pp. 551-552 
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Appendix Eiqhteen 
All cateqories of registrable interests in the House of Commons and share of 
these related to arms-producing companies 
The Commons 
Total number of MPs is 659 
Registered Interests Total members 
registering this type 
of interest in 2001 
Total registering this type 
of interest in military 
companies during 2001 
1. Remunerated Directorships 88 0 
2. Remunerated Employment 402 0 
3. Clients 7 0 
4. Sponsorship/financial support 188 0 
5. Gifts benefits & hospitality 176 2 
6. Overseas visits 175 3 
7. Overseas Benefits and Gifts 14 0 
8. Land and property 160 0 
9. Registrable Shareholclin6-! ýý 83 0 
10. Misc. & unremunerated interests 1 227 0 
Source: Register of Members' Interests, November 2001 edition 93 
Appendix Nineteen 
Relevant cateqories of Lords' reqistrable interests and proportion of these related to 
militarv companies 
The Lords 
Total number of Peers is 6B1 
Registered Interests 
Total members 
- Total registering this 
registering this type type of 
interest in arms- 
of interest for 2002 producing companies for 2002 
Remunerated Directorships 234 6 
Non-Parliamentary Consultant 114 3 






Remunerated Employmen t F 258 3 
Source: Register of Lords' Interests, December 2002 edition 94 
92 Shareholdings become registrable when a Commons member holds more than 1% of the shares of a 
company or if they hold shares in a company worth more than E25,000 
93 The Register of Members' Interests as at November 2001 <http: //www. partiament. the- stationery- 
office. co. uk> Last accessed 23rd December 2003 
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Source: Labour Partv Annual Reports 1988-2002 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
-1.3 1.3 0.19 4.58 4.114 -4.5 -0.06 2.13 2.99 -6.05 
Source: Labour Party Annual Reports 1992-2002 
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Appendix Twentv Three 
The careers of the heads of the DSO/DESO 
Name & date Seconded Career 
of position from 
Raymond 
Brown Racal 
Raymond Brown founded military electronics firm Racal, now 
'O' owned by military electronics firm Thales. (1966-1969) 
Lester British 
Suff leld Leyland Information unavailable (1969-1976) 
Ronald Ellis British 
Ronald Ellis was the Director of British Leyland in 1970. After 
(1976-198 1) Leyland 
his position in the DSO, Ellis became Director of shipbuilders 
102 Yarrow & Co. (1981-1986), now BAE Systems Marine. 
Blyth, a former General Manager of military aerospace firm 
Lucas, returned to the private sector as Managing Director of 
James Blyth Lucas military electronics firm Plessy Electronic Systems (1985- 
(1981-1985) Aerospace 1986). He went on to become Managing Director of the Plessy 
Company Pic (1986-1987) and Non-Executive Director of 
British Aerospace (1990-1994). 103 
Chandler was seconded from his job as Group Marketing 
Director of British Aerospace. He returned to the military sector 
as Non-Executive Director of military electronics supplier 
Siemens Plessey Electronic Systems, now part of BAE 
Systems, (1990-1995), of the TI Group, now part of aerospace 
manufacturer Smiths Group, from 1992 and of Racal 
Electronics Plc/Thales, (1999-2000). Chandler also became 
Colin 
Managing Director of tank maker Vickers Pic (1990-1992), 
Chandler 
British Chief Executive of Vickers (1992-1998), Chair of Vickers (1997- 
104 1115 
(1985-1989) 
Aerospace 2000), Deputy Chair of Smiths and Director of Thales. 
While on secondment at DESO more than half of Chandler's 
salary was paid for by British Aerospace, an arrangement that 
was subsequently investigated in a 1989 report by the Select 
Committee on Defence. To avoid any conflict of interest with 
military industry the head of DESO now receives a civil servant 
salary topped up by the Defence Industries Council, a Council 
made up of senior executives from military industry and 
Chaired by Dick Evans, Chair of BAE Systems. ' 06 
'0' Thales, Thales-Our History 
h <http: //www. thalesgroup. co. ukIThales_Corporatelaboutlhistorylhistory_home. cfm> Last accessed t June 
2004. 
102 Who's Who, 2003, p 658. 
103 Who's Who, 2003, p 207. 
104 Who's Who, 2003, p 381. 
105 Cranfield University, Officers of the University <http: //www. cranfield. ac. uk/university/prochancellor. htm> 
Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
'06 House of Commons Select Committee of Defence, Second Report: The Appointment of the New Head of 
Defence Export Services, HC 147, minutes of evidence paragraphs 16-17; House of Commons, Hansard, 
23 Id January 2003, Written Answers, Column 444. 
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Thomas was seconded from his job as Vice President of arms 
giant Raytheon Co. (1985-1989) and President as well as Chief 
Alan 
Executive Officer of Raytheon Europe (1985-1989). 107 His move 
Thomas Raytheon to 
DESO sparked a report by the Select Committee on Defence 
(1989-1994) that found that the post had not been advertised openly. One factor in this decision was "to reassure certain overseas 
customers". 108 One is believed to be the Saudi government with 
whom the UK government had signed the Al Yamamah deal. 109 
Masefield was seconded from his job as President of Avro 
international Aerospace and Commercial Director of Airbus 
Industrie by the MoD. According to the biography that used to be 
posted on the BAE Systems website, as head of DESO Avro and Masefield enjoyed "direct access to Major and Blair" and "close Aibus, personal relationships with prestigious Prime Minister and royal Charles part families around the world. ""O These contacts may have been Masefield 
owned helpful when he returned to the private sector immediately after (1994-1998) 
by BAE leaving DESO to become Chair of GEC (1998-1999), although 
Systems Masefield was reportedly not involved in any contracts between 
the MoD and GEC during his time at DESO and GEC's 
competitors raised no objections to this appointment "' . . Masefield went on to become a Marketing Director of BAE 
Systems in 1999 and Vice-Chair in January 2002.112 
107 Who's Who, 2003. p 2140. 
'08 House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Second Report: The Appointment of the 
New Head 
of Defence Export Serv; c9s, HC 147, paragraph 4. 
09 Phythian, The Politics of British Arms Sales Since 1964, p 75. 
10 BAE Systems. About us-Leader Biographies <http: //www. BAEsystems. com/aboutus/cmasetield. 
htm> 
Last accessed November 30"' 2002. 
... The Cabinet Ottice, The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments, Second Report 1998-1999, p 
10. 
IQ BAE Systems, 'BAE Systems Organisation and Structure', Virtual News Room, 17'h January 
2002 
<httpjlwww. BAEsystems. com/newsroom/2002flan/170102newsl. 
htm> Last accessed 26 th June 2004. 
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Edwards was Group Managing Director at Lucas Industries and 
Chief Executive of the TI Group PIc until his DESO appointment 
in 1998.113 When questioned by the Select Committee on 
Defence in 1999 about remuneration and the potential for 
conflict of interest, Edwards explained "I can say openly I am 
Tony TI Group beholden to the industry and grateful to them for this top up but 
Edwards (now then I am working for them openly and overtly anyway. " 114 He 
(1998-2002) Smiths) has been Chair of the Defence Aerospace Sector Panel, 
involved in the OST technology foresight programme from 1995- 
1997. He was on SBAC's member council from 1989-1998 after 
which he became Vice President (1990-1991), President (1991 - 
1992) and Deputy President (1992-1993). Edwards also sat on 
the DTI Aviation Committee from 1992-1998.115 
Since September 2002, the head of DESO has been Alan 
Garwood. Garwood joined British Aerospace in 1977 dealing 
BAE with 
Middle East military export contracts. He became Sales and 
Alan Systems 
Customer Support Director of BAE Dynamics then Managing 
Garwood 
and 
Director, Europe and North America in 1996. Garwood became 
(2002-) 
MBDA 
Deputy Chief Executive of Matra BAE Dynamics in 1998, 
Europe's largest missile manufacturer just before it merged with 
two other companies to become MBDA Missile Systems, of 
I which BAE owns a third. 116 
Source: Phythian, The politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 (Columns 1 and 2 only); 
DESO website; Who's Who (column 3) 
113 Who's Who, 2003, p 644. 
114 House of Commons, Select Committee on Defence, Second Report: The Appointment of the New Head 
of Defence Export Services, HC 147, Minutes of Evidence, question 16. 
''5 Who's Who, 2003, p. 644 
1'6 DESO, 'Senior DESO officials' <http: //www. deso. mod. uk/officials l. htm> Last accessed 3"' December 
2003 
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Appendix Twentv Four 
Staff seconded from industry into the MoD between April 2000 and November 2002 
Seconded from Role within the MoD 
Duration of 
placement 
BAE Systems Business Development 6 
Addleshaw, Booth & Co. Legal Advisor 12 
- BAE Systems Acquisition Training 12 
- BAE Systems Avionics 8 
AXA plc Claims Manager 8 
QinetiQ Director or Marketing 36 
BAE Systems Air Systems Technology Manager 24 
BAE Systems Commercial Support 6 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Commercial Adviser 12 
Babtie Group Commercial Support 9 
BAE Systems Warship SuPport 36 
URS Ltd. Risk Manager 5 
BAE Systems Support Chain Adviser 12 
Ernst & Young Commercial Advisor 12 
Rolls Royce Propulsion Project Engineer 24 
QinetiQ Future Business Group 32 
QinetiQ Customer Support manager 24 
Burges Salmon Legal Adviser 8 
BAE Systems Support Chain Advisor 24 
MASS Consultants Electronic Warfare Technical Support 48 
Hagglunds Vehicle AB Engineering Advice and Support 22 
Wragg & Co. Legal Advisor 10 
BAE Systems Logistics Capability Development 24 
Rolls Royce 
- - 
Maritime Team Leader 36 
TricewaterhouseCoope rs Public Private Partnering Adviser 12 
BAE Systems Head Defence Export Services 36 
BAE Systems Air Logistics Support 12 
BAE Systems Ship Systems Project Leader 24 
BAE Systems I Graduat_e Trainee (acquisition assessment) 6 
Source: House of Commons, Hansard 
Appendix Twenty Five 
Staff seconded from the MoD into industry between April 2000 and November 2002 
Role within the MoD Secondedto Duration of placement 
Director Thomson-CSF/Thales Defence Ltd. 24 months 
Strategy Director Electronic Data System2 24 months 
Senior Project Manager Rolis Royce plc 24 months 
Manaqer Operational Development BAE Systems 24 months 
Deputy Technical Director Thales Defence Ltd. 24 months 
Research & Technology Liaison Officer BAE Systems 16 months 
Source: House of Commons, Hansard 
117 House of Commons, Hansard, 25'ý November 2002, Written Answers, column 10 
118 House of Commons, Hansard, 25" November 2002, Written Answers, column 11 
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Appendix Twentv Six 
Organisation diagram showinq some of the departments relevant to arms exports Policy 
and their affiliated qroups 
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Appendix Twentv Seven 
National Defence Industries Council members as at Januarv 2003 
Name Affiliation Type of Affillation 
Sir Richard Evans Chair Defence Industries Council and BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Mr. David Singleton Defence, Intellect Lobbying Group 
Mr. Martin Jay Society of Maritime Industries Trade Association 
Sir David Lees GKN pIc Arms-producing company 
Mr. Nick Prest Defence Manufacturers Association Trade Association 
Mr. Gordon Page Society British Aerospace Companies Trade Association 
Mr. David Marshall Defence Industries Council Lobbying group 
Mr. Simon Frost 
- - 
Claverham Group Arms-producing company 
Dorrian 
. Alex 
--Wr Thales Defence Ltd Arms-producing company ýr]. GjeýoZ! r eýo ný Secretary of State for Defence Government 
Lora Bach Under-Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Procurement Government 
-Mr. Adam Ingram 
_ 
Minister of State for the Armed Forces Government 
Alan Johnson Vr. Minister of State for Employment Relations, Industry & Regions, DT1 Government 
S' Kevin Tebbit Permanent Under-Secretary Government 
-§r Rogberl Walmsley Ministry of Defence Chief Executive Defence Procurement Agency Government 
Malcolm Pledger Ministry of Defence Chief Defence Logistics Government 
Keith O'Nions Ministry of Defence Chief Scientific Adviser Government 
Mr. Alan Garwood Head of Defence Export Services Government 
Mr. David Gould- 
DTI Director TBC 
Defence Procurement Agency Government 
Source: House of Commons, Hansard"9 
Appendix Twentv Eight 
National De ence Industries Council Research and Technology Group as at Januarv 
qn03 
Name Affiliation Type of 
Mr. David Marshall 
- - 
Society of British Aerospace Companies Ltd. Trade Association 
- Pr. An drew Sleigh QinetiQ Academia/Government 
Dr, AnýLLoý_ Thales UK Arms-producing company 
Mr. Derek Marshall Defence Industries Council -Lobbying Group 
Mr. Lambert Dopping 
Hepenstal 
BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Mrs. Linda Pike Defence Industries Council Lobbying Group 
Louis Wilkes Ne-fence Manufacturers Association Trade Association 
Mr. Ken Maciver Consultant (former CE(D) TRW Aeronautical Systems Arms-producing company 
Mr. Mike Steeden Society of British Aerospace Companies Ltd, Trade Association 
Mr. Bill Bardo AMS Arms-producing company 
Phillip Goddard Westland Helicopters Ltd Arms-producing company 
Mr. Ric Parker Rolls-Royce Arms-producing company 
Robert Limmergard Intellect Lobbying group 
Prof Terry Knibb BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Graham Jordan Chair. Ministry of Defence Government 
Dr Dai Morris Ministry Of Defence Government 
Mr. David Way Department of Trade and Industry Government 
Ms Fiona Strens Ministry of Defence Government 
Mr. Mike Markin Ministry of Defence Government 
Mr. Nick Helbren Detence Science and Technology Laboratories Government 
Nigel Raby FIN Ministry of Defence Government 
Richard Westqarth Ministry of Defence (Seconded from QinetiQ) Government 
Robert Beckham I Ministry of Defence Government 
Source: House of Commons, Hansard. 
120 
House of Commons, Hansard, 23 Yd January 2003, Written Answers, column 446 
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Appendix Twentv Nine 
Aerospace Committee members and their employers as at February 2003 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
Mr. Colin Green President- Defence Aerospace, Rolls-Royce Arms-producing (Chair) com any 
Dr David Anderson Managing Director, Future Systems, QinetiQ Academia/government 
Mr. Martin MID, Marshall of Cambridge Aerospace 
Arms-producing 
Broadhurst company 
Mr. Robin Clark Director, Cobham Arms-producing 
company 
Mr. Graham Cole Director of Government Affairs, GKN 
Arms-producing 
company 
Professor Bill Dawes Engineering Dept, Cambridge University Academic 
Dr. John Ferrie Group Managing Director Aerospace, Smiths Arms-producing 
__ _company 
Mr. Simon Frost Chief Executive, Claverham Arms-producing 
company 
Mr. Chris Chief Operating Officer, BAE Systems Arms-producing Geoghegan company 
Mr. Ken Maciver Consultant (former CEO) TRW Aeronautical Systems Arms-producing 
company 
Mr. David Marshall Director General, SBAC Trade Association 
Ms Eva Persson Business Development Director, Rolls-Royce Arms-producing 
company 
Professor Ian Poll Head of the College of Aeronautics, Cranfield Academic 
Mr. John Quigley National Officer, (Shipbuilding & Aerospace) AMICUS Union 
Mr. Michael Ryan General Manager, Aerospace, Bombardier & Shorts Arms-producing 
company 
Mj. General Alan 
Sharman Director General, Defence Manufacturers Association Trade Association 
Mr. John Sharman Executive Director, Spectrum Capital Ltd. Finance company 
Mr. Tom Williams MID and General Manger, Airbus UK Arms-producing company 
Mr. Richard Wood7 Managing Director, Weston Aerospace Arms-producing I company 
Source: House of Commons Library 
121 
12" House of Commons, Hansard, 23 d January 2003, Written Answers, column 447 
121 E-mail, DTI, to author, 31 s' October 2002; House of Commons Library, 'Aerospace Innovation and 
Growth Team Working Groups' Members and their Employers', entered 23 rd January 2003 ref. Dep. 03/289 
following Parliamentary Question 91919 Cohen/Johnson, column 500 
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Appendix Thirty 
Current National Defence and Aerospace Panel and its task forces 
2002 National Defence and Aerospace System Panel 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation Aim and Output: Sponsored by 
Consultant (former CE01 Ine MoD (reporting through the 
Ken Maciver TRW Aeronautical Arms-producing company NDIC), DTI (reporting through the (Chair) Systems aerospace committee) and ind st Ad h kf t F Fic -Parker ___\ Fic-eChair, Rolls Royce Arms-producing company ry. u orces are oc as used by the panel to pursue Engineering and Physical specific issue before reporting 
David Clark Sciences Research Research Council them to key decision-makers 
Council particularly on R&D policy. The 
___[awrence 
Kings College London Academia 
panel coordinates a series of 
Defence & Aerospace Research Freedman P t hi DARP Consultant to arms-producing ar ners ps 
( S) in 12 areas 
Phil Goddard Consultant to Westland - Rotorcraft, Advanced Metallic CO. Airframes Hi h Int rit R l , g eg y ea lain Gray Airbus UK ng Arms-produci company Time Modelling & Simulation or 
Terry Knibb BAE Systems Arms-producing company , Turbulence for Aerospace, 
Philip UWE Academia 
Aeroengine Materials, Sensor 
Lawrence fusion, Unsteady Modelling, DARP 
Royal Aeronautical for design, Safety and Integrity for 
Andrew Little Society Professional Body Advanced Maritime Structures, P ti M d -David ropaga on easurement an 
SBAC Trade Association Modelling for Defence, Aerospace Marshall & Composite Structures 
Alan DIVIA Trade Association 
, Aerodynamic Flows. They are 
Sharman supported by the EPS Research 
Andrew Council, the DTI, the MOD and 
__§ 
ýeih QinetiQ Academia/ Government industry. 
__ 





Thales Arms-producing company 
--Wike Markin MoD Government 
týamien Defence Diversification 
Government McDonnell Agency 
Graham Defence Science & Academia/ Government Coleman Technology Laboratories 
mment 
2002 National Defence and Aerospace System Panel: Defence Task Force 
Name Affiliation Type of Alm and Output: Reporting to the 2002 National ] 
Affiliation Defence and Aerospace System Panel. This will focus 
P Lj I el aI Wrob) Thales Atnis producing on the Nation Defence Technology Strategy. C hai r 
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2002 National Defence and Aerospace System Panel: Research and Technology Task 
Force 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation Alm and 
_Ric 
Parker (Chair) Rolls Royce Arms-producing company Output: 
Geoff Byharn Westland Helicopters Arms-producing company Reporting to 




Ian Risk Airbus Arms-producing company Defence and 
- Cyril Hilsum No further information qiven Aerospace 
- 
Terry Knibb BAE Systems Arms-producing company Panel, the 
- 
Andrew Little Royal Aeronautical Society Professional Body task force will 
- 
Jim McGuirk Loughborough University Academia take forward 
- 
John Tunnicliffe QinetiQ Academia/ Government DARPs and 
- 
Paul Vangasse BAE Systems Arms-producing company the 
NACs. 
- 
Nigel Chew MoD Government 
- 
Graham Coleman DSTL Government 
- 
Ray Kingcombe DTI Government 
Source: House of Commons, Hansard 122 
122 House of Commons, Hansard, 23d January 2003, Written Answers, columns 447- 448; E-mail, DTI, to 
author, 3 rd December 2002 
316 
Appendix Thirty One 
National Advisorv Committees and their members 
0 G Coleman, DERA * C Clarkson, BAE Systems 
0 P Hedges, EPSRC 0 C Eaton, Alenia Marconi 
0 R Kingcombe, DTI 0 R Harrison, GKN 
1. Aerodynamics 0 
J Smith, MoD 0 P Stow, Rolls Royce 
0 T Woods, CAA 0 R Williams, Airbus 
0 R Onions, DERA 0 P Bearman, Imperial College 
q 6 Williams, DERA 0 J McGuirk, Loughborough 
0 D Butler, ARA 0 A Little, RAeS 
0 Prof. D Allerton, Cranfield * A. Liddel, MOD 
University 9 J McDermid, York University 
0 R. Brockie, BAE Systems 0 C. Overden, Smiths Group 
2 Avionics and 
0 G. Butler, MOD 0 1. Postlethwaite, Leicester 
. Flight Systems 0 P. Durrant, 
Thales Avionics University 
0 R. Fountain, BAE Systems 0 1. Slater, MOD 
0 A. Gillespie, DERA 0 D. Tyler, GKN Westland 
0 R. Harrison, DTI 0 R. Axford, FEI (Secretary) 
0 K Leslie, EPS Research Council 
3. Human factors No further information available 
4. Synthetic No further information available Environments 
5. Systems 
Enaineering No further information available 
0 Steve Johnston, BAE Systems 0 John Garside, Warwick 
0 Sarah Bishop, DTI University 
0 Brian Ginty, BAE Systems 0 Neil Bateman, EPSRC 
6. Aerospace 0 Nabil Gindy, Nottingham 0 
Tony Curry, Shorts 
manufacturing 
University 0 Ian Palin, Goodrich 
0 Stephen Burgess, Rolls Royce 0 Karl Smith, UK LAI 
0 Neil McDougal, Cranfield 0 Jaffa Tall, SBAC 
University 0 Mike Gregory, Cambridge 
University 
0 Neill Forrest, Rolls-Royce 0 Martin Salzer, Westland 
0 Prof John Fielding, Cranfiled Helicopters 
7 Transmissions University 0 
Andy Olver, Imperial College, 
. 
and Mechanical 
0 Graham Penning, David Brown London 
systems 
0 Brian Farley, Dowty 0 Chris Weir, TRX Aerospace 
0 Geoff Byham, Westland Systems 
Helicopters 0 John Lowery, Systems & 
Airbourne TAC 
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0 Keith G Barraclough, QinetiQ 0 Ray Kingcombe, DTI 
0 Andrew J Bell, University of Leeds 0 Mike Mertens, Thales 
0 Steve Bland, IQE 0 David Pedder, TWI 
0 D. Burgess, DSTL * Andrew Phillips (Chair), Marconi 
0 Clive Dyson, CEO, NMI 0 C Snowdon, Filtronic 
S. Electronic 0 John Ellis, Zarlink 0 Peter Smith, EPSRC 
materials and 0 Martin Goosey, Shipley Europe 0 Richard RA Syms, Imperial 
devices 0 C Hayter, EPSRC College 
0 Cyril Hilsum 0 Roger W Whatmore, Cranfield 
0 Roger Hopper, Roke Manor 0 Colin R Whitehouse, University 
Research Ltd of Sheffield 
Colin J Humphreys, University of 0 Arthur Willoughby, University of 
Cambridge Southampton 
S. Garwood (Chair), Rolls Royce 0 Richard Jones, DSTL 
0 David Driver (Secretary) 0 Dan Kells, BAE Systems 
0 Geoff Armstrong, Goodrich 0 John Lindley, Messier Dowty 
0 Sarah Bishop, IDTI 0 Peter Morgan, Corus 
0 Brian Cantor, York University 0 Alex Morris, Alcoa 
9. Materials and 0 Paul Curtis, DSTL 0 Chris Peel, QinetiO 
structures 0 Glyn Davies, Imperial College 0 Alan Hooper, OinetiQ 
0 Jonathan Dee, Airbus 0 G. Tomlinson, Sheffield 
0 Sue Dunkerton, TWI University 
0 Brian Gittos, GKN 0 Lindsey Weston, EPSRC 
0 Ian Gurnell, Advanced 0 David Wilkes, MOD 
Composites 
Source: DTI"' 
123 Aerodynamics National Advisory Committee, Annual Report; S. H. Johnston, 2003 NACAM Activities 
Report; Electric Materials and Devices National Advisory Committee, Report of the Defence and Aerospace 
National Advisory Committee, April 2002; M&S National Advisory Committee, Annual Review 2003 
<http: //62.1 73.95.1 O> Last accessed I't July 2004. 
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Appendix Thirty Two 
The Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team and affiliated workinq qroups 
2004 Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team (AeIGT) 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation Alm and Output: Another 
Richard Evans BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
ýody set up to "improve 
(Chair) innovation and 
Noel Forgeard President and CEO Arms-producing company 
competitiveness in the 
" Airbus defence industry with the 
Sally Howes SBAC Trade association aim of securing "agreement 
Chair Cobharn Plc Arms-producing company between government and Gordon Page 
and President SBAC Trade association industry on a shared vision 
President and CEO and strategy for the future". Denis Ranque Thales International Arms-producing company The team will identify key 
John Rose Rolls Royce Arms-producing company challenges to the defence 
Kevin Smith GKN Aerospace Arms-producing comeany industry, suggest and cost 
Keith Butler- I look for 
Wheelhouse CEO Smiths Group Arms-producing company support for implementation. 
Michael Ryan Bombardier Arms-producing company 
The team reports their 
i M h d ti Jonathan Chair and CEO St Private company 
n recommen arc a ons 
2003 to the Prime Minister Wood Bernard Composite lth h th A IGT b a oug e e we John Wall Amicus Trade Union a es are hosted b p g y Sir Alex Broers Royal Academy of Academia SBAC. The AeIGT and its (Vice Chair) Engineering four workin rou s gg p , Sir Kevin Permanent Government membership of which is Tebbit Secretary, MoD outlined below are Sir Robin Permanent Government 
, 
supported by an Young Secretary, DTI "implementation team 
John Kinqman Treasury Government based at the DTI They are: 
Roy Griffins Department of Government 
. 0 Oliver Towers, Project 
Transport Director, Rolls Royce 
Chair Northwest 0 Bob Insley, Assistant 
Bryan Gray Development Development Agency Project Director, DTI 
Agency 0 Manjit Sahota, Project BAE S Desmond manager, ystems Cabinet Office Government 0 James Benn, Bowen Communications and 
Special Advisor Information Officer, SBAC 
Geoffrey Norris Number 10 policy Government Kelly Fowlis, Team 
I unit Administrator 
Mike Clasper I GAA Private company 
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2004 AelGT Working Group one: Technology 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
Ken Maciver 
(Chair) 




Ross Bradley Famborough Aerospace Consortium Trade Association 
Geoff Byham Head of Engineering Augusta Westland Arms-producing companv 
Lambert Dopping- 
Hepenstal BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
lain Gray Airbus Arms-producing company 
Jerry Haller Smiths Aerospace Arms-producing company 
Geoff Lindsley MoD DSTL Government 
Andy Low Thales Arms-producing company 
Phil McCarthy Messier-Dowty Arms-producing company 
Chris Peel QinetiQ Academia/government 
Rick Parker Rolls Royce Arms-producing company 
Ian Poll Cranfield University Academia 
David Way DTI Government 
Chris Weir Goodrich Arms-producing company 
Bob Young SEEDA Development Agency 
Mike Steeden SBAC Trade Association 
Tristan Crawford Airbus Arms-producing comp ny 
2004 AeIGT Working Group Two: Process Excellence 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
John Ferrie (Chair) Smiths Aerospace Arms-producing company 
Brian Fleet Airbus Arms-producing company 
Martin Evans MBDA UK Arms-producing company 
Mary O'Gorman DLO Government 
Simon Frost Claverham Arms-producing company 
Michael Gregory University of Cambridge Academia 
Maurice Hesford SBAC Trade Association 
Bob Collier DTI Government 
Jan Reid Scottish Enterprise Network Development agency 
Mike Gardiner Goodrich Arms-producing company 
Tony Miller Thales Arms-producing company 
Barry Mills University of Cambridge Academia 
Andy Start BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Jafar Tall SBAC Trade Association 
Peter Mooney Claverharn Arms-producing comp ny 
Mike Sa row BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
John Whalley CE Aerospace Wales Unknown 
Jonathon Brook Smiths Aerospace Arms-producing compan 
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Appendix Thirty Two continued 
2004 AeIGT Working Group Three: Skills and People Management 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
John Rivers Rolls Royce Arms-producing company 
Ian Carnell Sector Skills Council (SEMTA) Forum 
Julie Cook DFES Government 
Alan Jocelyn AAU Forum 
Ged Leahy Rolls Royce Arms-producing company 
John Lloyd AMICUS Union 
Andrew Mair UK Aerospace Forum Trade Association 
Derek Marshall Defence Industries Council 
, 
Lobbying group 
David Ramsay Smiths Arms-producing coMpany 
Steve Robinson MoD Government 
Josanne Stewart Regional Development Agencies Development agency 
Mark Stewart Airbus UK Arms-producing company 
Peter Dallaway DTI Government 
Louise Wallwork BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Nigel Macvean BAE Systems I Arms-producing company 
Jonathon Cook SBAC/Rolls Royce I Arms-producing company 
2004 AeIGT Working Group Four: Socio-Economic Environment 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
Colin Green Rolls Royce Arms-producing company 
John Alty DTI Government 
David Gould MoD Government 
lain Gray Airbus Arms-producing company 
Keith Hartley University of York Academia 
Sally Howes SBAC Trade Association 
Alan Johnston Westland Arms-producing company 
Rob Johnston AMICUS Union 
Peter Lovering NDI representing UK Aerospace Forum Trade - 
Association 
Michael McGhee Credit Suisse Private company 
Neil McKeever Smiths Arms-producing company 
Ray Newell EMDA representing the Regional Development Agencies Development Agency 
Richard Price HMT Unknown 
Andy Scott CBI Lobbying organsiation 
Alison Wood BAE Systems Arms-producing company 
Helen Harman Rolls-Royce Arms-producing company 
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Appendix Thirty Two continued 
2002 AeIGT Working Group Five: Safety, Security and the Environment 
Name Affiliation Type of Affiliation 
Jeff Jupp Airbus Arms-producing company 
Colin Beesley Rolls-Royce Arms-producing company 
Michael Burns QinetiQ Academia/government 
Graham Coleman DSTL Government 
Ann Dowlinq Cambridge University Academia 
Roger Gardner DfT Government 
Martyn Graham SBAC Trade Association 
Tony Houseman AECMA Trade Association 
Peter Hunt Civil Aviation Authority Regulator 
Tim Johnson Aviation Environment Federation NGO 
James Kilazoqlou Thales Arms-producing company 
Keith Mans RAeS and Greener by Design Professional body 
Tom Needham Airport Operators Association Trade Association 
Peter Newton DTI Government 
Ian Poll Cranfield University Academic 
Gill Richards DTI Government 
Mike Steeden SBAC Trade Association 
Tom Gunner SBAC Trade Association 
Anthony Barlow Fire Protection Coatings Unknown 
David Creswell Eastern Aerospace Alliance Trade Association 
Michael Polson Invest Northern Ireland Development Organisation 
Source: DTI and House of Commons Library. 124 
124 E-mail, DTI, to author, 31't October 2002; House of Commons Library, 'Aerospace Innovation and 
Growth Team Working Groups' Members and their Employers', entered 23 rd January 2003 ref. Dep 03/289 
following Parliamentary Question 91919 Cohen/Johnson. 
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Appendix Thirty Three 
The interests of the Directors and Non-Executive Directors of BAE Systems in 2004 
Directors Other remunerated positions Sector 
Non-executive Chair of United Utilities Electricity and 
Richard Evans (Chair 1998- pIc since 1997 water 
2004) _ Former Non-Executive Direct NatWest Banking 
plc (1998-2000) 
Non-Executive Director of Reuters Group Information 
Pic 
Richard Olver (Chair 2004) Deputy Chair TNK-BP Oil 
Former Deputy Group Chief Executive Oil 
BP pIc (2 03-2004) 
Mike Turner (Chief Executive Non-executive director of Babcock Military and 
since 1999) International Group Plc enq'ineering 
Chris Geoghegan (Chief 
one found Operating Officer) 
Michael Lester (Group legal Former Director and Vice Chair of GEC Military 
director) Non-Executive Director Premier Farnell Electronics 
- 
Pic 
Steve Mogford (Chief Operating 
Officer) None found 
Mark Ronald (Chief Operating None found Officer) 
Form ýr Non-Executive -Director Orange Communications 
(1995-) 
George Rose (Group Finance Non-Executive Director SAAB AB (from Military, aviation, 
Director) 1998) space 
Non-Executive Director National Grid 
Transco pIc (from 2000) Electricity and gas 
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Appendix Thirty Three continued 
Non-Executive Directors Other remunerated positions Sector 
Sue Birley Former Non-Executive Director NatWest Banking Bank 
Member of Supervisory Board of Banking 
lli i Deutsche Bank AG Ulrich Carte er 
Director of Robert Bosch GmbH 
Automotive, 
consumer go ds 
Former Finance Director Rexam plc Packaging 
Michael Hartnall Non-Executive Director of Lonmin plc Mining 
Non-Executive Director Elementis plc Chemicals 
Lord Hesketh Non-Executive Deputy 
Chair Babcock Milit 
. 
ary a. nd 
International Group plc engineering 
Former Executive Director of BICC plc Engineering 
Former Chair and Chief Executive of Construction, 
P M Balfour 
Beatty Ltd. engineering 
eter ason Former Chief Executive of Norwest Holst Construction 
Group plc 
Chief Executive AMEC plc Engineering 
Michael Portillo None found 
Chief Executive Enel SpA Electricity 
Non-Executive Director of Alliance Healthcare Unichern plc 
Paolo Scaroni Member of the Supervisory Board of Banking ABN Ambro Bank NV 
Former Chief Executive and Deputy Glass and glazing 
Chair of Pilkington pie products 
Former Non-Executive Director of Oil Burmah Castrol plc I 
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